



# Demscore Codebook

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**For data enquiries:** [contact@demscore.se](mailto:contact@demscore.se)

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# 1 Explanatory Notes

## 1.1 Cautionary Notes

The current release of the Demscore data is a beta version. The data is not yet complete and the data quality is not yet guaranteed. We are working on improving the data quality and are planning to do a full release later this year.

## 1.2 Demscore Background

Demscore provides worldwide free access to harmonized data on Democracy, Environment, Migration, Social Policy, Conflict and Representation from several of the world’s most prominent social science research institutes.

Demscore facilitates large-scale comparative analyses on the grand challenges of today’s societies, including those caused by population aging, rapidly changing migration patterns, increased social inequalities, accelerating globalization, recurrent financial crises, political deadlocks, violent conflict, and the rise of populism. The interdisciplinary nature of Demscore data is essential to advance adequate policy responses to such complex societal challenges facing Sweden, Europe, and the world today.

The Demscore consortium includes several national and internationally renowned databases of outmost importance for the scientific community when tackling complex societal challenges associated with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and beyond. The joint infrastructure ensures that data integrity and quality are at the highest international standards, and it maximizes usability in the measurement of contextual data with over 25,000 variables across nearly all countries in the world, from 1789 to the present.

It creates critical time- and cost saving advantages in data collection, management, distribution, and not the least for end-users in the scientific community. A fully normalized, joint PostgreSQL database, sophisticated programming, and a web-based interface make it possible to select a series of variables across all six Demscore databases, and get a custom-designed dataset and codebook generated automatically.

## 1.3 The Demscore Codebook

The autogenerated Demscore Codebook lists variable entries for those variables chosen by the user along with citation guidelines and license per variable.

The meta data is extracted from the codebooks per dataset stored in a table in The Demscore PostgreSQL database with one row per variable for all datasets. This table includes codebook entries, variable tags, labels and other variable information in LaTeX format used for the generating of an automated codebook.

For all meta data across all datasets, Demscore uses one set of standard entries that all members projects provided information on. In addition, variables from the different datasets have or require different sets of additional information as meta data specific to each dataset. These entries are also included, but as variable-specific meta data below the standard entries.

To avoid name clashes of variables and because variables entries have different naming schemes across datasets and projects, Demscore uses a hybrid form between original variable entries and new Demscore variable entries:

To begin with, all variable names in Demscore were cleaned in the beginning of the harmonization process. This cleaning included for instance that spaces or dots in the variable names were replaced with underscores and all letters were converted to lower case. The original tag is however still available and stored in the PostgreSQL table. Each variable in Demscore is available in a short- and long form. The short form is the cleaned name of the priginal variable tag, the long form begins with the name of the dataset from which it is retrieved, followed by the cleaned variable name.

For instance, the original name of the variable *MinisterPersonalID* from the H-DATA Foreign Minister Dataset is included as *ministerpersonalid* (short form) *hdata\_fomin\_ministerpersonalid* (long form) in Demscore.

In addition, each dataset includes Demscore unit-identifier variables which are named according to the following naming scheme: Beginning with `u_`, followed by the name of the primary unit and finally the variable tag. The *year-* variable from the COMPLAB SPIN The Out-of-Work Benefits Dataset (OUTWB), which is part of the primary unit `u_complab_country_year` has the Demscore unit identifier name *u\_complab\_country\_year\_year*.

## 1.4 Methodology

For details on our methodology please see the Demscore Methodology document which is included in the zip file retrieved from the download interface.

## 1.5 Download ID

The download ID allows the user to share the ID with other users for replication purposes. A user can type the download ID into the demscore website and retrieve the same download selection and files as the original user. This ID is autogenerated for each download from the demscore website.

Download ID:



## 2 V-DEM

Based at the University of Gothenburg, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Research Project takes a comprehensive approach to understanding democratization. This approach encompasses multiple core principles: electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensual, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. Each Principle is represented by a separate index, and each is regarded as a separate outcome in the proposed study. In this manner V-Dem reconceptualizes democracy from a single outcome to a set of outcomes. In addition, V-Dem breaks down each core principle into its constituent components, each to be measured separately. Components include features such as free and fair elections, civil liberties, judicial independence, executive constraints, gender equality, media freedom, and civil society. Finally, each component is disaggregated into specific indicators. This fundamentally different approach to democratization is made possible by the V-Dem Database, which measures 450+ indicators annually from 1789 to the present for all countries of the world. The V-Dem approach stands out, first, as a large global collaboration among scholars with diverse areas of expertise; second, as the first project attempting to explain different varieties of democracy; and third, thanks to the highly disaggregated V-Dem data, the first project to explore causal mechanisms linking different aspects of democracy together. With five Principal Investigators, 19 Project Managers with special responsibility for issue areas covered in the V-Dem dataset, around 33 Regional Managers, over 100 Country Coordinators and more than 3,500 Country Experts, the V-Dem project is one of the world's largest social science data collection projects on democracy. More information is available on the project's website: <https://www.v-dem.net/>

### 2.1 V-Dem Country-Date

**Dataset tag:** `vdem_cd`

**Description:** All 483 V-Dem indicators and indices.

**Dataset citation:** Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Nazifa Alizada, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Katrin Kinzelbach, Joshua Krusell, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Oskar Rydén, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson and Daniel Ziblatt. 2022. "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v12" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds22>.

and:

Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Juraj Medzihorsky, Joshua Krusell, Farhad Miri, and Johannes von Römer. 2022. "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data". V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 7th edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.

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<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode>

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page:  
<https://www.v-dem.net/vdemds.html>

#### 2.1.1 Identifier Variables in the V-Dem Datasets

Variables in this section identify the observations in the dataset.

##### 2.1.1.1 Country Name (`country_name`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_cd_country_name`

*Original tag:* country\_\_name

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Name of coded country.

CLARIFICATION: A V-Dem country is a political unit enjoying at least some degree of functional and/or formal sovereignty.

RESPONSES:

Text

NOTES: For more details on country units consult the *V-Dem Country Coding Units* document.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### **2.1.1.2 Country Name Abbreviation (country\_\_text\_\_id)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_country\_\_text\_\_id

*Original tag:* country\_\_text\_\_id

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Abbreviated country names.

RESPONSES:

Text

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### **2.1.1.3 V-Dem Country ID (country\_\_id)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_country\_\_id

*Original tag:* country\_\_id

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Unique country ID designated for each country.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

NOTES: A list of countries and their corresponding IDs used in the V-Dem dataset can be found in the country table in the codebook, as well as in the *V-Dem Country Coding Units* document.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### **2.1.1.4 Year (year)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_year

*Original tag:* year

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Four-digit designation of the year for which an observation is given that ranges from the start to the end of the coding period.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

NOTES: This variable is included in the V-Dem Country Year as well as Country Date datasets.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### **2.1.1.5 V-Dem Project (project)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_project

*Original tag:* project

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Indication what project team has coded country in respective year.

RESPONSES:

0: Contemporary.

1: Historical.

2: Both (overlap).

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**2.1.1.6 Historical V-Dem coding (historical)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_historical

*Original tag:* historical

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Binary indication whether the country in question has been coded by the team of Historical V-Dem project.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**2.1.1.7 Start of Coding Period (codingstart)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_codingstart

*Original tag:* codingstart

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Year in which coding of the country in question starts.

CLARIFICATION: V-Dem country coding starts in 1789, or from when a country first enjoyed at least some degree of functional and/or formal sovereignty.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

NOTES: For detailed information, please see the *V-Dem Country Coding Units* document.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**2.1.1.8 End of Coding Period (codingend)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_codingend

*Original tag:* codingend

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Either a maximum year of country coding period or the year when the country ceased to exist because it lost functional or formal sovereignty.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

NOTES: For more details about V-Dem country coding periods, please see the *V-Dem Country Coding Units* document.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**2.1.1.9 Contemporary Start of Coding Period (codingstart\_contemp)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_codingstart\_contemp

*Original tag:* codingstart\_contemp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Year in which the coding of Contemporary V-Dem project starts.

CLARIFICATION: Variables from “Contemporary” project can have different question formulation, variable type, or number of coders as opposed to the “Historical” one.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**2.1.1.10 Contemporary End of Coding Period (codingend\_contemp)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_codingend\_contemp

*Original tag:* codingend\_contemp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Year in which the coding of Contemporary V-Dem project ends.

CLARIFICATION: Variables from “Contemporary” project can have different question formulation, variable type, or number of coders as opposed to the “Historical” one.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**2.1.1.11 Historical Start of Coding Period (codingstart\_hist)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_codingstart\_hist

*Original tag:* codingstart\_hist

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Year in which the coding of Historical V-Dem project starts.

CLARIFICATION: Variables from “Historical” project can have different question formulation, variable type, or number of coders as opposed to the “Contemporary” one.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**2.1.1.12 Historical End of Coding Period (codingend\_hist)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_codingend\_hist

*Original tag:* codingend\_hist

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Year in which the coding of Historical V-Dem project ends.

CLARIFICATION: Variables from “Historical” project can have different question formulation, variable type, or number of coders as opposed to the “Contemporary” one.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**2.1.1.13 Gap index (gap\_index)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_gap\_index

*Original tag:* gap\_index

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

CLARIFICATION: Indication that party was not present in national legislature.  
RESPONSES:  
Numeric  
DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

#### 2.1.1.14 Country code (cowcode)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_cowcode

*Original tag:* COWcode

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Correlates of War (COW) project country codes.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SOURCE(S): Correlates of War Project (2017)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Correlates of War Project (2017)

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.2 V-Dem Democracy Indices - V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices

This section groups together macro-level indices that describe features of democracy at the highest (most abstract) level. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.1.2.1 Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_polyarchy

*Original tag:* v2x\_polyarchy

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy — liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_freexp\_altinf v2x\_frassoc\_thick v2x\_suffr v2xel\_frefair v2x\_elecoff

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. Release 1-5 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x\_frassoc\_thick), clean elections (v2xel\_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x\_freexp\_altinf), elected officials (v2x\_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x\_suffr) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation formulas in the literature, both allowing partial "compensation" in one sub-component for lack of polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to the "weakest link" argument. The aggregation is done at the level of Dahl's sub-components with the one exception of the non-electoral

component. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x\_polyarchy = \&.5 * MPI + .5 * API$$

$$\&x = .5 * (v2x\_elecoff * v2xel\_refair * v2x\_frassoc\_thick * \\ \&v2x\_suffr * v2x\_freexp\_altinf) \\ \& + .5 * ((1/8) * v2x\_elecoff + (1/4) * v2xel\_refair \\ \& + (1/4) * v2x\_frassoc\_thick + (1/8) * v2x\_suffr \\ \& + (1/4) * v2x\_freexp\_altinf)$$

CITATION: Teorell *et al.* (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.2.2 Liberal Democracy Index (v2x\_libdem)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_libdem

*Original tag:* v2x\_libdem

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_liberal v2x\_polyarchy

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. Release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

AGGREGATION: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x\_libdem = .25 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x\_liberal + .5 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x\_liberal$$

CITATION: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.2.3 Participatory Democracy Index (v2x\_partipdem)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_partipdem

*Original tag:* v2x\_partipdem

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation

by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_polyarchy v2x\_partip

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. Release 1-3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

AGGREGATION: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$v2x\_partipdem =$

$.25 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x\_partip + .5 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x\_partip$

CITATION: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.2.4 Deliberative Democracy Index (v2x\_delibdem)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_delibdem

*Original tag:* v2x\_delibdem

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of deliberative democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To make it a measure of not only the deliberative principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xdl\_delib v2x\_polyarchy

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. Release 1-3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

AGGREGATION: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$v2x\_delibdem =$

$.25 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2xdl\_delib + .5 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2xdl\_delib$

CITATION: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.2.5 Egalitarian Democracy Index (v2x\_egaldem)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_egaldem

*Original tag:* v2x\_egaldem

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when 1 rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; and 2 resources are distributed equally across all social groups; 3 groups and individuals enjoy equal access to

power. To make it a measure of egalitarian democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_egal v2x\_polyarchy

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. Release 1-4 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

AGGREGATION: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$v2x\_egaldem =$

$.25 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x\_egal + .5 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x\_egal$

CITATION: Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); Coppedge *et al.* 2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.1.3 V-Dem Democracy Indices - V-Dem Mid-Level Indices: Components of the Democracy Indices

This section includes the V-Dem mid-level indices, subcomponents of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.1.3.1 Additive polyarchy index (v2x\_api)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_api

*Original tag:* v2x\_api

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_frassoc\_thick v2x\_suffr v2xel\_frefair v2x\_elecoff v2x\_freexp\_altinf

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is operationalized by taking the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x\_frassoc\_thick), clean elections (v2xel\_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x\_freexp\_altinf), elected executive (v2x\_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x\_suffr). The weights are constructed so as to sum to 1 and weigh elected executive and suffrage half as much as the other three, respectively.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$v2x\_api = (1/4) * v2x\_frassoc\_thick + (1/4) * v2xel\_frefair + (1/4) * v2x\_freexp\_altinf + (1/8) * v2x\_elecoff + (1/8) * v2x\_suffr$

CITATION: Teorell *et al.* (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.3.2 Multiplicative polyarchy index (v2x\_mpi)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_mpi

*Original tag:* v2x\_mpi

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell



ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_frassoc\_thick v2x\_suffr v2xel\_frefair v2x\_elecoff v2x\_freexp\_altnf

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link. Specifically, the index is formed by multiplying indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x\_frassoc\_thick), clean elections (v2xel\_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x\_freexp\_altnf), elected executive (v2x\_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x\_suffr), or

$v2x\_mpi = v2x\_frassoc\_thick * v2xel\_frefair * v2x\_freexp\_altnf * v2x\_elecoff * v2x\_suffr$

CITATION: Teorell *et al.* (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.3.3 Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information Index (v2x\_freexp\_altnf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_freexp\_altnf

*Original tag:* v2x\_freexp\_altnf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

CLARIFICATION: This index includes all variables in the two indices v2x\_freexp and v2xme\_altnf.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2xcl\_disc v2clacfree v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

DATA RELEASE: 4-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media censorship effort (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media bias (v2mebias), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange), freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), and freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.3.4 Freedom of association index (thick) (v2x\_frassoc\_thick)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_frassoc\_thick

*Original tag:* v2x\_frassoc\_thick

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken, Michael Bernhard, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to

operate freely?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2x\_elecreg

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. Release 1-3 used a different aggregation formula for the thinner index v2x\_frassoc.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x\_elecreg.

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.3.5 Share of population with suffrage (v2x\_suffr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_suffr

*Original tag:* v2x\_suffr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What share of adult citizens as defined by statute has the legal right to vote in national elections?

CLARIFICATION: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal *de jure* restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice *de facto*. The adult population as defined by statute is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded as 100percent. Universal male suffrage only is coded as 50percent. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0percent. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or 'economic independence', estimates have been calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc., secondary country-specific sources, and — in the case of very poor information — the conditions in similar countries or colonies. The scores reflect *de jure* provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2elsuffrage

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: v2elsuffrage/100

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.3.6 Clean elections index (v2xel\_frefair)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xel\_frefair

*Original tag:* v2xel\_frefair

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan Lindberg, Jan Teorell  
 ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd  
 QUESTION: To what extent are elections free and fair?  
 CLARIFICATION: Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence.  
 SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).  
 SOURCE(S): v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elvotbuy v2elirreg v2elintim v2elpeace v2elfrfair v2x\_elecreg  
 DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
 AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap), election voter registry (v2elrgstry), election vote buying (v2elvotbuy), election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), non-state electoral violence (v2elpeace), and election free and fair (v2elfrfair). Since the bulk of these indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x\_elecreg. If a country is recorded as an electoral regime (v2x\_elecreg) at the beginning of the time series until the first election that we record, then the scores for this election are backfilled towards the beginning of the time series.  
 CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
 YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.3.7 Elected officials index (v2x\_elecoff)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_elecoff

*Original tag:* v2x\_elecoff

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections?

CLARIFICATION: This index attempts to measure (a) whether the chief executive is elected, either directly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive; and (b) whether the legislature, in presidential systems with a directly elected president that is also chief executive, is directly or indirectly elected. Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, "appointment" by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss. This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): v2ex\_elechos v2ex\_elechog v2exdfcbhs\_rec v2ex\_hosw v2ex\_elecleg v2lgbicam v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lginello v2lginelup v2exaphos v2exapathhs v2exaphogp v2exapathhg v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdsghg v2exhoshog v2exapupap v2exapup

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. 1-3 preliminary aggregation formula, 4-6 as v2x\_accex, 7 renamed to v2x\_elecoff and modified aggregation, 8.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed in two steps. First, there are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in constructing this index, all of which are scaled to vary from 0 to 1. First, whether the head of state is directly elected  $a = 1$  or not  $a = 0$ . Second, the extent to which the legislature is popularly elected  $b$ . If the legislature is unicameral,  $b$  is measured as the proportion of legislators directly elected + half of the proportion that are indirectly elected. If the legislature is bicameral and the upper house is involved in the appointment of the chief executive, the same proportion of directly and half of the indirectly elected legislators is calculated for the upper house; the scores for the lower and upper houses are then averaged. Third, whether the head of state is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of state  $c1 = 1$ , otherwise 0. Fourth, whether the head of government is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of

government  $c2 = 1$ , otherwise 0. Fifth, whether the head of government is appointed by the head of state  $d = 1$  or not  $d = 0$ . Sixth, whether the head of government is directly elected  $e = 1$  or not  $e = 0$ .

In the second step, the extent to which the legislature is elected (b) is also independently taken into account in order to penalize presidential systems with unelected legislatures, or legislatures with a large share of presidential appointees, for example.

Define  $hosw$  as the weight for the head of state. If the head of state is also head of government  $v2exhoshog = 1$ ,  $hosw = 1$ . If the head of state has more power than the head of government over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, then  $hosw = 1$ ; if the reverse is true,  $hosw = 0$ . If they share equal power,  $hosw = .5$ . Define the weight for the head of government as  $hogw = 1 - hosw$ . The formula then is:

$$v2x\_elecoff = \&hosw \times \max(a1, b \times c1) + hogw \times \max(a \times d, b \times c1 \times d, e, b \times c2),$$

unless the head of state is directly elected ( $v2ex\_elechos = 1$ ) and the chief executive ( $v2ex\_hosw = 1$ ), in case of which:

$$v2x\_elecoff = \&[hosw \times \max(a1, b \times c1) + hogw \times \max(a \times d, b \times c1 \times d, e, b \times c2) + b]/2)$$

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.3.8 Liberal Component Index (v2x\_liberal)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_liberal

*Original tag:* v2x\_liberal

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xcl\_rol v2x\_jucon v2xlg\_legcon v2lgbicam

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equality before the law and individual liberties (v2xcl\_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x\_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive (v2xlg\_legcon). Prior to the calculation v2xlg\_legcon gets set to 0 whenever v2lgbicam is 0.

CITATION: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.3.9 Equality before the law and individual liberty index (v2xcl\_rol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xcl\_rol

*Original tag:* v2xcl\_rol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2xcl\_acjst v2xcl\_prpty v2cltort v2clkill v2xcl\_slave v2clrelig v2clfmov v2xcl\_dmove

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for men/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), freedom from torture (v2cltort), freedom from political killings (v2clkill), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmov), and freedom of domestic movement for men/women (v2cldmovm, v2cldmovw).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.3.10 Judicial constraints on the executive index (v2x\_jucon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_jucon

*Original tag:* v2x\_jucon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exrescon v2jucomp v2juhccomp v2juhcind v2juncind

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), and lower court independence (v2juncind).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.3.11 Legislative constraints on the executive index (v2xlg\_legcon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xlg\_legcon

*Original tag:* v2xlg\_legcon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are the legislature and government agencies *e.g.*, comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2lgqstexp v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgoppart

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp),

executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

### 2.1.3.12 Participatory Component Index (v2x\_partip)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_partip

*Original tag:* v2x\_partip

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the participatory principle achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_cspart v2xdd\_dd v2xel\_locelec v2xel\_regelec

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: civil society participation (v2x\_cspart), elected local government power (v2xel\_locelec) or elected regional government power (v2xel\_regelec) — whichever has higher score — and direct popular vote (v2xdd\_dd).

CITATION: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.3.13 Civil society participation index (v2x\_cspart)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_cspart

*Original tag:* v2x\_cspart

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymakers; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?

CLARIFICATION: The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations CSOs. CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations if they are engaged in civic or political activities, social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.

The core civil society index CCSI is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2csptrcpt v2csgender

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor

analysis model of the indicators for candidate selection — national/local (v2psenslnl), CSO consultation (v2cscnsult), CSO participatory environment (v2csptrcpt), and CSO women participation (v2csgender).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.3.14 Direct Popular Vote Index (v2xdd\_dd)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xdd\_dd

*Original tag:* v2xdd\_dd

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: To what extent is the direct popular vote utilized?

CLARIFICATION: Direct popular voting refers here to an institutionalized process by which citizens of a region or country register their choice or opinion on specific issues through a ballot. It is intended to embrace initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites, as those terms are usually understood. It captures some aspects of the more general concept of direct democracy at the national level. The term does not encompass recall elections, deliberative assemblies, or settings in which the vote is not secret or the purview is restricted. Likewise, it does not apply to elections for representatives.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2ddlexci v2ddsigpci v2ddsiglci v2ddsigdci v2ddpartci v2ddapprci v2ddspmc  
v2ddadmci v2ddyrci v2ddlexrf v2ddsigprf v2ddsigdrf v2ddpartrf v2ddapprrf v2ddspmr  
v2ddadmrf v2ddyrrf v2ddpartpl v2ddapprpl v2ddspmpl v2ddadmpl v2ddlexpl v2ddyrl  
v2ddlexor v2ddpartor v2ddappor v2ddspmor v2ddadmor v2ddyror v2ddthreor v2ddthrer  
v2ddthrepl

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. New aggregation formula in version 7.

AGGREGATION: This index results from the addition of the weighted scores of each type of popular votes studied (popular initiatives  $\times 1.5$ , referendums  $\times 1.5$ , plebiscites, and obligatory referendums). Each type of popular vote receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of two terms (easiness of initiation and easiness of approval), where each term obtains a maximum value of one. As we are studying four types of popular votes, the minimum value is 0, and the maximum is 8. In the v2xdd\_dd all scores are normalized to range between 0 and 1. For an elaboration of the weighting factor of each component, see: Altman, David. 2017.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd\_dd = \&(v2xdd\_i\_ci) \times 1.5 + (v2xdd\_i\_rf) \times 1.5 \\ \& + (v2xdd\_i\_pl) + (v2xdd\_i\_or)$$

Regarding each type of citizen initiated popular vote (i.e., popular initiative), the ease of initiation is measured by (a) the existence of a direct democracy process (v2ddlexci), (b) the number of signatures needed (v2ddsigpci), and (c) time-limits to circulate the signatures (v2ddsigdci). Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by (a) participation quorum (v2ddsigdci), (b) approval quorum (v2ddpartci), and (c) supermajority (v2ddspmc). The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority (v2ddadmci). Consequences are measured by (a) the legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or merely consultative) (v2ddlexci), and (b) the frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past (v2ddthreor). The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
v2xdd\_dd = & \&[(IF\ v2ddlexci > 0, 1, 0) \times (1 - (v2ddsigpci)) \times (IF\ v2ddsigdci \\
& \& = 0, 1, .5 + (2 \times v2ddsigdci/365)) + \\
& \&(v2ddsigdci) \cap (v2ddpartci) \cap (v2ddspmc i)] \\
& \& \times (0.5 + ((100 - v2ddadmci)/100))/2] \\
& \& \times (IF\ v2ddlexci = 2, 1, IF\ v2ddlexci = 1, 0.75, v2ddlexci = 0, 0) \\
& \& \times (IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful\ event < 6, \\
& \& v2ddthreci = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06\ units\ per\ year \\
& \& until\ 0.1; if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful \\
& \& during\ the\ first\ years\ v2ddapprci \\
& \& = 0.9, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.1\ units\ per\ year\ until\ 0.1)
\end{aligned}$$

In case the vote originates from above (i.e., authorities), there is no need to account for v2ddsigpci and v2ddsigdci. For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums,  $(v2ddsigdci) \cap (v2ddpartci) \cap (v2ddspmc i)$ , see Altman, David. 2017.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.3.15 Local government index (v2xel\_locelec)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xel\_locelec

*Original tag:* v2xel\_locelec

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Are there elected local governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

CLARIFICATION: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the local level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body. A high score would be accorded to a country in which local governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local level with the exception of judicial bodies. Naturally, local governments remain subordinate to the regional and national governments.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2ellocelc v2ellocpwr v2ellocgov

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: First, local government elected (v2ellocelc) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected.

This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1. v2xel\_locelec is set to 0 whenever v2ellocgov is 0



(there is no local government).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.3.16 Regional government index (v2xel\_regelec)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xel\_regelec

*Original tag:* v2xel\_regelec

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Are there elected regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level?

CLARIFICATION: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected regional governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected regional governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the regional level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body. A high score would be accorded to a country in which regional governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the regional level with the exception of judicial bodies. Naturally, regional governments remain subordinate to the national government.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2elsrgel v2elrgpwr v2elreggov

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: First, regional government elected (v2elsrgel) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected.

This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1. v2xel\_regelec is set to 0 whenever v2elreggov is 0 (there is no regional government).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.3.17 Deliberative Component Index (v2xdl\_delib)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xdl\_delib

*Original tag:* v2xdl\_delib

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion.

To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2dlreason v2dlcommon v2dlcountr v2dlconslt v2dlengage

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: reasoned justification (v2dlreason), common good justification (v2dlcommon), respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr), range

of consultation (v2dlconslt), and engaged society (v2dlengage).

CITATION: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

### 2.1.3.18 Egalitarian Component Index (v2x\_egal)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_egal

*Original tag:* v2x\_egal

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the egalitarian principle achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when 1 rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; 2 resources are distributed equally across all social groups; and 3 access to power is equally distributed by gender, socioeconomic class and social group.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xeg\_eqprotec v2xeg\_eqaccess v2xeg\_eqdr

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. Release 1-4 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula, 5-8 modified aggregation formula including v2xeg\_eqaccess.

AGGREGATION: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equal protection index (v2xeg\_eqprotec), equal access index (v2xeg\_eqaccess) and equal distribution of resources (v2xeg\_eqdr).

CITATION: Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); Coppedge *et al.* 2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.1.3.19 Equal protection index (v2xeg\_eqprotec)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xeg\_eqprotec

*Original tag:* v2xeg\_eqprotec

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How equal is the protection of rights and freedoms across social groups by the state?

CLARIFICATION: Equal protection means that the state grants and protects rights and freedoms evenly across social groups. To achieve equal protection of rights and freedoms, the state itself must not interfere in the ability of groups to participate and it must also take action to ensure that rights and freedoms of one social group are not threatened by the actions of another group or individual.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2clacjust v2clsocgrp v2clsnlpct

DATA RELEASE: 5-12. Release 7 modified excluding v2xcl\_acjst.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for social class equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clacjust), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp) and percent of population with weaker civil liberties (v2clsnlpct); reversed scale.

CITATION: Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at

the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.3.20 Equal access index (v2xeg\_eqaccess)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xeg\_eqaccess

*Original tag:* v2xeg\_eqaccess

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How equal is access to power?

CLARIFICATION: The Equal Access subcomponent is based on the idea that neither the protections of rights and freedoms nor the equal distribution of resources is sufficient to ensure adequate representation. Ideally, all groups should enjoy equal *de facto* capabilities to participate, to serve in positions of political power, to put issues on the agenda, and to influence policymaking.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2pepwrngen v2pepwr soc v2pepwr ses

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by socioeconomic position (v2pepwr ses), power distributed by social group (v2pepwr soc), and power distributed by gender (v2pepwr gen).

CITATION: Sigman and Lindberg (2017); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.3.21 Equal distribution of resources index (v2xeg\_eqdr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xeg\_eqdr

*Original tag:* v2xeg\_eqdr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How equal is the distribution of resources?

CLARIFICATION: This component measures the extent to which resources — both tangible and intangible — are distributed in society. An equal distribution of resources supports egalitarian democracy in two ways. First, lower poverty rates and the distribution of goods and services such as food, water, housing, education and healthcare ensure that all individuals are capable of participating in politics and government. In short, basic needs must be met in order for individuals to effectively exercise their rights and freedoms see, for example, Sen 1999, Maslow 1943. Second, high levels of resource inequality undermine the ability of poorer populations to participate meaningfully Aristotle, Dahl 2006. Thus, it is necessary to include not only measures of poverty and the distribution of goods and services, but also the levels of inequality in these distributions, and the proportion of the population who are not eligible for social services *i.e.* means-tests, particularistic distribution, etc.. This principle also implies that social or economic inequalities can translate into political inequalities, an issue addressed most notably by Walzer 1983, who argues that overlapping "spheres" of inequality are particularly harmful to society. To address these overlapping "spheres", this component also includes measures of the distribution of power in society amongst different socio-economic groups, genders, etc.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2dlencmps v2dlunivl v2peedueq v2pehealth

DATA RELEASE: 5, 7-12. Release 7 modified: v2pepwr ses, v2pepwr soc and v2pepwr gen now form a separate subcomponent index.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor

analysis model of the indicators for particularistic or public goods v2dlencmps, means tested vs. universalistic welfare policies v2dlunivl, educational equality v2peedueq and health equality v2pehealth.

CITATION: Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

## 2.1.4 V-Dem Indicators - Elections

**Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys) Elections:** Among national elections we distinguish elections to: (i) the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature (including constituent or constitutional assemblies), (ii) the upper chamber of the legislature, and (iii) the presidency. For present purposes an executive who is elected by a legislature is considered a *prime minister*, not a president. In order to be considered a *president*, an executive must, under ordinary circumstances, be chosen directly by the electorate (perhaps mediated by an electoral college).

**Non-election specific coding:** The following questions are not election-specific and should be coded for every year from 1900 (or when applicable) to the present.

**Election specific questions:** The following questions pertain to specific national elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date. If you have coded for V-Dem in the past, your previous scores will be displayed in the survey. You are welcome to revise previously submitted scores in all surveys. For this section, we kindly ask you make sure that you have coded all election years.

**Election specific questions – Historical clarification:** The following questions pertain to specific national elections. National elections include elections to the presidency (if applicable) and legislature (lower and upper house, whatever applies), whether direct or indirect, as well as constituent assembly elections. It does not include other elections, *e.g.*, subnational elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referendums, or by-elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date."

**Subnational elections and offices:** This section of the survey asks a small number of questions about *subnational* elections and offices. You will be instructed to identify two subnational levels, referred to as "regional government" and "local government". Questions in this section should be answered for every year, rather than for specific elections.

**Lower chamber election:** The following questions pertain to specific lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections. The dates of these elections have been pre-coded.

### Executive and legislative versions of Election specific variables

- In order to subset election specific variables for executive elections only (previously \*\_ex) – keep only those observations where v2xel\_elecpres is 1.
- In order to subset election specific variables for legislative elections only (previously \*\_leg) – keep only those observations where v2xel\_elecparl is 1.

#### 2.1.4.1 Election type (v2eltype)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2eltype

*Original tag:* v2eltype

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: What type of election was held on this date?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply. Whenever possible, specify the exact date of each election. If the election unfolds across more than one day, enter the date for the first day. If the precise date is unavailable, enter the first of the month; if the month is unknown, enter

January 1. Multiple-round elections (*e.g.*, two-round elections) are counted separately. (More than one election in a single year can be accommodated.)

RESPONSES:

0: Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_0]

1: Legislative, lower, sole, or both chambers, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_1]

2: Legislative, upper chamber only, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_2] (Not yet coded)

3: Legislative, upper chamber only, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_3] (Not yet coded)

4: Constituent Assembly, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_4]

5: Constituent Assembly, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_5]

6: Presidential, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_6]

7: Presidential, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_7]

8: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_8] (Not yet coded)

9: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_9] (Not yet coded)

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple selection.

SOURCE(S): NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IFES; IDEA; Reif (2011, 2012); Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers 2007); *Keesings Records*; *CIA Factbook*; Wikipedia.

NOTES: All direct elections and elections by an electoral college that is elected by the people and has the sole purpose of electing an executive or members of parliament are coded. Note that single-party elections, elections held under limited suffrage and for only parts of a parliament, as well as elections of which the results are subsequently cancelled are included. Elections for constituent assemblies that come to perform functions beyond drafting and adopting a new constitution (*e.g.* legislating, electing president, adopting budget, etc) are also included and coded under category 0 and 1 (Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers; first or second round). Excluded are elections that are not decisive, i. e. when the HOS alone is selecting the candidate(s). The variable includes elections where results were declared invalid after the fact, *e.g.* by a constitutional court, since they also provide information on the quality of democracy.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.2 Suffrage (v2asuffrage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2asuffrage

*Original tag:* v2asuffrage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised adults older than the minimal voting age?

CLARIFICATION: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, being in the military service or being legally incompetent.

This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see v2x\_elecreg), v2asuffrage is zero while v2elsuffrage may still be 100.

The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Bilinski (2015); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); constituteproject.org; v2x\_elecereg.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.4.3 Minimum voting age (v2elage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elage

*Original tag:* v2elage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Megan Reif

QUESTION: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote in national elections?

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): IFES; IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Furtak (1990); KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Paxton *et al.* (2003); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012). See Reif GVED and Reif EDATES (2011, 2012 for additional country-specific sources).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.4 Compulsory voting (v2elcomvot)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elcomvot

*Original tag:* v2elcomvot

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: Is voting compulsory (for those eligible to vote) in national elections?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced.

2: Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter.

3: Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Constitute Project; IPU Parline; V-Dem Country coordinators.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.4.5 Female suffrage restricted (v2elfemrst)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elfemrst

*Original tag:* v2elfemrst

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Are women eligible to vote in national elections?

CLARIFICATION: If there are no (direct) national elections, observations are not coded (missing).

RESPONSES:

0: No female suffrage. No women are allowed to vote, but some or all males vote.

1: Restricted female suffrage. Some women are allowed to vote, and face more or different restrictions than men

2: Universal female suffrage. All women are allowed to vote.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Paxton *et al.* (2003); Paxton *et al.* (2008); Reif (GVED).

DATA RELEASE: 1-6, 10-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.6 Suffrage level (v2elgvsuffvl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elgvsuffvl

*Original tag:* v2elgvsuffvl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Megan Reif

QUESTION: What is the level of suffrage practiced?

CLARIFICATION: Note that this question applies to citizens only. Note also that we are interested in legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). In cases where married people are allowed to vote at a younger age than single people, the higher (older) age minimum for single voters is given (see v2elage).

RESPONSES:

0: Indirect suffrage and/or offices filled by appointment only

1: Propertied ethnic males

2: Ethnic males

3: Propertied/educated males

4: Ethnic males and females

5: Propertied/educated males and females

6: All males

7: Spatially variant

8: Universal

9: Occupational categories/Party membership

10: Only citizens of colonial metropole

11: Propertied/tax-paying colons and non-colons

12: Propertied males and military females

13: Propertied/landowning households

14: All households

15: All males and married Females

16: Age differential: Married people vote at younger age than single

SCALE: Nominal.

SOURCE(S): IFES; IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Furtak (1990); KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); IPU; [constituteproject.org](http://constituteproject.org). See Reif GVED and Reif EDATES (2011, 2012 for additional country-specific sources).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.4.7 Percent of population with suffrage (v2elsuffrage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elsuffrage

*Original tag:* v2elsuffrage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What percentage (percent) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

CLARIFICATION: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, being in the military service or being legally incompetent. It covers legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies.

Universal suffrage is coded as 100percent. Universal male suffrage is only coded as 50percent. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0percent. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or 'economic independence'), estimates have been calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information (on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.), secondary country-specific sources, and — in the case of very poor information — the conditions in similar countries or colonies.

The scores reflect *de jure* provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); country-specific sources.

NOTES: In Version 3 of the dataset this variable was re-coded from scratch based on the modified criteria reflected in the clarification section (above).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.8 Fraud allegations by Western election monitors (v2elwestmon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elwestmon

*Original tag:* v2elwestmon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Were there allegations of significant vote-fraud by any Western monitors?

CLARIFICATION: If there were no Western monitors, or no international monitors, this variable is coded as missing.

RESPONSES:

0: No/Unclear

1: Yes

SOURCE(S): NELDA 47 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IDEA; websites by Western election monitors.



DATA RELEASE: 5-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1945-2021

#### 2.1.4.9 Female suffrage (most can vote) (v2fsuffrage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2fsuffrage

*Original tag:* v2fsuffrage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised female adults older than the minimal voting age?

CLARIFICATION: This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see v2x\_elecreg), v2fsuffrage is zero while v2elsuffrage may still be 100.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Bilinski (2015); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); constituteproject.org; v2x\_elecreg.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.4.10 Male suffrage (most can vote) (v2msuffrage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2msuffrage

*Original tag:* v2msuffrage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised male adults older than the minimal voting age?

CLARIFICATION: This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see v2x\_elecreg), v2msuffrage is zero while v2elsuffrage may still be 100.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Bilinski (2015); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); constituteproject.org; v2x\_elecreg.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.4.11 Disclosure of campaign donations (v2eldonate)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2eldonate

*Original tag:* v2eldonate

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Are there disclosure requirements for donations to national election campaigns?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No. There are no disclosure requirements.  
1: Not really. There are some, possibly partial, disclosure requirements in place but they are not observed or enforced most of the time.  
2: Ambiguous. There are disclosure requirements in place, but it is unclear to what extent they are observed or enforced.  
3: Mostly. The disclosure requirements may not be fully comprehensive (some donations not covered), but most existing arrangements are observed and enforced.  
4: Yes. There are comprehensive requirements and they are observed and enforced almost all the time.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021  
CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.1.4.12 Public campaign finance (v2elpubfin)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elpubfin

*Original tag:* v2elpubfin

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Is significant public financing available for parties' and/or candidates' campaigns for national office?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No. Public financing is not available.  
1: Little. There is public financing but it is so small or so restricted that it plays a minor role in most parties' campaigns.  
2: Ambiguous. There is some public financing available but it is unclear whether it plays a significant role for parties.  
3: Partly. Public financing plays a significant role in the campaigns of many parties.  
4: Yes. Public financing funds a significant share of expenditures by all, or nearly all parties.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021  
CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.1.4.13 EMB autonomy (v2elembaut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elembaut

*Original tag:* v2elembaut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?

CLARIFICATION: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

RESPONSES:

0: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other *de facto* ruling body.

1: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the *de facto* ruling body.

2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election.

3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the *de facto* ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections.

4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.14 EMB capacity (v2elembcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elembcap

*Original tag:* v2elembcap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election?

CLARIFICATION: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

RESPONSES:

0: No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the organization across the territory.

1: Not really. Deficits are not glaring but they nonetheless seriously compromised the organization of administratively well-run elections in many parts of the country.

2: Ambiguous. There might be serious deficiencies compromising the organization of the election but it could also be a product of human errors and co-incidence or other factors outside the control of the EMB.

3: Mostly. There are partial deficits in resources but these are neither serious nor widespread.

4: Yes. The EMB has adequate staff and other resources to administer a well-run election.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.1.4.15 Elections multiparty (v2elmulpar)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elmulpar

*Original tag:* v2elmulpar

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Was this national election multiparty?

RESPONSES:

0: No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few parties are legal but they are all *de facto* controlled by the dominant party).

1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency.

2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained — legally or informally.

3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (*de jure* or *de facto*) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory.

4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (*e.g.* far-right/left extremist parties, anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.16 Election voter registry (v2elrgstry)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elrgstry

*Original tag:* v2elrgstry

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There was no registry, or the registry was not used.

1: No. There was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20percent or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised or the outcome could have been affected significantly by double-voting and impersonation).

2: Uncertain. There was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes.

3: Yes, somewhat. The registry was imperfect but less than 10percent of eligible voters may have been disenfranchised, and double-voting and impersonation could not have affected the results significantly.

4: Yes. The voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 1percent of voters were affected by any flaws) and it was applied in a reasonable fashion.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.17 Election vote buying (v2elvotbuy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elvotbuy

*Original tag:* v2elvotbuy

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?

CLARIFICATION: Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, *i.e.*, "porkbarrel" legislation.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties.

2: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an 'entry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded.

3: Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.

4: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.18 Election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elirreg

*Original tag:* v2elirreg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was there evidence of other *intentional* irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud?

CLARIFICATION: Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions).

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country.

2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups.

3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups' access to participation.

4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.19 Election government intimidation (v2elintim)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elintim

*Original tag:* v2elintim

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents?

CLARIFICATION: Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should *not* be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately).

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet.

1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period.

2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated — harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents.

3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups.

4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.20 Election other electoral violence (v2elpeace)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elpeace

*Original tag:* v2elpeace

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types (*not* by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election

period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees.

1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily.

2: Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small.

3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured.

4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.1.4.21 Election boycotts (v2elboycot)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elboycot

*Original tag:* v2elboycot

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, did any registered opposition candidates or parties boycott?

CLARIFICATION: A boycott is a deliberate and public refusal to participate in an election by a candidate or party who is eligible to participate.

RESPONSES:

0: Total. All opposition parties and candidates boycotted the election.

1: Significant. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but they constituted a major opposition force.

2: Ambiguous. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but it is unclear whether they would have constituted a major electoral force.

3: Minor. A few opposition parties or candidates boycotted and they were relatively insignificant ones.

4: Nonexistent. No parties or candidates boycotted the elections.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.22 Election free campaign media (v2elfrcamp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elfrcamp

*Original tag:* v2elfrcamp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, did parties or candidates receive either free or publicly financed access to national broadcast media?

RESPONSES:

0: Either no parties or only the governing party receives free access.

1: Some parties in addition to the governing party receive free access.

2: All parties receive free access.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.4.23 Election paid campaign advertisements (v2elpdcamp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elpdcamp

*Original tag:* v2elpdcamp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, were parties or candidates able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor the government and its allies.

2: It is permitted without limit.

3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster fair competition.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.1.4.24 Election paid interest group media (v2elpaidig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elpaidig

*Original tag:* v2elpaidig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this election, were interest groups and individuals able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor groups allied with the government.

2: It is permitted without limit.

3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster representation of diverse perspectives.



SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.1.4.25 Election free and fair (v2elfrfair)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elfrfair

*Original tag:* v2elfrfair

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?

CLARIFICATION: The only thing that should *not* be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately).

RESPONSES:

0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (*i.e.*, who became president; or who won the legislative majority).

1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (*i.e.*, who became president; or who won the legislative majority).

2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above).

3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above).

4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.26 Election domestic election monitors (v2eldommon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2eldommon

*Original tag:* v2eldommon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: In this national election, were election monitors from all parties and independent domestic election monitors allowed to monitor the vote at polling stations across the country?

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes  
SCALE: Dichotomous.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.4.27 Election international monitors (v2elintmon)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elintmon

*Original tag:* v2elintmon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg  
QUESTION: In this national election, were international election monitors present?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No/Unclear  
1: Yes  
SCALE: Dichotomous.  
SOURCE(S): NELDA 45 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IDEA; websites by international election monitors.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.4.28 Election international monitors denied (v2elmonden)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elmonden

*Original tag:* v2elmonden

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg  
QUESTION: In this national election, were some international election monitors denied opportunity to be present by the government holding the election?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No/Unclear  
1: Yes  
SCALE: Dichotomous.  
SOURCE(S): NELDA 48 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IDEA; websites by international election monitors.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1915-2021

#### **2.1.4.29 Monitors refuse to be present (v2elmonref)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elmonref

*Original tag:* v2elmonref

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg  
QUESTION: Did any monitors refuse to go to an election because they believed that it would not be free and fair?

RESPONSES:

0: No/Unclear

1: Yes

SOURCE(S): NELDA 49 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); websites of election monitors.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1915-2021

**2.1.4.30 Candidate restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (v2elrstrct)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elrstrct

*Original tag:* v2elrstrct

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Is the eligibility of candidates for national legislative office (when elected) formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

CLARIFICATION: Language restriction should be understood as a restriction of spoken language, not literacy.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.

1: No, there are no such restrictions or the candidates are not elected.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem country coordinators; Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v221, v250; Constitute Project; ACE Electoral Knowledge Network.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.1.4.31 Election losers accept results (v2elaccept)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elaccept

*Original tag:* v2elaccept

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this national election within three months?

RESPONSES:

0: None. None of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results the election, or all opposition was banned.

1: A few. Some but not all losing parties or candidates accepted the results but those who constituted the main opposition force did not.

2: Some. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results but it is unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively insignificant.

3: Most. Many but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results and those who did not had little electoral support.

4: All. All parties and candidates accepted the results.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.32 Election assume office (v2elasmoff)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elasmoff

*Original tag:* v2elasmoff

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Following this national election, did winners assume office according to prescribed constitutional rules and norms?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The official winner of the election was prevented from assuming office by *unconstitutional* means.

1: Partially. The official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter was forced at least in part by unconstitutional means to share power, or delay assuming power for more than 6 months.

2: Yes. Constitutional rules and norms were followed and the official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter assumed office accordingly (or continued in office).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: The question text between contemporary and historical differ in inclusion of "within 12 months of the election". In contemporary it is excluded while included in historical.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.33 Election turnout (v2eltrnout)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2eltrnout

*Original tag:* v2eltrnout

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: In this national election, what percentage (percent) of all registered voters cast a vote according to official results?

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SOURCE(S): IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IPU Parline; Election Guide.

NOTES: In cases where executive and legislative elections were held on the same day but there is a different turnout for each election, the turnout for this date is coded for the executive elections only. The turnout data for the legislative elections, in these cases, can be found in the IDEA Voter turnout database (see references).

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021

#### 2.1.4.34 Election VAP turnout (v2elvaptrn)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elvaptrn

*Original tag:* v2elvaptrn

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: In this national election, what percentage (percent) of the adult voting-age population cast a vote according to official results?

CLARIFICATION: The VAP can reflect irregularities such as problems with the voters' register or registration system. VAP numbers are estimates since they do not take into account legal or systemic barriers to the exercise of the franchise or account for non-eligible members of the population. Thus, it can occur that VAP values surpass 100 which is not an error but reflects such conditions.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): IDEA (VAP figures are estimates and should be treated as such).

NOTES: In cases where executive and legislative elections were held on the same day but there is a different VAP turnout for each election, the VAP turnout for this date is coded for the executive elections only. The VAP turnout data for the legislative elections, in these cases, can be found in the IDEA Voter turnout database (see references).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1830-2021

#### **2.1.4.35 Name of largest party (v2lpname)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lpname

*Original tag:* v2lpname

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the name of the largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Based on seat share.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2020

#### **2.1.4.36 Name of second largest party (v2slpname)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2slpname

*Original tag:* v2slpname

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the name of the second largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Based on seat share.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1790-2020

#### **2.1.4.37 Name of third largest party (v2tlpname)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2tlpname

*Original tag:* v2tlpname

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the name of the third largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Based on seat share.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1791-2020

#### **2.1.4.38 Presidential elections consecutive (v2elprescons)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elprescons

*Original tag:* v2elprescons

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: How many consecutive presidential elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

CLARIFICATION: This counts the consecutive number of presidential elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 whichever is more recent. Do not code if there is no office of the presidency.

SOURCE(S): v2eltype

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v2eltype\_6, v2eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.4.39 Presidential elections cumulative (v2elprescumul)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elprescumul

*Original tag:* v2elprescumul

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: How many presidential elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

CLARIFICATION: This counts the cumulative number of presidential elections, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no office of the presidency. However, if there is a presidency, and no elections have ever occurred, this should be recorded as 0.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2eltype

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v2eltype\_6, v2eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.4.40 HOG restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (v2elrsthog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elrsthog

*Original tag:* v2elrsthog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Is the eligibility of candidates for the office of head of government (when elected) formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

CLARIFICATION: Language restriction should be understood as a restriction of spoken language, not literacy.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.

1: No, there are no such restrictions or the candidates are not elected.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v221, v130 ; National constitutions; IPU Parline; IDEA; ACE Electoral Knowledge Network.

DATA RELEASE: 4-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.4.41 HOS restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (v2elrsthos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elrsthos

*Original tag:* v2elrsthos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Is the eligibility of candidates for the office of head of state (when elected) formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

CLARIFICATION: Language restriction should be understood as a restriction of spoken language, not literacy.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.

1: No, there are no such restrictions or the candidates are not elected.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v221, v95; Constitute Project; IPU Parline; IDEA; ACE Electoral Knowledge Network.

DATA RELEASE: 4-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.4.42 Election HOG turnover ordinal (v2elturnhog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elturnhog

*Original tag:* v2elturnhog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Was there turnover in the office of the head of government (HOG) as a result of this national election?

CLARIFICATION: Turnover can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party. If the HOS and HOG are the same person, the coding is the same for the two variables. The second round of election is coded as the first.

RESPONSES:

0: No. The head of government- retained his/her position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the HOG.

1: Half. The head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party that was in power before the election, or a new independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership.

2: Yes. The executive(s) - head of state and head of government- lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party than before the election or an independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. This code also applies if this is the first head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; Election Guide; IDEA; IPU Parline; V-Dem Country Coordinators.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.4.43 Elections HOS turnover ordinal (v2elturnhos)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elturnhos

*Original tag:* v2elturnhos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Was there turnover in the office of the head of state (HOS) as a result of this national election?

CLARIFICATION: Turnover can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party.

RESPONSES:

0: No. The head of state retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the HOS.

1: Half. The head of state is a different individual than before the election but from the same party that was in power before the election, or a new independent candidate is elected.

2: Yes. The head of state lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party than before the election or an independent candidate is elected. This code also applies if this is the first head of state elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; Election Guide; IDEA; IPU Parline; V-Dem Country Coordinators.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.4.44 Election executive turnover ordinal (v2eltvrexo)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2eltvrexo

*Original tag:* v2eltvrexo

*Description:*



VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Was there turnover in the executive office as a result of this national election?

CLARIFICATION: Turnover in the executive can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party. This question considers whether turnover occurs both in the office of head of state and head of government, even if one of the positions is not contested in the particular elections.

RESPONSES:

0: No. The executive(s) — head of state and head of government — retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the executive.

1: Half. The head of state or head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party (or independent) that was in power before the election. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership, or a new independent head of government. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when the elections result in co-habitation after a period when one party (or independent) has held both offices, or if one of the executive office holders — the head of state or head of government changes, while the other retains their position.

2: Yes. The executive(s) — head of state and head of government — lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party (or independent) than before the election. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when one party holds both the office of the head of state and head of government after a period of co-habitation, or if the holders of both offices change in terms of person and party (or independent) in the same election. This code also applies if this is the first head of state and/or head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; Election Guide; IDEA; IPU Parline; V-Dem Country Coordinators.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.4.45 Presidential election vote share of largest vote-getter (v2elvotlrg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elvotlrg

*Original tag:* v2elvotlrg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: In the first (or only round) of this presidential election, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by candidate eventually winning office?

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IFES; Election Guide; IPU Parline.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v2eltype\_6, v2eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1792-2021

#### 2.1.4.46 Presidential election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (v2elvotsml)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elvotsml

*Original tag:* v2elvotsml

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: In this presidential election, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second most successful candidate in the first round?

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IFES; Election Guide; IPU Parline.

NOTES: In uncontested elections this question is coded 0.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v2eltype\_6, v2eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1792-2021

#### 2.1.4.47 Lower chamber election consecutive (v2ellocons)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ellocons

*Original tag:* v2ellocons

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: How many consecutive lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

CLARIFICATION: This counts the consecutive number of lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 whichever is more recent. Do not code if there is no legislature.

SOURCE(S): v2eltype

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.4.48 Lower chamber election cumulative (v2ellocumul)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ellocumul

*Original tag:* v2ellocumul

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: How many lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

CLARIFICATION: This counts the cumulative number of elections to the lower chamber or unicameral legislature, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no legislature. However, if there is a legislature and no elections to that body have ever occurred, this should be coded as 0.

SOURCE(S): v2eltype

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.4.49 Lower chamber election district magnitude (v2elloeldm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elloeldm

*Original tag:* v2elloeldm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

QUESTION: For this election, what was the average district magnitude for seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SOURCE(S): Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Colomer (2016).

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.4.50 Lower chamber electoral system (v2elloelsy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elloelsy

*Original tag:* v2elloelsy

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Mixed majoritarian systems were coded as a two-round system. Regarding multi-member districts we coded list PR with large multi-member districts when the mean district size = 7. Constituent Assembly elections are excluded from the coding, since they often use specifically designed electoral systems. Further information on the following electoral system types can be found in Reynolds/Reilly, *The New International IDEA Handbook* (2005), chapter two and Annex B (Glossary of Terms) — downloadable, free of charge, at [www.idea.int/publications/esd/](http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/).

RESPONSES:

0: First-past-the-post (FPP, aka plurality) in single-member constituencies. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat.

1: Two-round system in single-member constituencies. Like FPP except that a threshold — usually 50percent + 1 — is required to avoid a runoff between the two top vote-getters.

2: Alternative vote in single-member districts. Voters rank-order their preferences for the candidates who compete for a single seat. If any candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, s/he is elected.

If not, then the least successful candidates (based on first-preferences) are eliminated and their votes reallocated to the second-preferences. This process is repeated until a candidate reaches 50percent +1 of the votes.

3: Block vote in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are seats within that district and can rank-order them (within or across parties) as they please.

4: Party block vote in multi-member districts. Voters cast a vote for a single party (but not for individual candidates within the party's list). The party with the most votes (*i.e.*, a plurality) wins all the seats in that district.

5: Parallel (SMD/PR). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are independent.

6: Mixed-member proportional (SMD with PR compensatory seats). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in

multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are not independent. Specifically, the multimember seats are used to rectify disproportionalities achieved in the single-member district election — by adding seats, as necessary.

This means that the representation of parties in the legislature is determined entirely by the PR ballot. It also means that the result of an MMP election is similar to the result of a PR election: parties achieve representation according to their nationwide vote share (on the PR ballot).

7: List PR with small multi-member districts (mean district size < 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is less than seven.

8: List PR with large multi-member districts (mean district size > 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is greater than seven.

9: Single-transferable vote (STV) in multi-member districts. Electors rank-order candidates nominated for a district. Candidates that surpass a specified quota of first-preference votes are elected. The remaining seats are chosen by reallocating the votes of the least successful candidates to elector's second- (or third-) preferences until the specified quota is reached. This process is repeated until all seats for that district are filled.

10: Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts. Each elector chooses a single candidate. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

11: Limited vote in multi-member districts.

Electors have more than one vote but fewer votes than the number of seats in the district. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

12: Borda Count in single- or multi-member districts. Electors use numbers to mark preferences among candidates and each preference is assigned a value. For example, in a ten-candidate field a first preference is worth one, a second preference is worth .9, and so forth. These are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are elected.

SOURCE(S): Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Colomer (2016).

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.51 Lower chamber election seats (v2elloseat)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elloseat

*Original tag:* v2elloseat

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats were there in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1790-2021

#### 2.1.4.52 Lower chamber election seats won by largest party (v2ellostlg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ellostlg

*Original tag:* v2ellostlg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021

#### 2.1.4.53 Lower chamber election seat share won by largest party (v2ellostsl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ellostsl

*Original tag:* v2ellostsl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: In this election, what percentage (percent) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021

#### 2.1.4.54 Lower chamber election seats won by second largest party (v2ellostsm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ellostsm

*Original tag:* v2ellostsm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021

#### **2.1.4.55 Lower chamber election seat share won by second largest party (v2ellostss)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ellostss

*Original tag:* v2ellostss

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election, what percentage (percent) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021

#### **2.1.4.56 Lower chamber election seats won by third largest party (v2ellosttm)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ellosttm

*Original tag:* v2ellosttm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1791-2021

#### **2.1.4.57 Lower chamber election seat share won by third largest party (v2ellostts)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ellostts

*Original tag:* v2ellostts

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, what percentage (percent) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1791-2021

**2.1.4.58 Lower chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (v2ellovtlg)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ellovtlg

*Original tag:* v2ellovtlg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021

**2.1.4.59 Lower chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (v2ellovtsm)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ellovtsm

*Original tag:* v2ellovtsm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1790-2021

#### **2.1.4.60 Lower chamber election vote share of third-largest vote-getter (v2ellovttm)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ellovttm

*Original tag:* v2ellovttm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1795-2021

#### **2.1.4.61 Lower chamber electoral system (v2elparallel)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elparallel

*Original tag:* v2elparallel

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

RESPONSES:

0: Majoritarian.

1: Proportional.

2: Mixed.

3: Other (*e.g.* single non-transferable voting, limited voting)

SOURCE(S): Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Colomer (2016).

NOTES: Mixed majoritarian systems were coded as majoritarian systems. Category 3: Other was introduced for data release 7.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.4.62 Lower chamber election statutory threshold (v2elthresh)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elthresh

*Original tag:* v2elthresh

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: B

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: For this election, what was the statutory threshold (percent share of votes) that a party needed to obtain in order to gain representation in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: If there is no statutory threshold, enter 0. (Some thresholds are applied



at regional levels. Nonetheless, they are usually consistent across regions.) Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1816-2021

#### 2.1.4.63 Lower chamber election turnover (v2eltvrig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2eltvrig

*Original tag:* v2eltvrig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Did control of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The majority party or ruling coalition includes the same or substantially the same parties, even if some minor parties (holding less than 10 percent of the seats in the legislature) left or joined the coalition, or because the elections do not affect the lower chamber.

1: Half. A minority party or coalition who was not in control of the chamber before the elections assumed the leading position in the legislature but is dependent on other parties for support. Or, a post-election ruling coalition includes some old parties and some new parties and the new parties represent more than 10 percent of the seats in the legislature.

2: Yes. The incumbent party or coalition lost its majority or plurality-dominant position in the legislature and a different party or coalition assumes the majority position.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem country coordinators; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide; IDEA.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021

#### 2.1.4.64 Regional government exists (v2elreggov)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elreggov

*Original tag:* v2elreggov

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A,C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

QUESTION: Is there a regional government?

CLARIFICATION: Regional government is typically the second-highest level of government, just below the national government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are regions, provinces, states, departments, and cantons.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of regional government. If this is the case, for all questions about regional government please code the regional level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

Some countries are so small that, now or in earlier time periods, they have only local

government and not regional government. If this is the case, please code this question as "0" for the appropriate time period.

If you have questions about identifying the regional government for your country, please send an email inquiry to your V-Dem contact.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

ORDERING: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions focused on regional government.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): Country expert coding (C data).

NOTES: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.65 Regional government name (v2elregnam)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elregnam

*Original tag:* v2elregnam

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A,C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

QUESTION: What is the term(s) for the regional government units?

CLARIFICATION: If different types of units exist at this single level of regional government use multiple terms such as "provinces and federal city." If the language of politics in your country is not English, please use whatever language is commonly used. For example, in Germany regional units are called "Länder."

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Country expert coding (C data).

NOTES: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.66 Regional government elected (v2elsrgel)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elsrgel

*Original tag:* v2elsrgel

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A,C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

QUESTION: At the regional level, are government offices elected in practice?

CLARIFICATION: "Government offices" here refers to a regional executive and a regional assembly, *not* a judiciary and *not* minor bureaucrats. An *executive* is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a governor). An *assembly* is a larger body of officials, who may be divided into two chambers.

"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a regional elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office — including appointment by higher or lower levels of government — are considered to be *non-elected*.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

RESPONSES:

- 0: Generally, offices at the regional level are not elected.
- 1: Generally, the regional executive is elected but not the assembly.
- 2: Generally, the regional assembly is elected but not the executive.
- 3: Generally, the regional executive is elected and there is no assembly.
- 4: Generally, the regional assembly is elected and there is no executive.
- 5: Generally, the regional executive and assembly are elected.

SCALE: Nominal.

SOURCE(S): Country expert coding (C data).

NOTES: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2elreggov is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.67 Regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elrgpwr

*Original tag:* v2elrgpwr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the regional level?

CLARIFICATION: We are concerned with the relative power of regional offices to each other, *not* the power of regional offices relative to higher or lower levels of government.

Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, *not* those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)

An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

RESPONSES:

- 0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.
- 1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.
- 2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the regional level.
- 3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.
- 4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2elreggov is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.68 Local government exists (v2ellocgov)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ellocgov

*Original tag:* v2ellocgov

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A,C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

QUESTION: Is there a local government?

CLARIFICATION: Local government refers to the level of government below the regional government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are counties, communes, cities, municipalities, towns, rural municipalities, and villages.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of local government. If this is the case, please code the local level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

ORDERING: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions focused on local government.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

SOURCE(S): Country expert coding (C data).

NOTES: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.4.69 Local government name (v2ellocnam)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ellocnam

*Original tag:* v2ellocnam

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A,C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

QUESTION: What is the term(s) for the local government units?

CLARIFICATION: If different types of units exist at this single level of local government, use multiple terms. For example, different terms may be needed for rural and urban units.

If the language of politics in your country is not English, please use whatever language is commonly used. For example, in Mexico local units are called "Municipios."

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Country expert coding (C data).

NOTES: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.4.70 Local government elected (v2ellocelc)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ellocelc

*Original tag:* v2ellocelc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A,C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

QUESTION: At the local level, are government (local government) offices elected in practice?

CLARIFICATION: "Government offices" here refers to a local executive and a local assembly, *not* a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An *executive* is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a mayor). An *assembly* is a larger body of officials.

"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a local elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office — including appointment by a higher level of government — are considered to be *non-elected*.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

RESPONSES:

0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected.

1: Generally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly.

2: Generally, the local assembly is elected but not the executive.

3: Generally, the local executive is elected and there is no assembly.

4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no executive.

5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected.

ORDERING: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions on local offices relative power.

SCALE: Nominal.

SOURCE(S): Country expert coding (C data).

NOTES: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2ellogov is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.71 Local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ellocpwr

*Original tag:* v2ellocpwr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the local level?

CLARIFICATION: We are concerned with the relative power of local offices to *each other*, not the power of local offices relative to higher levels of government.

Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, *not* those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)

An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

RESPONSES:

0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.

1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.

2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local level.

3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.

4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2ellocgov is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.72 Subnational elections free and fair (v2elffelr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elffelr

*Original tag:* v2elffelr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider subnational elections (regional and local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average?

CLARIFICATION: This question refers to subnational levels that have elected offices and elections. It does not refer to subnational levels without elected offices and elections. If there were no subnational elections in any of the years covered in this survey, choose option 5.

"Free and fair" refers to all aspects of the election process *except* the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (we measure that issue separately).

RESPONSES:

0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (who won office).

1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the elections (who won office).

2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (who won office).

3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (who won office).

4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: As of December 2014, the former category "5" is recoded as a separate variable (v2elffelrbin).

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2elffelrbin\_ord is 0.

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.73 Subnational elections held (v2elffelrbin)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elffelrbin

*Original tag:* v2elffelrbin

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are subnational elections held?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: As of December 2014, the former category "5" from variable v2elffelr is recoded as a separate variable (v2elffelrbin). If a coder chose the 5th category in the original question, it receives 0 in the new "v2elffelrbin" variable (corresponding to the answer, no, there were no subnational elections); otherwise it receives 1 (yes, there are subnational elections held). The resulting series of 0-1 country-coder time-series is run in the measurement model, which calculates the final value of v2elffelrbin while taking into account background coder characteristics.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.74 Subnational election unevenness (v2elsnlsff)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elsnlsff

*Original tag:* v2elsnlsff

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the freeness and fairness of subnational elections vary across different areas of the country?

CLARIFICATION: Subnational elections refer to elections to regional or local offices, as specified above.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are significantly more free and fair (or, alternatively, significantly less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.

1: Somewhat. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are somewhat more free and fair (or, alternatively, somewhat less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.

2: No. Subnational elections in most or all areas of the country are equally free and fair (or, alternatively, equally not free and not fair).

ORDERING: If answer is "2", skip remaining questions in this section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.4.75 Subnational election area less free and fair characteristics (v2elsnlfc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elsnlfc

*Original tag:* v2elsnlfc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *less* free and fair?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_0]  
 1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_1]  
 2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_2]  
 3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_3]  
 4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_4]  
 5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_5]  
 6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_6]  
 7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_7]  
 8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_8]  
 9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_9]  
 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_10]  
 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_11]  
 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_12]  
 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_13]  
 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_14]  
 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_15]  
 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_16]  
 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_17]  
 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_18]  
 19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_19]  
 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_20]  
 21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_21]  
 SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.  
 ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple selection.  
 DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
 CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.  
 CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
 YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.4.76 Subnational election area more free and fair characteristics (v2elsnmrfc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2elsnmrfc

*Original tag:* v2elsnmrfc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
 PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann  
 ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr  
 QUESTION: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *more* free and fair?  
 CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.  
 RESPONSES:  
 0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_0]  
 1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_1]  
 2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_2]  
 3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_3]  
 4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_4]  
 5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_5]  
 6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_6]  
 7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_7]  
 8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_8]  
 9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_9]  
 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_10]  
 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_11]  
 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_12]  
 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example).



(0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_13]  
14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_14]  
15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_15]  
16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_16]  
17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_17]  
18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_18]  
19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_19]  
20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_20]  
21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_21]  
SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.  
ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

## 2.1.5 V-Dem Indicators - Political Parties

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

#### **Political parties:**

A "political party" refers to an organization that nominates candidates for public office. A party may refer to a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party. Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party/coalition changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituency then it should be considered the same organization. Our notion of a party includes loose factional groupings such as the Tories and Whigs in the 19th-century Britain or the Caps and Hats in 18th-century Sweden. Unless stated otherwise the following questions pertain to parties that compete for seats in the national legislature or for the presidency.

Most of the questions in the following section ask you to generalize across parties in a particular country (and at a particular point in time). We realize that practices vary from party to party; these are, after all, highly diverse organizations. However, for our purposes it is important to consider what the most common practices are.

In answering these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them. And if there is no clarification of the issue, assume that the question is referring to practices rather than formal rules.

### 2.1.5.1 Barriers to parties (v2psbars)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2psbars

*Original tag:* v2psbars

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?

CLARIFICATION: Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits, as well as harassment.

RESPONSES:

0: Parties are not allowed.

1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally).

2: There are significant obstacles (*e.g.* party leaders face high levels of regular political

harassment by authorities).

3: There are modest barriers (*e.g.* party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities).

4: There are no substantial barriers.

ORDERING: If your answer is 1-4, proceed to the next question [v2psoppaut]. If your answer is 0, skip to the question about Party organization [v2psorgs].

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.5.2 Party Ban (v2psparban)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2psparban

*Original tag:* v2psparban

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are any parties banned?

CLARIFICATION: This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet registration requirements or support thresholds.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned.

1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties.

2: Yes. Many parties are banned.

3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned.

4: No. No parties are officially banned.

ORDERING: If your answer is 4, skip the next question [v2psbantar].

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.5.3 Opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2psoppaut

*Original tag:* v2psoppaut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?

CLARIFICATION: An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government, *i.e.*, that has no control over the executive.

RESPONSES:

0: Opposition parties are not allowed.

1: There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co-opted by the ruling regime.

2: At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

3: Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

4: All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.5.4 Party organizations (v2psorgs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2psorgs

*Original tag:* v2psorgs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?

CLARIFICATION: A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season.

RESPONSES:

0: No parties.

1: Fewer than half of the parties.

2: About half of the parties.

3: More than half of the parties.

4: All parties.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.5.5 Party Branches (v2psprbrch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2psprbrch

*Original tag:* v2psprbrch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How many parties have permanent local party branches?

RESPONSES:

0: None.

1: Fewer than half.

2: About half.

3: More than half.

4: All.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.5.6 Party linkages (v2psprlnks)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2psprlnks

*Original tag:* v2psprlnks

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their constituents?

CLARIFICATION: A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of "good" that the party offers in exchange for political support and participation in party activities.

RESPONSES:

0: Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs.

1: Mixed clientelistic and local collective.

2: Local collective. Constituents are rewarded with local collective goods, *e.g.*, wells, toilets, markets, roads, bridges, and local development.

3: Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic.

4: Policy/programmatic. Constituents respond to a party's positions on national policies, general party programs, and visions for society.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.1.5.7 Distinct party platforms (v2psplats)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2psplats

*Original tag:* v2psplats

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How many political parties with representation in the national legislature or presidency have publicly available party platforms (manifestos) that are publicized and relatively distinct from one another?

CLARIFICATION: In order to be counted in the affirmative, parties must have platforms that are both distinct (either in terms of content or generalized ideology) and publicly disseminated.

This question is *not* intended to measure how much the public actually knows about these platforms or whether they are important in structuring policymaking.

RESPONSES:

0: None, or nearly none.

1: Fewer than half.

2: About half.

3: More than half.

4: All, or nearly all.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded

thresholds.

#### 2.1.5.8 Candidate selection—National/local (v2pscnslnl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2pscnslnl

*Original tag:* v2pscnslnl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How centralized is legislative candidate selection within the parties?

CLARIFICATION: The power to select candidates for national legislative elections is often divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organizations, and national party leaders. One level usually dominates the selection process, while sometimes candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organization.

RESPONSES:

0: National legislative candidates are selected exclusively by national party leaders.

1: National legislative candidate selection is dominated by national party leaders but with some limited influence from local or state level organizations.

2: National legislative candidates are chosen through bargaining across different levels of party organization.

3: National legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level organizations, perhaps with some input from local party organizations or constituency groups.

4: National legislative candidates are chosen by a small cadre of local or municipal level actors.

5: National legislative candidates are chosen by constituency groups or direct primaries.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.1.5.9 Legislative party cohesion (v2pscohesv)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2pscohesv

*Original tag:* v2pscohesv

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their party on important bills?

RESPONSES:

0: Not really. Many members are elected as independents and party discipline is very weak.

1: More often than not. Members are more likely to vote with their parties than against them, but defections are common.

2: Mostly. Members vote with their parties most of the time.

3: Yes, absolutely. Members vote with their parties almost all the time.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.5.10 Party competition across regions (v2pscomprg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2pscomprg

*Original tag:* v2pscomprg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following best describes the nature of electoral support for major parties (those gaining over 10 percent of the vote)?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

0: Most major parties are competitive in only one or two regions of the country, *i.e.*, their support is heavily concentrated in a few areas.

1: Most major parties are competitive in some regions of the country, but not in others.

2: Most major parties are competitive in most regions of the country.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.5.11 National party control (v2psnatpar)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2psnatpar

*Original tag:* v2psnatpar

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How unified is party control of the national government?

CLARIFICATION: With respect to the executive, consider only those offices that have effective power over policymaking. (If there is a monarch or president with very little policymaking power, this office should not be considered.) With respect to bicameral legislatures, consider only the chamber, or chambers, that have effective policymaking power. (If the upper chamber is inactive or clearly subordinate, consider only the lower chamber.) Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

0: Unified coalition control. A single multi-party coalition controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single coalition gathers together a majority of seats.).

1: Divided party control. (A) Different parties or individuals (unconnected to parties) control the executive and the legislature or (B) Executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each of which belongs to different parties; or between a non-partisan monarch and a prime minister.

2: Unified party control. A single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single party has a majority of seats.).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.5.12 Subnational party control (v2pssunpar)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2pssunpar

*Original tag:* v2pssunpar

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does a single party control important policymaking bodies across subnational units (regional and local governments)?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

0: In almost all subnational units (at least 90percent), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

1: In most subnational units (66percent-90percent), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

2: In few subnational units (less than 66percent), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.5.13 Party ban target (v2psbantar)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2psbantar

*Original tag:* v2psbantar

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: If any parties are banned, what label best describes these parties?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Ethnic party. [v2psbantar\_0]

1: Religious party. [v2psbantar\_1]

2: Regional/local party. [v2psbantar\_2]

3: Leftist extremist party. [v2psbantar\_3]

4: Rightist extremist party. [v2psbantar\_4]

5: Other. [v2psbantar\_5]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

NOTES: The answer categories for contemporary and historical differ in the inclusion of the word "extremist". In contemporary it is included while excluded in the historical answer categories.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.6 V-Dem Indicators - Direct Democracy

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Direct democracy:** This set of questions focuses on direct popular votes. Four mechanisms are distinguished: a. Measures placed on the ballot by the executive and/or the legislature for which the constitution or basic laws require a vote. These are referred to as *constitutional referendums* (*i.e. obligatory referendums*). b. Measures placed on the ballot by the executive and/or the legislature that for which the constitution or basic laws does not require a vote. These are referred to as *plebiscites*. c. Measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process that concern the possible adoption of a new law or constitutional amendment. These are referred to as *popular initiatives*. d. Measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process that concern the possible rejection of a recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. These are referred to as *referendums*.

Note that we do not consider recall elections or citizen petitions to the legislature even they may also involve a gathering of signatures or a popular vote. Note also that in coding these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice. In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..."

#### 2.1.6.1 Initiatives permitted (v2ddlexci)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddlexci

*Original tag:* v2ddlexci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: Is there legal provision for initiatives?

CLARIFICATION: These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either a new law or a constitutional amendment.

RESPONSES:

0: Not allowed.

1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).

2: Allowed and binding.

ORDERING: If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question "Referendums permitted" [v2ddlexrf].

SCALE: Ordinal.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.6.2 Initiatives signatures (v2ddsignci)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddsignci

*Original tag:* v2ddsignci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How many signatures are required in order to place an initiative on the ballot?

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021



#### 2.1.6.3 Initiatives signatures percent (v2ddsigpci)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddsigpci

*Original tag:* v2ddsigpci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How many signatures — expressed as the percentage (percent) of registered voters — are required in order to place an initiative on the ballot?

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.6.4 Initiatives signature-gathering period (v2ddsigdci)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddsigdci

*Original tag:* v2ddsigdci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: If you answered yes to the previous question, how long is the period allowed for gathering signatures (expressed as a number of days) for an initiative?

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

ORDERING: Answer only if answered 1 for previous question.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1919-2021

#### 2.1.6.5 Initiatives signature-gathering time limit (v2ddsiglci)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddsiglci

*Original tag:* v2ddsiglci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: Is there a limit on the time allowed for signature gathering prior to placing an initiative on the ballot?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.6.6 Initiatives participation threshold (v2ddpartci)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddpartci

*Original tag:* v2ddpartci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: What threshold of participation — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for an initiative to be binding?  
CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.7 Initiatives approval threshold (v2ddapprci)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddapprci

*Original tag:* v2ddapprci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: What threshold of approval — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for an initiative to be binding?  
CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.8 Initiatives administrative threshold (v2ddadmci)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddadmci

*Original tag:* v2ddadmci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: What percentage of subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for an initiative to be approved?  
CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.9 Initiatives super majority (v2ddspmc)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddspmc

*Original tag:* v2ddspmc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: What percentage (percent) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of an initiative?  
CLARIFICATION: For 2/3, enter 66 percent.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.6.10 Popular initiative credible threat (v2ddthreci)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddthreci

*Original tag:* v2ddthreci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: How effective is the menace of a popular initiative?  
CLARIFICATION: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then v2ddthreci =1, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years v2ddthreci =0.9, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.6.11 Referendums permitted (v2ddlexrf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddlexrf

*Original tag:* v2ddlexrf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: Is there legal provision for referendums?  
CLARIFICATION: These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either the rejection of a recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. (They do not include recall elections.)  
RESPONSES:  
0: Not allowed.  
1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).  
2: Allowed and binding.  
ORDERING: If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question "Occurrence of plebiscite this year" [v2ddyprl].  
SCALE: Ordinal.  
NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.6.12 Referendums signatures (v2ddsignrf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddsignrf

*Original tag:* v2ddsignrf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How many signatures are required in order to place a referendum on the ballot?

CLARIFICATION: If the law treats this as a percentage (percent) of registered voters, please leave this question blank and answer the next question instead.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.13 Referendums signatures percent (v2ddsigprf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddsigprf

*Original tag:* v2ddsigprf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How many signatures — expressed as the percentage (percent) of registered voters — are required in order to place a referendum on the ballot?

CLARIFICATION: If the law treats this as a raw number of registered voters, please leave this question blank and answer the previous question instead.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.14 Referendums signature-gathering period (v2ddsigdrf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddsigdrf

*Original tag:* v2ddsigdrf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: If you answered yes to the previous question, how long is period allowed for gathering signatures (expressed as a number of days) for a referendum?

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

ORDERING: Answer if previous question is coded 1.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.15 Referendums signature-gathering limit (v2ddsiglrf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddsiglrf

*Original tag:* v2ddsiglrf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: Is there a limit on the time allowed for signature gathering prior to placing a referendum on the ballot?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.16 Referendums participation threshold (v2ddpartrf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddpartrf

*Original tag:* v2ddpartrf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: What threshold of participation — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a referendum to be binding?

CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.17 Referendums approval threshold (v2ddapprf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddapprf

*Original tag:* v2ddapprf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: What threshold of approval — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a referendum to be binding?

CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.18 Referendums administrative threshold (v2ddadmrf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddadmrf

*Original tag:* v2ddadmrf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: What percentage of subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for a referendum to be approved?

CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.19 Referendums super majority (v2ddspmrf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddspmrf

*Original tag:* v2ddspmrf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: What percentage (percent) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of a referendum?

CLARIFICATION: For 2/3, enter 66 percent.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.20 Popular referendum credible threat (v2ddthrerf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddthrerf

*Original tag:* v2ddthrerf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How effective is the menace of a popular referendum?

CLARIFICATION: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then v2ddthrerf =1, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years v2ddthrerf =0.9, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.21 Constitutional changes popular vote (v2ddlexor)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddlexor

*Original tag:* v2ddlexor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: Is a popular and direct vote required in order for a constitutional change to be legally binding?

CLARIFICATION: Unless otherwise stated, every question refers to direct democracy at the national level, *i.e.* it does not incorporate popular votes at the provincial or local level.

RESPONSES:

0: No, it is not required.

1: Depends on the content of constitutional change (for some it is required, for others however it is not).

2: Yes, any constitutional must be approved directly by the citizenry.

SCALE: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.22 Obligatory referendum participation threshold (v2ddpartor)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddpartor

*Original tag:* v2ddpartor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: Must some threshold of participation be reached in order for an obligatory referendum to be binding?

CLARIFICATION: Specify the required turnout as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.23 Obligatory referendum approval threshold (v2ddappor)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddappor

*Original tag:* v2ddappor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: Must some threshold of approval — among registered voters — be reached in order for an obligatory referendum to be binding?

CLARIFICATION: Express your answer as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.24 Obligatory referendum administrative threshold (v2ddadmor)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddadmor

*Original tag:* v2ddadmor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: What percentage of subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for an obligatory referendum to be approved?

CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.25 Obligatory referendum super majority (v2ddspmor)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddspmor

*Original tag:* v2ddspmor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: What percentage (percent) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of an obligatory referendum?

CLARIFICATION: For 2/3, enter 66 percent.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.26 Obligatory referendum credible threat (v2ddthreor)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddthreor

*Original tag:* v2ddthreor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How effective is the menace of an obligatory referendum?

CLARIFICATION: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then v2ddthreor =1, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years v2ddthreci =0.9, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.27 Plebiscite permitted (v2ddlexpl)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddlexpl

*Original tag:* v2ddlexpl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A



PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: Is there legal provision for plebiscites?  
CLARIFICATION: These are measures placed on the ballot by the legislature and/or the executive.  
RESPONSES:  
0: Not allowed.  
1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).  
2: Allowed and binding.  
ORDERING: If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question "Initiatives permitted" [v2ddlexci].  
SCALE: Ordinal.  
NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.6.28 Plebiscite participation threshold (v2ddpartpl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddpartpl

*Original tag:* v2ddpartpl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: What threshold of participation — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a plebiscite to be binding?  
CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.6.29 Plebiscite approval threshold (v2ddapprpl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddapprpl

*Original tag:* v2ddapprpl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: What threshold of approval — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a plebiscite to be binding?  
CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.6.30 Plebiscite administrative threshold (v2ddadmpl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddadmpl

*Original tag:* v2ddadmpl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: Must a majority across subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) be attained in order for a plebiscite to be approved?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes — at least half of subnational districts.

2: Yes — more than half of subnational districts.

SCALE: Ordinal.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.31 Plebiscite super majority (v2ddspmpl)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddspmpl

*Original tag:* v2ddspmpl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: What percentage (percent) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of a plebiscite?

CLARIFICATION: For 2/3, enter 66 percent.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.32 Plebiscite credilbe threat (v2ddthrepl)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddthrepl

*Original tag:* v2ddthrepl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How effective is the menace of a plebiscite?

CLARIFICATION: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then v2ddthrepl =1, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years v2ddthrepl =0.9, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.33 Occurrence of citizen-initiative this year (v2ddyrcl)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddyrcl

*Original tag:* v2ddyrci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: How many *citizen-initiative* occurred this year?  
RESPONSES:  
Numeric.  
SCALE: Interval.  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.34 Occurrence of referendum this year (v2ddyrrf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddyrrf

*Original tag:* v2ddyrrf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: How many *referendums* occurred this year?  
RESPONSES:  
Numeric.  
SCALE: Interval.  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.35 Occurrence of obligatory referendum this year (v2ddyror)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddyror

*Original tag:* v2ddyror

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: How many *obligatory referendums* occurred this year?  
RESPONSES:  
Numeric.  
SCALE: Interval.  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.36 Occurrence of plebiscite this year (v2ddyrrpl)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddyrrpl

*Original tag:* v2ddyrrpl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: How many *plebiscites* occurred this year?  
RESPONSES:  
Numeric.  
SCALE: Interval.  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.37 Number of popular votes this year (v2ddyrall)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddyrall

*Original tag:* v2ddyrall

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How many direct democracy elections (initiatives, referendums and/or plebiscites) occurred this year?

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 3, 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.6.38 Occurrence of any type of popular vote this year credible (v2ddcredal)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ddcredal

*Original tag:* v2ddcredal

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: If any direct democracy election occurred this year, was the official result of the vote, or votes (their success or failure) credible?

CLARIFICATION: By credible, we mean whether the official results of the vote(s) reflect the actual vote (leaving aside issues of voter exclusion, intimidation, or vote-buying).

RESPONSES:

0: Not credible.

1: Credible.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### **2.1.7 V-Dem Indicators - The Executive**

#### **Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)**

##### **Executive:**

In this section, we distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG). The *head of state* is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. Sometimes this is a largely ceremonial role, *e.g.* a monarch who reigns but does not rule, or a president whose powers are strictly circumscribed. The *head of government* is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government, typically presiding over a cabinet. In a parliamentary system, this is usually the prime minister. In a presidential system, this is usually the president, who then serves as both, head of state and head of government. In a typical semi-presidential system, the president serves as head of state and the prime minister serves as head of government.

These definitions are grounded in the *functions* that each office performs, as described above. Titles can be confusing. Do not assume, for example, that simply because an individual holds the title of "president" s/he is serving as the chief public representative of the country. Likewise, it may be that the *effective* head of state/head of government is someone other than the *official* head of state/head

of government. In this instance, the following questions apply to the person who effectively wields this power. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of state was a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country was the chairman of the communist party. It is the latter who is the "effective" head of state, and hence should be the focus of your answers. The same applies if the head of state/head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else. It is the latter person who is the effective head of state/head of government.

If you are considering a semi sovereign territory, such as a colony, an annexed territory or a member of the British Commonwealth, please answer the following questions with respect to the head of state and (if separate) the head of government who is located in the territory in question. Thus, in a typical British colony the governor-general—not the King/Queen of England—would be understood as the head of state. Likewise, in a British colony the local prime minister in the colony—not the prime minister in London—would be understood as the head of government.

In order to mitigate potential misunderstandings, the identities of the head of state and head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, "HOS name." This is your key to what we mean by "head of state" or "head of government."

Note also that when the two functions are fused in the same office, we ask you to code only the head of state section of the survey. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the precoded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your V-Dem contact. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question.

In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days.

#### 2.1.7.1 HOS name (v2exnamhos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exnamhos

*Original tag:* v2exnamhos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the name of the head of state?

CLARIFICATION: If the head of state is a collective body, provide the name of the person exercising the most effective power within this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression "collective body." Do not include nicknames. If multiple Heads of State were appointed in a given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment and *reappointment* for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.7.2 HOS title (v2extithos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2extithos

*Original tag:* v2extithos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the title of the head of state?

CLARIFICATION: If the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, this and the following questions refer to both. Please provide a literal translation of the title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If the head of state temporarily fills the role, this will be excluded from the answer; they should be called i.e. "President" and not "Acting President". If the head of state is a collective body, provide the title of the person exercising the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression "collective body." If multiple Heads of State with different titles were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002); worldstatesmen.org.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.7.3 HOS removal by legislature in practice (v2exremhsp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exremhsp

*Original tag:* v2exremhsp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of state from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity *and* without the involvement of any other agency?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

RESPONSES:

0: No, under no circumstances.

1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.

2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.

3: Yes, most likely.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.1.7.4 HOS dissolution in practice (v2exdfdshs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exdfdshs

*Original tag:* v2exdfdshs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of state took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. By "dissolving the legislature" we refer to the ability of the head of state to call a new election for the legislature.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as "once a year", by time point within term, such as "not within the last sixth months of the head of state's term", and by the requirement that the head of state must then himself/herself stand for election).

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.5 HOS appoints cabinet in practice (v2exdfcbhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exdfcbhs

*Original tag:* v2exdfcbhs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the head of state have the power to appoint — or is the approval of the head of state necessary for the appointment of — cabinet ministers?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOS controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet, and only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

2: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

3: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet.

4: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.6 HOS veto power in practice (v2exdfvths)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exdfvths

*Original tag:* v2exdfvths

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of state took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: By "veto", we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).

2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).

3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority — *e.g.*, 2/3 or 3/4 — of those voting).

4: Yes, with no possibility of override.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.7 HOS dismisses ministers in practice (v2exdfdmhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exdfdmhs

*Original tag:* v2exdfdmhs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of state took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (*e.g.*, vote of no confidence).

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).



2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of state proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, *i.e.*, so called "constructive dismissal").

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.8 HOS proposes legislation in practice (v2exdfpphs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exdfpphs

*Original tag:* v2exdfpphs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the head of state have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

CLARIFICATION: By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).

1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.

2: No. The head of state cannot propose legislation.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.9 HOS = HOG? (v2exhoshog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exhoshog

*Original tag:* v2exhoshog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the head of state (HOS) also head of government (HOG)?

CLARIFICATION: Note that this question only pertains to whether the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, regardless of the relative powers of the two. Thus, in a constitutional monarchy, for example, the head of state and head of government are not the same even though the head of state may lack any real political power. If multiple head of states/head of governments were appointed in any year, please answer this question with respect to all of them by checking or unchecking the specific dates. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all

the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.  
RESPONSES:  
0: No  
1: Yes  
ORDERING: If HOS=HOG (answer is yes: 1) for all years: skip to "Executive as whole introduction" [v2exintro3].  
SCALE: Dichotomous.  
SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v83-v87; Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002).  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.10 HOS age (v2exagehos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exagehos

*Original tag:* v2exagehos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell  
QUESTION: In what year was the head of state born?  
RESPONSES:  
date-year only  
99: Not applicable, *e.g.* the HOS is a collective body.  
SOURCE(S): worldstatesman.org.  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.11 HOS selection by legislature in practice (v2exaphos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exaphos

*Original tag:* v2exaphos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell  
QUESTION: Was approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?  
CLARIFICATION: By "approval" we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of state has to have majority support (or should not be opposed by the majority) in the legislature even though no vote is taken on his/her appointment. We are *not* concerned with certification of electoral college votes (as in the US, Mexico).  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
ORDERING: Answer this question only for those years you selected 1-5 on question v2expathhs.  
SCALE: Dichotomous.  
SOURCE(S): V-Dem country coordinators; constituteproject.org; IPU Parline.  
NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).  
CLEANING: Set to missing where v2expathhs is 6 or 7  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.1.7.12 HOS directly elected (v2ex\_elechos)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ex\_elechos

*Original tag:* v2ex\_elechos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the head of state HOS directly elected?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2expathhs

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.1.7.13 HOS female (v2exfemhos)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exfemhos

*Original tag:* v2exfemhos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell, Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: What is the gender of the head of state?

CLARIFICATION: If the head of state is a collective body, provide the gender of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are female.

RESPONSES:

0: Male

1: Female

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): worldstatesman.org; Melander (2005); Paxton and Hughes (2007).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.1.7.14 HOS term length by law (v2exfxtmhs)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exfxtmhs

*Original tag:* v2exfxtmhs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the maximum term length of the Head of State, in years?

RESPONSES:

Numeric, number of years.

0: Term length not specified in constitution.

99: Not Applicable.

100: Term length for life or there is no term length.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); National constitutions.

NOTES: *De jure* term lengths for Head of State and Head of Government, coded for each head of state and head of government as coded in v2exnamhos and v2exnamhog. In the case of a single office representing both Head of State and Head of Government, HOS is coded

to the appropriate term length while HOG is coded as 99. For colonies, if there was no official local constitution, HOS/HOG is coded by their constitutional status according to the colonial power. Finally, for sovereign states lacking a constitution or having suspended their constitution, HOS/HOG is coded to 99 as not applicable for those relevant years.

Changes to term lengths are recorded as occurring on the date that a new constitution or constitutional amendment takes force, or, if unavailable, date of promulgation.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.7.15 HOS appointment in practice (v2expathhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2expathhs

*Original tag:* v2expathhs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: How did the head of state reach office?

CLARIFICATION: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 7 should only be selected if the head of state is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election. We count as direct elections (category 7) also those indirect elections carried out by an electoral college, whose only purpose is to elect the president.

RESPONSES:

0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.

1: Appointed by a foreign power.

2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).

3: Appointed by a royal council.

4: Through hereditary succession.

5: Appointed by the military.

6: Appointed by the legislature.

7: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).

8: Other.

ORDERING: If you select 0 or 8, proceed to the next question [v2exothhs]. If you select 1-5, skip to question "HOS selection by legislature in practice [v2exaphos]". If you selected 6-7, skip to question [v2excomhs].

SCALE: Nominal (v2expathhs), or a series of dichotomous scales.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem country coordinators; [constituteproject.org](http://constituteproject.org); IPU Parline.

NOTES: Converted from B to A coding. v2expathhs is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of State. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOS was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhs).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.16 HOS control over (v2exctlhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exctlhs

*Original tag:* v2exctlhs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, from which of the following bodies must the head of state

customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply. In case the HOS does not have the power to make important decisions on domestic policy, select 0 (None).

RESPONSES:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_4]

5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_5]

6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_6]

7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_7]

ORDERING: If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhos]. If you select 0-6, skip to question "HOS dissolution in practice" [v2exdfdshs].

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.17 HOS year of death (v2exdeathos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exdeathos

*Original tag:* v2exdeathos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: In what year did the head of state die?

RESPONSES:

Date — year only

SCALE: Interval

SOURCE(S): worldstatesman.org.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.18 HOS party (v2exparhos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exparhos

*Original tag:* v2exparhos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Nils Düpont

QUESTION: What is the name of the political party to which the head of state belongs?

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Leaders Global (Düpont, Döring, and Bederke 2021), Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019); worldstatesmen.org

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.7.19 HOS removal by other in practice (v2exrmhsol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exrmhsol

*Original tag:* v2exrmhsol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of state if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_4]

5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_5]

6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_6]

7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_7]

ORDERING: If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exrmhsol]. If you select 0-6, skip to question "HOS dissolution in practice" [v2exctlhs].

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.20 Name of HOG (v2exnamhog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exnamhog

*Original tag:* v2exnamhog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the name of the head of government?

CLARIFICATION: If the head of government is a collective body, provide the name of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression "collective body." Do not include nicknames. If multiple heads of government were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment and *reappointment* for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.21 Title of HOG (v2extithog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2extithog

*Original tag:* v2extithog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the title of the head of government (HOG)?

CLARIFICATION: Please provide a literal translation of the title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If the head of government temporarily fills the role, this will be excluded from the answer; they should be called i.e. "Prime Minister" and not "Acting Prime Minister". If the head of government is a collective body, provide the title of the person exercising the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, the name of the entire body. If multiple heads of government with different titles were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to all of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.22 HOG removal by legislature in practice (v2exremhog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exremhog

*Original tag:* v2exremhog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of government from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity *and* without the involvement of any other agency?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

RESPONSES:

0: No, under no circumstances.

1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.

2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.

3: Yes, most likely.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.23 HOG dissolution in practice (v2exdjdshg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exdjdshg

*Original tag:* v2exdjdshg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of government took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. By "dissolving the legislature" we refer to the ability of the head of government to call a new election for the legislature.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as "once a year", by time point within term, such as "not within the last sixth months of the head of government's term", and by the requirement that the head of government must then himself/herself stand for election).

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.24 HOG appoints cabinet in practice (v2exdjcbhg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exdjcbhg

*Original tag:* v2exdjcbhg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the head of government have the power to appoint — or is the approval of the head of government necessary for the appointment of — cabinet ministers?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOG controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

2: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.



DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.25 HOG dismisses ministers in practice (v2exdfdshg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exdfdshg

*Original tag:* v2exdfdshg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of government took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (*e.g.*, vote of no confidence).

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of government proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, *i.e.*, so called "constructive dismissal").

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.26 HOG veto power in practice (v2exdfvthg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exdfvthg

*Original tag:* v2exdfvthg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of government took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: By "veto", we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).

2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).

3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority — *e.g.*, 2/3 or 3/4 — of those voting).

4: Yes, with no possibility of override.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.27 HOG proposes legislation in practice (v2exdfpphg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exdfpphg

*Original tag:* v2exdfpphg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the head of government have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

CLARIFICATION: By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).

1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.

2: No. The head of government cannot propose legislation.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.1.7.28 HOG age (v2exagehog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exagehog

*Original tag:* v2exagehog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: In what year was the head of government born?

RESPONSES:

[date-year only]

99: Not applicable, *e.g.* the HOG is a collective body.

SOURCE(S): worldstatesman.org.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.7.29 HOG selection by legislature in practice (v2exaphogp)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exaphogp

*Original tag:* v2exaphogp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Was the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of government?

CLARIFICATION: By "approval" we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of government has to have majority support in the legislature although no vote is taken on his/her appointment. If the same person or body is both head of state and head of government, they are only coded as head of state.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

ORDERING: Answer this question only if you selected 1-6 on question v2expathhg.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem country coordinators; constituteproject.org; IPU Parline.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. v2expathhg is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of Government. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOG was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1 or when v2expathhg is 7 or 8.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.7.30 HOG directly elected (v2ex\_elechog)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ex\_elechog

*Original tag:* v2ex\_elechog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the head of government HOG directly elected?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2expathhg

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.7.31 HOG female (v2exfemhog)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exfemhog

*Original tag:* v2exfemhog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Jan Teorell  
QUESTION: What is the gender of the head of government?  
CLARIFICATION: If the head of government is a collective body, provide the gender of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are female.  
RESPONSES:  
0: Male  
1: Female  
SCALE: Dichotomous.  
SOURCE(S): worldstatesmen.org; cf. Melander (2005); Paxton and Hughes (2007).  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).  
CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.7.32 HOG term length by law (v2exfxtmhg)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exfxtmhg

*Original tag:* v2exfxtmhg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell  
QUESTION: What is the maximum term length of the head of government?  
RESPONSES:  
Numeric  
0: Term length not specified  
99: Not Applicable  
100: Term length is explicitly unlimited or the life of the office holder.  
ORDERING: CCP ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM=3 or HOSHOG=2; Constitutions.  
SCALE: Interval.  
SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v126.  
NOTES: Changes to term lengths are recorded as occurring on the date that a new constitution or constitutional amendment takes force, or, if unavailable, date of promulgation.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.7.33 Relative power of the HOG (v2ex\_hogw)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ex\_hogw

*Original tag:* v2ex\_hogw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell  
QUESTION: Does the head of government HOG have more relative power than the head of state HOS over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers?  
CLARIFICATION: The relative power of the HOG is simply 1- v2ex\_hosw.  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
0.5: The HOS and HOG share equal power.  
0.75: See notes.  
1: Yes.  
SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).  
SOURCE(S): v2exdfcbhs v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdsghg  
NOTES: If the head of state is also head of government, v2ex\_hogw is 1.

From 1900-01-01 to 1960-08-09 Belgium has a score of 0.75.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.7.34 HOG appointed by HOS (v2ex\_hosconhog)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ex\_hosconhog

*Original tag:* v2ex\_hosconhog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the head of government HOG appointed by the head of state HOS?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2expathhg

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.7.35 HOG appointment in practice (v2expathhg)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2expathhg

*Original tag:* v2expathhg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: How did the head of government gain access to office?

CLARIFICATION: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 8 should only be selected if the head of government is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election. If the same person or body is both head of state and head of government, they are only coded as head of state.

RESPONSES:

0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.

1: Appointed by a foreign power.

2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).

3: Appointed by a royal council.

4: Through hereditary succession.

5: Appointed by the military.

6: Appointed by the head of state.

7: Appointed by the legislature.

8: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).

9: Other.

ORDERING: If you select 0 or 9, proceed to the next question [v2exothhgl]. If you selected 1-6, skip to question "HOG selection by legislature in practice" [v2exaphogp]. If you selected 7-8, skip to question [v2excomex].

SCALE: Nominal (v2expathhg), or a series of dichotomous scales.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem country coordinators; [constituteproject.org](http://constituteproject.org); IPU Parline.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. v2expathhg is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of Government. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOG was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).  
CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.36 HOG control over (v2exctlhg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exctlhg

*Original tag:* v2exctlhg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, from which of the following bodies does the head of government customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply. In case the HOG does not have the power to make important decisions on domestic policy, select 0 (None).

RESPONSES:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_4]

5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_5]

6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_6]

7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_7]

8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_8]

ORDERING: If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhog]. If you select 0-7, skip to question HOG dissolution in practice [v2exdjdshg].

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.37 HOG year of death (v2exdeathog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exdeathog

*Original tag:* v2exdeathog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: In what year did the head of government die?

RESPONSES:

Date — year only

SCALE: Interval

SOURCE(S): worldstatesman.org.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.38 HOG party (v2expothog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2expothog

*Original tag:* v2expothog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Nils Düpont

QUESTION: What is the name of the political party to which the head of government belongs?

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Leaders Global (Düpont, Döring, and Bederke 2021), Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke et al. 2021); worldstatesmen.org

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.7.39 HOG removal by other in practice (v2exrmhgnp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exrmhgnp

*Original tag:* v2exrmhgnp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of government if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_4]

5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_5]

6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_6]

7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_7]

8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_8]

ORDERING: If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exrmhgop]. If you select 0-7, skip to question HOG control [v2extlhog].

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple selection

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.40 Executive respects constitution (v2exrescon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exrescon

*Original tag:* v2exrescon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution?

RESPONSES:

0: Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences.

1: Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but still must respect certain provisions.

2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution, but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences.

3: Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution, and when it happens they face legal charges.

4: Members of the executive never violate the constitution.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.41 Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exbribe

*Original tag:* v2exbribe

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

RESPONSES:

0: It is routine and expected.

1: It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive.

2: It happens but is unpredictable: those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be necessary.

3: It happens occasionally but is not expected.

4: It never, or hardly ever, happens.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.42 Executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembezz)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exembezz

*Original tag:* v2exembezz

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government,



and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

RESPONSES:

0: Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.

1: Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.

2: About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.

3: Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.

4: Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.43 Public sector corrupt exchanges (v2excrptps)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2excrptps

*Original tag:* v2excrptps

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

CLARIFICATION: When responding to this question, we would like to you think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time.

1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees.

2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times.

3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time.

4: No. Never, or hardly ever.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.7.44 Public sector theft (v2exthftps)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exthftps

*Original tag:* v2exthftps

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

CLARIFICATION: When responding to this question, we would like you to think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

RESPONSES:

0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.

1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.

2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.

3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.

4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.1.7.45 Chief executive appointment by upper chamber (v2exapup)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exapup

*Original tag:* v2exapup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the approval of the upper chamber (together with the lower chamber) necessary for the appointment of the chief executive?

CLARIFICATION: The chief executive is defined by whether the head of state or the head of government have more relative power (v2ex\_hosw, v2ex\_hogw). Answer v2exapup only if the legislature is playing a role in the appointment of the chief executive (if v2exaphos or v2exaphogp are 1).

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): National constitutions; Websites of national governments.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.1.7.46 Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval (v2exapupap)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exapupap

*Original tag:* v2exapupap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the tacit or implicit approval of the upper chamber (alongside the lower chamber) necessary for the appointment of the chief executive?

CLARIFICATION: The chief executive is defined by whether the head of state or the head of government have more relative power (v2ex\_hosw, v2ex\_hogw). Answer v2exapupap only if the legislature is playing a role in the appointment of the chief executive (if v2exaphos or v2exaphogp are 1).

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): National constitutions; Websites of national governments.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.7.47 Regime information (v2reginfo)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2reginfo

*Original tag:* v2reginfo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

QUESTION: What is the regime name as well as start and end dates of this regime?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the identity of the regime, which is given a suggestive name, and its start and end dates have already been entered. We are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded information. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regime.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### **2.1.7.48 Regime end type (v2regendtype)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regendtype

*Original tag:* v2regendtype

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

QUESTION: Could you specify the type of process that you consider the most important in leading to the end of the regime?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that what is considered the most important process that eventually ended the relevant regime has already been entered. We are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded information. This means that the information has already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regime.

RESPONSES:

0: A military coup d'état.  
1: A coup d'état conducted by other groups than the military.  
2: A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader.  
3: Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d'état)  
4: Natural death of the sitting leader  
5: Loss in civil war.  
6: Loss in inter-state war.  
7: Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war)  
8: Popular uprising.  
9: Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by sitting regime leaders  
10: Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization/democratization)  
11: Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for the sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1–10  
12: Other process than those specified by categories 1–11.  
13: The regime still exists  
DATA RELEASE: 9-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021  
DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.1.7.49 Regime interregnum (v2regint)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regint

*Original tag:* v2regint

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

QUESTION: Does there exist an identifiable political regime?

CLARIFICATION: This question is used to identify so-called interregnum periods, where no political regime is in control over the entity. Different types of political situations can lead to periods of time under which there is no identifiable political regime, one example being a civil war in which none of the parties have clear control over political bodies and processes in the country. However, the interregnum coding is employed conservatively, meaning that partial control over political bodies and processes in fairly large parts of the country (which is often the case also during civil wars) is sufficient for a 0 score.

Please note that the expert coded (C) questions on support and opposition groups in the regime survey are only coded when v2regint=1.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): Encyclopedia Britannica; Wikipedia; various region- and country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.1.7.50 Regime ID (D) (v2regidnr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regidnr

*Original tag:* v2regidnr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the unique identifier number given to the current regime?

CLARIFICATION: This numeric regime identifier consists, first, of the country's V-Dem country code and, second, of a regime numeric counter that has at least two digits (hence the first regime identified for a country would be assigned 01).

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): v2reginfo

DATA RELEASE: 12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### **2.1.7.51 Regime Duration (D) (v2regdur)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regdur

*Original tag:* v2regdur

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: How many days have passed since the current regime started?

CLARIFICATION: The variable pertains to the regime coded under v2reginfo, and is measured in number of calendar days.

SCALE: Interval

SOURCE(S): v2reginfo

DATA RELEASE: 12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### **2.1.7.52 Regime most important support group (v2regimpgroup)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regimpgroup

*Original tag:* v2regimpgroup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which (one) group does the current political regime rely on most strongly in order to maintain power?

CLARIFICATION: Choose the group that, if it were to retract its support to the regime, would most endanger the regime (most strongly increase the chance that it loses power).

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).

3: Business elites.

4: Civil servants.

5: The military.

6: An ethnic or racial group(s).

7: A religious group(s).

8: Local elites, including chiefs.

9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.

10: Urban middle classes

11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).

12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)

13: A foreign government or colonial power.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.1.7.53 Regime support groups size (v2regsupgroupssize)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regsupgroupssize

*Original tag:* v2regsupgroupssize

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In total, how large is the percentage share of the domestic adult (18+) population that belongs to the political regime's supporting groups?

CLARIFICATION: You should consider the sum of all the groups (excepting foreign governments and colonial powers) entered in v2regsupgroups. Hence, your answer should take into account the total size of the/those groups that are supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power. Regarding the issue of overlapping identities, and one individual potentially belonging to more than one groups: Individuals should only be "counted" once; thus if the two relevant supporting groups are (4) civil servants, which total about 5percent, and all of them belong to a particular ethnic group (6) also coded as a relevant, the overall total size of the supporting groups is still 5percent (presuming that no other members of that ethnic group are essential for the regime staying in power).

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely small

(About 1 percent of the population or less; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — a handful of higher-rank military officers, or by only a royal council and a few hundred landowners)

1: Very small

(Between 1 percent and 5 percent of the population; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — higher ranking civil servants and the military, or by moderately sized business and agrarian elites)

2: Small

(Between 5 percent and 15 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — relatively small ethnic groups, or by urban elites and the urban middle classes in predominantly rural societies)

3: Moderate

(Between 15 percent and 30 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — moderately sized ethnic groups, by rural middle classes in rural societies, or by urban middle classes in urban societies)

4: Large

(More than 30 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — large ethnic groups (and then not only the elites/leaders of such groups), or by rural working classes in rural societies.)

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model

(see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.1.7.54 Regime support location (v2regsuploc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regsuploc

*Original tag:* v2regsuploc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: In which geographic area do the support groups for the current political regime mainly reside?

RESPONSES:

0: Abroad.

1: In the capital.

2: In urban areas outside the capital.

3: In rural areas.

4: The groups are not concentrated in any particular area.

SCALE: Nominal

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories receive the value 4.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.1.7.55 Regime most important opposition group (v2regimpoppgroup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regimpoppgroup

*Original tag:* v2regimpoppgroup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which (one) group constitutes the greatest threat to the current regime?

CLARIFICATION: Choose the one group (among those you registered as opposition groups under the v2regoppgroups question) that is the most dangerous threat to the regime in a given year. That is, the group that could most strongly increase the chance that the regime loses power. The importance/danger associated with an opposition group will be affected both by its level of hostility towards the regime and its power resources/how capable it is of removing the regime should it try to do so. We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).

3: Business elites.

4: Civil servants.

5: The military.

6: An ethnic or racial group(s).

7: A religious group(s).  
8: Local elites, including chiefs.  
9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.  
10: Urban middle classes  
11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).  
12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)  
13: A foreign government or colonial power.  
DATA RELEASE: 11-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.  
"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regoppgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.  
CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2020  
DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.1.7.56 Regime opposition groups size (v2regoppgroupssize)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regoppgroupssize

*Original tag:* v2regoppgroupssize

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In total, how large is the share of the domestic adult (18+) population that are noteworthy opposition actors to the current political regime?

CLARIFICATION: Consider the sum total of all the groups (excepting foreign governments and colonial powers) entered in v2regoppgroups. Hence, your answer should take into account the total size/number of the actors that oppose the regime and pose a threat to the regime maintaining power.

We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year.

Regarding the issue of individuals potentially belonging to more than one "opposition group": Individuals should only be "counted" once for the purpose of this question. For example, if the two relevant opposition groups are (4) civil servants, which total about 5percent of the population, and all of them belong to a particular ethnic group (6) also coded as a relevant, the overall total size of the opposition groups is still 5percent (presuming that there are no other members of that ethnic group who oppose the regime).

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely small (About 1 percent of the population or less)

1: Very small (Between 1 percent and 5 percent of the population)

2: Small (Between 5 percent and 15 percent)

3: Moderate (Between 15 percent and 30 percent)

4: Large (More than 30 percent)

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).



YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### **2.1.7.57 Regime opposition location (v2regopploc)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regopploc

*Original tag:* v2regopploc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: In which geographic area do groups opposing the current political regime mainly reside?

CLARIFICATION: You should consider the groups entered in v2regoppgroups, hence groups that both want to see the regime removed and (at least under “favorable conditions”) are capable of removing the regime. We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

0: Abroad.

1: In the capital.

2: In urban areas outside the capital.

3: In rural areas.

4: The groups are not concentrated in any particular area.

SCALE: Nominal

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories receive the value 4.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### **2.1.7.58 Strongest pro-regime preferences (v2regproreg)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regproreg

*Original tag:* v2regproreg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which (one) group has the strongest pro-regime preferences, irrespective of the group's resources and capabilities for affecting the regime's hold on power?

CLARIFICATION: Consider only the pro-regime preferences of individuals in this group, and do not take into consideration the abilities of this group to actually affect regime survival. Hence, the group with the strongest pro-regime preferences need not be the most important support group.

One way to think about what pro-/anti-regime preferences means is: what would individuals hypothetically (honestly) answer if asked in a survey: “On a scale from 0-10, how pleased are you with the current political regime, with 10 indicating the strongest support.” Select the group with the highest average score in this hypothetical survey.

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).

3: Business elites.

4: Civil servants.

5: The military.

6: An ethnic or racial group(s).

7: A religious group(s).

8: Local elites, including chiefs.

9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.

10: Urban middle classes

11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).

12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)

13: A foreign government or colonial power.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.1.7.59 Strongest anti-regime preferences (v2regantireg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regantireg

*Original tag:* v2regantireg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which (one) group has the strongest anti-regime preferences/antipathy against the current regime, irrespective of the group's resources and capabilities for affecting the regime's hold on power?

CLARIFICATION: Consider only the anti-regime preferences of the actors in this group, and do not take into consideration the abilities of this group to actually affect regime survival and change. Hence, the group with the strongest anti-regime preferences need not be the most important opposition group. Both capable and incapable political actors may have strong anti-regime preferences and want to see the regime removed from power. We also remind that the group needs not be currently mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; individuals may strongly resent a regime, without taking particular actions, in a given year.

One way to think about what pro-/anti-regime preferences mean, independently of ability to affect regime survival is: what would individuals hypothetically (honestly) answer if asked in a survey: "On a scale from 0-10, how pleased are you with the current political regime".

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regoppgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.1.7.60 Most powerful group in affecting regime duration and change (v2regpower)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regpower

*Original tag:* v2regpower

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Irrespective of its stance toward the regime (pro-, anti-, or neutral), which one group is the most important for affecting the current regime's chances of staying in power?

CLARIFICATION: Here we ask you to disregard group preferences, and only consider a group's resources and capabilities vis-a-vis affecting regime survival. In other words, do not consider whether this group is pro-regime, anti-regime, or neutral to the regime. Take only into consideration the capabilities of this group to affect regime survival, if key members of the group were to hypothetically mobilize the group in an effort to remove the regime. Politically neutral, as well as pro- and anti-regime groups, may have ample resources and be capable of organizing coordinated action. As a result, all three types of groups may have great influence over regime survival and change.

RESPONSES:

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.1.7.61 Regime end type, multiple selection version (v2regendtypems)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regendtypems

*Original tag:* v2regendtypems

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

QUESTION: Could you specify the types of processes (one or more) that led to the end of the regime?

RESPONSES:

0: A military coup d'état. [v2regendtypems\_0]

1: A coup d'état conducted by other groups than the military. [v2regendtypems\_1]

2: A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader. [v2regendtypems\_2]

3: Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d'état). [v2regendtypems\_3]

4: Natural death of the sitting leader. [v2regendtypems\_4]

5: Loss in civil war. [v2regendtypems\_5]

6: Loss in inter-state war. [v2regendtypems\_6]

7: Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war). [v2regendtypems\_7]

8: Popular uprising. [v2regendtypems\_8]

9: Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by sitting regime leaders. [v2regendtypems\_9]

10: Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization/democratization). [v2regendtypems\_10]

11: Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for the sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1-10. [v2regendtypems\_11]

12: Other process than those specified by categories 1-11. [v2regendtypems\_12]

13: The regime still exists. [v2regendtypems\_13]

SCALE: Nominal

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple selection

SOURCE(S): Encyclopedia Britannica; Wikipedia; various region- and country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.1.7.62 Regime opposition groups (v2regoppgroups)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regoppgroups

*Original tag:* v2regoppgroups

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which groups include noteworthy opposition actors – that is, individuals (mobilized or not) who both want to and who could, under favorable circumstances, be able to remove the existing political regime?(Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: Consider which group(s) include a significant share of individuals who both oppose the regime and pose a non-negligible threat to the regime (either mobilized or dormant). In other words, these individuals must both want to see the regime removed and, at least under hypothetical “favorable conditions”, be capable of removing the regime. Groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; opposition groups also include individuals who oppose the regime without taking particular actions, at the moment. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regoppgroups\_0]

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regoppgroups\_1]

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regoppgroups\_2]

3: Business elites. [v2regoppgroups\_3]

4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regoppgroups\_4]

5: The military. [v2regoppgroups\_5]

6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regoppgroups\_6]

7: A religious group(s). [v2regoppgroups\_7]

8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regoppgroups\_8]

9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regoppgroups\_9]

10: Urban middle classes. [v2regoppgroups\_10]

11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regoppgroups\_11]

12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regoppgroups\_12]

13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regoppgroups\_13]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.1.7.63 Explicit and active regime opposition groups (v2regoppgroupsact)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regoppgroupsact

*Original tag:* v2regoppgroupsact

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sirianne Dahlum, Tore Wig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which (if any) groups include a significant share of individuals who explicitly and actively mobilize against the regime in a particular year? (Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: Consider which group(s) include a significant share of individuals who engage in active and explicit opposition to the regime to promote its removal. These actors make explicit statements of dissent from the regime, publicly voice their preference for regime change, and may possibly engage in other actions intended to further the removal of the regime such as anti-regime demonstrations, sit-ins, boycotts, strikes, the formation of anti-system parties, acts of sabotage, or armed rebellion. Please note that only years when anti-regime speech or activity occurs should be coded. In years when groups probably oppose the regime, but are not engaged in any explicit acts of opposition, the group should not be selected. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a

democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regoppgroupsact\_0]

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regoppgroupsact\_1]

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regoppgroupsact\_2]

3: Business elites. [v2regoppgroupsact\_3]

4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regoppgroupsact\_4]

5: The military. [v2regoppgroupsact\_5]

6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regoppgroupsact\_6]

7: A religious group(s). [v2regoppgroupsact\_7]

8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regoppgroupsact\_8]

9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regoppgroupsact\_9]

10: Urban middle classes. [v2regoppgroupsact\_10]

11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regoppgroupsact\_11]

12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regoppgroupsact\_12]

13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regoppgroupsact\_13]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.1.7.64 Regime support groups (v2regsupgroups)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2regsupgroups

*Original tag:* v2regsupgroups

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which groups does the current political regime rely on in order to maintain power? (Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: Consider which group(s) is supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regsupgroups\_0]

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regsupgroups\_1]

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regsupgroups\_2]

3: Business elites. [v2regsupgroups\_3]

4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regsupgroups\_4]

5: The military. [v2regsupgroups\_5]

6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regsupgroups\_6]

7: A religious group(s). [v2regsupgroups\_7]

8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regsupgroups\_8]

9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regsupgroups\_9]

10: Urban middle classes. [v2regsupgroups\_10]

11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regsupgroups\_11]

12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regsupgroups\_12]

13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regsupgroups\_13]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.  
CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2020  
DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

## 2.1.8 V-Dem Indicators - The Legislature

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

#### The Legislature:

The following questions pertain to the legislature, an assembly of deputies or representatives with powers to consider, pass, amend, or repeal laws. If there is no legislature in the country you are coding for some period of years, do not code any questions for those years. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory such as a colony please answer this question with respect to the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the Parliament in London). A popular election need not involve universal suffrage; indeed, suffrage may be highly restricted. A "direct election" can include seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election.

Frequently, it is important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues. Note that sometimes we ask different coders to code different aspects of a question. So, you might get a question about the *de facto* state of affairs, but another source might provide the answer to the *de jure* state of affairs.

#### 2.1.8.1 Legislature bicameral (v2lgbicam)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgbicam

*Original tag:* v2lgbicam

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: How many chambers does the legislature contain?

CLARIFICATION: The number of chambers have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. This means that the score has already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating. If there is a change in the number of chambers, this is coded on the exact date of when the change occurred, for example the exact date of when a legislature was dissolved, or when the lower and/or upper chamber was established (usually coded on the date when the new legislature first meets; otherwise on the date of the legislative election where the composition of the new legislature was decided).

RESPONSES:

0: 0 chambers.

1: 1 chamber.

2: 2 or more chambers.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IFES; Websites of national parliaments; National constitutions; CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v191.

NOTES: For the country-year aggregation of the dataset, we have taken the minimum value of v2lgbicam. Constituent assemblies that perform other functions except for drafting and adopting a new constitution (*e.g.* legislating, electing president, adopting budget, etc) are coded as 1 (1 chamber). In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable "Lower chamber legislature name" (v2lgnamelo), while the others are listed in the variable "Upper chamber name" (v2lgnameup). South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable v2lgbicam is coded 2, v2lgnamelo is coded "House of Assembly", and

v2lgnameup enlists "House of Representatives, House of Delegates".  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.2 Legislature dominant chamber (v2lgdomchm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgdomchm

*Original tag:* v2lgdomchm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the legislature is bicameral, which chamber is dominant?

RESPONSES:

0: The lower chamber is clearly dominant.

1: The lower chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.

2: They are roughly co-equal in power.

3: The upper chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.

4: The upper chamber is clearly dominant.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.1.8.3 Legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgqstexp

*Original tag:* v2lgqstexp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?

CLARIFICATION: By "question" we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain its policies or testify.

RESPONSES:

0: No — never or very rarely.

1: Yes — routinely.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.4 Legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lginvstp

*Original tag:* v2lginvstp



*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.

2: As likely as not.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.5 Executive oversight (v2lgotovst)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgotovst

*Original tag:* v2lgotovst

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body *other than the legislature*, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.

2: Very uncertain.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.1.8.6 Legislature corrupt activities (v2lgcrrpt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgcrrpt

*Original tag:* v2lgcrrpt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?

CLARIFICATION: This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.

Please make your best estimate, based upon what is known or suspected to be true.

RESPONSES:

0: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.

1: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.

2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.

3: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.

4: Never, or hardly ever.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: For reasons of consistency, as of December, 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.7 Legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgoppart

*Original tag:* v2lgoppart

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?

RESPONSES:

0: No, not at all.

1: Occasionally.

2: Yes, for the most part.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.8 Legislature controls resources (v2lgfunds)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgfunds

*Original tag:* v2lgfunds

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal operations and the perquisites of its members?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature's operation depend on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.9 Representation of disadvantaged social groups (v2lgdsadlo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgdsadlo

*Original tag:* v2lgdsadlo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Considering all disadvantaged social groups in the country, how well represented are these groups, as a whole, in the national legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

RESPONSES:

0 (1): They have no representation at all.

1 (2): They are highly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

2 (3): They are slightly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

3 (4): They are represented roughly equal relative to their proportion of the general population.

4 (5): They are over-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: As of December 2014, the former category 0: There are no disadvantaged groups in the society, is coded as a separate variable (v2lgdsadlobin). The variable is then rebased to zero.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.8.10 Representation of disadvantaged groups binary (v2lgdsadlobin)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgdsadlobin

*Original tag:* v2lgdsadlobin

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are there disadvantaged groups in the society?

CLARIFICATION: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.8.11 Relative power of the HOS (v2ex\_hosw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ex\_hosw

*Original tag:* v2ex\_hosw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Does the head of state HOS have more relative power than the head of government HOG over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

0.25: See notes.

0.5: The HOS and HOG share equal power.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Nominal.

SOURCE(S): v2exdfcbhs\_rec v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg v2exhoshog

NOTES: If the head of state is also head of government, v2ex\_hosw is 1.

From 1900-01-01 to 1960-08-09 Belgium has a score of 0.25.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.12 HOG appointed by legislature (v2ex\_legconhog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ex\_legconhog

*Original tag:* v2ex\_legconhog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the head of government HOG appointed by the legislature, or is the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2expathhg v2exaphogp

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.13 HOS appointed by legislature (v2ex\_legconhos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2ex\_legconhos

*Original tag:* v2ex\_legconhos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the head of state HOS appointed by the legislature, or is the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2expathhs v2exaphos

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.8.14 Legislature approval of treaties by law (v2lgtreaty)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgtreaty

*Original tag:* v2lgtreaty

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: By law, is the approval of the legislature necessary to ratify treaties with foreign countries?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v492; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

#### **2.1.8.15 Legislature declares war by law (v2lgwarlaw)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgwarlaw

*Original tag:* v2lgwarlaw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to declare war?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v488; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

#### **2.1.8.16 Upper chamber name (v2lgnameup)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgnameup

*Original tag:* v2lgnameup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: What is the name of the upper chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the upper chamber of the legislature in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.

The legislature names have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. This means that the text and specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating.

RESPONSES:

Text.

NOTES: In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable "Lower chamber legislature name" (v2lgnamelo), while the others are enlisted in the variable "Upper chamber name" (v2lgnameup). Example: South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable v2lgbicam is coded 2, v2lgnamelo is coded "House of Assembly", and v2lgnameup enlists "House of Representatives, House of Delegates".

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.8.17 Upper chamber legislates in practice (v2lglegpup)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lglegpup

*Original tag:* v2lglegpup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the upper chamber of the legislature.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.8.18 Upper chamber elected (v2lgelecup)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgelecup

*Original tag:* v2lgelecup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

CLARIFICATION: Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body, and members who are indirectly elected by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Thus, if 10 percent of a upper chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90 percent.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

NOTES: Converted from B to A coding.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.19 Percentage of indirectly elected legislators upper chamber (v2lginelup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lginelup

*Original tag:* v2lginelup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

CLARIFICATION: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.

We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.20 Upper chamber introduces bills (v2lgintbup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgintbup

*Original tag:* v2lgintbup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: By law, does the upper chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

RESPONSES:

0: No, there are policy areas in which the upper chamber cannot introduce bills.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v263; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

#### 2.1.8.21 Lower chamber legislature name (v2lgnamelo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgnamelo

*Original tag:* v2lgnamelo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: What is the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.

The legislature names have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. This means that the text and specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating.

RESPONSES:

Text.

NOTES: In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable "Lower chamber legislature name" (v2lgnamelo), while the others are enlisted in the variable "Upper chamber name" (v2lgnameup). Example: South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable v2lgbicam is coded 2, v2lgnamelo is coded "House of Assembly", and v2lgnameup enlists "House of Representatives, House of Delegates".

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.22 Lower chamber legislates in practice (v2lglegplo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lglegplo

*Original tag:* v2lglegplo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0



CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.23 Lower chamber committees (v2lgcomslo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgcomslo

*Original tag:* v2lgcomslo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have a functioning committee system?

RESPONSES:

0: No, there are no committees.

1: Yes, but there are only special (not permanent) committees.

2: Yes, there are permanent committees, but they are not very significant in affecting the course of policy.

3: Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.24 Lower chamber members serve in government (v2lgsrvlo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgsrvlo

*Original tag:* v2lgsrvlo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, are members of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature able to serve simultaneously as ministers in the government?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.25 Lower chamber staff (v2lgstafflo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgstafflo

*Original tag:* v2lgstafflo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Does each member of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have at least one staff member with policy expertise?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 3-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.8.26 Lower chamber elected (v2lgello)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgello

*Original tag:* v2lgello

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

CLARIFICATION: Direct election includes seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election.

Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body, and members who are indirectly elected by local/ regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Thus, if 10percent of a lower chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90 percent.

We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.27 Lower chamber female legislators (v2lgfemleg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgfemleg

*Original tag:* v2lgfemleg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: What percentage (percent) of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is female?

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Edgell (2014); Paxton *et al.* (2008); Carmichael *et al.* (2014); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); genderproject.org.

DATA RELEASE: 4-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.8.28 Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber (v2lginello)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lginello

*Original tag:* v2lginello

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

CLARIFICATION: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.

We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.8.29 Lower chamber introduces bills (v2lgintblo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgintblo

*Original tag:* v2lgintblo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: By law, does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

RESPONSES:

0: No, there are policy areas in which the lower (or unicameral) chamber cannot introduce bills.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v263; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

#### 2.1.8.30 Lower chamber gender quota (v2lgqugen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgqugen

*Original tag:* v2lgqugen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: Is there a national-level gender quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: National-level quotas either reserve some seats for women in the legislature (as a whole or per district) or mandate through statutory law that all political parties must nominate a certain percentage of female candidates or candidates considered for nomination. A sanction for noncompliance imposes a penalty on a party that fails to meet the quota provisions. Examples of sanctions for noncompliance include rejection of the party list, loss of public campaign funds, or other financial penalties. Weak sanctions are those that parties may be able to ignore, such as a very weak financial penalty. Strong sanctions provide strong deterrents for noncompliance. An example of a strong sanction would be the rejection of a party's list. Countries with both candidate quotas and reserved seats are recorded at the stronger level. This variable records quotas from the date of implementation. The quota adoption date may be earlier, sometimes by several years. Data on quota adoption is available from the QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017) while the theoretical implications of adoption vs. implementation are discussed in Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018).

RESPONSES:

0: No national level gender quota.

1: Yes, a statutory gender quota for all parties without sanctions for noncompliance.

2: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with weak sanctions for noncompliance.

3: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with strong sanctions for noncompliance.

4: Yes, there are reserved seats in the legislature for women.

ORDERING: If you answer 1-4, proceed to the next question [v2lgqugens]. If you answer 0, skip to question [v2lglegllo].

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017), Quota project (2018); International IDEA (2018a) ; Coding by project manager.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.8.31 Lower chamber gender quota placement mandate (v2lgqugens)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgqugens

*Original tag:* v2lgqugens

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: Does the national-level quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature contain a placement mandate?

CLARIFICATION: A placement mandate is a rule concerning rank order on the party list, usually to ensure that women are placed in electable positions on the party list. An example would be a rule stating that no more than three of the top five candidates can be of the same gender. Coded only for years where a gender quota was present.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

ORDERING: Only answer this question if you answered 1-4 on previous question [v2lgqugen].

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017), Quota project (2018); International IDEA (2018a); Coding by project manager.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgqugen is 0  
CITATION: Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1947-2021

#### 2.1.8.32 Lower chamber gender quota threshold (v2lgqugent)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2lgqugent

*Original tag:* v2lgqugent

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: What is the threshold of the quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: A quota is the minimum threshold, understood as a percentage (percent) of the total seats in the legislature. Coded only for years where a gender quota was present.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017), Quota project (2018); International IDEA (2018a); Coding by project manager.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgqugen is 0

CITATION: Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1947-2021

#### 2.1.9 V-Dem Indicators - Deliberation

##### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

###### **Deliberation:**

The following questions address the deliberative or non-deliberative nature of a country's politics, with particular focus on elite levels. Some of these questions focus on the quality of discourse and others focus on public policies.

##### 2.1.9.1 Reasoned justification (v2dlreason)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2dlreason

*Original tag:* v2dlreason

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, *i.e.* before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?

CLARIFICATION: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

RESPONSES:

0: No justification. Elites almost always only dictate that something should or should not be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, "We must cut spending."

1: Inferior justification. Elites tend to give reasons why someone should or should not be for doing or not doing something, but the reasons tend to be illogical or false, although they may appeal to many voters. For example, "We must cut spending. The state is inefficient." [The inference is incomplete because addressing inefficiencies would not necessarily reduce spending]

and it might undermine essential services.]

2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current programs."

3: Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex, nuanced and complete justification. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurt economic growth, and deficit spending would lead to inflation."

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.1.9.2 Common good (v2dlcommon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2dlcommon

*Original tag:* v2dlcommon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?

CLARIFICATION: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

RESPONSES:

0: Little or no justification in terms of the common good is usually offered.

1: Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part offered as justifications.

2: Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other.

3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests and on appeals to the common good.

4: Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping the least advantaged in a society.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.1.9.3 Respect counterarguments (v2dlcountr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2dlcountr

*Original tag:* v2dlcountr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?

CLARIFICATION: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer

on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

RESPONSES:

0: Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished.

1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored.

2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them.

3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them.

4: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they ultimately reject them for the most part.

5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently also even accept them and change their position.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.1.9.4 Range of consultation (v2dlconslt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2dlconslt

*Original tag:* v2dlconslt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at *elite levels*?

CLARIFICATION: Because practices vary greatly from policy to policy, base your answer on the style that is most typical of policymaking.

RESPONSES:

0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (*e.g.* military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own.

1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites.

2: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such as the ruling party's or parties' local executives and/or women, youth and other branches.

3: Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties.

4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives.

5: Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.9.5 Engaged society (v2dlengage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2dlengage

*Original tag:* v2dlengage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?

CLARIFICATION: This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media.

RESPONSES:

0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.

1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.

2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.

3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.

4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.

5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.9.6 Particularistic or public goods (v2dlencmps)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2dlencmps

*Original tag:* v2dlencmps

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how "particularistic" or "public goods" are most expenditures?

CLARIFICATION: Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as "pork", "clientelistic", or "private goods."

Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-test are allowed to receive the benefit.

Your answer should consider the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending. We are interested in the relative value of particularistic and public-goods spending, not the number of bills or programs that fall into either category.

RESPONSES:

0: Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic.

1: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (*e.g.* 1/4 or 1/3) is public-goods.

2: Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs.

3: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion (*e.g.*, 1/4 or 1/3) is particularistic.

4: Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic.



SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.9.7 Means-tested vs. universalistic (v2dlunivl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2dlunivl

*Original tag:* v2dlunivl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity?

CLARIFICATION: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested.

A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these programs (*e.g.*, when people with higher salaries get higher unemployment benefits). The key point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary, or potential beneficiary.

The purpose of this question is not to gauge the size of the welfare state but rather its quality. So, your answer should be based on whatever programs exist.

RESPONSES:

0: There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health, retirement, unemployment, poverty programs).

1: Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested.

2: Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion (*e.g.* 1/4 or 1/3) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population.

3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic.

4: Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion (*e.g.*, 1/4 or 1/3) are means-tested.

5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is means-tested.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.10 V-Dem Indicators - The Judiciary

##### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Judiciary:** This set of questions pertains to the judiciary. Before you proceed, we would like to clarify several general points. First, some questions below refer to the judiciary in general, whereas others ask for specific evaluations of particular courts or types of courts. Unless otherwise prompted, please consider the judiciary as a whole. This includes all courts in the judicial system at every level, both general jurisdiction courts and more specialized courts. However, with potentially one exception, it excludes specialized courts that are located outside the judiciary, *e.g.* an immigration court that lies inside the executive branch. The one potential exception is the peak constitutional court of the country. Please include this court in your considerations, even though it will be located outside of

the judiciary in some countries. If the country you are coding is a federal state, please focus only on the federal judiciary and the federal government.

Seven of the questions about the judiciary concern high courts. By "high court" we are asking you to consider the country's constitutional court, if one exists. If there is no constitutional court, please consider the court of last resort for constitutional matters. If there is no court in your country with constitutional jurisdiction, please consider the highest ordinary court of the state.

For example, in Mexico in 2004, you would consider the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and not the Electoral Tribunal for the Federal Judiciary. In Russia in the same year, you would consider the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and not the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. In Sweden, you would ignore the Supreme Administrative Court and instead focus on the Supreme Court. Germany has both a constitutional court, the Federal Constitutional Court, and a court of last resort for ordinary matters, the Federal Court of Justice. The Federal Constitutional Court is the high court for our purposes. In the United States, there is no separate constitutional court or review body. The Supreme Court is both the highest ordinary court and the highest court in the state with constitutional jurisdiction. Therefore, we consider it to be the high court of the United States. If your country's highest judicial body has separate divisions, only one of which is dedicated to final constitutional review, please consider that division to be the high court if its judges are permanently assigned to that division only. For example, the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica has four chambers. The Fourth Chamber reviews constitutional matters, its judges are appointed to it specifically and the other judges of the Supreme Court do not rotate onto the Fourth Chamber. Therefore, the high court for Costa Rica is the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.

If a new high court was established in a given year, please consider that court as the high court for the purposes of these questions only if the court was functioning for the majority of the calendar year. If a new high court was established in a given year, but did not start functioning until a subsequent year, please do not consider the new court as the high court until it was functioning for the majority of the given calendar year. If you are considering a semi sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to the government or judicial bodies seated within the territory in question (*e.g.*, the governor-general and his local administration in a British colony or a Commonwealth country), not abroad (*e.g.*, the King/Queen or government of England).

In coding the following questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens "on the ground"). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them.

#### 2.1.10.1 Judicial reform (v2jreform)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2jreform

*Original tag:* v2jreform

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Were the judiciary's formal powers altered this year in ways that affect its ability to control the arbitrary use of state authority?

CLARIFICATION: Evidence of this kind of reform could include the creation or removal of various forms of constitutional review, new rules increasing or decreasing access to the judiciary, changes in available judicial remedies, and any other formal institution (procedural or otherwise) that influences the ability of courts to control the arbitrary use of power.

RESPONSES:

0: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was *reduced* via institutional reform.

1: There was no change to the judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power via institutional review.

2: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was *enhanced* via institutional reform.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.10.2 Judicial purges (v2jupurge)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2jupurge

*Original tag:* v2jupurge

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Judges are sometimes removed from their posts for cause, as when there is strong evidence of corruption; however, some judges are removed arbitrarily, typically for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe the removal of judges that occurred this calendar year.

CLARIFICATION: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited arbitrary removals (*i.e.*, when only a few judges are targeted) by the political importance of the removal. For example, you may consider the arbitrary removal of a few high court judges as more important than the arbitrary removal of a few lower court judges.

RESPONSES:

0: There was a massive, arbitrary purge of the judiciary.

1: There were limited but very important arbitrary removals.

2: There were limited arbitrary removals.

3: Judges were removed from office, but there is no evidence that the removals were arbitrary.

4: Judges were not removed from their posts.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.10.3 Government attacks on judiciary (v2jupoatck)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2jupoatck

*Original tag:* v2jupoatck

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often did the government attack the judiciary's integrity in public?

CLARIFICATION: Attacks on the judiciary's integrity can include claims that it is corrupt, incompetent or that decisions were politically motivated. These attacks can manifest in various ways including, but not limited to prepared statements reported by the media, press conferences, interviews, and stump speeches.

RESPONSES:

0: Attacks were carried out on a daily or weekly basis.

1: Attacks were common and carried out in nearly every month of the year.

2: Attacks occurred more than once.

3: There were attacks, but they were rare.

4: There were no attacks on the judiciary's integrity.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

*V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.1.10.4 Court packing (v2jupack)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2jupack

*Original tag:* v2jupack

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: The size of the judiciary is sometimes increased for very good reasons, as when judges are added to manage an increasing caseload; however, sometimes judges are added purely for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe any increases in the size of the judiciary that occurred this calendar year.

CLARIFICATION: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited court packing efforts (*i.e.* when relatively few judgeships are added) by the political importance of the packing. For example, you may consider the packing of the high court to be more important than the packing of a lower court.

RESPONSES:

0: There was a massive, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships across the entire judiciary.

1: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships on very important courts.

2: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships.

3: Judgeships were added to the judiciary, but there is no evidence that the increase was politically motivated; or there was no increase.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: A previous version of the variable contained category "4: There was no increase". As of November 2014, all responses in category "4" are assigned to category "3", since the two responses have the same meaning in practice.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.10.5 Judicial accountability (v2juacct)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2juacct

*Original tag:* v2juacct

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct, how often are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined?

RESPONSES:

0: Never.

1: Seldom.

2: About half of the time.

3: Usually.

4: Always.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.10.6 Judicial corruption decision (v2jucorrdc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2jucorrdc

*Original tag:* v2jucorrdc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?

RESPONSES:

0: Always.

1: Usually.

2: About half of the time.

3: Not usually.

4: Never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: For reasons of consistency, as of December, 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.10.7 High court name (v2juhcname)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2juhcname

*Original tag:* v2juhcname

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

QUESTION: Please enter the name of the high court.

CLARIFICATION: As accurately as possible, please provide a literal translation of the name of the court in English, followed by the name in the native language, or a transcription transliteration thereof, within parentheses.

RESPONSES:

Text.

NOTES: Converted from (C) to (A(C)) from version 7. Where possible, data was pre-coded, and CEs were asked to add their answers to the remaining gaps.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.10.8 High court independence (v2juhcind)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2juhcind

*Original tag:* v2juhcind

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When the high court in the judicial system is ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record?

CLARIFICATION: We are seeking to identify autonomous judicial decision-making and its absence. Decisions certainly can reflect government wishes without "merely reflecting" those wishes, *i.e.* a court can be autonomous when its decisions support the government's position. This is because a court can be fairly persuaded that the government's position is meritorious. By "merely reflect the wishes of the government" we mean that the court's own view of the record, its sincere evaluation of the record, is irrelevant to the outcome. The court simply adopts the government's position regardless of its sincere view of the record.

RESPONSES:

0: Always.

1: Usually.

2: About half of the time.

3: Seldom.

4: Never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: The historical version of the variable is set to missing when v3juhcourt is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.10.9 Lower court independence (v2juncind)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2juncind

*Original tag:* v2juncind

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When judges *not* on the high court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record?

RESPONSES:

0: Always.

1: Usually.

2: About half of the time.

3: Seldom.

4: Never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.10.10 Compliance with high court (v2juhccomp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2juhccomp

*Original tag:* v2juhccomp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions of the high court with which it disagrees?

RESPONSES:

0: Never.

1: Seldom.

2: About half of the time.

3: Usually.

4: Always.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: The historical version of the variable is set to missing when v3juhcourt is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.10.11 Compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2jucomp

*Original tag:* v2jucomp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees?

CLARIFICATION: We are looking for a summary judgment for the entire judiciary, excluding the high court. You should consider judges on both ordinary courts and specialized courts.

RESPONSES:

0: Never.

1: Seldom.

2: About half of the time.

3: Usually.

4: Always.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.10.12 Judicial review (v2jureview)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2jureview

*Original tag:* v2jureview

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does any court in the judiciary have the legal authority to invalidate governmental policies (*e.g.* statutes, regulations, decrees, administrative actions) on the grounds that they violate a constitutional provision?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.1.10.13 Codeable (v2jucodable)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2jucodable

*Original tag:* v2jucodable

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

QUESTION: Can we generate a flowchart describing the appointment process from this constitutional event?

CLARIFICATION: This variable indicates the reasons we could or could not create a visual flowchart representing the selection procedure.

RESPONSES:

1. Yes

2. No, the event is in a language the coder can not read

3. No, there is no appointment or removal information

4. No, the process is explicitly left to be developed via a statute

5. Yes, but much of the process is left to law

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1901-2015

**2.1.10.14 Corresponding flowchart (v2jufLOW)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2jufLOW

*Original tag:* v2jufLOW

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

QUESTION: Is a flowchart of the process available?

CLARIFICATION: This variable indicates if a flowchart summarizing the appointment process was generated and is available.

RESPONSES:

0. No

1. Yes

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1901-2015

**2.1.10.15 Language (v2julanguage)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2julanguage



*Original tag:* v2julanguage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

QUESTION: In which language is the constitutional event written?

CLARIFICATION: If the Comparative Constitutions Project had the same constitutional event in both an English and a non-English language, we used the English version.

RESPONSES:

1. English
  2. French
  3. German
  4. Spanish
  27. Arabic
  43. Azerbaijani
  82. Czech
  229. Korean
  245. Latvian
  249. Lithuanian
  282. Maltese
  306. Nepali
  312. Norwegian Nynorsk; Nynorsk, Norwegian
  343. Polish
  345. Portuguese
  357. Romanian; Moldavian; Moldovan
  382. Slovak
  409. Swahili
  410. Swedish
  441. Turkish
  485. Greek
  113. German
  121. Dutch; Flemish
  130. Estonian
  136. Persian
  151. Georgian
  170. Hebrew
  180. Hungarian
  185. Icelandic
- SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1901-2015

#### **2.1.10.16 Team translated (v2juteamtr)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2juteamtr

*Original tag:* v2juteamtr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

QUESTION: For constitutions not available in English, did our coders translate the relevant sections of a non-English event?

CLARIFICATION: This variable indicates whether someone on our coding team read the constitutional event in a non-English language and translated information in order to collect the necessary information.

RESPONSES:

- 0: No

1: Yes, this event was translated by our team  
SCALE: Dichotomous  
SOURCE(S): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).  
DATA RELEASE: 9-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1901-2015

### 2.1.11 V-Dem Indicators - Civil Liberty

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Civil Liberty:** The following questions are focused on actual practices (*de facto*) rather than formal legal or constitutional rights (*de jure*). Note that if there is significant variation in the respect for a particular civil liberty across the territory, the score should reflect the "average situation" across the territorial scope of the country unit (for each period) as defined in the coder instructions.

#### 2.1.11.1 Freedom from torture (v2cltort)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cltort

*Original tag:* v2cltort

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there freedom from torture?

CLARIFICATION: Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, with an aim to extract information or intimidate victims, who are in a state of incarceration. Here, we are concerned with torture practiced by state officials or other agents of the state (*e.g.*, police, security forces, prison guards, and paramilitary groups).

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of government.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by top leaders of government. At the same time, leaders of government are not actively working to prevent it.

2: Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by top leaders of government.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by top government leaders.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. Torture is non-existent.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.11.2 Freedom from political killings (v2clkill)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clkill

*Original tag:* v2clkill

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there freedom from political killings?

CLARIFICATION: Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process

of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state (including paramilitary groups).

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced systematically and they are typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced frequently and top leaders of government are not actively working to prevent them.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced in a few isolated cases but they are not incited or approved by top leaders of government.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings are non-existent.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.11.3 Freedom from forced labor for men (v2clsavem)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clsavem

*Original tag:* v2clsavem

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are adult men free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

CLARIFICATION: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

RESPONSES:

0: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.

1: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.

2: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.

3: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.

4: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.11.4 Freedom from forced labor for women (v2clsavew)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clsavew

*Original tag:* v2clsavew

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

CLARIFICATION: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women from forced labor. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (0) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes.

RESPONSES:

0: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.

1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.

2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.

3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.

4: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.11.5 Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cltrnslw

*Original tag:* v2cltrnslw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner?

CLARIFICATION: This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land.

RESPONSES:

0: Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion.

1: Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion.

2: Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly created in a non-arbitrary fashion but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country.

3: Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

4: Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*)

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.11.6 Rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clrspct

*Original tag:* v2clrspct

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?

CLARIFICATION: This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (*i.e.*, nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination).

The question covers the public officials that handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies.

RESPONSES:

0: The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant.

1: The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread.

2: The law is modestly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate.

3: The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited.

4: The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is very limited.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.11.7 Access to justice for men (v2clacjstm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clacjstm

*Original tag:* v2clacjstm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do men enjoy secure and effective access to justice?

CLARIFICATION: This question specifies the extent to which men can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and men have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely limited — access to justice.

RESPONSES:

0: Secure and effective access to justice for men is non-existent.

1: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually not established or widely respected.

2: Secure and effective access to justice for men is inconsistently observed. Minor problems

characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.

3: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually observed.

4: Secure and effective access to justice for men is almost always observed.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.11.8 Access to justice for women (v2clacjstw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clacjstw

*Original tag:* v2clacjstw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice?

CLARIFICATION: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely limited — access to justice.

RESPONSES:

0: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent.

1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected.

2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.

3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed.

4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.11.9 Social class equality in respect for civil liberty (v2clacjust)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clacjust

*Original tag:* v2clacjust

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do?

CLARIFICATION: This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socioeconomic groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Poor people enjoy much fewer civil liberties than rich people.

1: Poor people enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than rich people.

2: Poor people enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than rich people.

3: Poor people enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than rich people.

4: Poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.11.10 Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clsocgrp

*Original tag:* v2clsocgrp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

CLARIFICATION: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population.

1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population.

2: Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population.

3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population.

4: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.11.11 Subnational civil liberties unevenness (v2clrgunev)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clrgunev

*Original tag:* v2clrgunev

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does government respect for civil liberties vary across different areas of the country?

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties significantly more (or, alternatively, significantly less) than government officials in other areas of the country.

1: Somewhat. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties somewhat more (or, alternatively, somewhat less) than government officials in other areas of the country.

2: No. Government officials in most or all areas of the country equally respect (or, alternatively, equally do not respect) civil liberties.

ORDERING: If answer is "2" skip remaining civil liberties questions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.11.12 Weaker civil liberties pop percent (v2clsnpct)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clsnpct

*Original tag:* v2clsnpct

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What percentage (percent) of the total population of the country lives in the areas where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *weaker* than the country average?

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bootstrapped.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.11.13 Stronger civil liberties characteristics (v2clrgstch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clrgstch

*Original tag:* v2clrgstch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you describe the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *stronger*?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_0]

1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_1]

2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_2]

3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_3]

4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_4]

5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_5]

6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_6]

7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_7]

8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_8]

9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_9]

10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_10]

11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_11]

12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_12]

13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_13]



14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_14]  
15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_15]  
16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_16]  
17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_17]  
18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_18]  
19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_19]  
20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_20]  
21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_21]  
SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.  
ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.11.14 Weaker civil liberties characteristics (v2clrgwkch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clrgwkch

*Original tag:* v2clrgwkch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you describe the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *weaker*?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

- 0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_0]
- 1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_1]
- 2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_2]
- 3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_3]
- 4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_4]
- 5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_5]
- 6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_6]
- 7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_7]
- 8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_8]
- 9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_9]
- 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_10]
- 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_11]
- 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_12]
- 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_13]
- 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_14]
- 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_15]
- 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_16]
- 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_17]
- 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_18]
- 19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_19]
- 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_20]
- 21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_21]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.11.15 Freedom of discussion for men (v2cldiscm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cldiscm

*Original tag:* v2cldiscm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are men able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which men are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — rights to freedom of discussion.

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for men. Men are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.

1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.

2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.

3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if men make political statements.

4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech for men in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.11.16 Freedom of discussion for women (v2cldiscw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cldiscw

*Original tag:* v2cldiscw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — rights to freedom of discussion.

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.

1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.

2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.

3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements.

4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.1.11.17 Freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clacfree

*Original tag:* v2clacfree

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted or controlled by the government.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.1.11.18 Freedom of religion (v2clrelig)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clrelig

*Original tag:* v2clrelig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Is there freedom of religion?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion, and practice that religion in private or in public as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to public authorities, who control the activities of religious communities in some detail.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. But significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, voluntary conversions are restricted, and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Yet, minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, and/or instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion occur occasionally.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions against proselytizing, or hindrance to access to or construction of places of worship.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. The population enjoys the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select, and train personnel; solicit and receive contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without undue interference. If religious communities have to register, public authorities do not abuse the process to discriminate against a religion and do not constrain the right to worship before registration.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.11.19 Freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmmove)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clfmmove

*Original tag:* v2clfmmove

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there freedom of foreign travel and emigration?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from traveling.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular social groups. This can take the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/refusals of visas.

2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular social groups is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only met

minor restrictions.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from traveling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family.

4: Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by public authorities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.11.20 Freedom of domestic movement for men (v2cldmovem)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cldmovem

*Original tag:* v2cldmovem

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do men enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which all men are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals.

Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no men enjoy full freedom of movement (*e.g.*, North Korea).

1: Some men enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (*e.g.*, Apartheid South Africa).

2: Most men enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all men enjoy partial freedom of movement.

3: Most men enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.

4: Virtually all men enjoy full freedom of movement.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.11.21 Freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cldmovew

*Original tag:* v2cldmovew

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

**CLARIFICATION:** This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

**RESPONSES:**

0: Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (*e.g.*, North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban).

1: Some women enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (*e.g.*, Apartheid South Africa).

2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all women enjoy partial freedom of movement.

3: Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.

4: Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement.

**SCALE:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**DATA RELEASE:** 1-12.

**CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

**CITATION:** Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**YEARS:** 1789-2021

### 2.1.11.22 State ownership of economy (v2clstown)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clstown

*Original tag:* v2clstown

*Description:*

**VARIABLE TYPE:** C

**PROJECT MANAGER(S):** Svend-Erik Skaaning

**ADDITIONAL VERSIONS:** \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

**QUESTION:** Does the state own or directly control important sectors of the economy?

**CLARIFICATION:** This question gauges the degree to which the state owns and controls capital (including land) in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors.

It does *not* measure the extent of government revenue and expenditure as a share of total output; indeed, it is quite common for states with expansive fiscal policies to exercise little direct control (and virtually no ownership) over the economy.

**RESPONSES:**

0: Virtually all valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state. Private property may be officially prohibited.

1: Most valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

2: Many sectors of the economy either belong to the state or are directly controlled by the state, but others remain relatively free of direct state control.

3: Some valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state, but most remains free of direct state control.

4: Very little valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

**SCALE:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**DATA RELEASE:** 1-12.

**CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

**CITATION:** Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**YEARS:** 1789-2021

#### 2.1.11.23 Property rights for men (v2clprptym)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clprptym

*Original tag:* v2clprptym

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do men enjoy the right to private property?

CLARIFICATION: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and very minimal — property rights.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no men enjoy private property rights of any kind.

1: Some men enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.

2: Many men enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.

3: More than half of men enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of men have much more restricted rights.

4: Most men enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.

5: Virtually all men enjoy all, or almost all property rights.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.11.24 Property rights for women (v2clprptyw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clprptyw

*Original tag:* v2clprptyw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do women enjoy the right to private property?

CLARIFICATION: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and very minimal — property rights.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no women enjoy private property rights of any kind.

1: Some women enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.

2: Many women enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.

3: More than half of women enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of women have much more restricted rights.

4: Most women enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.

5: Virtually all women enjoy all, or almost all, property rights.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

## 2.1.12 V-Dem Indicators - Sovereignty and State

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Sovereignty:** This section addresses a number of issues concerning the sovereignty of the state. A state is political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis. With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from other actors in the system. The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

**Sovereignty – Historical clarification:** This section addresses a number of issues concerning the state. A state is a political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis. The questions concern two general themes: state sovereignty and state administration.

With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from and recognition by other actors in the system. The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

A second attribute of states is the state administration: the set of institutions that administer and implement governmental decisions. Here we are mainly interested in the professionalization, or lack thereof, of the state administrative staff – in this context termed the state administrators.

**The State:** “This section addresses a number of issues concerning the state. A state is a political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis. The questions concern two general themes: state sovereignty and state administration.

With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from and recognition by other actors in the system. The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

A second attribute of states is the state administration: the set of institutions that administer and implement governmental decisions. Here we are mainly interested in the professionalization, or lack thereof, of the state administrative staff—in this context termed the state administrators.”

### 2.1.12.1 Domestic Autonomy (v2svdomaut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2svdomaut

*Original tag:* v2svdomaut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the



conduct of domestic policy?

CLARIFICATION: The question of domestic autonomy does not include restrictions emanating from treaties (*e.g.*, NATO), international organizations (*e.g.*, the WTO), or confederations (*e.g.*, the European Union) if these agreements are freely negotiated by the state and if the state is free to exit from that treaty, organization, or confederation. Nor does it include restrictions on policymaking emanating from international market forces and trans-national corporations.

RESPONSES:

0: Non-autonomous. National level authority is exercised by an external power, either by law or in practice. The most common examples of this are direct colonial rule and military occupation (*e.g.* quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). It also includes situations in which domestic actors provide *de jure* cover for *de facto* control by a foreign power (*e.g.* Vichy France). However, control of some part of the territory of a state by an enemy during war is not considered control by external actors if the sovereign government remains on scene and continues to wage conventional war (*e.g.*, the USSR during WW II).

1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to rule, decides who can or cannot rule through formal rules or informal understandings, or precludes certain policies through explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples include Soviet "satellite" states in Eastern Europe, and situations where colonial powers grant limited powers of national self-government to their possessions (*e.g.*, protectorates and limited home government).

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise political authority free of the direct control of external political actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.12.2 International autonomy (v2svinlaut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2svinlaut

*Original tag:* v2svinlaut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of its foreign policy?

RESPONSES:

0: Non-autonomous. Foreign policy is controlled by an external power, either *de facto* or *de jure*. The most common examples of this are colonial rule and military occupation (*e.g.* quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). Situations in which domestic actors provide *de jure* cover for *de facto* control by a foreign power should not be construed as semi-autonomy (*e.g.* Vichy France). Governments in exile that control underground forces waging unconventional warfare are not considered as mitigating an occupation regime (*e.g.* countries under German occupation during WWII).

1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to pursue an independent foreign policy course in some important areas. This may be the product of explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples would include Soviet strictures over rule in so-called "satellite" states in Eastern Europe, and explicitly negotiated postwar settlements (*e.g.* Austria following WWII).

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise foreign policy free of the direct control of external political actors. Direct control is meant to exclude the exercise of constraint or the impact of interdependence in the international system. Treaties in which states concede some

part of that control to a supra- or international organization voluntarily, and from which there is a possibility of exit should not be interpreted as a violation of autonomy.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.12.3 State authority over territory (v2svstterr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2svstterr

*Original tag:* v2svstterr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Over what percentage (percent) of the territory does the state have effective control?

CLARIFICATION: With this question we seek to judge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its territory. We are not interested here in perfect control by the state, or whether it is relatively effective in comparison to other states, but an assessment of the areas over which it is hegemonic, *e.g.* where it is recognized as the preeminent authority and in a contest of wills it can assert its control over political forces that reject its authority. Several illustrative examples may help in this coding. During civil wars the claim of the state to rule is effectively neutralized by insurgent groups (*e.g.*, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka). There are also situations in which criminals or warlords exert control in contravention of state authority (*e.g.* opium growers in parts of Indochina). There are also cases of failed states where the central government cannot assert control over a share of its territory (*e.g.*, contemporary Somalia). Here, we ask you to estimate the size of the territory that the state has effective control over, as a percentage (percent) of the total territory that is officially part of the country.

By "officially part of the country" we refer to international law. In cases where international law is not entirely clear, we refer you to general understandings. For example, China claims sovereignty over Taiwan, but it remains under the control of its own government. For purposes of this question, Taiwan should not be considered a failure to control its territory by the government of the PRC.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 1-6, 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bootstrapped.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2svindep is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.12.4 State fiscal source of revenue (v2stfisccap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2stfisccap

*Original tag:* v2stfisccap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: On which of the following sources of revenue does the central government primarily rely to finance its activities?

RESPONSES:

0: The state is not capable of raising revenue to finance itself.  
1: The state primarily relies on external sources of funding (loans and foreign aid) to finance its activities.  
2: The state primarily relies on directly controlling economic assets (natural resource rents, public monopolies, and the expropriation of assets within and outside the country) to finance its activities.  
3: The state primarily relies on taxes on property (land taxes) and trade (customs duties).  
4: The state primarily relies on taxes on economic transactions (such as sales taxes) and/or taxes on income, corporate profits and capital.  
SCALE: Ordinal.  
DATA RELEASE: 9-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.12.5 Bureaucratic remuneration (v2strenadm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2strenadm

*Original tag:* v2strenadm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are state administrators salaried employees?

CLARIFICATION: A state administrator is anyone who works for the state administration. By "salaried employee", we mean someone who is employed on a contract and paid a regular allowance directly out of the state coffers. It does not include unpaid work; work paid for through a private collection of fees, material perquisites or bribes; private employment by a higher-ranking "patron" within the administration; contractors being paid on an irregular basis; or "parastatals" (those working for state-owned companies), since the latter are not paid directly out of the state coffers. Note that the question refers to the practices obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces.

RESPONSES:

- 0: None or almost none are salaried state employees.  
1: A small share is salaried state employees.  
2: About half are salaried state employees.  
3: A substantial number are salaried state employees.  
4: All or almost all are salaried state employees.

SCALE: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.12.6 Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration (v2stcritrecadm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2stcritrecadm

*Original tag:* v2stcritrecadm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Agnes Cornell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are appointment decisions in the state administration based on

personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit?

CLARIFICATION: Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotion in the state administration. Note that the question refers to the typical *de facto* (rather than *de jure*) situation obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the state administration or between top and lower level state administrators please try to consider the average when answering the question.

RESPONSES:

0: All appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit.

1: Most appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit.

2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit.

3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Most appointment decisions are based on skills and merit.

4: None of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit.

SCALE: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.12.7 Criteria for appointment decisions in the armed forces (v2stcritapparm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2stcritapparm

*Original tag:* v2stcritapparm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Agnes Cornell, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are appointment decisions in the armed forces based on personal or political connections or alternatively based on skills and merit?

CLARIFICATION: Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotions in the armed forces. Note that the question refers to the typical *de facto* (rather than *de jure*) situation obtaining in the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the armed forces or between top and lower level ranks please try to consider the average when answering the question.

RESPONSES:

0: All appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit.

1: Most appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit.

2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit.

3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Most are based on skills and merit.

4: None of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit.

ORDERING: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*

(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.12.8 Remuneration in the Armed Forces (v2strenarm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2strenarm

*Original tag:* v2strenarm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell, Agnes Cornell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are members of the armed forces salaried employees?

CLARIFICATION: By members of the armed forces, we mean members of all ranks, excluding conscripts. By "salaried employee", we mean someone who is employed on a contract and paid a regular allowance directly out of the state coffers. It does not include unpaid work, work paid for through a private collection of fees, material perquisites or bribes, or private employment by a higher-ranking "patron" within the armed forces.

RESPONSES:

0: None or almost none are salaried employees

1: A small share is salaried employees

2: About half are salaried employees

3: A substantial number are salaried employees

4: All or almost all are salaried employees

ORDERING: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.12.9 Independent states (v2svindep)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2svindep

*Original tag:* v2svindep

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Michael Bernhard

QUESTION: Is the polity an independent state?

CLARIFICATION: We use Gleditsch and Ward's (1999) coding of independent states. Their definition recognizes that listing independent states relies at least in part on subjective evaluations. A state is considered to be an independent polity if it (a) has a relatively autonomous administration over some territory, (b) is considered a distinct entity by local actors or the state it is dependent on. Polities excluded from the list are: colonies; states that have some form of limited autonomy (*e.g.* Scotland); are alleged to be independent but are contiguous to the dominant entity (Ukraine and Belarus prior to 1991); *de facto* independent polities but recognized by at most one other state (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). Occupations or foreign rule are considered to be an actual loss of statehood when they extend beyond a decade. This means that cases such as the Baltic Republic during Soviet occupation are not considered independent states, but independent statehood is retained for European countries occupied during World War II.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): Gleditsch and Ward (1999; 2013); IPU Parline; IDEA.

NOTES: V-Dem uses the updated List of independent states (v.5.0), including the tentative list of microstates, posted on Gleditsch's webpage on 14 March 2013. We have reconciled

Gleditsch and Ward's data with the V-Dem country definitions (see the document "V-Dem Countries v1.1").

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.13 V-Dem Indicators - Civil Society

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **Civil society organization:**

The following set of questions focus on civil society organizations (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but *not* businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

**Civil society organization – Historical clarification:** The following set of questions focus on civil society organizations (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but not businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

If no CSOs exist at all for a particular time period, code the following relevant questions as giving the "lowest score" (indicating, for instance, strong repression or no consultation, a 0).

**Religious organizations:** In this section, we ask two questions regarding religious organizations. These may be religiously inspired civil society organizations (CSOs) or organizations whose purpose is primarily spiritual.

#### 2.1.13.1 CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cseeorgs

*Original tag:* v2cseeorgs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?

RESPONSES:

0: Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes, or publicly commenting on public officials and policies are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity.

1: Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity.

2: Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expedience.

3: Minimal control. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, there exist constitutional provisions that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history

of anti-democratic action in the past (*e.g.* the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and conditions of judicial independence.

4: Unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.13.2 CSO repression (v2csreprss)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2csreprss

*Original tag:* v2csreprss

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)?

RESPONSES:

0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of CSOs. They seek not only to deter the activity of such groups but to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China.

1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in responses 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional CSOs who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property). Examples include Mugabe's Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law, Serbia under Milosevic.

2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in response 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s, the late Franco period in Spain.

3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Government Organized Movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. One example would be Singapore in the post-Yew phase or Putin's Russia.

4: No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: For reasons of consistency, as of December 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.1.13.3 CSO consultation (v2cscnsult)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cscnsult

*Original tag:* v2cscnsult

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies.

1: To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.

2: Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.13.4 CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2csprtcpt

*Original tag:* v2csprtcpt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

RESPONSES:

0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary.

1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them.

2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal.

3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.13.5 CSO womens participation (v2csgender)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2csgender



*Original tag:* v2csgender

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

CLARIFICATION: Please pay attention to both (A) whether women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs) because of their gender and (B) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life.

RESPONSES:

0: Almost always.

1: Frequently.

2: About half the time.

3: Rarely.

4: Almost never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.13.6 CSO anti-system movements (v2csantimv)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2csantimv

*Original tag:* v2csantimv

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Among civil society organizations, are there anti-system opposition movements?

CLARIFICATION: An anti-system opposition movement is any movement — peaceful or armed — that is based in the country (not abroad) and is organized in opposition to the current political system. That is, it aims to change the polity in fundamental ways, *e.g.*, from democratic to autocratic (or vice-versa), from capitalist to communist (or vice-versa), from secular to fundamentalist (or vice-versa). This movement may be linked to a political party that competes in elections but it must also have a "movement" character, which is to say a mass base and an existence separate from normal electoral competition.

If there are several movements, please answer in a general way about the relationship of those movements to the regime.

RESPONSES:

0: No, or very minimal. Anti-system movements are practically nonexistent.

1: There is only a low-level of anti-system movement activity but it does not pose much of a threat to the regime.

2: There is a modest level of anti-system movement activity, posing some threat to the regime.

3: There is a high level of anti-system movement activity, posing substantial threat to the regime.

4: There is a very high level of anti-system movement activity, posing a real and present threat to the regime.

ORDERING: If coded "0", skip the following questions focused on anti-system movements.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.*

(2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.1.13.7 Religious organization repression (v2csrlgrep)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2csrlgrep

*Original tag:* v2csrlgrep

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government attempt to repress religious organizations?

RESPONSES:

0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of religious organizations. It seeks not only to deter the activity of such groups but also to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia and Maoist China.

1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional religious organizations who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property).

2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of religious civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar religious civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts.

3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new religious civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize parallel religious organizations to crowd out independent religious organizations.

4: No. Religious civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.13.8 Religious organization consultation (v2csrlgcon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2csrlgcon

*Original tag:* v2csrlgcon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are major religious organizations routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from input from religious organizations. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize religious organizations after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But typically, it does not consult with them in formulating policies.

1: To some degree. Religious organizations are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.

2: Yes. Important religious organizations are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.13.9 CSO anti-system movement character (v2csanmvch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2csanmvch

*Original tag:* v2csanmvch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you characterize the anti-system movement(s) identified in the previous question?

CLARIFICATION: Check all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Works through legal channels, for the most part. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_0]

1: Participates in elections. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_1]

2: Works through a mix of legal and extra-legal channels. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_2]

3: Insurrectionary. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_3]

4: Democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as willing to play by the rules of the democratic game, willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_4]

5: Anti-democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as unwilling to play by the rules of the democratic game, not willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and/or not willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_5]

6: Leftist, socialist, communist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_6]

7: Rightist, conservative, party of order. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_7]

8: Ethnolinguistic, tribe, kinship, clan. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_8]

9: Separatist or autonomist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_9]

10: Religious. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_10]

11: Paramilitary. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_11]

12: Heavily engaged in criminal activity, *e.g.*, narcotics, bootlegging, illegal exploitation of natural resources, extortion, kidnapping. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_12]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015 *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.13.10 CSO structure (v2csstruc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2csstruc

*Original tag:* v2csstruc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Civil societies inevitably involve a mix of larger and smaller organizations. Please characterize the relative influence of large mass constituency civil society organizations (CSOs) versus smaller, more local, or narrowly construed CSOs.

RESPONSES:

0: The state does not allow autonomous CSOs. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_0]

1: Large encompassing organizations dominate. The government and CSOs are linked formally through a corporatist system of interest intermediation; or, due to historical circumstances, particular large CSOs are highly influential. The voice of such organizations is recognized by the government and is accorded special weight by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_1]

2: Neither large encompassing nor small CSOs dominate. Influence is contingent on circumstances. Organizations, both large and small, contend with one another to have their voice considered by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_2]

3: Small CSOs dominate. Many small organizations contend with one another to have their voices heard by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_3]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

## 2.1.14 V-Dem Indicators - The Media

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Media:** Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and broadcast (radio and television), and (2) online media. We ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. Thus, "the print and broadcast media" can provide a wide range of perspectives in a country even when individual publications or programs take a consistently narrow perspective.

**Historical clarification:** Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and (2) broadcast (radio) media. The latter is, however, only for reference to the contemporary era, and should of course be ignored before it appeared. But when applicable, we ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. If there is no print or broadcast media at all in a given time period, leave the following questions blank (missing) for this time period. Please also explicitly note in the comments section at the end for which years there was no print or broadcast media at all.

### 2.1.14.1 Government censorship effort - Media (v2mecenefm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2mecenefm

*Original tag:* v2mecenefm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?

CLARIFICATION: Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery.

We are not concerned with censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political speech.

RESPONSES:

0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine.

1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.

2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.

3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.

4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*)

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.14.2 Internet censorship effort (v2mecenefi)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2mecenefi

*Original tag:* v2mecenefi

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet?

CLARIFICATION: Censorship attempts include Internet filtering (blocking access to certain websites or browsers), denial-of-service attacks, and partial or total Internet shutdowns. We are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions. We are also not concerned with the *extent* of internet access, unless there is absolutely no access at all (in which case the coding should be 0).

RESPONSES:

0 (1): The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content.

1 (2): The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls.

2 (3): The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues.

3 (4): The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned above.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: As of December 2014, the former category "0 There is no internet" is coded separately as v2mecenefibin. The variable is then rebased to zero.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1993-2021

#### 2.1.14.3 Internet binary (v2mecenefibin)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2mecenefibin

*Original tag:* v2mecenefibin

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there Internet in this country?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1993-2021

#### **2.1.14.4 Print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2mecrit

*Original tag:* v2mecrit

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?

RESPONSES:

0: None.

1: Only a few marginal outlets.

2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do.

3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.14.5 Print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2merange

*Original tag:* v2merange

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives?

RESPONSES:

0: The major media represent only the government's perspective.

1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party.

2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.

3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the

major media.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.14.6 Percent (percent) Female Journalists (v2mefemjrn)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2mefemjrn

*Original tag:* v2mefemjrn

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Please estimate the percentage (percent) of journalists in the print and broadcast media who are women.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bootstrapped.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.14.7 Harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2meharjrn

*Original tag:* v2meharjrn

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are individual journalists harassed — *i.e.*, threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed — by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities?

RESPONSES:

0: No journalists dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.

1: Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually are forced to stop.

2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.

3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished.

4: Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.14.8 Media self-censorship (v2meslfcen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2meslfcen

*Original tag:* v2meslfcen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive?

RESPONSES:

0: Self-censorship is complete and thorough.

1: Self-censorship is common but incomplete.

2: There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues.

3: There is little or no self-censorship among journalists.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.14.9 Media bias (v2mebias)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2mebias

*Original tag:* v2mebias

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates?

CLARIFICATION: We ask you to take particular care in rating the year-to-year variation on this question if media bias tends to increase or decrease in election years. Coverage can be considered "more or less impartial" when the media as a whole present a mix of positive and negative coverage of each party or candidate.

RESPONSES:

0: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage, or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover.

1: The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage.

2: The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate.

3: The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated *amount* of coverage to the governing party or candidates.

4: The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.14.10 Media corrupt (v2mecorrpt)**



*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2mecorrpt

*Original tag:* v2mecorrpt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?

RESPONSES:

0: The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage.

1: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

2: It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

3: It is not normal for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally, without anyone being punished.

4: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments, and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

## 2.1.15 V-Dem Indicators - Political Equality

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Political Equality:** This section pertains to political equality, that is, the extent to which members of a polity possess equal political power. It does not refer to the inevitable differentiation in power that occurs in all large societies between those who hold positions of power within the state (political elites) and lay citizens. It is, rather, about the distribution of political power among identifiable groups within the population.

What does it mean for a group of individuals to wield real political power? Although political power cannot be directly observed, one can infer that groups possess power to the extent that they: (a) actively participate in politics (by voting, etc.), (b) are involved in civil society organizations, (c) secure representation in government, (d) are able to set the political agenda, (e) influence political decisions, and (f) influence the implementation of those decisions. Please consider all these factors when answering the following questions. (Of course, the picture across these different dimensions may be mixed; your response should indicate the overall picture, taking all aspects of political power into account.)

### 2.1.15.1 Power distributed by socioeconomic position (v2pepwrses)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2pepwrses

*Original tag:* v2pepwrses

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?

CLARIFICATION: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned

not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power.

RESPONSES:

0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence.

1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence.

2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.

3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.

4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.15.2 Power distributed by social group (v2pepwrSOC)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2pepwrSOC

*Original tag:* v2pepwrSOC

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is political power distributed according to social groups?

CLARIFICATION: A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does *not* include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, *i.e.*, as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood — by those residing within that society — to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant.

RESPONSES:

0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, *i.e.*, not subject to frequent change.

1: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, *i.e.*, not subject to frequent change.

2: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, *i.e.*, not subject to frequent change.

3: Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another — but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.

4: All social groups have roughly equal political power *or* there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*

(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.15.3 Power distributed by gender (v2pepwrgen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2pepwrgen

*Original tag:* v2pepwrgen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is political power distributed according to gender?

RESPONSES:

0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power.

1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.

2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.

3: Men have somewhat more political power than women.

4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.15.4 Power distributed by sexual orientation (v2pepwrtort)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2pepwrtort

*Original tag:* v2pepwrtort

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent is political power distributed according to sexual orientation?

CLARIFICATION: This question contrasts (A) the political power of heterosexuals and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are not open about their sexuality with (B) the political power of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are open about their sexuality. (A) will be referred to as "heterosexual" and (B) as "LGBT."

Note that in comparing the political power of these two groups we are comparing their power per person. So, when we say that LGBT have less, equal, or more power than heterosexuals we mean relative to their share of the population (as near as this can be estimated).

RESPONSES:

0: LGBTs are entirely excluded from the public sphere and thus deprived of any real political power (even though they may possess formal powers such as the ballot).

1: LGBTs have much less political power than heterosexuals. LGBTs enjoy formal rights to participate in politics but are subject to informal norms that often serve to exclude them from the halls of power.

2: LGBTs have somewhat less political power than heterosexual citizens.

3: LGBTs have about the same political power as heterosexuals. Each group enjoys a degree of political power that is roughly proportional to their population.

4: LGBTs enjoy somewhat more political power than heterosexuals by virtue of greater wealth, education, and high level of organization and mobilization.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.15.5 Educational equality (v2peedueq)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peedueq

*Original tag:* v2peedueq

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?

CLARIFICATION: Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

1: Unequal. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but ten to 25 percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

3: Relatively equal. Basic education is overall equal in quality but five to ten percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.15.6 Health equality (v2pehealth)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2pehealth

*Original tag:* v2pehealth

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens?

CLARIFICATION: Poor-quality healthcare can make citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed).

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 75 percent (percent) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

1: Unequal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 25 percent (percent) of citizens' ability

to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

2: Somewhat equal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, ten to 25 percent (percent) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

3: Relatively equal. Basic health care is overall equal in quality but because of poor-quality healthcare, five to ten percent (percent) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

4: Equal. Basic health care is equal in quality and less than five percent (percent) of citizens cannot exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.15.7 Primary school enrollment (v2peprisch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peprisch

*Original tag:* v2peprisch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

QUESTION: What percentage of the primary school-aged population is enrolled in primary school?

CLARIFICATION: This is based on Barro and Lee's (2016) long-term data on primary school enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). The time series is interpolated to impute values for all years between the five-year intervals.

SOURCE(S): Barro and Lee Long-Run Enrollment Ratios by Country.

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1820-2010

#### 2.1.15.8 Secondary school enrollment (v2pesecsch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2pesecsch

*Original tag:* v2pesecsch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

QUESTION: What percentage of the secondary school-aged population is enrolled in secondary school?

CLARIFICATION: This is based on Barro and Lee's (2016) long-term data on secondary school enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). The time series is interpolated to impute values for all years between the five-year intervals.

SOURCE(S): Barro and Lee Long-Run Enrollment Ratios by Country.

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1820-2010

#### 2.1.15.9 Secondary tertiary enrollment (v2petersch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2petersch

*Original tag:* v2petersch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

QUESTION: What percentage of the tertiary school-aged population is enrolled in tertiary school?

CLARIFICATION: This is based on Barro and Lee's (2016) long-term data on tertiary school enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). The time series is interpolated to impute values for all years between the five-year intervals.

SOURCE(S): Barro and Lee Long-Run Enrollment Ratios by Country.

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1820-2010

## 2.1.16 V-Dem Indicators - Exclusion

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

#### **Exclusion:**

The following survey contains questions pertaining to exclusion. Political, economic and social well-being may depend on whether groups or individuals are excluded from positions of power, the state's protection of rights and freedoms, access to public goods and services, and opportunities to work or do business with the state.

Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

*Exclusion* is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. It is not necessary for all members of a group to be excluded in order for group-based exclusion to occur. Exclusion occurs even when only a single individual is excluded based on her or his identity or membership (perceived or actual) in a particular group.

*Political groups* are defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. A common form of partisan exclusion is when state services or regulations are implemented in a way that seeks to reward the incumbent's political supporters and punish non-supporters.

*Socio-Economic position* defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property. Exclusion of economic groups occurs when, for example, those who are not property owners are restricted from voting, or when fees associated with justice, health or education are set at a rate that is unaffordable for poorer individuals.

*Social group* is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood - by those residing within that society - to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant. Contrast Identity group.

*Geographic group* refers to those living in rural or urban areas. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer and there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54).

### 2.1.16.1 Access to public services distributed by socio-economic position (v2peapsecon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peapsecon

*Original tag:* v2peapsecon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education,

clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally according to socioeconomic position?

CLARIFICATION: This question asks if socio-economic position is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular socio-economic position, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a socio-economic group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.1.16.2 Access to state jobs by socio-economic position (v2peasjsoecon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peasjsoecon

*Original tag:* v2peasjsoecon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of socio-economic position?

CLARIFICATION: Socio-economic position defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income, makes 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### **2.1.16.3 Access to state business opportunities by socio-economic position (v2peasbecon)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peasbecon

*Original tag:* v2peasbecon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals regardless of socio-economic position?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Socio-economic position defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income makes 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income makes 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income makes 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income makes 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income makes less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.16.4 Gender equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgenc1)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clgenc1

*Original tag:* v2clgenc1

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do women enjoy the same level of civil liberties as men?

CLARIFICATION: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Women enjoy much fewer civil liberties than men.

1: Women enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than men.

2: Women enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than men.

3: Women enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than men.

4: Women enjoy the same level of civil liberties as men.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-



Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.16.5 Access to public services distributed by gender (v2peapsgen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peapsgen

*Original tag:* v2peapsgen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally according to gender?

CLARIFICATION: This question asks if gender is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between gender, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that women are denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75 percent (percent) or more of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25 percent (percent) or more of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because of their gender, less than 5 percent (percent) of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.16.6 Access to state jobs by gender (v2peasjgen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peasjgen

*Original tag:* v2peasjgen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of gender?

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75 percent (percent) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25 percent (percent) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because of their gender, less than 5 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.16.7 Access to state business opportunities by gender (v2peasbgen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peasbgen

*Original tag:* v2peasbgen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of gender?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75 percent (percent) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25 percent (percent) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of their gender, 5 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.16.8 Power distributed by urban-rural location (v2pepwrgeo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2pepwrgeo

*Original tag:* v2pepwrgeo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is political power distributed according to urban-rural location?

CLARIFICATION: Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54)

RESPONSES:

0: People living in urban areas have a near-monopoly on political power.

1: People living in urban areas have a dominant hold on political power. Those living in rural

areas have only marginal influence.

2: People living in urban areas have much more political power but those living in rural areas have some areas of influence.

3: People living in urban areas have somewhat more political power than those living in rural areas.

4: People living in any area have roughly equal political power or people living in rural areas have more access to political power than those in urban areas.

5: People living in rural areas have much more political power but those living in urban areas have some areas of influence.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.16.9 Urban-rural location equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgeocl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clgeocl

*Original tag:* v2clgeocl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do those who reside in rural areas enjoy same level of civil liberties as those residing in urban areas?

CLARIFICATION: This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across geographic areas. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road (World Development Report, 2009: 54). Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Those who live in rural areas enjoy much fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.

1: Those who live in rural areas enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.

2: Those who live in rural areas enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.

3: Those who live in rural areas enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.

4: Residents of rural areas enjoy the same level of civil liberties as those in urban areas.

5: Residents of rural areas enjoy more civil liberties than those in urban areas.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.16.10 Access to public services distributed by urban-rural location (v2peapsgeo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peapsgeo

*Original tag:* v2peapsgeo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across urban and rural areas?

CLARIFICATION: Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54). This question asks if geographic group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between urban and rural areas, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a geographic group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, only 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

5: Rural-Bias: Because they live in urban areas, 25percent or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.16.11 Access to state jobs by urban-rural location (v2peasjgeo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peasjgeo

*Original tag:* v2peasjgeo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of their rural or urban location?

CLARIFICATION: Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54)

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, only 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

5: Rural-Bias. Because they live in urban areas, 25percent or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.1.16.12 Access to state business opportunities by urban-rural location (v2peasbegeo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peasbegeo

*Original tag:* v2peasbegeo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of their rural or urban locations?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54)

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

5: Rural-Bias. Because they live in urban areas, 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.16.13 Political group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clpolcl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2clpolcl

*Original tag:* v2clpolcl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do members of all political groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

CLARIFICATION: A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates that can be distinguished from others in terms of enjoyment of civil liberties. Responses should not reflect which party controls the legislature and executive. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Some political groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

1: Some political groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

2: Some political groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

3: Some political groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

4: All political groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.16.14 Access to public services distributed by political group (v2peapspol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peapspol

*Original tag:* v2peapspol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across political groups?

CLARIFICATION: A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. This question asks if political group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular political groups, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a political group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation 75 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation 25 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation only 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation less than 5 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*

(see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.1.16.15 Access to state jobs by political group (v2peasjpol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peasjpol

*Original tag:* v2peasjpol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of their association with a political group?

CLARIFICATION: A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.16.16 Access to state business opportunities by political group (v2peasbepol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peasbepol

*Original tag:* v2peasbepol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of an individual's association with a political group?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates that can be distinguished from others in terms of access to power. Responses should not reflect which party controls the legislature and executive.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack equal access to state business opportunities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.16.17 Access to public services distributed by social group (v2peapssoc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peapssoc

*Original tag:* v2peapssoc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across social groups?

CLARIFICATION: This question asks if social group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular social groups, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a social group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because of their social group, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group, only 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because of their social group, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.16.18 Access to state jobs by social group (v2peasjsoc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peasjsoc

*Original tag:* v2peasjsoc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of social group?



CLARIFICATION: Social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.)

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because of their social group identity, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group identity, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group identity, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because of their social group identity, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.1.16.19 Access to state business opportunities by social group (v2peasbsoc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2peasbsoc

*Original tag:* v2peasbsoc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of social group?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.)

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of their social group, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of their social group, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.1.17 V-Dem Indicators - Legitimation

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **Legitimation strategies:**

Governments make legitimacy claims—provide justifications for the form of rule under which they govern. In the following section we are interested in the nature of the legitimacy claims made by the sitting government. Please note that the government's claims to legitimacy - their legitimation strategies - are the object of inquiry here. We are not asking you to assess how ordinary people judge the legitimacy of their rulers. Do not assume that governments make legitimacy claims on only one basis. We are interested in multi-track and hybrid legitimation strategies. The regime is understood as a set of formal and/or informal rules that govern the choice of political leaders and their exercise of power. The government is understood as the chief executive along with the cabinet, ministries, and top civil servants.

#### **2.1.17.1 Ideology (v2exl\_legitideol)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exl\_legitideol

*Original tag:* v2exl\_legitideol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the current government promote a specific ideology or societal model (an officially codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular set of social, political, and economic relations; for example, socialism, nationalism, religious traditionalism, etc.) in order to justify the regime in place?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: To a small extent.

2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.

3: To a large extent but not exclusively.

4: Almost exclusively.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.17.2 Person of the leader (v2exl\_legitlead)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exl\_legitlead

*Original tag:* v2exl\_legitlead

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent is the Chief Executive portrayed as being endowed with extraordinary personal characteristics and/or leadership skills (e.g. as father or mother of the nation, exceptionally heroic, moral, pious, or wise, or any other extraordinary attribute valued by the society)?

CLARIFICATION: The Chief Executive refers to the Head of State or the Head of Government, depending on the relative power of each office. We are interested in the key leadership figure.

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: To a small extent.  
2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.  
3: To a large extent but not exclusively.  
4: Almost exclusively.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 9-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).  
CITATION: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.17.3 Performance legitimization (v2exl\_legitperf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exl\_legitperf

*Original tag:* v2exl\_legitperf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: To what extent does the government refer to performance (such as providing economic growth, poverty reduction, effective and non-corrupt governance, and/or providing security) in order to justify the regime in place?  
RESPONSES:  
0: Not at all.  
1: To a small extent.  
2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.  
3: To a large extent but not exclusively.  
4: Almost exclusively.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 9-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).  
CITATION: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.17.4 Rational-legal legitimization (v2exl\_legitratio)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exl\_legitratio

*Original tag:* v2exl\_legitratio

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: To what extent does the current government refer to the legal norms and regulations in order to justify the regime in place?  
CLARIFICATION: This question pertains to legal norms and regulations as laid out for instance in the constitution regarding access to power (e.g. elections) as well as exercise of power (e.g. rule of law). Electoral regimes may score high on this question as well as non-electoral regimes that emphasize their rule-boundedness.  
RESPONSES:  
0: Not at all.  
1: To a small extent.  
2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.  
3: To a large extent but not exclusively.

4: Almost exclusively.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.17.5 Ideology character (v2exl\_legitideolcr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2exl\_legitideolcr

*Original tag:* v2exl\_legitideolcr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you characterize the ideology/ideologies identified in the previous question?

CLARIFICATION: Check all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Nationalist (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr\_0]

1: Socialist or communist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_1]

2: Restorative or conservative. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_2]

3: Separatist or autonomist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_3]

4: Religious. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_4]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.18 V-Dem Indicators - Civic and Academic Space

##### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **Civic and Academic Space:**

In this survey, we ask you to assess several issues concerning the space for and state of civil society and academia. First, we ask about some general issues such as polarization and peaceful assembly. Then, we probe into mobilization for mass events and associations. Finally, we ask you to consider questions related to academia.

##### 2.1.18.1 Political polarization (v2cacamps)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cacamps

*Original tag:* v2cacamps

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is society polarized into antagonistic, political camps?

CLARIFICATION: Here we refer to the extent to which political differences affect social relationships beyond political discussions. Societies are highly polarized if supporters of opposing political camps are reluctant to engage in friendly interactions, for example, in family functions, civic associations, their free time activities and workplaces

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a friendly manner.  
1: Mainly not. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a friendly than a hostile manner.  
2: Somewhat. Supporters of opposing political camps are equally likely to interact in a friendly or hostile manner.  
3: Yes, to noticeable extent. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a hostile than friendly manner.  
4: Yes, to a large extent. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a hostile manner.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.1.18.2 Political violence (v2caviol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2caviol

*Original tag:* v2caviol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often have non-state actors used political violence against persons this year?

CLARIFICATION: We understand political violence as the use of physical force to achieve political objectives by non-state actors. The restriction to political objectives excludes profit-driven crime-related violence, for instance. By non-state actors we refer to individuals or entities that are not formally part of the state. Thus, politically oriented militias and youth groups count as non-state actors even though they might potentially be informally affiliated with the ruling party or the state. Political violence against persons excludes psychological and symbolic violence (e.g. destruction of objects).

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. Non-state actors did not use political violence.

1: Rare. Non-state actors rarely used political violence.

2: Occasionally. Non-state actors occasionally used political violence.

3: Frequently. Non-state actors frequently used political violence.

4: Often. Non-state actors often used political violence.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.1.18.3 Freedom of peaceful assembly (v2caassemb)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2caassemb

*Original tag:* v2caassemb

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do state authorities respect and protect the right of peaceful assembly?

CLARIFICATION: This question focuses on the ability to assemble publically in practice.

An assembly is “an intentional and temporary presence of a number of individuals in a public place, for a common expressive purpose” (ODIHR and Venice Commission of the Council of Europe 2010). Authorities may limit the right to assembly only if limitations are necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and are lawful, necessary, and proportionate to the aim pursued. Such reasonable and legal restrictions should not be considered when answering. However, if there is evidence that restrictions are used as a pretext for political reasons, this evidence should be considered.

RESPONSES:

0: Never. State authorities do not allow peaceful assemblies and are willing to use lethal force to prevent them.

1: Rarely. State authorities rarely allow peaceful assemblies, but generally avoid using lethal force to prevent them.

2: Sometimes. State authorities sometimes allow peaceful assemblies, but often arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully.

3: Mostly. State authorities generally allow peaceful assemblies, but in rare cases arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully.

4: Almost always. State authorities almost always allow and actively protect peaceful assemblies except in rare cases of lawful, necessary, and proportionate limitations.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.18.4 State of emergency (v2casoe)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2casoe

*Original tag:* v2casoe

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Was a national state of emergency in place at any point this year?

CLARIFICATION: A state of emergency is a formal legal act that enables state actors and institutions to change their roles during times of international or domestic crisis. Our definition of state of emergency includes the application of martial law. If there was more than one state of emergency, code the one that was in place for the longer time. Select one option.

RESPONSES:

0: The legal framework does not allow for a declaration of a national state of emergency. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_0]

1: There was no state of emergency in place at any point this year, even though provisions for a declaration of a national state of emergency exist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_1]

2: A national state of emergency was in place due to a natural disaster. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_2]

3: A national state of emergency was in place due to a terrorist attack. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_3]

4: A national state of emergency was in place due to an armed conflict/war, domestically or internationally. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_4]

5: A national state of emergency was in place due to mass protest/popular uprising. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_5]

6: A national state of emergency was in place for reasons other than those listed above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_6]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.18.5 Mass mobilization (v2cagenmob)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cagenmob

*Original tag:* v2cagenmob

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization been?

CLARIFICATION: This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

RESPONSES:

0: There have been virtually no events.

1: There have been several small-scale events.

2: There have been many small-scale events.

3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.

4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.18.6 Mass mobilization concentration (v2caconmob)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2caconmob

*Original tag:* v2caconmob

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Were mass mobilization events concentrated in the capital?

CLARIFICATION: This question is about the geographic location of the events and not their intensity. In the unlikely event that no event at all took place, code option 2. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. Events of mass mobilization were much more frequent in the capital.

1: Somewhat. Events of mass mobilization were somewhat more frequent in the capital.

2: No. Events of mass mobilization were as common in many cities across the country as in the capital or did not take place at all.

3: No. Events of mass mobilization were more common in cities other than the capital.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.1.18.7 Mobilization for democracy (v2cademmob)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cademmob

*Original tag:* v2cademmob

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization for pro-democratic aims been?

CLARIFICATION: Events are pro-democratic if they are organized with the explicit aim to advance and/or protect democratic institutions such as free and fair elections with multiple parties, and courts and parliaments; or if they are in support of civil liberties such as freedom of association and speech. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins.

RESPONSES:

0: There have been virtually no events.

1: There have been several small-scale events.

2: There have been many small-scale events.

3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.

4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Hellmeier and Bernhard (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:128); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.1.18.8 Mobilization for autocracy (v2caautmob)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2caautmob

*Original tag:* v2caautmob

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization for pro-autocratic aims been?

CLARIFICATION: Events are pro-autocratic if they are organized explicitly in support of non-democratic rulers and forms of government such as a one-party state, monarchy, theocracy or military dictatorships. Events are also pro-autocratic if they are organized in support of leaders that question basic principles of democracy, or are generally aiming to undermine democratic ideas and institutions such as the rule of law, free and fair elections, or media freedom. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes, sit. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns also count state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

RESPONSES:

0: There have been virtually no events.

1: There have been several small-scale events.

2: There have been many small-scale events.

3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.

4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.



CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Hellmeier and Bernhard (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:128); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.18.9 Engagement in state-administered mass organizations (v2castate)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2castate

*Original tag:* v2castate

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What share of the population is regularly active in state-administered mass associations, such as women, worker or youth leagues?

CLARIFICATION: State-administered mass associations are civilian organizations created and led by the government or the ruling party. Large shares of specific societal groups are voluntary or compulsory members of these associations. Examples include youth leagues such as the Hitlerjugend in Nazi Germany and the pioneers in the Soviet Union, women leagues such as the Women's Federation in China or the Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas and official trade unions in the Soviet Union. Such organizations are formally or informally affiliated with the state and/or with the ruling party. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no one.

1: A small share of the population (less than 5percent).

2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 percent).

3: A large share of the population (about 16 percent to 25percent).

4: A very large share of the population (about 26percent or more).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.1.18.10 Engagement in independent trade unions (v2catrauni)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2catrauni

*Original tag:* v2catrauni

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What share of the population is regularly active in independent trade unions?

CLARIFICATION: An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no one.

1: A small share of the population (less than 5percent).

2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 percent).

3: A large share of the population (about 16 percent to 25percent).

4: A very large share of the population (about 26percent or more).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.1.18.11 Engagement in independent political associations (v2capolit)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2capolit

*Original tag:* v2capolit

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What share of the population is regularly active in independent political interest associations, such as environmental associations, animal rights groups, or LGBT rights groups?

CLARIFICATION: Political associations include all associations whose main purpose is the change of policy or practice at the state or societal level. It does NOT include political parties or trade unions. An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no one.

1: A small share of the population (less than 5percent).

2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 percent).

3: A large share of the population (about 16 percent to 25percent).

4: A very large share of the population (about 26percent or more).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.18.12 Engagement in independent non-political associations (v2canonpol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2canonpol

*Original tag:* v2canonpol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What share of the population is regularly active in independent non-political associations, such as sports clubs, literary societies, charities, fraternal groups, or support groups?

CLARIFICATION: Non-political associations include all associations whose main purpose is not the change of policy or practice at the state or societal level. It does NOT include political parties, or trade unions. An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting activity or event at least twice a year.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no one.

1: A small share of the population (less than 5percent).

2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 percent).  
3: A large share of the population (about 16 percent to 25percent).  
4: A very large share of the population (about 26percent or more).  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.18.13 Existence of Universities (v2cauni)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cauni

*Original tag:* v2cauni

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Alicja Polakiewicz, Janika Spannagel  
QUESTION: Have universities existed in this country?  
CLARIFICATION: This indicator captures if universities have (ever) existed in this country. Thus, even if all universities were temporarily closed in a given year, this indicator is coded as 1 (“yes”).  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
SCALE: Dichotomous  
SOURCE(S): Apfeld (2019) drawing on 4icu.org (Atuzzo 2019); whed.net; various country-specific sources.  
NOTES: Country-specific sources were consulted where 4icu.org and whed.net suggested conflicting years of establishment of first university.  
DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, *V-Dem Users’ Working Paper Series*); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.18.14 Total number of universities (v2canuni)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2canuni

*Original tag:* v2canuni

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring, Brendan Apfeld  
QUESTION: What is the total number of universities?  
CLARIFICATION: The total number of universities founded in or before the given year. Universities are considered to be degree-granting institutions of higher education that grant at least one bachelor’s degree or its equivalent, corresponding to International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels 6-8.  
RESPONSES:  
Numeric  
SCALE: Interval  
SOURCE(S): Apfeld (2019)  
DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: Apfeld (2019) drawing on Atuzzo (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2016

#### 2.1.18.15 Constitutional Protection for Academic Freedom (v2caprotac)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2caprotac

*Original tag:* v2caprotac

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach

QUESTION: Do constitutional provisions for the protection of academic freedom exist?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

95: Constitution suspended.

97: Other, or undetermined.

99: Missing.

SCALE: Ordinal

SOURCE(S): Elkins et al. (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.18.16 Freedom to research and teach (v2cafres)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cafres

*Original tag:* v2cafres

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are scholars free to develop and pursue their own research and teaching agendas without interference?

CLARIFICATION: Examples of interference include research agendas or teaching curricula being drafted, restricted, or fully censored by a non-academic actor; scholars being externally induced, through possible reprisals, to self-censor; or the university administration abusing its position of power to impose research or teaching agendas on individual academics. It also includes public pressure on academics - offline and online. We do not consider as interference restrictions that are due to research priorities, as well as ethical and quality standards, freely defined by the scholarly community as well as the development of standardized curricula by academics that aim to structure and enhance teaching.

RESPONSES:

0: Completely restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are, across all disciplines, consistently subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

1: Severely restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are, in some disciplines, consistently subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

2: Moderately restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are occasionally subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

3: Mostly free. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are rarely subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

4: Fully free. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are not subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, *V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series*); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.18.17 Freedom of academic exchange and dissemination (v2cafexch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cafexch

*Original tag:* v2cafexch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are scholars free to exchange and communicate research ideas and findings?

CLARIFICATION: Free academic exchange includes uncensored access to research material, unhindered participation in national or international academic conferences, and the uncensored publication of academic material. Free dissemination refers to the unrestricted possibility for scholars to share and explain research findings in their field of expertise to non-academic audiences through media engagement or public lectures.

RESPONSES:

0: Completely restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is, across all disciplines, consistently subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

1: Severely restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is, in some disciplines, consistently subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

2: Moderately restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is occasionally subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

3: Mostly free. Academic exchange and dissemination is rarely subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

4: Fully free. Academic exchange and dissemination is not subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.18.18 Institutional autonomy (v2cainsaut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cainsaut

*Original tag:* v2cainsaut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do universities exercise institutional autonomy in practice?

CLARIFICATION: Institutional autonomy “means the independence of institutions of higher education from the State and all other forces of society, to make decisions regarding its internal government, finance, administration, and to establish its policies of education, research, extension work and other related activities” (Lima Declaration). Note that institutional autonomy does not preclude universities from accepting state or third party funding, but does require that they remain in charge of all types of decisions listed above. Institutional autonomy does also not preclude a public oversight role by the state over universities' spending of public funds.

RESPONSES:

0: No autonomy at all. Universities do not exercise any degree of institutional autonomy; non-academic actors control decision-making.

1: Minimal autonomy. Universities exercise only very limited institutional autonomy;

non-academic actors interfere extensively with decision-making.

2: Moderate autonomy. Universities exercise some institutional autonomy; non-academic actors interfere moderately with decision-making.

3: Substantial autonomy. Universities exercise institutional autonomy to a large extent; non-academic actors have only rare and minimal influence on decision-making.

4: Complete autonomy. Universities exercise complete institutional autonomy from non-academic actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.1.18.19 Campus integrity (v2casurv)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2casurv

*Original tag:* v2casurv

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are campuses free from politically motivated surveillance or security infringements?

CLARIFICATION: "Campus" refers to all university buildings as well as digital research and teaching platforms. Campus integrity means the preservation of an open learning and research environment marked by an absence of an externally induced climate of insecurity or intimidation on campus. Examples of infringements of campus integrity are politically motivated on-campus or digital surveillance, presence by intelligence or security forces, presence of student militias, or violent attacks by third parties, if specifically targeting universities to repress academic life on campus. Note that we are only interested in politically motivated infringements and targeted attacks on campus integrity, not in non-political security concerns or proportionate security measures taken on campus to address these.

RESPONSES:

0: Completely restricted. Campus integrity is fundamentally undermined by extensive surveillance and severe intimidation, including violence or closures.

1: Severely restricted. Campus integrity is to a large extent undermined by surveillance and intimidation, at times including violence or closures.

2: Moderately restricted. Campus integrity is challenged by some significant cases of surveillance or intimidation.

3: Mostly free. Campus integrity is to a large extent respected, with only minor cases of surveillance or intimidation.

4: Fully free. Campus integrity is comprehensively respected; there are no cases of surveillance or intimidation.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.1.18.20 Academics as critics (v2cacritic)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2cacritic

*Original tag:* v2cacritic

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do scholars and university students publicly criticize government policies?

CLARIFICATION: This question is only about the extent scholars and students actually criticize government policies – irrespective of how free they are to do so and whether they are met with repression or not. We ask you simply to consider to what extent scholars and students are noticeable as government critics in the public discourse.

Public criticism of government policies can be conveyed for example through the publication of op-eds or social media posts on current affairs, the signing of open letters or petitions, the taking part in or organization of public protests, or the holding of critical lectures to students or the public.

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. Scholars and university students do not publicly express criticism of government policies.

1: To a small extent. Scholars and university students publicly express minor criticism of government policies.

2: To a moderate extent. Scholars and university students publicly express moderate criticism of government policies.

3: To a large extent. Scholars and university students publicly express substantive criticism of government policies.

4: To a major extent. Scholars and university students publicly express fundamental criticism of government policies.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.1.18.21 International legal commitment to academic freedom (v2caacadfree)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2caacadfree

*Original tag:* v2caacadfree

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Alicja Polakiewicz, Janika Spannagel

QUESTION: Is the state party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) without reservations to article 15 (right to science)?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator captures the country's international legal commitment to academic freedom. It indicates whether the country is party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights without having made explicit reservations to its article 15 (right to science), which stipulates, among other things, that states parties "undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research".

RESPONSES:

0: State not a party to ICESCR, or made reservations to article 15.

1: State is party to ICESCR without reservations to article 15, but treaty not yet in force.

2: ICESCR in force and signed without reservations to article 15.

3: ICESCR in force and ratified without reservations to article 15.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): <https://treaties.un.org/>

NOTES: Coded is the ratification status as of December 31st of each year.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1966-2021

### 2.1.19 Historical V-Dem - Elections

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem Elections*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 2.1.19.1 Minimum candidate age lower chamber (v3canagelc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3canagelc

*Original tag:* v3canagelc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to serve in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1968

#### 2.1.19.2 Minimum candidate age upper chamber (v3canageuc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3canageuc

*Original tag:* v3canageuc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to serve in the upper chamber?

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger



and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1962

#### 2.1.19.3 Minimum voting age presidency (v3elagepr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elagepr

*Original tag:* v3elagepr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote for presidential elections?

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if there are no presidential elections.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v3eltype\_6, v3eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1792-1920

#### 2.1.19.4 Minimum voting age upper chamber (v3elageuc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elageuc

*Original tag:* v3elageuc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote for the upper chamber of the national parliament?

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Upper chamber election dates (v3eltype\_2, v3eltype\_3)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1849-1920

#### 2.1.19.5 Voting, voice or ballot (v3elbalpap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elbalpap

*Original tag:* v3elbalpap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How are votes cast?

RESPONSES:

0: Votes are cast verbally (viva voce).

1: Both voice votes and paper ballots are used, but verbal voting is more common.

2: Voice voting and paper ballots are both common.

3: Both voice votes and paper ballots are used, but paper ballots are more common.

4: All votes are cast on paper ballots.

ORDERING: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following question (v3elbalstat), meaning: jump to v3elecsdf.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.19.6 Ballot printing (v3elbalstat)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elbalstat

*Original tag:* v3elbalstat

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Who prints ballot papers?

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if all or nearly all voting is verbal (viva voce).

RESPONSES:

0: Political parties or candidates print all (or nearly all) the ballot papers.

1: Both the state and parties or candidates print the ballot papers.

2: The state prints all (or nearly all) ballot papers.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3elbalpap is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.19.7 Compulsory voting (H) (v3elcomvot)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elcomvot

*Original tag:* v3elcomvot

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is voting compulsory (for those eligible to vote) in national elections?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced.

2: Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter.

3: Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### **2.1.19.8 Direct lower chamber (unicameral) elections (v3eldirelc)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3eldirelc

*Original tag:* v3eldirelc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What is the mode of election of the parliament/lower chamber?

RESPONSES:

0: Indirect

1: Direct

2: Mixed (differs depending on individual or collective characteristics).

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources. Constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1930

#### **2.1.19.9 Direct presidential elections (v3eldirepr)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3eldirepr

*Original tag:* v3eldirepr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What is the mode of election of the president in popular elections?

CLARIFICATION: Cases in which the constitution provides that the president is elected by the legislature, including those in which the legislature elects only if none of the candidates obtains some minimum threshold of votes, should be coded according to the provisions concerning popular elections.

RESPONSES:

0: Indirect

1: Direct

2: Mixed (differs depending on individual or collective characteristics).

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources. Constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1792-1920

#### **2.1.19.10 Direct upper chamber elections (v3eldireuc)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3eldireuc

*Original tag:* v3eldireuc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning  
QUESTION: What is the mode of election of the upper chamber?  
RESPONSES:  
0: Indirect  
1: Direct  
2: Mixed (differs depending on individual or collective characteristics).  
SCALE: Nominal  
SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources. Constitutions.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 2.1.19.11 Secret ballot, de facto (v3elecsedf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elecsedf

*Original tag:* v3elecsedf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Are polling stations organized to guarantee voters a secret, anonymous choice?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No. Voters cannot make a secret, anonymous choice.  
1: No. Some voters can make a secret, anonymous choice, but voting secrecy is in most instances violated.  
2: Mixed. Voting secrecy and anonymity is assured to roughly the same extent as it is violated.  
3: Yes. Most voters can make a secret, anonymous choice, but voting secrecy is in some instances violated.  
4: Yes. All voters can make a secret, anonymous choice.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.19.12 Malapportionment legislature/lower chamber (v3elmalalc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elmalalc

*Original tag:* v3elmalalc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Daniel Ziblatt  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Is there a large discrepancy in the vote/seat ratio across electoral districts for the lower (or unicameral) chamber?  
CLARIFICATION: "Malapportionment" characterizes a situation in which voters in some districts have more power by virtue of a more favorable vote/seat ratio. For example, if seats have not been reapportioned in a long time rural areas may be over-represented relative to urban areas simply because the latter have grown more rapidly than the former. (This question does not address inequality of votes based on class or other criteria.) Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.  
RESPONSES:

0: There is a high degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 50:1.  
1: There is a substantial degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ as much as 10:1.  
2: There is some degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 2:1.  
3: There is modest or no malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by less than 2:1.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.19.13 Malapportionment upper chamber (v3elmalauc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elmalauc

*Original tag:* v3elmalauc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Daniel Ziblatt

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the electoral system (including the size of electoral districts) involve large differences in the ratios of votes to representatives in elections for the upper chamber?

CLARIFICATION: This question does not address inequality of votes based on class or other criteria but only the relationship between votes and seats. Leave blank if no upper chamber.

RESPONSES:

0: There is a high degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 50:1.

1: There is a substantial degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ as much as 10:1.

2: There is some degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 2:1.

3: There is modest or no malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by less than 2:1.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.19.14 Minority or majority government (v3elnbmaj)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elnbmaj

*Original tag:* v3elnbmaj

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In the first cabinet after this national election, did the political parties that were represented in the cabinet hold a majority of the seats in the (lower chamber of) the legislature?

RESPONSES:

0: Parties are not allowed.

1: No, the parties represented in cabinet held less than half of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

2: Yes, the parties represented in cabinet held half, or more than half, of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.  
3: Parties are allowed but nonexistent or so diffuse as to be more like factions, and the factions represented in government hold less than half of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.  
4: Parties are allowed but nonexistent or so diffuse as to be more like factions, but the factions represented in government hold half, or more than half, of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.  
SCALE: Nominal  
SOURCE(S): <http://www.countrystudies.us>, various country specific sources.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-1920

#### 2.1.19.15 Reapportionment legislature/lower chamber (v3elreapplc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elreapplc

*Original tag:* v3elreapplc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Daniel Ziblatt

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there a legal or constitutional statute, upheld in practice, stating that seats or electoral boundaries for elections to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature should be regularly reapportioned?

CLARIFICATION: Reapportionment is the process of reallocating the number of seats or the boundaries of a district in order to reflect its relative share of the population. Answering yes does not imply perfect apportionment (see later question). Leave blank if no lower (or unicameral) chamber. (This question is not about suffrage or informal restrictions to suffrage.)  
RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law but not upheld in practice.

2: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law and upheld in practice.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.19.16 Reapportionment upper chamber (v3elreappuc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elreappuc

*Original tag:* v3elreappuc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Daniel Ziblatt

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there a legal or constitutional statute, upheld in practice, stating that seats or electoral boundaries for elections to the upper chamber of the legislature should be regularly reapportioned?

CLARIFICATION: Reapportionment is the process of reallocating the number of seats or the boundaries of a district in order to reflect its relative share of the population. Answering yes does not imply perfect apportionment (see later question). Leave blank if no upper chamber. (This question is not about suffrage or informal restrictions to suffrage.)

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law but not upheld in practice.

2: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law and upheld in practice.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.19.17 Candidate exclusions (de jure) lower (unicameral) chamber (v3elrstrlc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elrstrlc

*Original tag:* v3elrstrlc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Is the right to run as a candidate to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons? (Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

RESPONSES:

0: Literacy [v3elrstrlc\_0]

1: Property [v3elrstrlc\_1]

2: Income [v3elrstrlc\_2]

3: Tax payment [v3elrstrlc\_3]

4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elrstrlc\_4]

5: Slave [v3elrstrlc\_5]

6: Ethnicity, race [v3elrstrlc\_6]

7: Religion [v3elrstrlc\_7]

8: Region [v3elrstrlc\_8]

9: "Bad moral character" [v3elrstrlc\_9]

10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elrstrlc\_10]

11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elrstrlc\_11]

12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elrstrlc\_12]

13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elrstrlc\_13]

SCALE: Nominal

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1968

#### 2.1.19.18 Candidate exclusions (de jure) presidential elections (v3elrstrpr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elrstrpr

*Original tag:* v3elrstrpr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Is the right to run as a candidate in presidential elections restricted for any of

the following reasons? Check all that apply.

CLARIFICATION: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if there is no direct presidential elections. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

RESPONSES:

- 0: Literacy [v3elstrpr\_0]
- 1: Property [v3elstrpr\_1]
- 2: Income [v3elstrpr\_2]
- 3: Tax payment [v3elstrpr\_3]
- 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elstrpr\_4]
- 5: Slave [v3elstrpr\_5]
- 6: Ethnicity, race [v3elstrpr\_6]
- 7: Religion [v3elstrpr\_7]
- 8: Region [v3elstrpr\_8]
- 9: "Bad moral character" [v3elstrpr\_9]
- 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elstrpr\_10]
- 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elstrpr\_11]
- 12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elstrpr\_12]
- 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elstrpr\_13]

SCALE: Nominal

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1804-1938

### 2.1.19.19 Candidate exclusions (de jure) upper chamber (v3elstrup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elstrup

*Original tag:* v3elstrup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Is the right to run as a candidate to the upper chamber of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

CLARIFICATION: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if there is no upper chamber. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

RESPONSES:

- 0: Literacy [v3elstrup\_0]
- 1: Property [v3elstrup\_1]
- 2: Income [v3elstrup\_2]
- 3: Tax payment [v3elstrup\_3]
- 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elstrup\_4]
- 5: Slave [v3elstrup\_5]
- 6: Ethnicity, race [v3elstrup\_6]
- 7: Religion [v3elstrup\_7]
- 8: Region [v3elstrup\_8]



9: "Bad moral character" [v3elrstrup\_9]  
10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elrstrup\_10]  
11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elrstrup\_11]  
12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elrstrup\_12]  
13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elrstrup\_13]  
SCALE: Nominal  
ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.  
SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1795-1962

#### 2.1.19.20 De jure ballot secrecy (v3elsec)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elsec

*Original tag:* v3elsec

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring  
QUESTION: Is there ballot secrecy by law?  
RESPONSES:  
0: no.  
1: Yes.  
2: Secrecy optional.  
3: Varies spatially and/or hierarchically.  
SCALE: Nominal  
SOURCE(S): IFES; IDEA; [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret\\_ballot](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_ballot), various country specific sources.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-1920

#### 2.1.19.21 Upper chamber election turnover (v3eltvriguc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3eltvriguc

*Original tag:* v3eltvriguc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning  
QUESTION: Did control of the upper chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No. The same party/group/coalition remained in control of the majority of seats.  
  
1: Partly. The leading position within a coalition changed. Or, a new coalition includes some old groups/parties and some new groups/parties.  
  
2: Yes. Another party/group/coalition gained control of the majority of seats.  
SCALE: Ordinal.  
SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1831-1900

#### **2.1.19.22 Upper chamber election seats (v3elupseat)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elupseat

*Original tag:* v3elupseat

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats were there in the upper chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1900

#### **2.1.19.23 Upper chamber election seats won by largest party (v3elupstsl)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elupstsl

*Original tag:* v3elupstsl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1900

#### **2.1.19.24 Upper chamber election seats won by second largest party (v3elupstsm)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elupstsm

*Original tag:* v3elupstsm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats in the upper chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric  
SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1790-1900

**2.1.19.25 Upper chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (v3elupvtlg)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elupvtlg

*Original tag:* v3elupvtlg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning  
QUESTION: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?  
CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.  
SCALE: Interval  
ANSWER-TYPE: Percent  
SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1894-1900

**2.1.19.26 Upper chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (v3elupvtsm)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elupvtsm

*Original tag:* v3elupvtsm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning  
QUESTION: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?  
CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.  
SCALE: Interval  
ANSWER-TYPE: Percent  
SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1894-1900

**2.1.19.27 Suffrage exclusions (de jure) lower (unicameral) chamber (v3elvstrlc)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elvstrlc

*Original tag:* v3elvstrlc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Is the right to vote for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons?

CLARIFICATION: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*).

It applies to direct elections and not indirect elections (except situations where the electors are merely executing the will of the voters such as US presidential elections after 1800).

If there is variation across regions of a country, for each category try to estimate the modal (most common) category. Thus, if most regions of a country imposed restrictions based on property, choose answer #2.

Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) parliament.

RESPONSES:

0: Literacy [v3elvstrlc\_0]

1: Property [v3elvstrlc\_1]

2: Income [v3elvstrlc\_2]

3: Tax payment [v3elvstrlc\_3]

4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elvstrlc\_4]

5: Slave [v3elvstrlc\_5]

6: Ethnicity, race [v3elvstrlc\_6]

7: Religion [v3elvstrlc\_7]

8: Region [v3elvstrlc\_8]

9: "Bad moral character" [v3elvstrlc\_9]

10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elvstrlc\_10]

11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elvstrlc\_11]

12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elvstrlc\_12]

13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elvstrlc\_13]

SCALE: Nominal

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1968

### 2.1.19.28 Suffrage exclusions (de jure) presidential elections (v3elvstrpr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elvstrpr

*Original tag:* v3elvstrpr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Is the right to vote in the presidential election restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

CLARIFICATION: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if the head of state is not directly elected. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

RESPONSES:

0: Literacy [v3elvstrpr\_0]

1: Property [v3elvstrpr\_1]

2: Income [v3elvstrpr\_2]

3: Tax payment [v3elvstrpr\_3]

4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father)

[v3elvstrpr\_4]  
 5: Slave [v3elvstrpr\_5]  
 6: Ethnicity, race [v3elvstrpr\_6]  
 7: Religion [v3elvstrpr\_7]  
 8: Region [v3elvstrpr\_8]  
 9: "Bad moral character" [v3elvstrpr\_9]  
 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elvstrpr\_10]  
 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elvstrpr\_11]  
 12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elvstrpr\_12]  
 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elvstrpr\_13]  
 SCALE: Nominal  
 ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.  
 SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.  
 DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
 COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
 CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
 YEARS: 1789-1938

### 2.1.19.29 Suffrage exclusions (de jure) upper chamber (v3elvstruc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elvstruc

*Original tag:* v3elvstruc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Is the right to vote for the upper house of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

CLARIFICATION: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). It applies to direct elections and not indirect elections (except situations where the electors are merely executing the will of the voters such as US presidential elections after 1800). If there is variation across regions of a country, for each category try to estimate the modal (most common) situation. Thus, if most regions imposed restrictions based on property, choose answer #2. Leave blank if there is no upper chamber or if upper chamber is not directly elected. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

RESPONSES:

0: Literacy [v3elvstruc\_0]  
 1: Property [v3elvstruc\_1]  
 2: Income [v3elvstruc\_2]  
 3: Tax payment [v3elvstruc\_3]  
 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elvstruc\_4]  
 5: Slave [v3elvstruc\_5]  
 6: Ethnicity, race [v3elvstruc\_6]  
 7: Religion [v3elvstruc\_7]  
 8: Region [v3elvstruc\_8]  
 9: "Bad moral character" [v3elvstruc\_9]  
 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elvstruc\_10]  
 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elvstruc\_11]  
 12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elvstruc\_12]  
 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elvstruc\_13]

SCALE: Nominal

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005,

2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1795-1962

#### **2.1.19.30 Election women in the cabinet (v3elwomcab)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elwomcab

*Original tag:* v3elwomcab

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: In the first cabinet after this national election, what percentage (percent) of the ministers was female?

CLARIFICATION: A "minister" is defined as a person with a specific set of duties (a portfolio). It excludes ministers without portfolio and no specific responsibilities. Please provide an estimate if you do not know the exact figure.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): <http://countrystudies.us>, various country specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v3eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

#### **2.1.19.31 Total votes (v3ttlvote)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3ttlvote

*Original tag:* v3ttlvote

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the total number of votes cast in this election.

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

#### **2.1.20 Historical V-Dem - Political Parties**

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the

Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - Political Parties*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 2.1.20.1 Party identification (v3partyid)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3partyid

*Original tag:* v3partyid

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do voters identify with a political party?

CLARIFICATION: When party identification is strong, vote choice is largely determined by a voter's party affiliation (and his/her affiliation with that party) rather than attachments to particular candidates, non-partisan issue-positions, or material incentives (*e.g.*, vote-buying). Likewise, when party identification is strong, voters retain loyalty to a single party rather than switching from one party to another across elections or across offices in the same election (ticket-splitting). In this fashion we can somewhat crudely distinguish between partisans and non-partisans. Note that this question refers only to voters, not to members of the population who do not vote (because they are disenfranchised, choose not to vote, or are discouraged from voting). Leave this question blank if there are no national elections.

RESPONSES:

0: There are national elections, but there are no political parties.

1: Only one party is allowed to participate in national elections.

2: More than one party participates, and nearly all voters are non-partisans.

3: More than one party participates, and most voters are non-partisans.

4: More than one party participates, and voters are equally divided between partisans and non-partisans.

5: More than one party participates, and most voters are partisans.

6: More than one party participates, and nearly all voters are partisans.

SCALE: Nominal, but categories 2—6 constitute ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.20.2 Party age largest (v3psagefirst)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3psagefirst

*Original tag:* v3psagefirst

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: How many years have passed since the party that holds the most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

CLARIFICATION: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing

coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): <http://countrystudies.us>

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

#### **2.1.20.3 Party age executive (v3psagepm)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3psagepm

*Original tag:* v3psagepm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: How many years have passed since the party controlling the executive was formed?

CLARIFICATION: If there is a coalition government, you should count the party of the prime minister was counted. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): <http://countrystudies.us>

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

#### **2.1.20.4 Party age second largest (v3psagesecond)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3psagesecond

*Original tag:* v3psagesecond

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: How many years have passed since the party that holds the second most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

CLARIFICATION: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): <http://countrystudies.us>

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

#### **2.1.20.5 Party age third largest (v3psagethird)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3psagethird

*Original tag:* v3psagethird

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: How many years have passed since the party that holds the third most seats in



the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

CLARIFICATION: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): <http://countrystudies.us>

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1791-1920

### 2.1.21 Historical V-Dem - The Legislature

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - The Legislature*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 2.1.21.1 Lower chamber budget (v3lgbudglo)

Long tag: vdem\_cd\_v3lgbudglo

Original tag: v3lgbudglo

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is the lower chamber of the legislature required to approve the budget?

CLARIFICATION: The budget refers to major revenue (appropriations) and expenditure (spending) bills. Typically, these are passed annually or bi-annually. Approval is understood to mean a formal vote on the floor of the chamber in which at least 50percent of those voting approve the measure.

RESPONSES:

0: No. Includes situations in which (a) there are no formal budget bills, or (b) the executive entirely by-passes the lower house or ignores its actions.

1: Yes. Includes situations in which (a) the executive exercises selective ("line-item") vetoes, and (b) there is a prolonged period in which no budget is passed and the executive is unable to raise and spend money, or must operate under the terms of the previous budget.

SCALE: Dichotomous

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*

(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2010

#### **2.1.21.2 Upper chamber budget (v3lgbudgup)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgbudgup

*Original tag:* v3lgbudgup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is the upper chamber of the legislature required to approve the budget?

CLARIFICATION: The budget refers to major revenue (appropriations) and expenditure (spending) bills. Typically, these are passed annually or bi-annually. Approval is understood to mean a formal vote on the floor of the chamber in which at least 50percent of those voting approve the measure.

RESPONSES:

0: No. Includes situations in which (a) there are no formal budget bills, or (b) the executive entirely by-passes the upper house or ignores its actions.

1: Yes. Includes situations in which (a) the executive exercises selective ("line-item") vetoes, and (b) there is a prolonged period in which no budget is passed and the executive is unable to raise and spend money, or must operate under the terms of the previous budget.

SCALE: Dichotomous

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### **2.1.21.3 Legislature other than uni- or bicameral (v3lgcamoth)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgcamoth

*Original tag:* v3lgcamoth

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the cameral structure of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Please provide the names of all chambers, as well as how they are grouped into a "upper" and "lower" chamber. For example, in Sweden prior to 1866, the names would be Estates of Nobility, Clergy, Burghers and Peasantry, where the Estates of Nobility and Clergy are grouped into the "upper" chamber, those of the Burghers and Peasantry into the "lower" chamber.

SCALE: Nominal

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1919

#### **2.1.21.4 Lower chamber in session (v3lginsees)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lginsees

*Original tag:* v3lginsees

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: During the year, for how long was the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature in session?

CLARIFICATION: If there is only one session during the year, your answer should reflect the length of this session. If there are multiple sessions, your answer should reflect the total time spent in session, adding together the length of all session during the year.

RESPONSES:

0: It did not convene at all during the year.

1: It did convene, and was in session for less than 1 month, in total.

2: It did convene, and was in session for 1-2 months, in total.

3: It did convene, and was in session for 3-5 months, in total.

4: It did convene, and was in session for 6-8 months, in total.

5: It did convene, and was in session for 9 months or more, in total.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**2.1.21.5 Upper chamber in session (v3lginsesup)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lginsesup

*Original tag:* v3lginsesup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: During the year, for how long was the upper chamber of the legislature in session?

CLARIFICATION: If there is only one session during the year, your answer should reflect the length of this session. If there are multiple sessions, your answer should reflect the total time spent in session, adding together the length of all sessions during the year.

RESPONSES:

0: It did not convene at all during the year.

1: It did convene, and was in session for less than 1 month, in total.

2: It did convene, and was in session for 1-2 months, in total.

3: It did convene, and was in session for 3-5 months, in total.

4: It did convene, and was in session for 6-8 months, in total.

5: It did convene, and was in session for 9 months or more, in total.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**2.1.21.6 Lower chamber quota for social groups (v3lgqumin)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgqumin

*Original tag:* v3lgqumin

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: Is there a national-level quota for any social groups in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: These quotas are sometimes informally known as "minority quotas." Do not record gender quotas here (as gender is not part of what we mean by a social group). Also, do not include special rules that benefit parties defined by social group but do not guarantee seats for these groups. For example, do not count a rule exempting parties from threshold requirements. Code "yes" only if the groups covered by the quota have full voting rights in the legislature.

RESPONSES:

0: No national level quota for any social group.

1: Yes, there are reserved seats for at least one social group.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>;  
<https://en.wikipedia.org>

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

## 2.1.22 Historical V-Dem - The Judiciary

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - The Judiciary*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

### 2.1.22.1 High court existence (v3juhcourt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3juhcourt

*Original tag:* v3juhcourt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is there a high court?

CLARIFICATION: Note that in some cases we consider an institution to be the Highest Court in a given country, even though we acknowledge that its jurisdiction covers most though not all the territory of the country. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the rating and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

ORDERING: If answer is "0", skip to v2juncind.

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.1.23 Historical V-Dem - Civil Liberty

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - Civil Liberty*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 2.1.23.1 Labor rights (v3cllabrig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3cllabrig

*Original tag:* v3cllabrig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does labor enjoy the right to organize freely and bargain collectively?

CLARIFICATION: Refers to actual practice not formal (*de jure*) rights. If practices vary across the country, or across sectors, please consider the overall situation of labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Independent labor unions (free from state or ruling party control) are not allowed.

1: Independent labor unions are allowed, at least in some sectors of the economy or some sections of the country. However, they are subject to harassment by the police, paramilitary groups, business associations, or other groups. Harassment refers to systematic beatings, imprisonment, outlawing of specific unions, and other actions that seriously impinge upon the ability of unions to organize and bargain collectively.

2: Independent labor unions are allowed and they do not face violent repression but the legal climate is not friendly (*e.g.*, "closed shop" rules are widespread), making it difficult to organize and bargain collectively.

3: Independent labor unions are allowed and may organize freely in all sectors of the economy.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.23.2 Slavery (v3clslavery)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3clslavery

*Original tag:* v3clslavery

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring  
QUESTION: Is slavery legal?  
CLARIFICATION: Refers to the *de jure* status of slavery, not its actual practice.  
RESPONSES:  
0: Yes.  
1: No.  
SCALE: Dichotomous  
SOURCE(S): Various country specific sources  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2015

### 2.1.23.3 Serfdom de jure/slavery de jure (v3serfdeju)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3serfdeju

*Original tag:* v3serfdeju

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring  
QUESTION: Is serfdom legal?  
CLARIFICATION: Refers to the *de jure* status of serfdom, not its actual practice.  
RESPONSES:  
0. Yes.  
1. No.  
SCALE: Dichotomous  
SOURCE(S): Various country specific sources  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2015

### 2.1.24 Historical V-Dem - Sovereignty and State

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - Sovereignty and State*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 2.1.24.1 Census (v3stcensus)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3stcensus

*Original tag:* v3stcensus

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

QUESTION: Was there a national census in this year?

CLARIFICATION: In order to count as a "census", the following four criteria needs to be satisfied:

1. UNIVERSALITY: the census attempted to cover the entire population and not just a sample.

2. INDIVIDUAL ENUMERATION: the census enumerates each individual separately and records his or her characteristics separately. If the census only produces aggregate or summarised information, it is only a population count and should not count as a census. For example, A population count of a household with 4 people would produce the following results:

Age—Adults: 2; Children: 2

Sex—Males: 2; Females: 2

Instead, an individual enumeration would look like this:

Head of household-male-adult

Spouse-female-adult

Son-male-child

Daughter-female-child

The key difference is that only in the individual enumeration the data on various characteristics can be cross-tabulated.

3. DEFINED TERRITORY: The territory covered, along with any changes in its area is clearly stated.

4. SIMULTANEITY AND SPECIFIED TIME: Each person is enumerated as nearly as possible to the same well-defined point in time, and the collected data should refer to a well-defined reference period.

Code "1" if a national census was completed in this year – but not if it was aborted or was not national in scope.

RESPONSES:

0. No.

1. Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

#### 2.1.24.2 Citizenship laws (v3stcitlaw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3stcitlaw

*Original tag:* v3stcitlaw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: Are there laws specifying who is a citizen and who is not and establishing procedures for naturalization?

RESPONSES:

0. No.

1. Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): CCP (v543); <https://globalcit.eu/country-profiles/>; various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-1920

#### 2.1.24.3 Flag (v3stflag)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3stflag

*Original tag:* v3stflag

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: Is there a national flag?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): CCP (v68); Whitney Smith (1975), *Flags Through the Ages and Across the World*; Wikipedia; World Fact Book, CIA.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

#### 2.1.24.4 National anthem (v3stnatant)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3stnatant

*Original tag:* v3stnatant

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: Is there a national anthem?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There may be popular songs identified with the nation but there is no official, state-recognized national anthem.

1: Yes. There is an official, state-recognized national anthem.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): CCP (v67); Bristow, Michael Jamieson (ed). 2006. *National Anthems of the World*, Eleventh Edition. Casell. [www.nationalanthems.info](http://www.nationalanthems.info); <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/>; [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_historical\\_national\\_anthems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_historical_national_anthems).

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

#### 2.1.24.5 National bank (v3stnatbank)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3stnatbank

*Original tag:* v3stnatbank

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: Is there a national bank?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last



CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2015

#### 2.1.24.6 Rulers involvement in the state administration (v3struinvadm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3struinvadm

*Original tag:* v3struinvadm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Agnes Cornell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are day-to-day decisions made by state administrators subject to intervention from political elites?

CLARIFICATION: By political elites we mean members of the executive, members of the legislature and political elites at local and regional levels. Note that the focus on the day-to-day decisions of the state administration implies interference in specific operational decisions in a meticulous manner. Decisions taken by rulers about the general direction of the state administration should not be considered. Note that the question refers to the *de facto* situation.

RESPONSES:

0: Constantly. Day-to-day decisions taken by state administrators are constantly subject to intervention.

1: Often. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are often subject to intervention.

2: About half. Approximately half of the day-to-day decisions in the state administration are subject to intervention.

3: Occasionally. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are occasionally subject to intervention.

4: Never, or hardly ever. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are never or hardly ever subject to intervention.

SCALE: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.24.7 Statistical agency (v3ststatag)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3ststatag

*Original tag:* v3ststatag

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

QUESTION: Is there a national statistical agency?

CLARIFICATION: A statistical agency is an official government organization exclusively devoted to gathering numerical information in a variety of subjects about the country. This may be a completely independent agency or a distinguishable office or department within another governmental agency.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

#### 2.1.24.8 State steering capacity (v3ststeecap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3ststeecap

*Original tag:* v3ststeecap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Can the state oversee and regulate the economy?

CLARIFICATION: This refers to the state's ability to keep track of economic activities in its territory and potentially influence them by shaping the incentives and constraints that private firms face to do business; *e.g.*, through licensing, granting exploitation rights, taxing, imposing market barriers, building infrastructure, offering subsidies, adjudicating conflicts, or enforcing regulations.

RESPONSES:

0: Most economic activities happen outside the reach of the state

1: The state steers some economic activities

2: The state steers a substantial share – but less than half – of the national economy

3: The state steers about half or more than half, of the national economy

4: The state steers all or almost all economic activities

SCALE: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.24.9 Statistical yearbook covered (v3ststybcov)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3ststybcov

*Original tag:* v3ststybcov

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

QUESTION: Was this year covered by a published statistical yearbook?

CLARIFICATION: By "covered" we mean whether, based on the title of the yearbook, information about this year was included in a statistical yearbook. For example, if a yearbook was published in 1914, according to its title covering 1911-1914, then v3ststybpub should be coded as 1 for 1914 only, 0 for 1911-1913, but v3ststybcov as 1 for 1911-1914.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

#### 2.1.24.10 Statistical yearbook published (v3ststybpub)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3ststybpub

*Original tag:* v3ststybpub

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

QUESTION: Was there a statistical yearbook issued this year?

CLARIFICATION: A statistical yearbook is a recurrent publication of a government agency published annually or less frequently which contain statistical tables in more than one of the following categories:

1. Physical environment; 2. Demography; 3. Economic Affairs; 4. Political Affairs; and 5. Cultural Affairs.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

## 2.1.25 Historical V-Dem - Political Equality

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - Political Equality*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

### 2.1.25.1 Equal vote legislature/lower chamber (v3equavolc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3equavolc

*Original tag:* v3equavolc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are ballots in elections for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature counted differently for different social groups? (Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.

RESPONSES:

0: No. All ballots are counted equally, regardless of social group. [v3equavolc\_0]

1: Yes. There is a curial/estate voting system where voters are separated into categories by, for example, class criteria and assigned a disproportionate numbers of deputies. [v3equavolc\_1]

2: Yes. There is census/plural vote for particular groups (*e.g.*, votes cast by individuals with higher incomes or tax contributions are given more weight) [v3equavolc\_2]

3: Yes. Some voters are allowed to vote in several constituencies. [v3equavolc\_3]

SCALE: Nominal  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.25.2 Equal vote upper chamber (v3equavouc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3equavouc

*Original tag:* v3equavouc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Are ballots in elections for the upper chamber of the national legislature counted differently for different social groups? (Check all that apply.)  
CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.  
RESPONSES:  
0: No. All ballots are counted equally, regardless of social group. [v3equavouc\_0]  
1: Yes. There is a curial/estate voting system where voters are separated into categories by, for example, class criteria and assigned a disproportionate numbers of deputies. [v3equavouc\_1]  
2: Yes. There is census/plural vote for particular groups (*e.g.*, votes cast by individuals with higher incomes or tax contributions are given more weight) [v3equavouc\_2]  
3: Yes. Some voters are allowed to vote in several constituencies. [v3equavouc\_3]  
SCALE: Nominal  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.25.3 Child labor laws (v3pechilabl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3pechilabl

*Original tag:* v3pechilabl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring  
QUESTION: Is there national regulation prohibiting child labor?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: For nonagricultural employment only.  
2: For all sectors.  
SCALE: Ordinal.  
SOURCE(S): Child Labor: A Global View (A World View of Social Issues) Hardcover—October 30, 2004 by Cathryne L. Schmitz (Editor), Elizabeth K. Collardey (Editor), Desi Larson (Editor). CCP (v592) asks Does the constitution place limits on child employment? The Routledge History of Childhood in the Western World, 2013, Paula S. Fass (editor). The World of Child Labor: An Historical and Regional Survey, 2009 by Hugh D. Hindman.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-1920

#### 2.1.25.4 Minimum wage (v3peminwage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3peminwage

*Original tag:* v3peminwage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: Is there a minimum wage?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, the state imposes a minimum wage (legislation, regulations).

2: Yes, there are corporate bargaining arrangements that effectively ensure a minimum wage.

3: Yes, there is a tripartite committee that sets the wage (representatives from union, employer, government).

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): ILO; East Asia Pacific at Work: Employment, Enterprise, and Well-being, By World Bank, 2014.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

#### 2.1.25.5 Minimum wage restriction (v3peminwagerestr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3peminwagerestr

*Original tag:* v3peminwagerestr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: If there is a minimum wage provision, are there any explicit exceptions based on one or more of the following categories?

CLARIFICATION: Code as missing if there is no minimum wage.

RESPONSES:

0: Rural/urban area [v3peminwagerestr\_0]

1: Region of the country [v3peminwagerestr\_1]

2: Trade (industry) [v3peminwagerestr\_2]

3: Gender [v3peminwagerestr\_3]

4: Ethnicity [v3peminwagerestr\_4]

5: Age [v3peminwagerestr\_5]

6: Public/private sector [v3peminwagerestr\_6]

7: Other characteristic [v3peminwagerestr\_7]

8: There are no exceptions. [v3peminwagerestr\_8]

SCALE: Nominal

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

SOURCE(S): ILO; East Asia Pacific at Work: Employment, Enterprise, and Well-being By World Bank, 2014; National minimum wage: Low Pay Commission report 2011, Low Pay Commission.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1899-2015

#### 2.1.26 Historical V-Dem - Historical V-Dem Modified

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

V-Dem indicators that are different to their contemporary counterparts, for the purpose of gathering additional relevant information for the historical period in Historical V-Dem. These variables are also merged into their v2 equivalents.

First, In contrast to contemporary V-Dem, Historical V-Dem codes upper chamber elections and thus also includes eltype category 2. Those observations are treated as missing in the historical-contemporary merged version of v2eltype. Due to election specific variables being cleaned by v2eltype, these do not include upper chamber elections either. In order to include historical data on upper chamber elections we thus also provide v3eltype and v3 election specific variables that are cleaned by v3eltype.

Second, Historical V-Dem codes additional chambers compared to contemporary V-Dem. When merging v2lgbicam and v3lgbicam the categories get recoded as follows:

- Categories 3 (tricameral) and 4 (quadricameral) become category 2 for the merged v2lgbicam.
- Category 9 (Other types of legislature) becomes category 0 for the merged v2lgbicam.

In order to include historical data on additional chambers, we thus also provide v3lgbicam and v3 chamber specific variables that are cleaned by v3lgbicam.

#### 2.1.26.1 Lower chamber electoral system (v3elloelsy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elloelsy

*Original tag:* v3elloelsy

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Further information on the following electoral system types can be found in Reynolds/Reilly, The New International IDEA Handbook (2005), chapter two and Annex B (Glossary of Terms) – downloadable, free of charge, at [www.idea.int/publications/esd/](http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/).

RESPONSES:

0: First-past-the-post (FPP, aka plurality) in single-member constituencies. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat.

1: Two-round system in single-member constituencies. Like FPP except that a threshold — usually 50percent + 1 — is required to avoid a runoff between the two top vote-getters.

2: Alternative vote in single-member districts. Voters rank-order their preferences for the candidates who compete for a single seat. If any candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, s/he is elected. If not, then the least successful candidates (based on first-preferences) are eliminated and their votes reallocated to the second-preferences. This process is repeated until a candidate reaches 50percent +1 of the votes.

3: Block vote in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are seats within that district and can rank-order them (within or across parties) as they please.

4: Party block vote in multi-member districts. Voters cast a vote for a single party (but not for individual candidates within the party's list). The party with the most votes (*i.e.*, a plurality) wins all the seats in that district.

5: Parallel (SMD/PR). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are independent.

6: Mixed-member proportional (SMD with PR compensatory seats). Some seats are in

single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are not independent. Specifically, the multimember seats are used to rectify disproportionalities achieved in the single-member district election — by adding seats, as necessary. This means that the representation of parties in the legislature is determined entirely by the PR ballot. It also means that the result of an MMP election is similar to the result of a PR election: parties achieve representation according to their nationwide vote share (on the PR ballot)

7: List PR with small multi-member districts (mean district size < 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is less than seven.

8: List PR with large multi-member districts (mean district size > 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is greater than seven.

9: Single-transferable vote (STV) in multi-member districts. Electors rank-order candidates nominated for a district. Candidates that surpass a specified quota of first-preference votes are elected. The remaining seats are chosen by reallocating the votes of the least successful candidates to elector's second- (or third-) preferences until the specified quota is reached. This process is repeated until all seats for that district are filled.

10: Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts. Each elector chooses a single candidate. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

11: Limited vote in multi-member districts.

Electors have more than one vote but fewer votes than the number of seats in the district. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

12: Borda Count in single- or multi-member districts. Electors use numbers to mark preferences among candidates and each preference is assigned a value. For example, in a ten-candidate field a first preference is worth one, a second preference is worth .9, and so forth. These are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are elected.

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): Golder (2006); CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2011); Colomer (2004); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; IFES; Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1902

#### 2.1.26.2 Lower chamber election seats (v3elloseat)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elloseat

*Original tag:* v3elloseat

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats were there in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank

if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.  
SCALE: Interval  
ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric  
SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 2.1.26.3 Lower chamber election seats won by largest party (v3ellostlg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3ellostlg

*Original tag:* v3ellostlg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen  
QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?  
CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.  
SCALE: Interval  
ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric  
SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 2.1.26.4 Lower chamber election seat share won by largest party (v3ellostsl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3ellostsl

*Original tag:* v3ellostsl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen  
QUESTION: In this election, what percentage (percent) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the largest party?  
CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.  
SCALE: Interval  
ANSWER-TYPE: Percent  
SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 2.1.26.5 Lower chamber election seats won by second largest party (v3ellostsm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3ellostsm



*Original tag:* v3ellostsm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

#### **2.1.26.6 Lower chamber election seat share won by second largest party (v3ellostss)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3ellostss

*Original tag:* v3ellostss

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, what percentage (percent) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

#### **2.1.26.7 Lower chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (v3ellovtlg)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3ellovtlg

*Original tag:* v3ellovtlg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 2.1.26.8 Lower chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (v3ellovtsm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3ellovtsm

*Original tag:* v3ellovtsm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 2.1.26.9 Effective number of cabinet parties (v3elnbpr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elnbpr

*Original tag:* v3elnbpr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: In the first cabinet after this national election, how many political parties were represented in the cabinet?

RESPONSES:

0: Parties are not allowed.

1: One party.

2: Two parties.

3: Three parties.

4: Four or more parties.

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): <http://www.countrystudies.us>, various country specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v3eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 2.1.26.10 Lower chamber electoral system (v3elparallel)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elparallel

*Original tag:* v3elparallel

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen  
QUESTION: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?  
RESPONSES:  
0: Majoritarian.  
1: Proportional.  
2: Mixed.  
3: Other (*e.g.* single non-transferable voting, limited voting)  
SCALE: Nominal  
SOURCE(S): Golder (2006); CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2011); Colomer (2004); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; IFES; Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); various country-specific sources.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-1902

#### 2.1.26.11 Election turnout (v3eltrnout)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3eltrnout

*Original tag:* v3eltrnout

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen  
QUESTION: In this national election, what percentage (percent) of all registered voters cast a vote according to official results?  
SCALE: Interval  
ANSWER-TYPE: Percent  
SOURCE(S): IDEA; Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); NELDA (Hyde, Marinov 2012). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v3eltype).  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 2.1.26.12 Lower chamber election turnover (v3eltvrig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3eltvrig

*Original tag:* v3eltvrig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen  
QUESTION: Did control of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No. The majority party or ruling coalition includes the same or substantially the same parties, even if some minor parties (holding less than 10 percent of the seats in the legislature) left or joined the coalition, or because the elections do not affect the lower chamber.  
1: Half. A minority party or coalition who was not in control of the chamber before the elections assumed the leading position in the legislature but is dependent on other parties for support. Or, a post-election ruling coalition includes some old parties and some new parties and the new parties represent more than 10 percent of the seats in the legislature.  
2: Yes. The incumbent party or coalition lost its majority or plurality-dominant position in the legislature and a different party or coalition assumes the majority position.  
SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources. Constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1912

### 2.1.26.13 Election type (v3eltype)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3eltype

*Original tag:* v3eltype

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What type of election was held on this date?

CLARIFICATION: The date and type of each election has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same elections.

If the election unfolds across more than one day, the date for the first day is entered. If the precise date was unavailable, the first of the month is entered. If the month is unknown, January 1 is entered. Multiple-round elections (*e.g.*, two-round elections) are counted separately, *i.e.*, as separate elections. More than one election in a single year is accommodated by listing each election with a separate calendar date. When elections to more than one office occur on the same day these are listed separately (though naturally with the same date).

RESPONSES:

0: Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers, first or only round. [v3eltype\_0]

1: Legislative, lower, sole, or both chambers, second round. [v3eltype\_1]

2: Legislative, upper chamber only, first or only round. [v3eltype\_2]

3: Legislative, upper chamber only, second round. [v3eltype\_3]

4: Constituent Assembly, first or only round. [v3eltype\_4]

5: Constituent Assembly, second round. [v3eltype\_5]

6: Presidential, first or only round. [v3eltype\_6]

7: Presidential, second round. [v3eltype\_7]

8: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, first or only round. [v3eltype\_8]

9: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, second round. [v3eltype\_9]

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Lindvall-Larson (2000); websites of national parliaments; Wikipedia;

Election Politique Citoyen (<http://www.election-politique.com/>); CLEA (<https://electiondataarchive.org/data-and-documentation/>); various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.1.26.14 Presidential election vote share of largest vote-getter (v3elvotlrg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elvotlrg

*Original tag:* v3elvotlrg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this presidential election, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the winning candidate in the first round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Record only direct presidential elections. Cases where the presidents are elected indirectly by the legislature (*i.e.* Germany) are not being coded since there is no popular vote share. However, in countries where electoral college is present (*i.e.* U.S.), the percentage of popular vote should be recorded if available.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v3eltype\_6, v3eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1792-1919

#### 2.1.26.15 Presidential election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (v3elvotsml)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elvotsml

*Original tag:* v3elvotsml

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this presidential election, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second most successful candidate in the first round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Record only direct presidential elections. Cases where the presidents are elected indirectly by the legislature (*i.e.* Germany) are not being coded since there is no popular vote share. However, in countries where electoral college is present (*i.e.* U.S.), the percentage of popular vote should be recorded if available.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v3eltype\_6, v3eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1792-1919

#### 2.1.26.16 Legislature bicameral (H) (v3lgbicam)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgbicam

*Original tag:* v3lgbicam

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: How many chambers does the legislature contain?

CLARIFICATION: The answer to this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the code and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

RESPONSES:

0: No legislature exists (or the legislature is shut down).  
1: Unicameral  
2: Bicameral  
3: Tricameral  
4: Quadricameral  
9: Other type of legislature  
ORDERING: If all years are (0), skip to The Judiciary (v2juintro). If (1) is chosen, skip to v2lgintro2.  
SCALE: Ordinal.  
SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Lindvall-Larson (2000); CCP (<http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/>); websites of National Parliaments; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.26.17 Lower chamber committees (v3lgcomslo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgcomslo

*Original tag:* v3lgcomslo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have a functioning committee system?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No, there are no committees.  
1: Yes, but there are only special (not permanent) committees.  
2: Yes, there are permanent committees, but they are not very significant in affecting the course of policy.  
3: Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).  
CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.26.18 Legislature corrupt activities (v3lgcrrpt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgcrrpt

*Original tag:* v3lgcrrpt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?  
CLARIFICATION: This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.  
Please make your best estimate, based upon what is known or suspected to be true.

RESPONSES:

0: Never, or hardly ever.

1: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.

2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.

3: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.

4: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**2.1.26.19 Legislature dominant chamber (v3lghdomchm)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lghdomchm

*Original tag:* v3lghdomchm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the legislature is bicameral, which chamber is dominant?

RESPONSES:

0: The lower chamber is clearly dominant.

1: The lower chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.

2: They are roughly co-equal in power.

3: The upper chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.

4: The upper chamber is clearly dominant.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**2.1.26.20 Upper chamber elected (v3lgelecup)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgelecup

*Original tag:* v3lgelecup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

CLARIFICATION: Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body. Thus, if 10percent of a upper chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90percent.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-1920

#### 2.1.26.21 Lower chamber elected (v3lgello)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgello

*Original tag:* v3lgello

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

CLARIFICATION: Direct election includes seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election. Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body. Thus, if 10percent of a lower chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90percent.

We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1917

#### 2.1.26.22 Legislature controls resources (v3lgfunds)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgfunds

*Original tag:* v3lgfunds

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal operations and the perquisites of its members?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature's operation depend on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive.

1: Yes

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.26.23 Lower chamber indirectly elected (v3lginello)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lginello

*Original tag:* v3lginello

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A



PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What percentage of the lower chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

CLARIFICATION: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.

We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

#### 2.1.26.24 Upper chamber indirectly elected (v3lginelup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lginelup

*Original tag:* v3lginelup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

CLARIFICATION: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.

We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

#### 2.1.26.25 Legislature investigates in practice (v3lginvstp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lginvstp

*Original tag:* v3lginvstp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.

2: As likely as not.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.26.26 Lower chamber legislates in practice (v3lglegplo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lglegplo

*Original tag:* v3lglegplo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.26.27 Upper chamber legislates in practice (v3lglegpup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lglegpup

*Original tag:* v3lglegpup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the upper chamber of the legislature.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**2.1.26.28 Lower chamber legislature name (H) (v3lgnamelo)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgnamelo

*Original tag:* v3lgnamelo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: An as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the lower chamber of the legislature in English, and where possible with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Lindvall-Larson (2000); CCP (<http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/>); websites of National Parliaments; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**2.1.26.29 Upper chamber name (H) (v3lgnameup)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgnameup

*Original tag:* v3lgnameup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the name of the upper chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: An as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the upper chamber of the legislature in English, and where possible with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); CCP (<http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/>); websites of National Parliaments; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**2.1.26.30 Legislature opposition parties (v3lgoppart)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgoppart

*Original tag:* v3lgoppart

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No, not at all.  
1: Occasionally.  
2: Yes, for the most part.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).  
CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.26.31 Executive oversight (v3lgotovst)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgotovst

*Original tag:* v3lgotovst

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?  
RESPONSES:  
0: Extremely unlikely.  
1: Unlikely.  
2: Very uncertain.  
3: Likely.  
4: Certain or nearly certain.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).  
CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.26.32 Legislature questions officials in practice (v3lgqstexp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgqstexp

*Original tag:* v3lgqstexp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?  
CLARIFICATION: By "question" we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain its policies or testify.  
RESPONSES:  
0: No - never or very rarely.  
1: Yes - routinely.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.1.26.33 Lower chamber members serve in government (v3lgsrvlo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgsrvlo

*Original tag:* v3lgsrvlo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, are members of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature able to serve simultaneously as ministers in the government?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.1.27 Historical V-Dem - Overlap Period Discrepancies

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

This section includes A and A\* variables where there is a discrepancy in the coding of some observations between the Historical and Contemporary V-Dem coding for the overlap period (typically 1900-1920). The v2-versions of these variables, reported elsewhere in the codebook, report the Contemporary V-Dem scores in cases of discrepancies in the overlap period.

Remaining inconsistencies in the Historical and Contemporary V-Dem coding, that are not due to substantive differences in the indicators, will be sorted out for version 10 of the dataset.

#### 2.1.27.1 Local government elected (v3ellocelc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3ellocelc

*Original tag:* v3ellocelc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: At the local level, are government offices elected in practice?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same local governments.

"Government offices" here refers to a local executive and a local assembly, not a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An executive is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a mayor). An assembly is a larger body of officials.

"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a local elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including appointment by a higher level of government – are considered to be non-elected.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

RESPONSES:

0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected.

1: Generally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly.

2: Generally, the local assembly is elected but not the executive.

3: Generally, the local executive is elected and there is no assembly.

4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no executive.

5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.27.2 Local government exists (v3ellocgov)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3ellocgov

*Original tag:* v3ellocgov

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: Is there a local government?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same local governments.

Local government refers to the level of government below the regional government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are counties, communes, cities, municipalities, towns, rural municipalities, and villages.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of local government. If this is the case, please code the local level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

SOURCE(S): Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.27.3 Local government name (v3ellocnam)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3ellocnam

*Original tag:* v3ellocnam

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the term(s) for the local government units?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same local governments.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**2.1.27.4 Regional government exists (v3elreggov)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elreggov

*Original tag:* v3elreggov

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: Is there a regional government?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regional governments.

Regional government is typically the second-highest level of government, just below the national government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are regions, provinces, states, departments, and cantons.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of regional government. If this is the case, for all questions about regional government please code the regional level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

Some countries are so small that, now or in earlier time periods, they have only local government and not regional government. If this is the case, this question is coded as "0" for the appropriate time period.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

ORDERING: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions focused on regional government.

SOURCE(S): Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**2.1.27.5 Regional government name (v3elregnam)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elregnam

*Original tag:* v3elregnam

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the term(s) for the regional government units?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regional governments.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.27.6 Regional government elected (v3elsrgel)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3elsrgel

*Original tag:* v3elsrgel

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: At the regional level, are government offices elected in practice?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regional governments.

"Government offices" here refers to a regional executive and a regional assembly, not a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An executive is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a governor). An assembly is a larger body of officials, who may be divided into two chambers.

"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a regional elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including appointment by higher or lower levels of government – are considered to be non-elected.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

RESPONSES:

0: Generally, offices at the regional level are not elected.

1: Generally, the regional executive is elected but not the assembly.

2: Generally, the regional assembly is elected but not the executive.

3: Generally, the regional executive is elected and there is no assembly.

4: Generally, the regional assembly is elected and there is no executive.

5: Generally, the regional executive and assembly are elected.

SOURCE(S): Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.27.7 HOS age (v3exagehos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3exagehos

*Original tag:* v3exagehos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A



PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell  
QUESTION: In what year was the head of state born?  
SCALE: Interval  
ANSWER-TYPE: Date - year only  
SOURCE(S): worldstatesman.org.  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v3exnamhos).  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-1938

#### 2.1.27.8 HOS = HOG? (H) (v3exhoshog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3exhoshog

*Original tag:* v3exhoshog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell  
QUESTION: Is the head of state (HOS) also head of government (HOG)?  
CLARIFICATION: Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Note that this question only pertains to whether the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, regardless of the relative powers of the two. Thus, in a constitutional monarchy, for example, the head of state and head of government are not the same even though the head of state may lack any real political power. If multiple head of states/head of governments were appointed in any year, the question pertains to each one of them.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

ORDERING: If HOS=HOG (answer is "yes") for all years: skip to "Introduction to entire executive." (v2exintro3)

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v83-v87; Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002).

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.27.9 Name of HOG (H) (v3exnamhog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3exnamhog

*Original tag:* v3exnamhog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the name of the head of government?

CLARIFICATION: The identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Only heads of government in office for 100 or more days are listed. If the head of government

is a collective body, the name provided is of the person exercising the most effective power within this body, or, if no such person exists, the expression "collective body" is used. If multiple heads of government were appointed in a given year, this question pertains to each one of them, including the specific date of appointment and reappointment for each one of them.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1990

#### 2.1.27.10 HOS name (H) (v3exnamhos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3exnamhos

*Original tag:* v3exnamhos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the name of the head of state?

CLARIFICATION: The identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Only heads of states in office for 100 or more days are listed. If the head of state is a collective body, the name provided is of the person exercising the most effective power within this body, or, if no such person exists, the expression "collective body" is used. If multiple Heads of State were appointed in a given year, this question pertains to each one of them, including the specific date of appointment and reappointment for each one of them.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; ARCHIGOS.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.1.27.11 HOS appointment in practice (v3expathhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3expathhs

*Original tag:* v3expathhs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: How did the head of state reach office?

CLARIFICATION: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 7 should only be selected if the head of state is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election.

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v3exnamhos).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1933

#### **2.1.27.12 Title of HOG (H) (v3extithog)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3extithog

*Original tag:* v3extithog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the title of the head of government (HOG)?

CLARIFICATION: Again, the titles of the heads of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1990

#### **2.1.27.13 HOS title (H) (v3extithos)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3extithos

*Original tag:* v3extithos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the title of the head of state?

CLARIFICATION: Again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002).

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### **2.1.27.14 High court name (v3juhcname)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3juhcname

*Original tag:* v3juhcname

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Please enter the name of the high court.

CLARIFICATION: An as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the court in English, and where possible with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text  
SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CLEANING: Set to missing when v3juhcourt is 0  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-1995

#### **2.1.27.15 Legislature amends constitution (v3lgamend)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgamend

*Original tag:* v3lgamend

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen  
QUESTION: By law, can the legislature (including both chambers of the legislature) change the constitution without the involvement of any other body?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
SCALE: Dichotomous  
SOURCE(S): <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>;  
<https://en.wikipedia.org>; various country specific sources  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-1920

#### **2.1.27.16 Legislature amnesties (v3lgamnsty)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgamnsty

*Original tag:* v3lgamnsty

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring  
QUESTION: By law, does the legislature have the power to grant amnesty or pardon?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
SCALE: Dichotomous  
SOURCE(S): <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>;  
<https://en.wikipedia.org>  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-1920

#### **2.1.27.17 Lower chamber introduces bills (v3lgintblo)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgintblo

*Original tag:* v3lgintblo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring  
QUESTION: By law, does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?  
SCALE: Dichotomous  
SOURCE(S): <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>;

<https://en.wikipedia.org>  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-1920

#### **2.1.27.18 Lower chamber legislates by law (v3lglegllo)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lglegllo

*Original tag:* v3lglegllo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring  
QUESTION: By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to pass legislation?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
SCALE: Dichotomous  
SOURCE(S): <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>;  
<https://en.wikipedia.org>  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-1920

#### **2.1.27.19 Upper chamber legislates by law (v3lgleglup)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v3lgleglup

*Original tag:* v3lgleglup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring  
QUESTION: By law, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature necessary to pass legislation?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
SCALE: Dichotomous  
SOURCE(S): <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>;  
<https://en.wikipedia.org>  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-1920

#### **2.1.28 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Neopatrimonialism**

The *Neopatrimonialism Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

##### **2.1.28.1 Neopatrimonial Rule Index (v2x\_neopat)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_neopat

*Original tag:* v2x\_neopat

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is rule based on personal authority?

CLARIFICATION: Neopatrimonial rule reflects the idea that personalistic forms of authority pervade formal regime institutions (Clapham, 1985). According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) a neopatrimonialism regime is one that combines clientelistic political relationships, strong and unconstrained presidents and the use of public resources for political legitimization. The index is constructed using Bayesian Factor Analysis of 16 indicators representing these three concepts. The sixteen indicators are those included in the three sub-indices: Clientelism, Presidentialism and Regime Corruption. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2elvotbuy v2dlencmps v2psprlnks v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lgfunds v2lginvstp v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2elembaut v2exembev v2exbribe v2lgcrprt v2jucorrdc v2x\_elecreg

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more neopatrimonialism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for vote buying (v2elvotbuy), particularistic vs. public goods (v2dlencmps), party linkages (v2psprlnks), executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature controls resources (v2lgfunds), legislature investigates the executive in practice (v2lginvstp), high court independence (v2juhcind), low court independence (v2juncind), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), electoral management body autonomy (v2elembaut), executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembev), executive bribes and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe), legislative corruption (v2lgcrprt) and judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc).

CITATION: Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

## 2.1.28.2 Clientelism Index (v2xnp\_client)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xnp\_client

*Original tag:* v2xnp\_client

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are politics based on clientelistic relationships?

CLARIFICATION: Clientelistic relationships include the targeted, contingent distribution of resources (goods, services, jobs, money, etc) in exchange for political support. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2elvotbuy v2dlencmps v2psprlnks v2x\_elecreg

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more clientelism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for vote-

buying (v2elvotbuy), particularistic vs. public goods (v2dlencmps) and whether party linkages are programmatic or clientelistic (v2psprlnks).

CITATION: Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.28.3 Presidentialism Index (v2xnp\_pres)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xnp\_pres

*Original tag:* v2xnp\_pres

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the regime characterized by presidentialism?

CLARIFICATION: Presidentialism means the "systemic concentration of political power in the hands of one individual who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision making tasks" (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 63). It relates closely to V-Dem's index of Horizontal Accountability (v2x\_horacc) but focuses more specifically on the extent to which the President is free from constraints by other institutions or actors. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lgfunds v2lginvstp v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2elembaut v2lgbicam

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more presidentialism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respect for the constitution (v2exrescon), whether there are mechanisms for oversight of the executive other than the legislature (v2lgotovst). For legislative constraints, the index includes an indicator of whether the legislature controls its own resources (v2lgfunds) and investigates the executive in practice (v2lginvstp). There are four indicators of judicial constraints on the executive: high court independence (v2juhcind), lower court independence (v2juncind), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp) and compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp). Finally, the index includes a measure of autonomy of the electoral management body (v2elembaut) that captures whether or not the President can influence its decisions and actions.

CITATION: Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

### 2.1.28.4 Regime corruption (v2xnp\_regcorr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xnp\_regcorr

*Original tag:* v2xnp\_regcorr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent do political actors use political office for private or political gain?

CLARIFICATION: In systems of neopatrimonial rule, politicians use their offices for private

and/or political gain. This index relates closely to V-Dem's political corruption index (v2x\_corr), but focuses on a more specific set of actors – those who occupy political offices – and a more specific set of corrupt acts that relate more closely to the conceptualization of corruption in literature on neopatrimonial rule. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exembev v2exbribe v2lgcrprt v2juccrrdc

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more regime corruption) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive embezzlement (v2exembev), executive bribes (v2exbribe), legislative corruption (v2lgcrprt) and judicial corruption (v2juccrrdc).

CITATION: Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

## 2.1.29 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Civil Liberties

The *Civil Liberties Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

### 2.1.29.1 Civil liberties index (v2x\_civlib)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_civlib

*Original tag:* v2x\_civlib

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is civil liberty respected?

CLARIFICATION: Civil liberty is understood as liberal freedom, where freedom is a property of individuals. Civil liberty is constituted by the absence of physical violence committed by government agents and the absence of constraints of private liberties and political liberties by the government.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_clpriv v2x\_clphy v2x\_clpol

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the average of physical violence index (v2x\_clphy), political civil liberties index (v2x\_clpol), and private civil liberties (v2x\_clpriv).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.29.2 Physical violence index (v2x\_clphy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_clphy

*Original tag:* v2x\_clphy

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd



QUESTION: To what extent is physical integrity respected?

CLARIFICATION: Physical integrity is understood as freedom from political killings and torture by the government. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect violence committed by government agents and that are not directly referring to elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cltort v2clkill

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom from torture (v2cltort) and freedom from political killings (v2clkill).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.29.3 Political liberties index (v2x\_clpol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_clpol

*Original tag:* v2x\_clpol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are political liberties respected?

CLARIFICATION: Political liberties are understood as freedom of association and freedom of expression. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xcl\_disc v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2clacfree v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: government censorship effort — media (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men and women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree), party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.29.4 Private liberties index (v2x\_clpriv)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_clpriv

*Original tag:* v2x\_clpriv

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are private liberties respected?

CLARIFICATION: Private liberties are understood as freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom from forced labor, and property rights. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xcl\_slave v2xcl\_prpty v2clfmmove v2xcl\_dmove v2clrelig v2csrlgrep

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: property rights for men/women

(v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavew), freedom of religion (v2clrelig), religious organization repression (v2csrlgrop), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmovew), and freedom of domestic movement for men/women (v2cldmovew, v2cldmovew).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.30 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Exclusion

The *Exclusion Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.1.30.1 Exclusion by Socio-Economic Group (v2xpe\_exlecon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xpe\_exlecon

*Original tag:* v2xpe\_exlecon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Index of (political) exclusion by socio-economic group

CLARIFICATION: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

SOURCE(S): v2pepwrses v2clacjust v2peapsecon v2peasjsoecon v2peasbecon

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by socio-economic group (v2pepwrses), socio-economic position equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clacjust), access to public services by socio-economic group (v2peapsecon), access to state jobs by socio-economic group (v2peasjsoecon), and access to state business opportunities by socio-economic group (v2peasbecon).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

#### 2.1.30.2 Exclusion by Gender (v2xpe\_exlgender)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xpe\_exlgender

*Original tag:* v2xpe\_exlgender

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Index of (political) exclusion by gender

CLARIFICATION: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres

is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

SOURCE(S): v2pepwrngen v2clngencl v2peapsngen v2peasjngen v2peasbngen

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed bygender (v2pepwrngen), equality in respect for civil liberties by gender (v2clngencl), access to public services by gender (v2peapsngen), access to state jobs by gender (v2peasjngen), and access to state business opportunities by gender (v2peasbngen).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.1.30.3 Exclusion by Urban-Rural Location (v2xpe\_exlgeo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xpe\_exlgeo

*Original tag:* v2xpe\_exlgeo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Index of (political) exclusion by urban-rural location

CLARIFICATION: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

SOURCE(S): v2pepwrgeo v2clgeoel v2peapsgeo v2peasjgeo v2peasbegeo

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by urban-rural location (v2pepwrgeo), urban-rural equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgeoel), access to public services by urban-rural location (v2peapsgeo), access to state jobs byurban-rural location (v2peasjgeo), and access to state business opportunities by urban-rural location (v2peasbegeo).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept, measurement standard error.

### 2.1.30.4 Exclusion by Political Group (v2xpe\_exlpol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xpe\_exlpol

*Original tag:* v2xpe\_exlpol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Index of (political) exclusion by political group

CLARIFICATION: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

SOURCE(S): v2clpolcl v2peapspol v2peasjpol v2peasbepol

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators political group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clpolcl), access to public services by political group (v2peapspol), access to state jobs by political group (v2peasjpol), and access to state business opportunities by political group (v2peasbpol).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

#### 2.1.30.5 Exclusion by Social Group (v2xpe\_exlsocgr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xpe\_exlsocgr

*Original tag:* v2xpe\_exlsocgr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Index of (political) exclusion by social group

CLARIFICATION: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

SOURCE(S): v2pepwr soc v2clsocgrp v2peapssoc v2peasjsoc v2peasbsoc

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by social group (v2pepwr soc), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), access to public services by social group (v2peapssoc), access to state jobs by social group (v2peasjsoc), and access to state business opportunities by social group (v2peasbsoc).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.31 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Corruption

The *Corruption Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.1.31.1 Political corruption (v2x\_corr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_corr

*Original tag:* v2x\_corr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How pervasive is political corruption?

CLARIFICATION: The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt unlike the other V-Dem variables that generally run from less democratic to more democratic situation. The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the executive realm, the measures also distinguish between corruption mostly pertaining to bribery and corruption due to embezzlement. Finally, they differentiate between corruption in the highest echelons of the executive at the level of the rulers/cabinet on the one hand, and in the public sector at large on the other. The measures thus tap into several distinguished types of corruption: both 'petty' and 'grand'; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and influencing law making and that affecting implementation.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_pubcorr v2x\_execcorr v2lgcrrpt v2jucorrdc

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is arrived at by taking the average of (a) public sector corruption index (v2x\_pubcorr); (b) executive corruption index (v2x\_execcorr); (c) the indicator for legislative corruption (v2lgcrrpt); and (d) the indicator for judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc). In other words, these four different government spheres are weighted equally in the resulting index. We replace missing values for countries with no legislature by only taking the average of a, b and d.

CITATION: McMann *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:23); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.31.2 Executive corruption index (v2x\_execcorr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_execcorr

*Original tag:* v2x\_execcorr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

CLARIFICATION: The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exbribe v2exembeze

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: executive bribery (v2exbribe) and executive embezzlement (v2exembeze).

CITATION: McMann *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:23); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.31.3 Public sector corruption index (v2x\_pubcorr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_pubcorr

*Original tag:* v2x\_pubcorr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

CLARIFICATION: The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2excrpts v2exthttps

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: public sector bribery (v2excrpts) and embezzlement (v2exthttps).

CITATION: McMann *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:23); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.32 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Women's Empowerment

The *Women's Empowerment Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.1.32.1 Women political empowerment index (v2x\_gender)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_gender

*Original tag:* v2x\_gender

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How politically empowered are women?

CLARIFICATION: Women's political empowerment is defined as a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making. It is understood to incorporate three equally-weighted dimensions: fundamental civil liberties, women's open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_gencl v2x\_gencs v2x\_genpp

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the average of women's civil liberties index (v2x\_gencl), women's civil society participation index (v2x\_gencs), and women's political participation index (v2x\_genpp).

CITATION: Sundström *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:19); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.32.2 Women civil liberties index (v2x\_gencl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_genc1

*Original tag:* v2x\_genc1

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Do women have the ability to make meaningful decisions in key areas of their lives?

CLARIFICATION: Women's civil liberties are understood to include freedom of domestic movement, the right to private property, freedom from forced labor, and access to justice.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cldmovew v2cls slavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew), freedom from forced labor for women (v2cls slavef), property rights for women (v2clprptyw), and access to justice for women (v2clacjstw).

CITATION: Sundström *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:19); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.32.3 Women civil society participation index (v2x\_gencs)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_gencs

*Original tag:* v2x\_gencs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Do women have the ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups?

CLARIFICATION: Women's civil society participation is understood to include open discussion of political issues, participation in civil society organizations, and representation in the ranks of journalists.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cldiscw v2csgender v2mefemjrn

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for freedom of discussion for women (v2cldiscw), CSO women's participation (v2csgender), and female journalists (v2mefemjrn).

CITATION: Sundström *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:19); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.32.4 Women political participation index (v2x\_genpp)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_genpp

*Original tag:* v2x\_genpp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Are women descriptively represented in formal political positions?

CLARIFICATION: Women's political participation is understood to include women's descriptive representation in the legislature and an equal share in the overall distribution of power.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2lgfemleg v2pepwrngen v2lgbicam

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the average of the indicators for lower chamber female legislators (v2lgfemleg, standardized) and power distributed by gender (v2pepwrngen).

CITATION: Sundström *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:19); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.33 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Rule of Law

The *Rule of Law Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.1.33.1 Rule of law index (v2x\_rule)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_rule

*Original tag:* v2x\_rule

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning and Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are laws transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent do the actions of government officials comply with the law?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exrescon v2exbribe v2exembev v2excrtps v2exthtps v2juacct v2juccrdc v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2cltrnslw v2clrspct v2xcl\_acjst

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), lower court independence (v2juncind), executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for men (v2clacjstm), access to justice for women (v2clacjstw), judicial accountability (v2juacct), judicial corruption decision (v2juccrdc), public sector corrupt exchanges (v2excrtps), public sector theft (v2exthtps), executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe), executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembev).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.33.2 Access to justice (v2xcl\_acjst)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xcl\_acjst

*Original tag:* v2xcl\_acjst

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Do citizens enjoy secure and effective access to justice?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2clacjstm v2clacjstw

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: access to justice for



men (v2clacjstm) and women (v2clacjstw).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.33.3 Property rights (v2xcl\_prpty)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xcl\_prpty

*Original tag:* v2xcl\_prpty

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Do citizens enjoy the right to private property?

CLARIFICATION: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them; customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2clprptym v2clprptyw

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: property rights for men (v2clprptym) and women (v2clprptyw).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.34 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Direct Democracy

The *Direct Democracy Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.1.34.1 Popular initiative index (v2xdd\_i\_ci)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xdd\_i\_ci

*Original tag:* v2xdd\_i\_ci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: To what extent is the *popular initiative* utilized?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2ddlexci v2ddsigpci v2ddsiglci v2ddsigdci v2ddpartci v2ddapprci v2ddspmc  
v2ddadmci v2ddyrci v2ddthreci

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of popular initiatives, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process v2ddlexci,
- The number of signatures needed v2ddsigpci, and
- Time-limits to circulate the signatures v2ddsigdci.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum v2ddpartci,

- Approval quorum v2ddapprci, and
- Supermajority v2ddspmc.

For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman (2017). The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority v2ddadmci.

Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens binding or merely consultative v2ddlexci, and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past v2ddthreci. The baseline for those countries that have the legal apparatus to hold a particular MDD but have never experienced one is 0.1.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v2xdd\_i\_ci = & \&[(IF\ v2ddlexci > 0, 1, 0) \times (1 - v2ddsigpci)) \\
 & \& \times (IF\ v2ddsigdci = 0, 1, 0.5 + v2ddsigdci/365/2) \\
 & \& + (v2ddsigdci) \cap (v2ddpartci) \cap (v2ddspmc_i)] \\
 & \& \times (0.5 + 1 - v2ddadmci/2)] \\
 & \& \times (IF\ v2ddlexci = 1, 0.75, 1 \times IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful \\
 & \& event < 6, then\ v2ddthreci = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06 \\
 & \& then\ v2ddthreci = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06\ units\ per\ year \\
 & \& until\ 0.1; if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years \\
 & \& v2ddthrerci=0.9, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.1 \\
 & \& units\ per\ year\ until\ 0.1)
 \end{aligned}$$

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.34.2 Popular referendum index (v2xdd\_i\_rf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xdd\_i\_rf

*Original tag:* v2xdd\_i\_rf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: To what extent is the *referendum* utilized?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2ddlexrf v2ddsigprf v2ddsigdrf v2ddpartrf v2ddapprf v2ddspmrfrf v2ddadmrf v2ddyrrf v2ddthrerf

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of

the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of referendums, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process  $v2ddlexrf$ ,
- The number of signatures needed  $v2ddsigprf$ ,
- Time-limits to circulate the signatures  $v2ddsigdrf$ .

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum  $v2ddpartrf$ ,
- Approval quorum  $v2ddapprf$ , and
- Supermajority  $v2ddspmr$ . For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman 2016.

The resulting score is then multiplied with d district majority  $v2ddadmrf$ .

Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens binding or merely consultative  $v2ddlexrf$ , and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past  $v2ddthrerf$ . The baseline for those countries that have the legal apparatus to hold a particular MDD but have never experienced one is 0.1.

The index is aggregated using this *formula*:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v2xdd\_i\_rf = & \&[(IF\ v2ddlexrf > 0, 1, 0) \times (1 - v2ddsigprf) \\
 & \& \times (IF\ v2ddsigdrf = 0, 1, .5 + (v2ddsigdrf \times 2)/365) \\
 & \& + (v2ddpartrf \cap v2ddapprf \cap v2ddspmr)] \times (0.5 + (1 - v2ddadmrf)/2) \\
 & \& \times (IF\ v2ddlexrf = 1, .75, 1) \times (IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful\ event < 6, \\
 & \& then\ v2ddthrerf = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ .06units\ per\ year\ until\ .1, \\
 & \& if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years\ v2ddthrerf = .9, \\
 & \& afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.1units\ per\ year\ until\ .1)
 \end{aligned}$$

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.1.34.3 Obligatory referendum index (v2xdd\_i\_or)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xdd\_i\_or

*Original tag:* v2xdd\_i\_or

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: To what extent is the *obligatory referendum* utilized?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2ddlexor v2ddpartor v2ddappor v2ddspmor v2ddadmor v2ddthreor  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of obligatory referendums, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process v2ddlexor.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum v2ddpartor
- Approval quorum v2ddappor, and
- Supermajority V2ddspmor. For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman 2017.

The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority v2ddadmor.

Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens binding or merely consultative v2ddlexor, and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past v2ddthreor.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd\_i\_or = \&(IF\ v2ddlexor > 0, 1, 0) + (v2ddpartor) \cap v2ddappor \cap V2ddspmor)$$

$$\& \times ((.5 + (1 - v2ddadmor)/2) \times (IF\ v2ddlexor = 1, .75, 1)$$

$$\& \times (IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful\ event < 6, then\ v2ddthreor = 1,$$

$$\& afterwards\ decreases\ by\ .06\ units\ per\ year\ until\ .1,$$

$$\& if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years\ v2ddthreor = .9,$$

$$\& afterwards\ decreases\ by\ .1\ units\ per\ year\ until\ .1)$$

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.34.4 Plebiscite index (v2xdd\_i\_pl)

Long tag: vdem\_cd\_v2xdd\_i\_pl

Original tag: v2xdd\_i\_pl

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: To what extent is the *plebiscite* utilized?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2ddlexpl v2ddpartpl v2ddapprpl v2ddspmpl v2ddadmpl v2ddyrpl v2ddthrepl

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of

the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of plebiscites, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process  $v2ddlexpl$ .

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum  $v2ddpartpl$ ,
- Approval quorum  $v2ddapprpl$ , and
- Supermajority  $v2ddspmpl$ . For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman 2017.

The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority  $v2ddadmpl$ .

Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or merely consultative) ( $v2ddlexpl$ ), and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past ( $v2ddthrepl$ ). The baseline for those countries that have the legal apparatus to hold a particular MDD but have never experienced one is 0.1.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd\_i\_pl = \&(IF\ v2ddlexpl > 0, 1, 0) + (v2ddpartpl \cap v2ddapprpl \cap v2ddspmpl)$$

$$\& \times ((0.5 + (1 - v2ddadmpl)/2)) \times (IF\ v2ddlexpl = 1, 0.75, 1)$$

$$\& \times (IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful\ event < 6, then\ v2ddthrepl = 1,$$

$$\& afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06\ units\ per\ year\ until\ 0.1,$$

$$\& if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years\ v2ddthrepl = 0.9,$$

$$\& afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.1\ units\ per\ year\ until\ 0.1)$$

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.34.5 Citizen-initiated component of direct popular vote index ( $v2xdd\_cic$ )

*Long tag:*  $vdem\_cd\_v2xdd\_cic$

*Original tag:*  $v2xdd\_cic$

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: To what extent is the Citizen Initiated Component utilized?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S):  $v2xdd\_i\_ci$   $v2xdd\_i\_rf$

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: This index is the normalized average of the scores of both indices of citizen-initiated mechanism of direct democracy popular initiatives and referendums. For an

elaboration of the weighting factor of each component, see David Altman 2017. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd\_cic = [v2xdd\_i\_ci + v2xdd\_i\_rf]/4$$

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.34.6 Top-Down component of direct popular vote index (v2xdd\_toc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xdd\_toc

*Original tag:* v2xdd\_toc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: To what extent is the Top-Down Component utilized?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xdd\_i\_pl v2xdd\_i\_or

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: This index is the normalized average of the scores of both indices of mechanism of direct democracy which are not citizen-initiated obligatory referendums and plebiscites. For an elaboration of the weighting factor of each component, see David Altman 2016. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd\_toc = [v2xdd\_i\_pl + v2xdd\_i\_or]/4$$

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.1.35 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Civil Society

The *Civil Society Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

##### 2.1.35.1 Core Civil Society Index (v2xcs\_ccsi)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xcs\_ccsi

*Original tag:* v2xcs\_ccsi

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How robust is civil society?

CLARIFICATION: The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations CSOs. CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations if they are engaged in civic or political activities, social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.

The core civil society index CCSI is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2csprtcpt

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs), CSO repression (v2csreprss) and CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.1.36 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Elections

The *Elections Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V -Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.1.36.1 Electoral Regime Index (v2x\_elecreg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_elecreg

*Original tag:* v2x\_elecreg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

QUESTION: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

CLARIFICATION: Coded 0 until an executive or legislative election is held, defined by v2x\_elecpres and v2x\_elecparl, then set to 1 until any of the following two events occur (if they occur): (a) that the election was "aborted", meaning that those elected did not resume power, as defined by v2x\_hosabort and v2x\_legabort; or (b) an "electoral interruption", meaning that either the legislature was shut down, as defined by v2x\_leginter, or there was an executive coup, as defined by v2x\_hosinter; in the case of (a) or (b), v2x\_elecreg is set to 0 until there is another election. The operational indicator of an "aborted" executive election (v2x\_hosabort) is that v2expathhs did not turn 7 within 12 months after the election, for a legislative election (v2x\_legabort) that v2lgbicam did not turn positive within 12 months after the election. An interruption of the electoral regime occurring through the HOS, *e.g.* a coup d'état, is indicated by v2x\_hosinter as a change in v2x\_elecpres, meaning v2expathhs turned from 7 to something else, with the exception of 6, approval by the legislature (in case the legislature remained in place). An interruption of the electoral regime occurring through the legislature is defined by v2xlg\_leginter based on v2lgbicam turning 0. We note that the coding of v2x\_elecreg does not merely follow mechanically from the scores on these other variables, as the coding of v2x\_elecreg has also been cross-checked and validated by research assistants. An executive and a legislative electoral regime cannot be separated since they form an integral part, where an aborted legislature is interpreted as a signal that also the executive is not standing for election any longer, and vice versa.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2xel\_elecparl v2xlg\_leginter v2xel\_elecpres v2x\_hosinter v2x\_hosabort v2x\_legabort v2ex\_elechos v2ex\_elechog

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.36.2 Executive electoral regime index (v2xex\_elecreg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xex\_elecreg

*Original tag:* v2xex\_elecreg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

QUESTION: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on the executive on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

CLARIFICATION: Although we advice against it, since the executive and legislative electoral regime should be considered an integral part, for completeness we also provide this separate measure of executive electoral regimes. Coded 0 until an executive election is held, defined by v2x\_elecpres, then set to 1 until any of the following two events occur (if they occur): (a) that the election was "aborted", meaning that those elected did not resume power, as defined by v2x\_hosabort; or (b) an "electoral interruption", meaning that there was an executive coup, as defined by v2x\_hosinter; in the case of (a) or (b), v2xex\_elecreg is set to 0 until there is another election.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2xel\_elecpres v2x\_hosinter v2x\_hosabort v2ex\_elechog

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### **2.1.36.3 Legislative electoral regime index (v2xlg\_elecreg)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xlg\_elecreg

*Original tag:* v2xlg\_elecreg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

QUESTION: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on the legislature on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

CLARIFICATION: Although we advice against it, since the executive and legislative electoral regime should be considered an integral part, for completeness we also provide this separate measure of legislative electoral regimes. Coded 0 until a legislative election is held, defined by v2x\_elecparl, then set to 1 until any of the following two events occur (if they occur): (a) that the election was "aborted", meaning that those elected did not resume power, as defined by v2x\_legabort; or (b) an "electoral interruption", meaning that the legislature was shut down, as defined by v2x\_leginter; in the case of (a) or (b), v2x\_elecreg is set to 0 until there is another election.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2xel\_elecparl v2xlg\_leginter v2x\_legabort

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### **2.1.36.4 Electoral Component Index (v2x\_edcomp\_thick)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_edcomp\_thick

*Original tag:* v2x\_EDcomp\_thick

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell



ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_frassoc\_thick v2x\_suffr v2xel\_frefair v2x\_elecoff

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

AGGREGATION: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link of freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, and elected executive. The index is thus aggregated using this formula:

$v2x\_EDcomp\_thick =$

$.125 * v2x\_frassoc\_thick + .125 * v2x\_suffr + .125 * v2xel\_frefair + .125 * v2x\_elecoff + .5 * v2x\_frassoc\_thick * v2x\_suffr * v2xel\_frefair * v2x\_elecoff$

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.36.5 Freedom of expression index (v2x\_freexp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_freexp

*Original tag:* v2x\_freexp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2xcl\_disc v2clacfree

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for print/broadcast censorship effort (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw) and freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.36.6 Presidential election aborted (v2x\_hosabort)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_hosabort

*Original tag:* v2x\_hosabort

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Have presidential election results been aborted?

CLARIFICATION: Aborted election results usually occur when the President-elect does not reach office from the direct elections, *e.g.* if results are nullified or a coup d'état interferes with inaugural passage.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2exhoshog v2expathhg v2expathhs v2xel\_elecpres  
DATA RELEASE: 2-12.  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.1.36.7 Chief executive no longer elected (v2x\_hosinter)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_hosinter

*Original tag:* v2x\_hosinter

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell  
QUESTION: Is the chief executive no longer elected?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
SCALE: Dichotomous.  
SOURCE(S): v2exhoshog v2expathhg v2expathhs  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.1.36.8 Legislative or constituent assembly election aborted (v2x\_legabort)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_legabort

*Original tag:* v2x\_legabort

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell  
QUESTION: Have legislative election results been aborted?  
CLARIFICATION: Aborted election results usually occur when the elected members do not reach office after election occurs, *e.g.* if results are nullified or a coup d'état interferes with inaugural session.  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
SCALE: Dichotomous.  
SOURCE(S): v2lgbicam v2xel\_elecparl v2expathhs  
DATA RELEASE: 2-12.  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.1.36.9 Freedom of discussion (v2xcl\_disc)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xcl\_disc

*Original tag:* v2xcl\_disc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd  
QUESTION: Are citizens able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?  
CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc. without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cldiscm v2cldiscw

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom of discussion for men (v2cldiscm) and women (v2cldiscw).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.36.10 Freedom of domestic movement (v2xcl\_dmove)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xcl\_dmove

*Original tag:* v2xcl\_dmove

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Do citizens enjoy freedom of movement and residence?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary non-political criminals.

Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cldmovem v2cldmovew

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom of domestic movement for men (v2cldmovem) and women (v2cldmovew).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.36.11 Freedom from forced labor (v2xcl\_slave)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xcl\_slave

*Original tag:* v2xcl\_slave

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Are adult citizens free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

CLARIFICATION: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2clslavem v2clslavef

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom from forced labor for men (v2clslavem) and women (v2clslavef).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.36.12 Legislative or constituent assembly election (v2xel\_elecparl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xel\_elecparl

*Original tag:* v2xel\_elecparl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell  
QUESTION: Did a legislative or constituent assembly election take place this year?  
CLARIFICATION: In the country-date data set v2xel\_elecparl is coded only on the specific election date.  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
SCALE: Dichotomous.  
SOURCE(S): v2eltype\_0 v2eltype\_1 v2eltype\_4 v2eltype\_5  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.36.13 Presidential election (v2xel\_elecpres)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xel\_elecpres

*Original tag:* v2xel\_elecpres

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell  
QUESTION: Did a presidential election take place this year?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
SCALE: Dichotomous.  
SOURCE(S): v2eltype\_6 v2eltype\_7  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.1.36.14 Legislature directly elected (v2xex\_elecleg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xex\_elecleg

*Original tag:* v2xex\_elecleg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell  
QUESTION: To what extent is the legislature directly or indirectly elected?  
CLARIFICATION: If the legislature is unicameral, v2xex\_elecleg is measured as the proportion of legislators directly elected + half of the proportion that are indirectly elected. If the legislature is bicameral and the upper house is involved in the appointment of the chief executive, the same proportion of directly and half of the indirectly elected legislators is calculated for the upper house; the scores for the lower and upper houses are then averaged. Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition.  
This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right. Since the variables coding the share of directly and indirectly elected legislators are not yet fully in sync for all country dates, a few observations now receive an index value larger than 1.  
RESPONSES:  
Proportion.  
SCALE: Interval.  
SOURCE(S): v2lgetto v2lgelecup v2lginello v2lginelup v2exapup v2exapupap  
DATA RELEASE: 5, 7-12.  
CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.36.15 Legislature closed down or aborted (v2xlg\_leginter)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xlg\_leginter

*Original tag:* v2xlg\_leginter

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Has the legislature been closed down or aborted?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2lgbicam v2lgello

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.36.16 Alternative source information index (v2xme\_altinf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xme\_altinf

*Original tag:* v2xme\_altinf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage or lack of coverage of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media bias (v2mebias), print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.1.37 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Consensual Democracy Dimensions**

The *Consensual Democracy Dimensions Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

##### **2.1.37.1 Divided party control index (v2x\_divparctrl)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2x\_divparctrl

*Original tag:* v2x\_divparctrl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Are the executive and legislature controlled by different political parties?

CLARIFICATION: This variable is a reordered version of the continuous measurement model estimates for indicator v2psnatpar: National party control. After reordering, the positive

extreme signifies Divided party control. A Different parties or individuals unconnected to parties control the executive and the legislature or B Executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each of which belongs to different parties; or between a non-partisan monarch and a prime minister. The intermediate values signify Unified coalition control. A single multi-party coalition controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single coalition gathers together a majority of seats. And the negative extreme signifies "Unified party control. A single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single party has a majority of seats."

SCALE: Interval, from low to high.

SOURCE(S): v2psnatpar v2psnatpar\_ord

NOTES: V-Dem originally intended to generate indices to measure concepts inspired by Arend Lijphart's two dimensions of consensus vs. majoritarian democracy. The project no longer plans to produce such indices. Instead, it offers the two indices, the Divided party control index and the Division of power index, which are conceptually thinner than Lijphart's concepts and not equivalent substitutes for them. However, these alternatives are useful for some purposes.

DATA RELEASE: 6-12. For Version 6 as Divided party control of legislature index v2x\_lgdivparctrl, 7 modified to Divided party control index.

AGGREGATION: The reordering is accomplished in two steps. First, 5 is subtracted from v2psnatpar when the ordinal version of this variable, v2psnatpar\_ord, is 2. This moves the ordinal score corresponding to unified party control to the lowest values. Then the result is standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

## 2.1.38 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Academic Freedom

The *Academic Freedom Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

### 2.1.38.1 Academic Freedom Index (v2xca\_academ)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2xca\_academ

*Original tag:* v2xca\_academ

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is academic freedom respected?

CLARIFICATION: Academic freedom is understood as the right of academics, without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies (UNESCO 1997 Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel). The Academic Freedom Index is designed to provide an aggregated measure that captures the de facto realization of academic freedom, including the degree to which higher-education institutions are autonomous.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cafres v2cafexch v2cainsaut v2casurv v2clacfree

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: freedom to research and teach (v2cafres),

freedom of academic exchange and dissemination (v2cafexch), institutional autonomy (v2cainsaut), campus integrity (v2casurv), freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.1.39 Digital Society Survey - Coordinated Information Operations

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times' website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual's use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization's digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a

website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### **2.1.39.1 Government dissemination of false information domestic (v2smgovdom)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smgovdom

*Original tag:* v2smgovdom

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence its own population?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. The government disseminates false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. The government disseminates false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. The government disseminates false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. The government disseminates false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. The government never disseminates false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### **2.1.39.2 Government dissemination of false information abroad (v2smgovab)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smgovab

*Original tag:* v2smgovab

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence citizens of other countries abroad?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. The government disseminates false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. The government disseminates false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. The government disseminates false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. The government disseminates false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. The government never disseminates false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation



at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.1.39.3 Party dissemination of false information domestic (v2smpardom)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smpardom

*Original tag:* v2smpardom

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence their own population?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Major political parties and candidates never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.1.39.4 Party dissemination of false information abroad (v2smparab)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smparab

*Original tag:* v2smparab

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence citizens of other countries abroad?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Major political parties and candidates never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein

*et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### **2.1.39.5 Foreign governments dissemination of false information (v2smfordom)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smfordom

*Original tag:* v2smfordom

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Foreign governments disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Foreign governments disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Foreign governments never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### **2.1.39.6 Foreign governments ads (v2smforads)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smforads

*Original tag:* v2smforads

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use paid advertisements on social media in order to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Foreign governments disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Foreign governments disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Foreign governments never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein

*et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.1.40 Digital Society Survey - Digital Media Freedom

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual’s use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization’s digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### 2.1.40.1 Government Internet filtering capacity (v2smgovfilcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smgovfilcap

*Original tag:* v2smgovfilcap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Independent of whether it actually does so in practice, does the government have the technical capacity to censor information (text, audio, images, or video) on the Internet by filtering (blocking access to certain websites) if it decided to?

RESPONSES:

0: The government lacks any capacity to block access to any sites on the Internet.

1: The government has limited capacity to block access to a few sites on the Internet.

2: The government has adequate capacity to block access to most, but not all, specific sites on the Internet if it wanted to.

3: The government has the capacity to block access to any sites on the Internet if it wanted to.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.1.40.2 Government Internet filtering in practice (v2smgovfilprc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smgovfilprc

*Original tag:* v2smgovfilprc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How frequently does the government censor political information (text, audio, images, or video) on the Internet by filtering (blocking access to certain websites)?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to remove political content, except to sites that are pro-government.

1: Often. The government commonly removes online political content, except sites that are pro-government.

2: Sometimes. The government successfully removes about half of the critical online political content.

3: Rarely. There have been only a few occasions on which the government removed political content.

4: Never, or almost never. The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.1.40.3 Government Internet shut down capacity (v2smgovshutcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smgovshutcap

*Original tag:* v2smgovshutcap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Independent of whether it actually does so in practice, does the government have the technical capacity to actively shut down domestic access to the Internet if it decided to?

CLARIFICATION: A domestic Internet connection is any connection originating physically within the country, whether over wired, wireless, or satellite networks. This question asks what proportion of potential Internet connections of domestic origin the government has the capacity to render inoperable.

RESPONSES:

0: The government lacks the capacity to shut down any domestic Internet connections.

1: The government has the capacity to shut down roughly a quarter of domestic access to the Internet.

2: The government has the capacity to shut down roughly half of domestic access to the Internet.

3: The government has the capacity to shut down roughly three quarters of domestic access to the Internet.

4: The government has the capacity to shut down all, or almost all, domestic access to the Internet.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.1.40.4 Government Internet shut down in practice (v2smgovshut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smgovshut

*Original tag:* v2smgovshut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often does the government shut down domestic access to the Internet?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to shut down domestic access to the Internet.

1: Often. The government shut down domestic access to the Internet numerous times this year.

2: Sometimes. The government shut down domestic access to the Internet several times this year.

3: Rarely but there have been a few occasions throughout the year when the government shut down domestic access to Internet.

4: Never, or almost never. The government does not typically interfere with the domestic access to the Internet.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein

*et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.1.40.5 Government social media shut down in practice (v2smgovsm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smgovsm

*Original tag:* v2smgovsm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often does the government shut down access to social media platforms?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to shut down access to social media.

1: Often. The government shuts down access to social media numerous times this year.

2: Sometimes. The government shuts down access to social media several times this year.

3: Rarely. There have been a few occasions throughout the year when the government shuts down access to social media.

4: Never, or almost never. The government does not interfere with the access to social media, except in the cases mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.1.40.6 Government social media alternatives (v2smgovsmalt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smgovsmalt

*Original tag:* v2smgovsmalt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How prevalent is the usage of social media platforms that are wholly controlled by either the government or its agents in this country?

RESPONSES:

0: Essentially all social media usage takes place on platforms controlled by the state.

1: Most usage of social media is on state-controlled platforms, although some groups use non-state-controlled alternatives.

2: There is significant usage of both state-controlled and non-state-controlled social media platforms.

3: While some state-controlled social media platforms exist, their usage only represents a small share of social media usage in the country.

4: Practically no one uses state-controlled social media platforms.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.1.40.7 Government social media monitoring (v2smgovsmmon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smgovsmmon

*Original tag:* v2smgovsmmon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How comprehensive is the surveillance of political content in social media by the government or its agents?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely comprehensive. The government surveils virtually all content on social media.

1: Mostly comprehensive. The government surveils most content on social media, with comprehensive monitoring of most key political issues.

2: Somewhat comprehensive. The government does not universally surveil social media but can be expected to surveil key political issues about half the time.

3: Limited. The government only surveils political content on social media on a limited basis.

4: Not at all, or almost not at all. The government does not surveil political content on social media, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.1.40.8 Government social media censorship in practice (v2smgovsmcenprc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smgovsmcenprc

*Original tag:* v2smgovsmcenprc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what degree does the government censor political content (i.e., deleting or filtering specific posts for political reasons) on social media in practice?

RESPONSES:

0: The government simply blocks all social media platforms.

1: The government successfully censors all social media with political content.

2: The government successfully censors a significant portion of political content on social media, though not all of it.

3: The government only censors social media with political content that deals with especially sensitive issues.

4: The government does not censor political social media content, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.1.40.9 Government cyber security capacity (v2smgovcapsec)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smgovcapsec

*Original tag:* v2smgovcapsec

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government have sufficiently technologically skilled staff and resources to mitigate harm from cyber-security threats?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The government does not have the capacity to counter even unsophisticated cyber security threats.

1: Not really. The government has the resources to combat only unsophisticated cyber attacks.

2: Somewhat. The government has the resources to combat moderately sophisticated cyber attacks.

3: Mostly. The government has the resources to combat most sophisticated cyber attacks.

4: Yes. The government has the resources to combat sophisticated cyber attacks, even those launched by highly skilled actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.1.40.10 Political parties cyber security capacity (v2smpolcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smpolcap

*Original tag:* v2smpolcap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major political parties have sufficiently technologically skilled staff and resources to mitigate harm from cyber security threats?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The government does not have the capacity to counter even unsophisticated cyber security threats.

1: Not really. The government has the resources to combat only unsophisticated cyber attacks.

2: Somewhat. The government has the resources to combat moderately sophisticated cyber attacks.

3: Mostly. The government has the resources to combat most sophisticated cyber attacks.

4: Yes. The government has the resources to combat sophisticated cyber attacks, even those launched by highly skilled actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.1.41 Digital Society Survey - State Internet Regulation Capacity and Approach

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.



For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

**Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)**

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual’s use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization’s digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

**2.1.41.1 Internet legal regulation content (v2smregcon)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smregcon

*Original tag:* v2smregcon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What type of content is covered in the legal framework to regulate Internet?

RESPONSES:

0: The state can remove any content at will.

1: The state can remove most content, and the law protects speech in only specific, and politically uncontroversial contexts.

2: The legal framework is ambiguous. The state can remove some politically sensitive content, while other is protected by law.

3: The law protects most political speech, but the state can remove especially politically controversial content.

4: The law protects political speech, and the state can only remove content if it violates well-established legal criteria.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

**2.1.41.2 Privacy protection by law exists (v2smprivex)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smprivex

*Original tag:* v2smprivex

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does a legal framework to protect Internet users' privacy and their data exist?

RESPONSES:

0: No. (Skip to v2smregcap)

1: Yes

ORDERING: if 0 no, Skip to v2smregcap

SCALE: yes/no

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

**2.1.41.3 Privacy protection by law content (v2smprivcon)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smprivcon

*Original tag:* v2smprivcon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What does the legal framework to protect Internet users' privacy and their data stipulate?

RESPONSES:

0: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access any type of personal data on the Internet.

1: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access most types of personal data on the Internet.

2: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access many types of personal data on the Internet.

3: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access only a few types of personal information on the Internet.

4: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access personal information on the Internet only in extraordinary circumstances.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.1.41.4 Government capacity to regulate online content (v2smregcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smregcap

*Original tag:* v2smregcap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government have sufficient staff and resources to regulate Internet content in accordance with existing law?

RESPONSES:

0: No, almost all online activity happens outside of reach of the state, where it lacks the capacity to remove illegal content.

1: Not really. The state has extremely limited resources to regulate online content.

2: Somewhat. The state has the capacity to regulate only some online content or some portions of the law.

3: Mostly. The state has robust capacity to regulate online content, though not enough to regulate all content and all portions of the law.

4: Yes, the government has sufficient capacity to regulate all online content.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.1.41.5 Government online content regulation approach (v2smregapp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smregapp

*Original tag:* v2smregapp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government use its own resources and institutions to monitor and regulate online content or does it distribute this regulatory burden to private actors such as Internet service providers?

RESPONSES:

0: All online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state.

1: Most online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state, though the state involves private actors in a limited way.

2: Some online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state, but the state also involves private actors in monitoring and regulation in various ways.

3: The state does little online content monitoring and regulation, and entrusts most of the

monitoring and regulation to private actors.

4: The state off-loads all online content monitoring and regulation to private actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.1.41.6 Defamation protection (v2smlawpr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smlawpr

*Original tag:* v2smlawpr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the legal framework provide protection against defamatory online content, or hate speech?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The law provides no protection against Internet defamation and hate speech.

1: Not really. The law provides a weak protection and to very limited range of circumstances.

2: Somewhat. The law provides some protection against Internet defamation and hate speech but in limited circumstances, or only to particular groups of people.

3: Mostly. The law provides protection against Internet defamation and hate speech under many circumstances, and to most groups of people.

4: Yes. The law provides comprehensive protection against Internet defamation and hate speech.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.1.41.7 Abuse of defamation and copyright law by elites (v2smdefabu)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smdefabu

*Original tag:* v2smdefabu

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do elites abuse the legal system (e.g., defamation and copyright law) to censor political speech online?

RESPONSES:

0: Regularly. Elites abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet as regular practice.

1: Often. Elites commonly abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.

2: Sometimes. Elites abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet about half the time.

3: Rarely. Elites occasionally abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.

4: Never, or almost never. Elites do not abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.1.42 Digital Society Survey - Online Media Polarization

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual’s use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization’s digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a

website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### 2.1.42.1 Online media existence (v2smonex)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smonex

*Original tag:* v2smonex

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do people consume domestic online media?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. No one consumes domestic online media. Skip next question if this answer is selected.

1: Limited. Domestic online media consumption is limited.

2: Relatively extensive. Domestic online media consumption is common.

3: Extensive. Almost everyone consumes domestic online media.

ORDERING: if 0, skip v2smonper

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.1.42.2 Online media perspectives (v2smonper)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smonper

*Original tag:* v2smonper

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major domestic online media outlets represent a wide range of political perspectives?

RESPONSES:

0: The major domestic online media outlets represent only the government’s perspective.

1: The major domestic online media outlets represent only the perspectives of the government and a government approved, semi-official opposition party.

2: The major domestic online media outlets represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.

3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major domestic online media outlets.

4: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in many major domestic online media outlets.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.1.42.3 Online media fractionalization (v2smmefra)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smmefra

*Original tag:* v2smmefra

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major (political) news?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The major domestic online media outlets give opposing presentation of major events.

1: Not really. The major domestic online media outlets differ greatly in the presentation of major events.

2: Sometimes. The major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major events about half the time.

3: Mostly. The major domestic online media outlets mostly give a similar presentation of major events.

4: Yes. Although there are small differences in representation, the major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 2.1.43 Digital Society Survey - Social Cleavages

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or

gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times' website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual's use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization's digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss "censorship" or "censoring" content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### 2.1.43.1 Use of social media to organize offline violence (v2smorgviol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smorgviol

*Original tag:* v2smorgviol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do people use social media to organize offline violence?

RESPONSES:

0: Frequently. There are numerous cases in which people have used social media to organize offline violence.

1: Sometimes. There are a few cases in which people have used social media to organize offline violence.

2: Never. People have never used social media to organize offline violence.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021



#### 2.1.43.2 Average people's use of social media to organize offline action (v2smorgavgact)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smorgavgact

*Original tag:* v2smorgavgact

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do average people use social media to organize offline political action of any kind?

RESPONSES:

0: Never or almost never. Average people have almost never used social media to organize offline political action.

1: Rarely. Average people do not typically use social media to organize offline political action.

2: Sometimes. There are a few cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

3: Often. There have been several cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

4: Regularly. There are numerous cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.1.43.3 Elites' use of social media to organize offline action (v2smorgelitact)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smorgelitact

*Original tag:* v2smorgelitact

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do domestic elites use social media to organize offline political action of any kind?

RESPONSES:

0: Never or almost never. Elites have almost never used social media to organize offline political action.

1: Rarely. Elites do not typically use social media to organize offline political action.

2: Sometimes. There are a few cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.

3: Often. There have been several cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.

4: Regularly. There are numerous cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.1.43.4 Party/candidate use of social media in campaigns (v2smcamp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smcamp

*Original tag:* v2smcamp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do major political parties and candidates use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents?

RESPONSES:

0: None. Major political parties and candidates do not use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

1: A little. Major political parties and candidates rarely use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

2: Somewhat. Major political parties and candidates sometimes use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

3: Substantial. Major political parties and candidates frequently use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### **2.1.43.5 Arrests for political content (v2smarrest)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smarrest

*Original tag:* v2smarrest

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If a citizen posts political content online that would run counter to the government and its policies, what is the likelihood that citizen is arrested?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely likely.

1: Likely.

2: Unlikely.

3: Extremely unlikely.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### **2.1.43.6 Polarization of society (v2smpolsoc)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smpolsoc

*Original tag:* v2smpolsoc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you characterize the differences of opinions on major political issues in this society?

CLARIFICATION: While plurality of views exists in all societies, we are interested in knowing

the extent to which these differences in opinions result in major clashes of views and polarization or, alternatively, whether there is general agreement on the general direction this society should develop.

RESPONSES:

0: Serious polarization. There are serious differences in opinions in society on almost all key political issues, which result in major clashes of views.

1: Moderate polarization. There are differences in opinions in society on many key political issues, which result in moderate clashes of views.

2: Medium polarization. Differences in opinions are noticeable on about half of the key political issues, resulting in some clashes of views.

3: Limited polarization. There are differences in opinions on only a few key political issues, resulting in few clashes of views.

4: No polarization. There are differences in opinions but there is a general agreement on the direction for key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.1.43.7 Political parties hate speech (v2smpolhate)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smpolhate

*Original tag:* v2smpolhate

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do major political parties use hate speech as part of their rhetoric?

CLARIFICATION: Hate speech is any speech that is intended to insult, offend, or intimidate members of specific groups, defined by race, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, disability, or similar trait.

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often.

1: Often.

2: Sometimes.

3: Rarely.

4: Never, or almost never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.1.43.8 Online harassment groups (v2smhargr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smhargr

*Original tag:* v2smhargr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which groups are targets of hate speech or harassment in online media?

CLARIFICATION: Multiple selection. Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

- 0: Women [v2smhargr\_0]
- 1: LGBTQ groups and individuals [v2smhargr\_1]
- 2: Specific religious groups [v2smhargr\_2]
- 3: Specific ethnic groups [v2smhargr\_3]
- 4: Specific caste [v2smhargr\_4]
- 5: Specific language groups [v2smhargr\_5]
- 6: Specific race [v2smhargr\_6]
- 7: People with physical or cognitive disabilities [v2smhargr\_7]
- 8: People from specific regions [v2smhargr\_8]
- 9: Other (specify in the next question) [v2smhargr\_9]
- 10: No group is a specific target [v2smhargr\_10]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.1.43.9 Types of organization through social media (v2smorgtypes)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cd\_v2smorgtypes

*Original tag:* v2smorgtypes

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: What types of offline political action are most commonly mobilized on social media?

CLARIFICATION: Multiple selection. Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

- 0: Petition signing [v2smorgtypes\_0]
- 1: Voter turnout [v2smorgtypes\_1]
- 2: Street protests [v2smorgtypes\_2]
- 3: Strikes/labor actions [v2smorgtypes\_3]
- 4: Riots [v2smorgtypes\_4]
- 5: Organized rebellion [v2smorgtypes\_5]
- 6: Vigilante Justice (e.g., mob lynching, stalking harassment) [v2smorgtypes\_6]
- 7: Terrorism [v2smorgtypes\_7]
- 8: Ethnic cleansing/genocide [v2smorgtypes\_8]
- 9: Other (specify in the next question) [v2smorgtypes\_9]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

## 2.2 V-Dem Coder-Level

*Dataset tag:* vdem\_coder\_level

*Description:* Data coded by Country Experts and coder-reliability scores from the Measurement Model output.

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Nazifa Alizada, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa

Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Katrin Kinzelbach, Joshua Krusell, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Oskar Rydén, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson and Daniel Ziblatt. 2022. "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v12" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds22>.

and:

Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Juraj Medzihorsky, Joshua Krusell, Farhad Miri, and Johannes von Römer. 2022. "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data". V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 7th edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.

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More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page:  
<https://www.v-dem.net/vdemds.html>

### 2.2.1 Identifier Variables in the V-Dem Datasets

Variables in this section identify the observations in the dataset.

#### 2.2.1.1 Country Name Abbreviation (`country_text_id`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_coder_level_country_text_id`

*Original tag:* `country_text_id`

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Abbreviated country names.

RESPONSES:

Text

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 2.2.1.2 V-Dem Country ID (`country_id`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_coder_level_country_id`

*Original tag:* `country_id`

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Unique country ID designated for each country.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

NOTES: A list of countries and their corresponding IDs used in the V-Dem dataset can be found in the country table in the codebook, as well as in the *V-Dem Country Coding Units* document.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 2.2.1.3 Historical Date (`historical_date`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_coder_level_historical_date`

*Original tag:* `historical_date`

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Variable designating the date for which observation is given.

CLARIFICATION: The date is coded in *YYYY-MM-DD* format. December 31 observation always refers to the situation at the end of the year. There can be observations on other dates signifying other events, i.e. elections or executive appointments.

RESPONSES:

Date

NOTES: This variable is included in the V-Dem Country Date dataset.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

## 2.2.2 V-Dem Indicators - Civic and Academic Space

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

#### Civic and Academic Space:

In this survey, we ask you to assess several issues concerning the space for and state of civil society and academia. First, we ask about some general issues such as polarization and peaceful assembly. Then, we probe into mobilization for mass events and associations. Finally, we ask you to consider questions related to academia.

#### 2.2.2.1 Freedom of peaceful assembly (v2caassemb)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2caassemb

*Original tag:* v2caassemb

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do state authorities respect and protect the right of peaceful assembly?

CLARIFICATION: This question focuses on the ability to assemble publically in practice. An assembly is “an intentional and temporary presence of a number of individuals in a public place, for a common expressive purpose” (ODIHR and Venice Commission of the Council of Europe 2010). Authorities may limit the right to assembly only if limitations are necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and are lawful, necessary, and proportionate to the aim pursued. Such reasonable and legal restrictions should not be considered when answering. However, if there is evidence that restrictions are used as a pretext for political reasons, this evidence should be considered.

RESPONSES:

0: Never. State authorities do not allow peaceful assemblies and are willing to use lethal force to prevent them.

1: Rarely. State authorities rarely allow peaceful assemblies, but generally avoid using lethal force to prevent them.

2: Sometimes. State authorities sometimes allow peaceful assemblies, but often arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully.

3: Mostly. State authorities generally allow peaceful assemblies, but in rare cases arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully.

4: Almost always. State authorities almost always allow and actively protect peaceful assemblies except in rare cases of lawful, necessary, and proportionate limitations.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.2.2 Mobilization for autocracy (v2caautmob)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2caautmob

*Original tag:* v2caautmob

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization for pro-autocratic aims been?

CLARIFICATION: Events are pro-autocratic if they are organized explicitly in support of non-democratic rulers and forms of government such as a one-party state, monarchy, theocracy or military dictatorships. Events are also pro-autocratic if they are organized in support of leaders that question basic principles of democracy, or are generally aiming to undermine democratic ideas and institutions such as the rule of law, free and fair elections, or media freedom. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes, sit. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns also count state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

RESPONSES:

0: There have been virtually no events.

1: There have been several small-scale events.

2: There have been many small-scale events.

3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.

4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Hellmeier and Bernhard (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:128); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.2.3 Political polarization (v2cacamps)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2cacamps

*Original tag:* v2cacamps

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is society polarized into antagonistic, political camps?

CLARIFICATION: Here we refer to the extent to which political differences affect social relationships beyond political discussions. Societies are highly polarized if supporters of opposing political camps are reluctant to engage in friendly interactions, for example, in family functions, civic associations, their free time activities and workplaces

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a friendly manner.

1: Mainly not. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a friendly than a hostile manner.

2: Somewhat. Supporters of opposing political camps are equally likely to interact in a friendly or hostile manner.

3: Yes, to noticeable extent. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a hostile than friendly manner.

4: Yes, to a large extent. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a hostile manner.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.2.4 Mass mobilization concentration (v2caconmob)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2caconmob

*Original tag:* v2caconmob

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Were mass mobilization events concentrated in the capital?

CLARIFICATION: This question is about the geographic location of the events and not their intensity. In the unlikely event that no event at all took place, code option 2. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. Events of mass mobilization were much more frequent in the capital.

1: Somewhat. Events of mass mobilization were somewhat more frequent in the capital.

2: No. Events of mass mobilization were as common in many cities across the country as in the capital or did not take place at all.

3: No. Events of mass mobilization were more common in cities other than the capital.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.2.2.5 Academics as critics (v2cacritic)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2cacritic

*Original tag:* v2cacritic

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do scholars and university students publicly criticize government policies?

CLARIFICATION: This question is only about the extent scholars and students actually criticize government policies – irrespective of how free they are to do so and whether they are met with repression or not. We ask you simply to consider to what extent scholars and students are noticeable as government critics in the public discourse.

Public criticism of government policies can be conveyed for example through the publication of op-eds or social media posts on current affairs, the signing of open letters or petitions, the taking part in or organization of public protests, or the holding of critical lectures to students or the public.

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. Scholars and university students do not publicly express criticism of government policies.



1: To a small extent. Scholars and university students publicly express minor criticism of government policies.  
2: To a moderate extent. Scholars and university students publicly express moderate criticism of government policies.  
3: To a large extent. Scholars and university students publicly express substantive criticism of government policies.  
4: To a major extent. Scholars and university students publicly express fundamental criticism of government policies.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.2.6 Mobilization for democracy (v2cademmob)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2cademmob

*Original tag:* v2cademmob

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization for pro-democratic aims been?

CLARIFICATION: Events are pro-democratic if they are organized with the explicit aim to advance and/or protect democratic institutions such as free and fair elections with multiple parties, and courts and parliaments; or if they are in support of civil liberties such as freedom of association and speech. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins.

RESPONSES:

0: There have been virtually no events.

1: There have been several small-scale events.

2: There have been many small-scale events.

3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.

4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Hellmeier and Bernhard (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:128); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.2.2.7 Freedom of academic exchange and dissemination (v2cafexch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2cafexch

*Original tag:* v2cafexch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are scholars free to exchange and communicate research ideas and findings?

CLARIFICATION: Free academic exchange includes uncensored access to research material, unhindered participation in national or international academic conferences, and the uncensored publication of academic material. Free dissemination refers to the unrestricted possibility for scholars to share and explain research findings in their field of expertise to non-academic audiences through media engagement or public lectures.

RESPONSES:

0: Completely restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is, across all disciplines, consistently subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

1: Severely restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is, in some disciplines, consistently subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

2: Moderately restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is occasionally subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

3: Mostly free. Academic exchange and dissemination is rarely subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

4: Fully free. Academic exchange and dissemination is not subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.2.8 Freedom to research and teach (v2cafres)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2cafres

*Original tag:* v2cafres

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are scholars free to develop and pursue their own research and teaching agendas without interference?

CLARIFICATION: Examples of interference include research agendas or teaching curricula being drafted, restricted, or fully censored by a non-academic actor; scholars being externally induced, through possible reprisals, to self-censor; or the university administration abusing its position of power to impose research or teaching agendas on individual academics. It also includes public pressure on academics - offline and online. We do not consider as interference restrictions that are due to research priorities, as well as ethical and quality standards, freely defined by the scholarly community as well as the development of standardized curricula by academics that aim to structure and enhance teaching.

RESPONSES:

0: Completely restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are, across all disciplines, consistently subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

1: Severely restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are, in some disciplines, consistently subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

2: Moderately restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are occasionally subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

3: Mostly free. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are rarely subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

4: Fully free. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are not subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

*V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.2.9 Mass mobilization (v2cagenmob)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2cagenmob

*Original tag:* v2cagenmob

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization been?

CLARIFICATION: This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

RESPONSES:

0: There have been virtually no events.

1: There have been several small-scale events.

2: There have been many small-scale events.

3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.

4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.2.10 Institutional autonomy (v2cainsaut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2cainsaut

*Original tag:* v2cainsaut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do universities exercise institutional autonomy in practice?

CLARIFICATION: Institutional autonomy “means the independence of institutions of higher education from the State and all other forces of society, to make decisions regarding its internal government, finance, administration, and to establish its policies of education, research, extension work and other related activities” (Lima Declaration). Note that institutional autonomy does not preclude universities from accepting state or third party funding, but does require that they remain in charge of all types of decisions listed above. Institutional autonomy does also not preclude a public oversight role by the state over universities' spending of public funds.

RESPONSES:

0: No autonomy at all. Universities do not exercise any degree of institutional autonomy; non-academic actors control decision-making.

1: Minimal autonomy. Universities exercise only very limited institutional autonomy; non-academic actors interfere extensively with decision-making.

2: Moderate autonomy. Universities exercise some institutional autonomy; non-academic actors interfere moderately with decision-making.

3: Substantial autonomy. Universities exercise institutional autonomy to a large extent;

non-academic actors have only rare and minimal influence on decision-making.

4: Complete autonomy. Universities exercise complete institutional autonomy from non-academic actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.2.11 Engagement in independent non-political associations (v2canonpol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2canonpol

*Original tag:* v2canonpol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What share of the population is regularly active in independent non-political associations, such as sports clubs, literary societies, charities, fraternal groups, or support groups?

CLARIFICATION: Non-political associations include all associations whose main purpose is not the change of policy or practice at the state or societal level. It does NOT include political parties, or trade unions. An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting activity or event at least twice a year.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no one.

1: A small share of the population (less than 5percent).

2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 percent).

3: A large share of the population (about 16 percent to 25percent).

4: A very large share of the population (about 26percent or more).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.2.12 Engagement in independent political associations (v2capolit)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2capolit

*Original tag:* v2capolit

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What share of the population is regularly active in independent political interest associations, such as environmental associations, animal rights groups, or LGBT rights groups?

CLARIFICATION: Political associations include all associations whose main purpose is the change of policy or practice at the state or societal level. It does NOT include political parties or trade unions. An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no one.  
1: A small share of the population (less than 5percent).  
2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 percent).  
3: A large share of the population (about 16 percent to 25percent).  
4: A very large share of the population (about 26percent or more).  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.2.13 State of emergency (v2casoe)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2casoe

*Original tag:* v2casoe

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Was a national state of emergency in place at any point this year?

CLARIFICATION: A state of emergency is a formal legal act that enables state actors and institutions to change their roles during times of international or domestic crisis. Our definition of state of emergency includes the application of martial law. If there was more than one state of emergency, code the one that was in place for the longer time. Select one option.

RESPONSES:

0: The legal framework does not allow for a declaration of a national state of emergency. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_0]

1: There was no state of emergency in place at any point this year, even though provisions for a declaration of a national state of emergency exist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_1]

2: A national state of emergency was in place due to a natural disaster. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_2]

3: A national state of emergency was in place due to a terrorist attack. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_3]

4: A national state of emergency was in place due to an armed conflict/war, domestically or internationally. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_4]

5: A national state of emergency was in place due to mass protest/popular uprising. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_5]

6: A national state of emergency was in place for reasons other than those listed above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_6]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.2.14 Engagement in state-administered mass organizations (v2castate)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2castate

*Original tag:* v2castate

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What share of the population is regularly active in state-administered mass associations, such as women, worker or youth leagues?

CLARIFICATION: State-administered mass associations are civilian organizations created

and led by the government or the ruling party. Large shares of specific societal groups are voluntary or compulsory members of these associations. Examples include youth leagues such as the Hitlerjugend in Nazi Germany and the pioneers in the Soviet Union, women leagues such as the Women's Federation in China or the Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas and official trade unions in the Soviet Union. Such organizations are formally or informally affiliated with the state and/or with the ruling party. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no one.

1: A small share of the population (less than 5percent).

2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 percent).

3: A large share of the population (about 16 percent to 25percent).

4: A very large share of the population (about 26percent or more).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 2.2.2.15 Campus integrity (v2casurv)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2casurv

*Original tag:* v2casurv

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are campuses free from politically motivated surveillance or security infringements?

CLARIFICATION: "Campus" refers to all university buildings as well as digital research and teaching platforms. Campus integrity means the preservation of an open learning and research environment marked by an absence of an externally induced climate of insecurity or intimidation on campus. Examples of infringements of campus integrity are politically motivated on-campus or digital surveillance, presence by intelligence or security forces, presence of student militias, or violent attacks by third parties, if specifically targeting universities to repress academic life on campus. Note that we are only interested in politically motivated infringements and targeted attacks on campus integrity, not in non-political security concerns or proportionate security measures taken on campus to address these.

RESPONSES:

0: Completely restricted. Campus integrity is fundamentally undermined by extensive surveillance and severe intimidation, including violence or closures.

1: Severely restricted. Campus integrity is to a large extent undermined by surveillance and intimidation, at times including violence or closures.

2: Moderately restricted. Campus integrity is challenged by some significant cases of surveillance or intimidation.

3: Mostly free. Campus integrity is to a large extent respected, with only minor cases of surveillance or intimidation.

4: Fully free. Campus integrity is comprehensively respected; there are no cases of surveillance or intimidation.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, *V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series*); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at

the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.2.16 Engagement in independent trade unions (v2catrauni)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2catrauni

*Original tag:* v2catrauni

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What share of the population is regularly active in independent trade unions?

CLARIFICATION: An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no one.

1: A small share of the population (less than 5percent).

2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 percent).

3: A large share of the population (about 16 percent to 25percent).

4: A very large share of the population (about 26percent or more).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.2.2.17 Political violence (v2caviol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2caviol

*Original tag:* v2caviol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often have non-state actors used political violence against persons this year?

CLARIFICATION: We understand political violence as the use of physical force to achieve political objectives by non-state actors. The restriction to political objectives excludes profit-driven crime-related violence, for instance. By non-state actors we refer to individuals or entities that are not formally part of the state. Thus, politically oriented militias and youth groups count as non-state actors even though they might potentially be informally affiliated with the ruling party or the state. Political violence against persons excludes psychological and symbolic violence (e.g. destruction of objects).

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. Non-state actors did not use political violence.

1: Rare. Non-state actors rarely used political violence.

2: Occasionally. Non-state actors occasionally used political violence.

3: Frequently. Non-state actors frequently used political violence.

4: Often. Non-state actors often used political violence.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*

(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.2.3 V-Dem Indicators - Civil Liberty

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Civil Liberty:** The following questions are focused on actual practices (*de facto*) rather than formal legal or constitutional rights (*de jure*). Note that if there is significant variation in the respect for a particular civil liberty across the territory, the score should reflect the "average situation" across the territorial scope of the country unit (for each period) as defined in the coder instructions.

#### 2.2.3.1 Freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clacfree

*Original tag:* v2clacfree

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted or controlled by the government.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.3.2 Access to justice for men (v2clacjstm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clacjstm

*Original tag:* v2clacjstm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do men enjoy secure and effective access to justice?

CLARIFICATION: This question specifies the extent to which men can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and men have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely limited — access to justice.



RESPONSES:

- 0: Secure and effective access to justice for men is non-existent.
- 1: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually not established or widely respected.
- 2: Secure and effective access to justice for men is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.
- 3: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually observed.
- 4: Secure and effective access to justice for men is almost always observed.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.3.3 Access to justice for women (v2clacjstw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clacjstw

*Original tag:* v2clacjstw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice?

CLARIFICATION: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely limited — access to justice.

RESPONSES:

- 0: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent.
- 1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected.
- 2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.
- 3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed.
- 4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.3.4 Social class equality in respect for civil liberty (v2clacjust)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clacjust

*Original tag:* v2clacjust

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do?

CLARIFICATION: This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socioeconomic groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status. Here, civil liberties are understood

to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Poor people enjoy much fewer civil liberties than rich people.

1: Poor people enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than rich people.

2: Poor people enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than rich people.

3: Poor people enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than rich people.

4: Poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.3.5 Freedom of discussion for men (v2cldiscm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2cldiscm

*Original tag:* v2cldiscm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are men able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which men are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — rights to freedom of discussion.

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for men. Men are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.

1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.

2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.

3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if men make political statements.

4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech for men in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.3.6 Freedom of discussion for women (v2cldiscw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2cldiscw

*Original tag:* v2cldiscw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — rights to freedom of discussion.

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.

1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.

2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.

3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements.

4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.3.7 Freedom of domestic movement for men (v2cldmovem)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2cldmovem

*Original tag:* v2cldmovem

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do men enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which all men are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no men enjoy full freedom of movement (*e.g.*, North Korea).

1: Some men enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (*e.g.*, Apartheid South Africa).

2: Most men enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all men enjoy partial freedom of movement.  
3: Most men enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.  
4: Virtually all men enjoy full freedom of movement.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.3.8 Freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2cldmovew

*Original tag:* v2cldmovew

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (*e.g.*, North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban).

1: Some women enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (*e.g.*, Apartheid South Africa).

2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all women enjoy partial freedom of movement.

3: Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.

4: Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.3.9 Freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmovew)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clfmovew

*Original tag:* v2clfmovew

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there freedom of foreign travel and emigration?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel

freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from traveling.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular social groups. This can take the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/refusals of visas.

2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular social groups is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only met minor restrictions.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from traveling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family.

4: Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by public authorities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.3.10 Freedom from political killings (v2clkill)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clkill

*Original tag:* v2clkill

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there freedom from political killings?

CLARIFICATION: Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state (including paramilitary groups).

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced systematically and they are typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced frequently and top leaders of government are not actively working to prevent them.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced in a few isolated cases but they are not incited or approved by top leaders of government.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings are non-existent.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.3.11 Property rights for men (v2clprptym)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clprptym

*Original tag:* v2clprptym

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do men enjoy the right to private property?

CLARIFICATION: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and very minimal — property rights.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no men enjoy private property rights of any kind.

1: Some men enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.

2: Many men enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.

3: More than half of men enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of men have much more restricted rights.

4: Most men enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.

5: Virtually all men enjoy all, or almost all property rights.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.3.12 Property rights for women (v2clprptyw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clprptyw

*Original tag:* v2clprptyw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do women enjoy the right to private property?

CLARIFICATION: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and very minimal — property rights.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no women enjoy private property rights of any kind.

1: Some women enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.

2: Many women enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.

3: More than half of women enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of women have much more restricted rights.

4: Most women enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.

5: Virtually all women enjoy all, or almost all, property rights.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.3.13 Freedom of religion (v2clrelig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clrelig

*Original tag:* v2clrelig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there freedom of religion?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion, and practice that religion in private or in public as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to public authorities, who control the activities of religious communities in some detail.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. But significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, voluntary conversions are restricted, and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Yet, minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, and/or instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion occur occasionally.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions against proselytizing, or hindrance to access to or construction of places of worship.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. The population enjoys the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select, and train personnel; solicit and receive contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without undue interference. If religious communities have to register, public authorities do not abuse the process to discriminate against a religion and do not constrain the right to worship before registration.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.3.14 Stronger civil liberties characteristics (v2clrgstch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clrgstch

*Original tag:* v2clrgstch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you describe the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *stronger*?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_0]

1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_1]

2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_2]

3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_3]

4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_4]

5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_5]

6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_6]

7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_7]

8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_8]

9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_9]

10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_10]

11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_11]

12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_12]

13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_13]

14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_14]

15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_15]

16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_16]

17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_17]

18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_18]

19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_19]

20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_20]

21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_21]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.2.3.15 Subnational civil liberties unevenness (v2clrgunev)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clrgunev

*Original tag:* v2clrgunev

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does government respect for civil liberties vary across different areas of the country?

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties significantly more (or, alternatively, significantly less) than government officials in other areas of the country.

1: Somewhat. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties somewhat more (or, alternatively, somewhat less) than government officials in other areas of the country.

2: No. Government officials in most or all areas of the country equally respect (or, alternatively, equally do not respect) civil liberties.

ORDERING: If answer is "2" skip remaining civil liberties questions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.



CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.3.16 Weaker civil liberties characteristics (v2clrgwkch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clrgwkch

*Original tag:* v2clrgwkch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you describe the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *weaker*?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_0]

1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_1]

2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_2]

3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_3]

4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_4]

5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_5]

6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_6]

7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_7]

8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_8]

9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_9]

10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_10]

11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_11]

12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_12]

13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_13]

14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_14]

15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_15]

16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_16]

17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_17]

18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_18]

19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_19]

20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_20]

21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_21]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.2.3.17 Rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clrspct

*Original tag:* v2clrspct

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?

**CLARIFICATION:** This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (*i.e.*, nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination).

The question covers the public officials that handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies.

**RESPONSES:**

0: The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant.

1: The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread.

2: The law is modestly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate.

3: The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited.

4: The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is very limited.

**SCALE:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**DATA RELEASE:** 1-12.

**CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

**CITATION:** Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**YEARS:** 1789-2021

### 2.2.3.18 Freedom from forced labor for women (v2clslavef)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clslavef

*Original tag:* v2clslavef

*Description:*

**VARIABLE TYPE:** C

**PROJECT MANAGER(S):** Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

**ADDITIONAL VERSIONS:** \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

**QUESTION:** Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

**CLARIFICATION:** Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women from forced labor. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (0) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes.

**RESPONSES:**

0: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.

1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.

2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.

3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.

4: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

**SCALE:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**DATA RELEASE:** 1-12.

**CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

**CITATION:** Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.3.19 Freedom from forced labor for men (v2clsavem)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clsavem

*Original tag:* v2clsavem

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are adult men free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

CLARIFICATION: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

RESPONSES:

0: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.

1: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.

2: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.

3: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.

4: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.3.20 Weaker civil liberties pop percent (v2clsnpct)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clsnpct

*Original tag:* v2clsnpct

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What percentage (percent) of the total population of the country lives in the areas where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *weaker* than the country average?

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bootstrapped.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.2.3.21 Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clsocgrp

*Original tag:* v2clsocgrp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

CLARIFICATION: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population.

1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population.

2: Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population.

3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population.

4: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.3.22 State ownership of economy (v2clstown)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clstown

*Original tag:* v2clstown

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the state own or directly control important sectors of the economy?

CLARIFICATION: This question gauges the degree to which the state owns and controls capital (including land) in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors.

It does *not* measure the extent of government revenue and expenditure as a share of total output; indeed, it is quite common for states with expansive fiscal policies to exercise little direct control (and virtually no ownership) over the economy.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually all valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state. Private property may be officially prohibited.

1: Most valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

2: Many sectors of the economy either belong to the state or are directly controlled by the state, but others remain relatively free of direct state control.

3: Some valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state, but most remains free of direct state control.

4: Very little valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.3.23 Freedom from torture (v2cltort)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2cltort

*Original tag:* v2cltort

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there freedom from torture?

CLARIFICATION: Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, with an aim to extract information or intimidate victims, who are in a state of incarceration. Here, we are concerned with torture practiced by state officials or other agents of the state (*e.g.*, police, security forces, prison guards, and paramilitary groups).

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of government.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by top leaders of government. At the same time, leaders of government are not actively working to prevent it.

2: Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by top leaders of government.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by top government leaders.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. Torture is non-existent.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.2.3.24 Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2cltrnslw

*Original tag:* v2cltrnslw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner?

CLARIFICATION: This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land.

RESPONSES:

0: Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion.

1: Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion.

2: Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly created in a non-arbitrary fashion but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country.

3: Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

4: Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*

(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

## 2.2.4 V-Dem Indicators - Exclusion

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

#### **Exclusion:**

The following survey contains questions pertaining to exclusion. Political, economic and social well-being may depend on whether groups or individuals are excluded from positions of power, the state's protection of rights and freedoms, access to public goods and services, and opportunities to work or do business with the state.

Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

*Exclusion* is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. It is not necessary for all members of a group to be excluded in order for group-based exclusion to occur. Exclusion occurs even when only a single individual is excluded based on her or his identity or membership (perceived or actual) in a particular group.

*Political groups* are defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. A common form of partisan exclusion is when state services or regulations are implemented in a way that seeks to reward the incumbent's political supporters and punish non-supporters.

*Socio-Economic position* defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property. Exclusion of economic groups occurs when, for example, those who are not property owners are restricted from voting, or when fees associated with justice, health or education are set at a rate that is unaffordable for poorer individuals.

*Social group* is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood - by those residing within that society - to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant. Contrast Identity group.

*Geographic group* refers to those living in rural or urban areas. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer and there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54).

#### **2.2.4.1 Gender equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgenc1)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clgenc1

*Original tag:* v2clgenc1

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do women enjoy the same level of civil liberties as men?

CLARIFICATION: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Women enjoy much fewer civil liberties than men.

1: Women enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than men.

2: Women enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than men.

3: Women enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than men.

4: Women enjoy the same level of civil liberties as men.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.4.2 Urban-rural location equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgeocl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clgeocl

*Original tag:* v2clgeocl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do those who reside in rural areas enjoy same level of civil liberties as those residing in urban areas?

CLARIFICATION: This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across geographic areas. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road (World Development Report, 2009: 54). Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Those who live in rural areas enjoy much fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.

1: Those who live in rural areas enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.

2: Those who live in rural areas enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.

3: Those who live in rural areas enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.

4: Residents of rural areas enjoy the same level of civil liberties as those in urban areas.

5: Residents of rural areas enjoy more civil liberties than those in urban areas.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.4.3 Political group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clpolcl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2clpolcl

*Original tag:* v2clpolcl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do members of all political groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

CLARIFICATION: A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates that can be distinguished from others in terms of enjoyment of civil liberties. Responses should not reflect which party controls the legislature and executive. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Some political groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

1: Some political groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than other political groups.  
2: Some political groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than other political groups.  
3: Some political groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than other political groups.  
4: All political groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 9-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.4.4 Access to public services distributed by socio-economic position (v2peapsecon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peapsecon

*Original tag:* v2peapsecon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally according to socioeconomic position?

CLARIFICATION: This question asks if socio-economic position is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular socio-economic position, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a socio-economic group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.2.4.5 Access to public services distributed by gender (v2peapsgen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peapsgen

*Original tag:* v2peapsgen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr



**QUESTION:** Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally according to gender?

**CLARIFICATION:** This question asks if gender is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between gender, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that women are denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

**RESPONSES:**

0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75 percent (percent) or more of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25 percent (percent) or more of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because of their gender, less than 5 percent (percent) of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

**SCALE:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**DATA RELEASE:** 9-12.

**CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

**CITATION:** Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**YEARS:** 1900-2021

#### 2.2.4.6 Access to public services distributed by urban-rural location (v2peapsgeo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peapsgeo

*Original tag:* v2peapsgeo

*Description:*

**VARIABLE TYPE:** C

**PROJECT MANAGER(S):** Rachel Sigman

**ADDITIONAL VERSIONS:** \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

**QUESTION:** Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across urban and rural areas?

**CLARIFICATION:** Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54). This question asks if geographic group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between urban and rural areas, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a geographic group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

**RESPONSES:**

0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, only 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

5: Rural-Bias: Because they live in urban areas, 25percent or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.4.7 Access to public services distributed by political group (v2peapspol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peapspol

*Original tag:* v2peapspol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across political groups?

CLARIFICATION: A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. This question asks if political group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular political groups, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a political group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation 75 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation 25 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation only 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation less than 5 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.2.4.8 Access to public services distributed by social group (v2peapssoc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peapssoc

*Original tag:* v2peapssoc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across social groups?

CLARIFICATION: This question asks if social group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular social groups, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a social group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because of their social group, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group, only 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because of their social group, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.4.9 Access to state business opportunities by socio-economic position (v2peasbecon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peasbecon

*Original tag:* v2peasbecon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals regardless of socio-economic position?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Socio-economic position defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income makes 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income makes 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income makes 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income makes 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income makes less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*

(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.4.10 Access to state business opportunities by urban-rural location (v2peasbegeo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peasbegeo

*Original tag:* v2peasbegeo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of their rural or urban locations?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54)

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

5: Rural-Bias. Because they live in urban areas, 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.4.11 Access to state business opportunities by political group (v2peasbepol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peasbepol

*Original tag:* v2peasbepol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of an individual's association with a political group?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates that can be distinguished from others in terms of access to power. Responses should not reflect which party controls the legislature and executive.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.  
 1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.  
 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.  
 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.  
 4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack equal access to state business opportunities.  
 SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
 DATA RELEASE: 9-12.  
 CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).  
 CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
 YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.4.12 Access to state business opportunities by gender (v2peasbgen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peasbgen

*Original tag:* v2peasbgen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of gender?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75 percent (percent) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25 percent (percent) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of their gender, 5 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.4.13 Access to state business opportunities by social group (v2peasbsoc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peasbsoc

*Original tag:* v2peasbsoc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of social group?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.)

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of their social group, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of their social group, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.4.14 Access to state jobs by gender (v2peasjgen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peasjgen

*Original tag:* v2peasjgen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of gender?

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75 percent (percent) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25 percent (percent) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because of their gender, less than 5 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.4.15 Access to state jobs by urban-rural location (v2peasjgeo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peasjgeo

*Original tag:* v2peasjgeo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of their rural or urban location?

CLARIFICATION: Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54)

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, only 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

5: Rural-Bias. Because they live in urban areas, 25percent or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.2.4.16 Access to state jobs by political group (v2peasjpol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peasjpol

*Original tag:* v2peasjpol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of their association with a political group?

CLARIFICATION: A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.4.17 Access to state jobs by social group (v2peasjsoc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peasjsoc

*Original tag:* v2peasjsoc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of social group?

CLARIFICATION: Social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.)

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because of their social group identity, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group identity, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group identity, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because of their social group identity, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.4.18 Access to state jobs by socio-economic position (v2peasjsoecon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peasjsoecon

*Original tag:* v2peasjsoecon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of socio-economic position?

CLARIFICATION: Socio-economic position defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income, makes 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the



population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.2.4.19 Power distributed by urban-rural location (v2pepwrgeo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2pepwrgeo

*Original tag:* v2pepwrgeo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is political power distributed according to urban-rural location?

CLARIFICATION: Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54)

RESPONSES:

0: People living in urban areas have a near-monopoly on political power.

1: People living in urban areas have a dominant hold on political power. Those living in rural areas have only marginal influence.

2: People living in urban areas have much more political power but those living in rural areas have some areas of influence.

3: People living in urban areas have somewhat more political power than those living in rural areas.

4: People living in any area have roughly equal political power or people living in rural areas have more access to political power than those in urban areas.

5: People living in rural areas have much more political power but those living in urban areas have some areas of influence.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.5 V-Dem Indicators - Civil Society

##### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **Civil society organization:**

The following set of questions focus on civil society organizations (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but *not* businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

**Civil society organization – Historical clarification:** The following set of questions focus on civil society organizations (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but not businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

If no CSOs exist at all for a particular time period, code the following relevant questions as giving the "lowest score" (indicating, for instance, strong repression or no consultation, a 0).

**Religious organizations:** In this section, we ask two questions regarding religious organizations. These may be religiously inspired civil society organizations (CSOs) or organizations whose purpose is primarily spiritual.

#### 2.2.5.1 CSO anti-system movement character (v2csanmvch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2csanmvch

*Original tag:* v2csanmvch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you characterize the anti-system movement(s) identified in the previous question?

CLARIFICATION: Check all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Works through legal channels, for the most part. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_0]

1: Participates in elections. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_1]

2: Works through a mix of legal and extra-legal channels. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_2]

3: Insurrectionary. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_3]

4: Democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as willing to play by the rules of the democratic game, willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_4]

5: Anti-democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as unwilling to play by the rules of the democratic game, not willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and/or not willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_5]

6: Leftist, socialist, communist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_6]

7: Rightist, conservative, party of order. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_7]

8: Ethnolinguistic, tribe, kinship, clan. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_8]

9: Separatist or autonomist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_9]

10: Religious. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_10]

11: Paramilitary. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_11]

12: Heavily engaged in criminal activity, *e.g.*, narcotics, bootlegging, illegal exploitation of natural resources, extortion, kidnapping. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_12]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015 *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.5.2 CSO anti-system movements (v2csantimv)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2csantimv

*Original tag:* v2csantimv

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Among civil society organizations, are there anti-system opposition movements?  
CLARIFICATION: An anti-system opposition movement is any movement — peaceful or armed — that is based in the country (not abroad) and is organized in opposition to the current political system. That is, it aims to change the polity in fundamental ways, *e.g.*, from democratic to autocratic (or vice-versa), from capitalist to communist (or vice-versa), from secular to fundamentalist (or vice-versa). This movement may be linked to a political party that competes in elections but it must also have a "movement" character, which is to say a mass base and an existence separate from normal electoral competition.  
If there are several movements, please answer in a general way about the relationship of those movements to the regime.  
RESPONSES:  
0: No, or very minimal. Anti-system movements are practically nonexistent.  
1: There is only a low-level of anti-system movement activity but it does not pose much of a threat to the regime.  
2: There is a modest level of anti-system movement activity, posing some threat to the regime.  
3: There is a high level of anti-system movement activity, posing substantial threat to the regime.  
4: There is a very high level of anti-system movement activity, posing a real and present threat to the regime.  
ORDERING: If coded "0", skip the following questions focused on anti-system movements.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021  
CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.2.5.3 CSO consultation (v2cscnsult)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2cscnsult

*Original tag:* v2cscnsult

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies.  
1: To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.  
2: Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.5.4 CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2cseeorgs

*Original tag:* v2cseeorgs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?

RESPONSES:

0: Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes, or publicly commenting on public officials and policies are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity.

1: Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity.

2: Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expedience.

3: Minimal control. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, there exist constitutional provisions that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action in the past (*e.g.* the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and conditions of judicial independence.

4: Unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.5.5 CSO womens participation (v2csgender)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2csgender

*Original tag:* v2csgender

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

CLARIFICATION: Please pay attention to both (A) whether women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs) because of their gender and (B) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life.

RESPONSES:

0: Almost always.

1: Frequently.

2: About half the time.

3: Rarely.

4: Almost never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.5.6 CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2csprtcpt

*Original tag:* v2csprtcpt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

RESPONSES:

0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary.

1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them.

2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal.

3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.5.7 CSO repression (v2csreprss)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2csreprss

*Original tag:* v2csreprss

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)?

RESPONSES:

0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of CSOs. They seek not only to deter the activity of such groups but to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China.

1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in responses 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional CSOs who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property). Examples include Mugabe's Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law, Serbia under Milosevic.

2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in response 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s, the late Franco period in Spain.

3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Government Organized Movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. One example would be Singapore in the post-Yew phase or Putin's Russia.

4: No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: For reasons of consistency, as of December 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.2.5.8 Religious organization consultation (v2csrlgcon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2csrlgcon

*Original tag:* v2csrlgcon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are major religious organizations routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from input from religious organizations. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize religious organizations after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But typically, it does not consult with them in formulating policies.

1: To some degree. Religious organizations are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.

2: Yes. Important religious organizations are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.5.9 Religious organization repression (v2csrlgprep)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2csrlgprep

*Original tag:* v2csrlgrep

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government attempt to repress religious organizations?

RESPONSES:

0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of religious organizations. It seeks not only to deter the activity of such groups but also to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia and Maoist China.

1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional religious organizations who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property).

2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of religious civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar religious civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts.

3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new religious civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize parallel religious organizations to crowd out independent religious organizations.

4: No. Religious civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.5.10 CSO structure (v2csstruc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2csstruc

*Original tag:* v2csstruc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Civil societies inevitably involve a mix of larger and smaller organizations. Please characterize the relative influence of large mass constituency civil society organizations (CSOs) versus smaller, more local, or narrowly construed CSOs.

RESPONSES:

0: The state does not allow autonomous CSOs. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_0]

1: Large encompassing organizations dominate. The government and CSOs are linked formally through a corporatist system of interest intermediation; or, due to historical circumstances, particular large CSOs are highly influential. The voice of such organizations is recognized by the government and is accorded special weight by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_1]

2: Neither large encompassing nor small CSOs dominate. Influence is contingent on

circumstances. Organizations, both large and small, contend with one another to have their voice considered by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_2]  
3: Small CSOs dominate. Many small organizations contend with one another to have their voices heard by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_3]  
SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.  
CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

## 2.2.6 V-Dem Indicators - Deliberation

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

#### **Deliberation:**

The following questions address the deliberative or non-deliberative nature of a country's politics, with particular focus on elite levels. Some of these questions focus on the quality of discourse and others focus on public policies.

#### **2.2.6.1 Common good (v2dlcommon)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2dlcommon

*Original tag:* v2dlcommon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?

CLARIFICATION: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

RESPONSES:

0: Little or no justification in terms of the common good is usually offered.

1: Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part offered as justifications.

2: Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other.

3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests and on appeals to the common good.

4: Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping the least advantaged in a society.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.2.6.2 Range of consultation (v2dlconslt)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2dlconslt

*Original tag:* v2dlconslt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr



QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at *elite levels*?

CLARIFICATION: Because practices vary greatly from policy to policy, base your answer on the style that is most typical of policymaking.

RESPONSES:

0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (*e.g.* military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own.

1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites.

2: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such as the ruling party's or parties' local executives and/or women, youth and other branches.

3: Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties.

4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives.

5: Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.6.3 Respect counterarguments (v2dlcountr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2dlcountr

*Original tag:* v2dlcountr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?

CLARIFICATION: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

RESPONSES:

0: Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished.

1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored.

2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them.

3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them.

4: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they ultimately reject them for the most part.

5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently also even accept them and change their position.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 2.2.6.4 Particularistic or public goods (v2dlencmps)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2dlencmps

*Original tag:* v2dlencmps

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how "particularistic" or "public goods" are most expenditures?

CLARIFICATION: Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as "pork", "clientelistic", or "private goods."

Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-test are allowed to receive the benefit.

Your answer should consider the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending. We are interested in the relative value of particularistic and public-goods spending, not the number of bills or programs that fall into either category.

RESPONSES:

0: Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic.

1: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (*e.g.* 1/4 or 1/3) is public-goods.

2: Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs.

3: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion (*e.g.*, 1/4 or 1/3) is particularistic.

4: Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.6.5 Engaged society (v2dlengage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2dlengage

*Original tag:* v2dlengage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?

CLARIFICATION: This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media.

RESPONSES:

0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.

1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.

2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.

3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.

4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.

5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies

among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.6.6 Reasoned justification (v2dlreason)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2dlreason

*Original tag:* v2dlreason

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, *i.e.* before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?

CLARIFICATION: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

RESPONSES:

0: No justification. Elites almost always only dictate that something should or should not be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, "We must cut spending."

1: Inferior justification. Elites tend to give reasons why someone should or should not be for doing or not doing something, but the reasons tend to be illogical or false, although they may appeal to many voters. For example, "We must cut spending. The state is inefficient." [The inference is incomplete because addressing inefficiencies would not necessarily reduce spending and it might undermine essential services.]

2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current programs."

3: Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex, nuanced and complete justification. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurt economic growth, and deficit spending would lead to inflation."

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.6.7 Means-tested vs. universalistic (v2dlunivl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2dlunivl

*Original tag:* v2dlunivl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity?

CLARIFICATION: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested.

A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these programs (*e.g.*, when people with higher salaries get higher unemployment benefits). The key point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary, or potential beneficiary.

The purpose of this question is not to gauge the size of the welfare state but rather its quality. So, your answer should be based on whatever programs exist.

RESPONSES:

0: There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health, retirement, unemployment, poverty programs).

1: Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested.

2: Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion (*e.g.* 1/4 or 1/3) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population.

3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic.

4: Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion (*e.g.*, 1/4 or 1/3) are means-tested.

5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is means-tested.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

## 2.2.7 V-Dem Indicators - Elections

**Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys) Elections:** Among national elections we distinguish elections to: (i) the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature (including constituent or constitutional assemblies), (ii) the upper chamber of the legislature, and (iii) the presidency. For present purposes an executive who is elected by a legislature is considered a *prime minister*, not a president. In order to be considered a *president*, an executive must, under ordinary circumstances, be chosen directly by the electorate (perhaps mediated by an electoral college).

**Non-election specific coding:** The following questions are not election-specific and should be coded for every year from 1900 (or when applicable) to the present.

**Election specific questions:** The following questions pertain to specific national elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date. If you have coded for V-Dem in the past, your previous scores will be displayed in the survey. You are welcome to revise previously submitted scores in all surveys. For this section, we kindly ask you make sure that you have coded all election years.

**Election specific questions – Historical clarification:** The following questions pertain to specific national elections. National elections include elections to the presidency (if applicable) and legislature (lower and upper house, whatever applies), whether direct or indirect, as well as constituent assembly elections. It does not include other elections, *e.g.*, subnational elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referendums, or by-elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date."

**Subnational elections and offices:** This section of the survey asks a small number of questions about *subnational* elections and offices. You will be instructed to identify two subnational levels, referred to as "regional government" and "local government". Questions in this section should be answered for every year, rather than for specific elections.

**Lower chamber election:** The following questions pertain to specific lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections. The dates of these elections have been pre-coded.

### Executive and legislative versions of Election specific variables

- In order to subset election specific variables for executive elections only (previously `*_ex`) – keep only those observations where `v2xel_elecpres` is 1.
- In order to subset election specific variables for legislative elections only (previously `*_leg`) – keep only those observations where `v2xel_elecparl` is 1.

#### **2.2.7.1 Election losers accept results (v2elaccept)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elaccept

*Original tag:* v2elaccept

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: `*_osp`, `*_ord`, `*_codelow`, `*_codehigh`, `*_sd`, `*_mean`, `*_nr`

QUESTION: Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this national election within three months?

RESPONSES:

0: None. None of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results the election, or all opposition was banned.

1: A few. Some but not all losing parties or candidates accepted the results but those who constituted the main opposition force did not.

2: Some. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results but it is unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively insignificant.

3: Most. Many but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results and those who did not had little electoral support.

4: All. All parties and candidates accepted the results.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.2.7.2 Election assume office (v2elasmoff)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elasmoff

*Original tag:* v2elasmoff

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: `*_osp`, `*_ord`, `*_codelow`, `*_codehigh`, `*_sd`, `*_mean`, `*_nr`

QUESTION: Following this national election, did winners assume office according to prescribed constitutional rules and norms?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The official winner of the election was prevented from assuming office by *unconstitutional* means.

1: Partially. The official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter was forced at least in part by unconstitutional means to share power, or delay assuming power for more than 6 months.

2: Yes. Constitutional rules and norms were followed and the official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter assumed office accordingly (or continued in office).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: The question text between contemporary and historical differ in inclusion of "within 12 months of the election". In contemporary it is excluded while included in historical.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

*V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.7.3 Election boycotts (v2elboycot)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elboycot

*Original tag:* v2elboycot

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, did any registered opposition candidates or parties boycott?

CLARIFICATION: A boycott is a deliberate and public refusal to participate in an election by a candidate or party who is eligible to participate.

RESPONSES:

0: Total. All opposition parties and candidates boycotted the election.

1: Significant. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but they constituted a major opposition force.

2: Ambiguous. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but it is unclear whether they would have constituted a major electoral force.

3: Minor. A few opposition parties or candidates boycotted and they were relatively insignificant ones.

4: Nonexistent. No parties or candidates boycotted the elections.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.7.4 Disclosure of campaign donations (v2eldonate)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2eldonate

*Original tag:* v2eldonate

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are there disclosure requirements for donations to national election campaigns?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There are no disclosure requirements.

1: Not really. There are some, possibly partial, disclosure requirements in place but they are not observed or enforced most of the time.

2: Ambiguous. There are disclosure requirements in place, but it is unclear to what extent they are observed or enforced.

3: Mostly. The disclosure requirements may not be fully comprehensive (some donations not covered), but most existing arrangements are observed and enforced.

4: Yes. There are comprehensive requirements and they are observed and enforced almost all the time.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

*V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.2.7.5 EMB autonomy (v2elembaut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elembaut

*Original tag:* v2elembaut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?

CLARIFICATION: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

RESPONSES:

0: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other *de facto* ruling body.

1: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the *de facto* ruling body.

2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election.

3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the *de facto* ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections.

4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.7.6 EMB capacity (v2elembcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elembcap

*Original tag:* v2elembcap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election?

CLARIFICATION: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

RESPONSES:

0: No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the organization across the territory.

1: Not really. Deficits are not glaring but they nonetheless seriously compromised the organization of administratively well-run elections in many parts of the country.

2: Ambiguous. There might be serious deficiencies compromising the organization of the election but it could also be a product of human errors and co-incidence or other factors

outside the control of the EMB.

3: Mostly. There are partial deficits in resources but these are neither serious nor widespread.

4: Yes. The EMB has adequate staff and other resources to administer a well-run election.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 2.2.7.7 Subnational elections free and fair (v2elffelr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elffelr

*Original tag:* v2elffelr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider subnational elections (regional and local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average?

CLARIFICATION: This question refers to subnational levels that have elected offices and elections. It does not refer to subnational levels without elected offices and elections. If there were no subnational elections in any of the years covered in this survey, choose option 5.

"Free and fair" refers to all aspects of the election process *except* the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (we measure that issue separately).

RESPONSES:

0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (who won office).

1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the elections (who won office).

2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (who won office).

3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (who won office).

4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: As of December 2014, the former category "5" is recoded as a separate variable (v2elffelrbin).

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2elffelrbin\_ord is 0.

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.7.8 Subnational elections held (v2elffelrbin)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elffelrbin

*Original tag:* v2elffelrbin

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C



PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Are subnational elections held?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
NOTES: As of December 2014, the former category "5" from variable v2elffelrbin is recoded as a separate variable (v2elffelrbin). If a coder chose the 5th category in the original question, it receives 0 in the new "v2elffelrbin" variable (corresponding to the answer, no, there were no subnational elections); otherwise it receives 1 (yes, there are subnational elections held). The resulting series of 0-1 country-coder time-series is run in the measurement model, which calculates the final value of v2elffelrbin while taking into account background coder characteristics.  
DATA RELEASE: 3-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.7.9 Election free campaign media (v2elfrcamp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elfrcamp

*Original tag:* v2elfrcamp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: In this national election, did parties or candidates receive either free or publicly financed access to national broadcast media?  
RESPONSES:  
0: Either no parties or only the governing party receives free access.  
1: Some parties in addition to the governing party receive free access.  
2: All parties receive free access.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.7.10 Election free and fair (v2elfrfair)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elfrfair

*Original tag:* v2elfrfair

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?  
CLARIFICATION: The only thing that should *not* be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately).  
RESPONSES:

0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (*i.e.*, who became president; or who won the legislative majority).

1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (*i.e.*, who became president; or who won the legislative majority).

2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above).

3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above).

4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.7.11 Election government intimidation (v2elintim)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elintim

*Original tag:* v2elintim

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents?

CLARIFICATION: Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should *not* be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately).

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet.

1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period.

2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated — harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents.

3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups.

4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.7.12 Election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elirreg

*Original tag:* v2elirreg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was there evidence of other *intentional* irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud?

CLARIFICATION: Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions).

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country.

2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups.

3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups' access to participation.

4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.7.13 Local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2ellocpwr

*Original tag:* v2ellocpwr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the local level?

CLARIFICATION: We are concerned with the relative power of local offices to *each other*, not the power of local offices relative to higher levels of government.

Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, *not* those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)

An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

RESPONSES:

0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.

1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.

2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local level.

3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.

4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

*V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2ellocgov is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.7.14 Elections multiparty (v2elmulpar)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elmulpar

*Original tag:* v2elmulpar

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Was this national election multiparty?

RESPONSES:

0: No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few parties are legal but they are all *de facto* controlled by the dominant party).

1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency.

2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained — legally or informally.

3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (*de jure* or *de facto*) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory.

4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (*e.g.* far-right/left extremist parties, anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.7.15 Election paid interest group media (v2elpaidig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elpaidig

*Original tag:* v2elpaidig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this election, were interest groups and individuals able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor groups allied with the government.

2: It is permitted without limit.

3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster representation of diverse perspectives.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.2.7.16 Election paid campaign advertisements (v2elpdcamp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elpdcamp

*Original tag:* v2elpdcamp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, were parties or candidates able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor the government and its allies.

2: It is permitted without limit.

3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster fair competition.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.2.7.17 Election other electoral violence (v2elpeace)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elpeace

*Original tag:* v2elpeace

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types (*not* by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees.

1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily.

2: Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small.

3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured.

4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.2.7.18 Public campaign finance (v2elpubfin)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elpubfin

*Original tag:* v2elpubfin

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is significant public financing available for parties' and/or candidates' campaigns for national office?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Public financing is not available.

1: Little. There is public financing but it is so small or so restricted that it plays a minor role in most parties' campaigns.

2: Ambiguous. There is some public financing available but it is unclear whether it plays a significant role for parties.

3: Partly. Public financing plays a significant role in the campaigns of many parties.

4: Yes. Public financing funds a significant share of expenditures by all, or nearly all parties.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.2.7.19 Regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elrgpwr

*Original tag:* v2elrgpwr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the regional level?

CLARIFICATION: We are concerned with the relative power of regional offices to each other, *not* the power of regional offices relative to higher or lower levels of government.

Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, *not* those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)

An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

RESPONSES:

0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.

1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.

2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the regional level.  
3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.  
4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CLEANING: Set to missing when v2elreggov is 0  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.7.20 Election voter registry (v2elrgstry)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elrgstry

*Original tag:* v2elrgstry

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There was no registry, or the registry was not used.

1: No. There was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20percent or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised or the outcome could have been affected significantly by double-voting and impersonation).

2: Uncertain. There was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes.

3: Yes, somewhat. The registry was imperfect but less than 10percent of eligible voters may have been disenfranchised, and double-voting and impersonation could not have affected the results significantly.

4: Yes. The voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 1percent of voters were affected by any flaws) and it was applied in a reasonable fashion.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.7.21 Subnational election area less free and fair characteristics (v2elsnlfc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elsnlfc

*Original tag:* v2elsnlfc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *less* free and fair?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_0]

1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_1]

2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_2]

3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_3]  
4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_4]  
5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_5]  
6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_6]  
7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_7]  
8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_8]  
9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_9]  
10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_10]  
11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_11]  
12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_12]  
13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_13]  
14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_14]  
15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_15]  
16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_16]  
17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_17]  
18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_18]  
19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_19]  
20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_20]  
21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_21]  
SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.  
ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple selection.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.7.22 Subnational election unevenness (v2elsnlsff)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elsnlsff

*Original tag:* v2elsnlsff

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the freeness and fairness of subnational elections vary across different areas of the country?

CLARIFICATION: Subnational elections refer to elections to regional or local offices, as specified above.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are significantly more free and fair (or, alternatively, significantly less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.

1: Somewhat. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are somewhat more free and fair (or, alternatively, somewhat less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.

2: No. Subnational elections in most or all areas of the country are equally free and fair (or, alternatively, equally not free and not fair).

ORDERING: If answer is "2", skip remaining questions in this section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021



### 2.2.7.23 Subnational election area more free and fair characteristics (v2elsnmrfc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elsnmrfc

*Original tag:* v2elsnmrfc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *more* free and fair?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_0]

1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_1]

2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_2]

3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_3]

4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_4]

5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_5]

6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_6]

7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_7]

8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_8]

9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_9]

10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_10]

11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_11]

12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_12]

13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_13]

14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_14]

15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_15]

16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_16]

17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_17]

18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_18]

19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_19]

20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_20]

21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_21]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.2.7.24 Election vote buying (v2elvotbuy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2elvotbuy

*Original tag:* v2elvotbuy

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?

CLARIFICATION: Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, *i.e.*, "porkbarrel" legislation.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties.

2: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an 'entry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded.

3: Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.

4: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

## 2.2.8 V-Dem Indicators - The Executive

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

#### **Executive:**

In this section, we distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG). The *head of state* is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. Sometimes this is a largely ceremonial role, *e.g.* a monarch who reigns but does not rule, or a president whose powers are strictly circumscribed. The *head of government* is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government, typically presiding over a cabinet. In a parliamentary system, this is usually the prime minister. In a presidential system, this is usually the president, who then serves as both, head of state and head of government. In a typical semi-presidential system, the president serves as head of state and the prime minister serves as head of government.

These definitions are grounded in the *functions* that each office performs, as described above. Titles can be confusing. Do not assume, for example, that simply because an individual holds the title of "president" s/he is serving as the chief public representative of the country. Likewise, it may be that the *effective* head of state/head of government is someone other than the *official* head of state/head of government. In this instance, the following questions apply to the person who effectively wields this power. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of state was a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country was the chairman of the communist party. It is the latter who is the "effective" head of state, and hence should be the focus of your answers. The same applies if the head of state/head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else. It is the latter person who is the effective head of state/head of government.

If you are considering a semi sovereign territory, such as a colony, an annexed territory or a member of the British Commonwealth, please answer the following questions with respect to the head of state and (if separate) the head of government who is located in the territory in question. Thus, in a typical British colony the governor-general—not the King/Queen of England—would be understood as the head of state. Likewise, in a British colony the local prime minister in the colony—not the prime minister in London—would be understood as the head of government.

In order to mitigate potential misunderstandings, the identities of the head of state and head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, "HOS name." This is your key to what we mean by "head of state" or "head of government."

Note also that when the two functions are fused in the same office, we ask you to code only the head of state section of the survey. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that

either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the precoded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your V-Dem contact. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question.

In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days.

#### 2.2.8.1 Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exbribe

*Original tag:* v2exbribe

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

RESPONSES:

0: It is routine and expected.

1: It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive.

2: It happens but is unpredictable: those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be necessary.

3: It happens occasionally but is not expected.

4: It never, or hardly ever, happens.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.8.2 Public sector corrupt exchanges (v2excrptps)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2excrptps

*Original tag:* v2excrptps

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

CLARIFICATION: When responding to this question, we would like to you think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time.

1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees.

2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times.

3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from

time to time.

4: No. Never, or hardly ever.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.8.3 HOG control over (v2exctlhg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exctlhg

*Original tag:* v2exctlhg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, from which of the following bodies does the head of government customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply. In case the HOG does not have the power to make important decisions on domestic policy, select 0 (None).

RESPONSES:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_4]

5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_5]

6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_6]

7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_7]

8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_8]

ORDERING: If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhog]. If you select 0-7, skip to question HOG dissolution in practice [v2exdjdshg].

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.8.4 HOS control over (v2exctlhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exctlhs

*Original tag:* v2exctlhs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, from which of the following bodies must the head of state customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply. In case the HOS does not have the power to make important decisions on domestic policy, select 0 (None).

RESPONSES:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_2]  
3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_3]  
4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_4]  
5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_5]  
6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_6]  
7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_7]  
ORDERING: If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhos]. If you select 0-6, skip to question "HOS dissolution in practice" [v2exdfdshs].  
SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.  
ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.8.5 HOS appoints cabinet in practice (v2exdfcbhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exdfcbhs

*Original tag:* v2exdfcbhs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the head of state have the power to appoint — or is the approval of the head of state necessary for the appointment of — cabinet ministers?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOS controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet, and only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

2: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

3: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet.

4: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.8.6 HOS dismisses ministers in practice (v2exdfdmhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exdfdmhs

*Original tag:* v2exdfdmhs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of state took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold

this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (*e.g.*, vote of no confidence).

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of state proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, *i.e.*, so called "constructive dismissal").

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.8.7 HOG dismisses ministers in practice (v2exdfdshg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exdfdshg

*Original tag:* v2exdfdshg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of government took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (*e.g.*, vote of no confidence).

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of government proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, *i.e.*, so called "constructive dismissal").

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.8.8 HOS dissolution in practice (v2exdfdshs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exdfdshs

*Original tag:* v2exdfdshs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of state took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. By "dissolving the legislature" we refer to the ability of the head of state to call a new election for the legislature.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as "once a year", by time point within term, such as "not within the last sixth months of the head of state's term", and by the requirement that the head of state must then himself/herself stand for election).

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.8.9 HOG proposes legislation in practice (v2exdfpphg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exdfpphg

*Original tag:* v2exdfpphg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the head of government have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

CLARIFICATION: By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).

1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.

2: No. The head of government cannot propose legislation.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 2.2.8.10 HOS proposes legislation in practice (v2exdfpphs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exdfpphs

*Original tag:* v2exdfpchs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the head of state have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

CLARIFICATION: By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).

1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.

2: No. The head of state cannot propose legislation.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.2.8.11 HOG veto power in practice (v2exdfvthg)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exdfvthg

*Original tag:* v2exdfvthg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of government took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: By "veto", we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).

2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).

3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority — *e.g.*, 2/3 or 3/4 — of those voting).

4: Yes, with no possibility of override.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.2.8.12 HOS veto power in practice (v2exdfvths)**



*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exdfvths

*Original tag:* v2exdfvths

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of state took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: By "veto", we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).

2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).

3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority — *e.g.*, 2/3 or 3/4 — of those voting).

4: Yes, with no possibility of override.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.8.13 HOG appoints cabinet in practice (v2exdjcbhg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exdjcbhg

*Original tag:* v2exdjcbhg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the head of government have the power to appoint — or is the approval of the head of government necessary for the appointment of — cabinet ministers?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOG controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

2: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.8.14 HOG dissolution in practice (v2exdjdshg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exdjdshg

*Original tag:* v2exdjdshg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of government took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. By "dissolving the legislature" we refer to the ability of the head of government to call a new election for the legislature.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as "once a year", by time point within term, such as "not within the last sixth months of the head of government's term", and by the requirement that the head of government must then himself/herself stand for election).

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.8.15 Executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembez)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exembez

*Original tag:* v2exembez

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

RESPONSES:

0: Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.

1: Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.

2: About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.

3: Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.

4: Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

*V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.2.8.16 HOG removal by legislature in practice (v2exremhog)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exremhog

*Original tag:* v2exremhog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of government from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity *and* without the involvement of any other agency?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

RESPONSES:

0: No, under no circumstances.

1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.

2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.

3: Yes, most likely.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.2.8.17 HOS removal by legislature in practice (v2exremhsp)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exremhsp

*Original tag:* v2exremhsp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of state from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity *and* without the involvement of any other agency?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

RESPONSES:

0: No, under no circumstances.

1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.

2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.

3: Yes, most likely.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.2.8.18 Executive respects constitution (v2exrescon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exrescon

*Original tag:* v2exrescon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution?

RESPONSES:

0: Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences.

1: Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but still must respect certain provisions.

2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution, but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences.

3: Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution, and when it happens they face legal charges.

4: Members of the executive never violate the constitution.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.8.19 HOG removal by other in practice (v2exrmhgnp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exrmhgnp

*Original tag:* v2exrmhgnp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of government if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_4]

5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_5]

6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_6]

7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_7]

8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_8]

ORDERING: If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exrmhgop]. If you select 0-7, skip to question HOG control [v2exctlhg].

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple selection

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.8.20 HOS removal by other in practice (v2exrmhsol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exrmhsol

*Original tag:* v2exrmhsol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of state if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_4]

5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_5]

6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_6]

7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_7]

ORDERING: If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exrmhsnl]. If you select 0-6, skip to question "HOS dissolution in practice" [v2exctlhs].

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.8.21 Public sector theft (v2exthftps)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exthftps

*Original tag:* v2exthftps

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

CLARIFICATION: When responding to this question, we would like you to think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

RESPONSES:

0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.  
1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.  
2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.  
3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.  
4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.8.22 Strongest anti-regime preferences (v2regantireg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2regantireg

*Original tag:* v2regantireg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which (one) group has the strongest anti-regime preferences/antipathy against the current regime, irrespective of the group's resources and capabilities for affecting the regime's hold on power?

CLARIFICATION: Consider only the anti-regime preferences of the actors in this group, and do not take into consideration the abilities of this group to actually affect regime survival and change. Hence, the group with the strongest anti-regime preferences need not be the most important opposition group. Both capable and incapable political actors may have strong anti-regime preferences and want to see the regime removed from power. We also remind that the group needs not be currently mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; individuals may strongly resent a regime, without taking particular actions, in a given year.

One way to think about what pro-/anti-regime preferences mean, independently of ability to affect regime survival is: what would individuals hypothetically (honestly) answer if asked in a survey: "On a scale from 0-10, how pleased are you with the current political regime".

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes

11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).  
12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)  
13: A foreign government or colonial power.  
DATA RELEASE: 11-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.  
"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regoppgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.  
CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2020  
DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.2.8.23 Regime most important support group (v2regimpgroup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2regimpgroup

*Original tag:* v2regimpgroup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Which (one) group does the current political regime rely on most strongly in order to maintain power?  
CLARIFICATION: Choose the group that, if it were to retract its support to the regime, would most endanger the regime (most strongly increase the chance that it loses power).  
RESPONSES:  
0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.  
1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.  
2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).  
3: Business elites.  
4: Civil servants.  
5: The military.  
6: An ethnic or racial group(s).  
7: A religious group(s).  
8: Local elites, including chiefs.  
9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.  
10: Urban middle classes  
11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).  
12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)  
13: A foreign government or colonial power.  
DATA RELEASE: 9-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.  
"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.  
CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2020  
DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.2.8.24 Regime most important opposition group (v2regimpoppgroup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2regimpoppgroup

*Original tag:* v2regimpoppgroup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Which (one) group constitutes the greatest threat to the current regime?  
CLARIFICATION: Choose the one group (among those you registered as opposition groups

under the v2regoppgroups question) that is the most dangerous threat to the regime in a given year. That is, the group that could most strongly increase the chance that the regime loses power. The importance/danger associated with an opposition group will be affected both by its level of hostility towards the regime and its power resources/how capable it is of removing the regime should it try to do so. We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).

3: Business elites.

4: Civil servants.

5: The military.

6: An ethnic or racial group(s).

7: A religious group(s).

8: Local elites, including chiefs.

9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.

10: Urban middle classes

11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).

12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)

13: A foreign government or colonial power.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regoppgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.2.8.25 Regime opposition groups (v2regoppgroups)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2regoppgroups

*Original tag:* v2regoppgroups

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which groups include noteworthy opposition actors – that is, individuals (mobilized or not) who both want to and who could, under favorable circumstances, be able to remove the existing political regime?(Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: Consider which group(s) include a significant share of individuals who both oppose the regime and pose a non-negligible threat to the regime (either mobilized or dormant). In other words, these individuals must both want to see the regime removed and, at least under hypothetical “favorable conditions”, be capable of removing the regime. Groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; opposition groups also include individuals who oppose the regime without taking particular actions, at the moment. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.  
[v2regoppgroups\_0]



1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regoppgroups\_1]  
2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regoppgroups\_2]  
3: Business elites. [v2regoppgroups\_3]  
4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regoppgroups\_4]  
5: The military. [v2regoppgroups\_5]  
6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regoppgroups\_6]  
7: A religious group(s). [v2regoppgroups\_7]  
8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regoppgroups\_8]  
9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regoppgroups\_9]  
10: Urban middle classes. [v2regoppgroups\_10]  
11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regoppgroups\_11]  
12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regoppgroups\_12]  
13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regoppgroups\_13]  
SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.  
ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.  
DATA RELEASE: 11-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.  
CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2020  
DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.2.8.26 Explicit and active regime opposition groups (v2regoppgroupsact)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2regoppgroupsact

*Original tag:* v2regoppgroupsact

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sirianne Dahlum, Tore Wig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which (if any) groups include a significant share of individuals who explicitly and actively mobilize against the regime in a particular year? (Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: Consider which group(s) include a significant share of individuals who engage in active and explicit opposition to the regime to promote its removal. These actors make explicit statements of dissent from the regime, publicly voice their preference for regime change, and may possibly engage in other actions intended to further the removal of the regime such as anti-regime demonstrations, sit-ins, boycotts, strikes, the formation of anti-system parties, acts of sabotage, or armed rebellion. Please note that only years when anti-regime speech or activity occurs should be coded. In years when groups probably oppose the regime, but are not engaged in any explicit acts of opposition, the group should not be selected. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regoppgroupsact\_0]

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regoppgroupsact\_1]

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regoppgroupsact\_2]

3: Business elites. [v2regoppgroupsact\_3]

4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regoppgroupsact\_4]

5: The military. [v2regoppgroupsact\_5]

6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regoppgroupsact\_6]

7: A religious group(s). [v2regoppgroupsact\_7]

8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regoppgroupsact\_8]

9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regoppgroupsact\_9]

10: Urban middle classes. [v2regoppgroupsact\_10]  
11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regoppgroupsact\_11]  
12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regoppgroupsact\_12]  
13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regoppgroupsact\_13]  
SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.  
ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.  
DATA RELEASE: 11-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.  
CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2020  
DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.2.8.27 Regime opposition groups size (v2regoppgroupssize)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2regoppgroupssize

*Original tag:* v2regoppgroupssize

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In total, how large is the share of the domestic adult (18+) population that are noteworthy opposition actors to the current political regime?

CLARIFICATION: Consider the sum total of all the groups (excepting foreign governments and colonial powers) entered in v2regoppgroups. Hence, your answer should take into account the total size/number of the actors that oppose the regime and pose a threat to the regime maintaining power.

We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year.

Regarding the issue of individuals potentially belonging to more than one “opposition group”: Individuals should only be “counted” once for the purpose of this question. For example, if the two relevant opposition groups are (4) civil servants, which total about 5percent of the population, and all of them belong to a particular ethnic group (6) also coded as a relevant, the overall total size of the opposition groups is still 5percent (presuming that there are no other members of that ethnic group who oppose the regime).

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely small (About 1 percent of the population or less)

1: Very small (Between 1 percent and 5 percent of the population)

2: Small (Between 5 percent and 15 percent)

3: Moderate (Between 15 percent and 30 percent)

4: Large (More than 30 percent)

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.2.8.28 Regime opposition location (v2regopploc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2regopploc

*Original tag:* v2regopploc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: In which geographic area do groups opposing the current political regime mainly reside?

CLARIFICATION: You should consider the groups entered in v2regoppgroups, hence groups that both want to see the regime removed and (at least under “favorable conditions”) are capable of removing the regime. We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

0: Abroad.

1: In the capital.

2: In urban areas outside the capital.

3: In rural areas.

4: The groups are not concentrated in any particular area.

SCALE: Nominal

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories receive the value 4.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.2.8.29 Most powerful group in affecting regime duration and change (v2regpower)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2regpower

*Original tag:* v2regpower

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Irrespective of its stance toward the regime (pro-, anti-, or neutral), which one group is the most important for affecting the current regime's chances of staying in power?

CLARIFICATION: Here we ask you to disregard group preferences, and only consider a group's resources and capabilities vis-a-vis affecting regime survival. In other words, do not consider whether this group is pro-regime, anti-regime, or neutral to the regime. Take only into consideration the capabilities of this group to affect regime survival, if key members of the group were to hypothetically mobilize the group in an effort to remove the regime. Politically neutral, as well as pro- and anti-regime groups, may have ample resources and be capable of organizing coordinated action. As a result, all three types of groups may have great influence over regime survival and change.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).

- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.2.8.30 Strongest pro-regime preferences (v2regproreg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2regproreg

*Original tag:* v2regproreg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which (one) group has the strongest pro-regime preferences, irrespective of the group's resources and capabilities for affecting the regime's hold on power?

CLARIFICATION: Consider only the pro-regime preferences of individuals in this group, and do not take into consideration the abilities of this group to actually affect regime survival. Hence, the group with the strongest pro-regime preferences need not be the most important support group.

One way to think about what pro-/anti-regime preferences means is: what would individuals hypothetically (honestly) answer if asked in a survey: "On a scale from 0-10, how pleased are you with the current political regime, with 10 indicating the strongest support." Select the group with the highest average score in this hypothetical survey.

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.2.8.31 Regime support groups (v2regsupgroups)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2regsupgroups

*Original tag:* v2regsupgroups

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which groups does the current political regime rely on in order to maintain power? (Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: Consider which group(s) is supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regsupgroups\_0]

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regsupgroups\_1]

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regsupgroups\_2]

3: Business elites. [v2regsupgroups\_3]

4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regsupgroups\_4]

5: The military. [v2regsupgroups\_5]

6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regsupgroups\_6]

7: A religious group(s). [v2regsupgroups\_7]

8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regsupgroups\_8]

9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regsupgroups\_9]

10: Urban middle classes. [v2regsupgroups\_10]

11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regsupgroups\_11]

12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regsupgroups\_12]

13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regsupgroups\_13]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.2.8.32 Regime support groups size (v2regsupgroupssize)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2regsupgroupssize

*Original tag:* v2regsupgroupssize

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In total, how large is the percentage share of the domestic adult (18+) population that belongs to the political regime's supporting groups?

CLARIFICATION: You should consider the sum of all the groups (excepting foreign governments and colonial powers) entered in v2regsupgroups. Hence, your answer should take

into account the total size of the/those groups that are supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power. Regarding the issue of overlapping identities, and one individual potentially belonging to more than one groups: Individuals should only be "counted" once; thus if the two relevant supporting groups are (4) civil servants, which total about 5percent, and all of them belong to a particular ethnic group (6) also coded as a relevant, the overall total size of the supporting groups is still 5percent (presuming that no other members of that ethnic group are essential for the regime staying in power).

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely small

(About 1 percent of the population or less; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — a handful of higher-rank military officers, or by only a royal council and a few hundred landowners)

1: Very small

(Between 1 percent and 5 percent of the population; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — higher ranking civil servants and the military, or by moderately sized business and agrarian elites)

2: Small

(Between 5 percent and 15 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — relatively small ethnic groups, or by urban elites and the urban middle classes in predominantly rural societies)

3: Moderate

(Between 15 percent and 30 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — moderately sized ethnic groups, by rural middle classes in rural societies, or by urban middle classes in urban societies)

4: Large

(More than 30 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — large ethnic groups (and then not only the elites/leaders of such groups), or by rural working classes in rural societies.)

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.2.8.33 Regime support location (v2regsuploc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2regsuploc

*Original tag:* v2regsuploc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: In which geographic area do the support groups for the current political regime mainly reside?

RESPONSES:

0: Abroad.

1: In the capital.

2: In urban areas outside the capital.

3: In rural areas.

4: The groups are not concentrated in any particular area.

SCALE: Nominal

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories receive the value 4.  
CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.  
CITATION: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2020  
DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

## 2.2.9 V-Dem Indicators - Legitimation

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

#### **Legitimation strategies:**

Governments make legitimacy claims—provide justifications for the form of rule under which they govern. In the following section we are interested in the nature of the legitimacy claims made by the sitting government. Please note that the government's claims to legitimacy - their legitimation strategies - are the object of inquiry here. We are not asking you to assess how ordinary people judge the legitimacy of their rulers. Do not assume that governments make legitimacy claims on only one basis. We are interested in multi-track and hybrid legitimation strategies. The regime is understood as a set of formal and/or informal rules that govern the choice of political leaders and their exercise of power. The government is understood as the chief executive along with the cabinet, ministries, and top civil servants.

#### **2.2.9.1 Ideology (v2exl\_legitideol)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exl\_legitideol

*Original tag:* v2exl\_legitideol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the current government promote a specific ideology or societal model (an officially codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular set of social, political, and economic relations; for example, socialism, nationalism, religious traditionalism, etc.) in order to justify the regime in place?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: To a small extent.

2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.

3: To a large extent but not exclusively.

4: Almost exclusively.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.2.9.2 Ideology character (v2exl\_legitideolcr)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exl\_legitideolcr

*Original tag:* v2exl\_legitideolcr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you characterize the ideology/ideologies identified in the previous question?

CLARIFICATION: Check all that apply.

RESPONSES:

- 0: Nationalist (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_0]
- 1: Socialist or communist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_1]
- 2: Restorative or conservative. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_2]
- 3: Separatist or autonomist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_3]
- 4: Religious. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_4]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.2.9.3 Person of the leader (v2exl\_legitlead)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exl\_legitlead

*Original tag:* v2exl\_legitlead

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent is the Chief Executive portrayed as being endowed with extraordinary personal characteristics and/or leadership skills (e.g. as father or mother of the nation, exceptionally heroic, moral, pious, or wise, or any other extraordinary attribute valued by the society)?

CLARIFICATION: The Chief Executive refers to the Head of State or the Head of Government, depending on the relative power of each office. We are interested in the key leadership figure.

RESPONSES:

- 0: Not at all.
- 1: To a small extent.
- 2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.
- 3: To a large extent but not exclusively.
- 4: Almost exclusively.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.2.9.4 Performance legitimization (v2exl\_legitperf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exl\_legitperf

*Original tag:* v2exl\_legitperf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the government refer to performance (such as providing economic growth, poverty reduction, effective and non-corrupt governance, and/or providing security) in order to justify the regime in place?

RESPONSES:

- 0: Not at all.
- 1: To a small extent.



2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.

3: To a large extent but not exclusively.

4: Almost exclusively.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.2.9.5 Rational-legal legitimization (v2exl\_legitratio)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2exl\_legitratio

*Original tag:* v2exl\_legitratio

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the current government refer to the legal norms and regulations in order to justify the regime in place?

CLARIFICATION: This question pertains to legal norms and regulations as laid out for instance in the constitution regarding access to power (e.g. elections) as well as exercise of power (e.g. rule of law). Electoral regimes may score high on this question as well as non-electoral regimes that emphasize their rule-boundedness.

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: To a small extent.

2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.

3: To a large extent but not exclusively.

4: Almost exclusively.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

## 2.2.10 V-Dem Indicators - The Judiciary

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Judiciary:** This set of questions pertains to the judiciary. Before you proceed, we would like to clarify several general points. First, some questions below refer to the judiciary in general, whereas others ask for specific evaluations of particular courts or types of courts. Unless otherwise prompted, please consider the judiciary as a whole. This includes all courts in the judicial system at every level, both general jurisdiction courts and more specialized courts. However, with potentially one exception, it excludes specialized courts that are located outside the judiciary, *e.g.* an immigration court that lies inside the executive branch. The one potential exception is the peak constitutional court of the country. Please include this court in your considerations, even though it will be located outside of the judiciary in some countries. If the country you are coding is a federal state, please focus only on the federal judiciary and the federal government.

Seven of the questions about the judiciary concern high courts. By "high court" we are asking you to consider the country's constitutional court, if one exists. If there is no constitutional court, please consider the court of last resort for constitutional matters. If there is no court in your country with constitutional jurisdiction, please consider the highest ordinary court of the state.

For example, in Mexico in 2004, you would consider the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and not the Electoral Tribunal for the Federal Judiciary. In Russia in the same year, you would consider the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and not the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. In Sweden, you would ignore the Supreme Administrative Court and instead focus on the Supreme Court. Germany has both a constitutional court, the Federal Constitutional Court, and a court of last resort for ordinary matters, the Federal Court of Justice. The Federal Constitutional Court is the high court for our purposes. In the United States, there is no separate constitutional court or review body. The Supreme Court is both the highest ordinary court and the highest court in the state with constitutional jurisdiction. Therefore, we consider it to be the high court of the United States. If your country's highest judicial body has separate divisions, only one of which is dedicated to final constitutional review, please consider that division to be the high court if its judges are permanently assigned to that division only. For example, the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica has four chambers. The Fourth Chamber reviews constitutional matters, its judges are appointed to it specifically and the other judges of the Supreme Court do not rotate onto the Fourth Chamber. Therefore, the high court for Costa Rica is the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.

If a new high court was established in a given year, please consider that court as the high court for the purposes of these questions only if the court was functioning for the majority of the calendar year. If a new high court was established in a given year, but did not start functioning until a subsequent year, please do not consider the new court as the high court until it was functioning for the majority of the given calendar year. If you are considering a semi sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to the government or judicial bodies seated within the territory in question (*e.g.*, the governor-general and his local administration in a British colony or a Commonwealth country), not abroad (*e.g.*, the King/Queen or government of England).

In coding the following questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens "on the ground"). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them.

#### 2.2.10.1 Judicial accountability (v2juacct)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2juacct

*Original tag:* v2juacct

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct, how often are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined?

RESPONSES:

0: Never.

1: Seldom.

2: About half of the time.

3: Usually.

4: Always.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.10.2 Compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2jucomp

*Original tag:* v2jucomp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees?

CLARIFICATION: We are looking for a summary judgment for the entire judiciary, excluding the high court. You should consider judges on both ordinary courts and specialized courts.

RESPONSES:

0: Never.

1: Seldom.

2: About half of the time.

3: Usually.

4: Always.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.10.3 Judicial corruption decision (v2jucorrdc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2jucorrdc

*Original tag:* v2jucorrdc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?

RESPONSES:

0: Always.

1: Usually.

2: About half of the time.

3: Not usually.

4: Never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: For reasons of consistency, as of December, 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.10.4 Compliance with high court (v2juhccomp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2juhccomp

*Original tag:* v2juhccomp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions of the high court with which it disagrees?

RESPONSES:

- 0: Never.
- 1: Seldom.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Usually.
- 4: Always.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: The historical version of the variable is set to missing when v3juhcourt is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.10.5 High court independence (v2juhcind)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2juhcind

*Original tag:* v2juhcind

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When the high court in the judicial system is ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record?

CLARIFICATION: We are seeking to identify autonomous judicial decision-making and its absence. Decisions certainly can reflect government wishes without "merely reflecting" those wishes, *i.e.* a court can be autonomous when its decisions support the government's position. This is because a court can be fairly persuaded that the government's position is meritorious. By "merely reflect the wishes of the government" we mean that the court's own view of the record, its sincere evaluation of the record, is irrelevant to the outcome. The court simply adopts the government's position regardless of its sincere view of the record.

RESPONSES:

- 0: Always.
- 1: Usually.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Seldom.
- 4: Never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: The historical version of the variable is set to missing when v3juhcourt is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.10.6 Lower court independence (v2juncind)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2juncind

*Original tag:* v2juncind

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When judges *not* on the high court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government wishes

regardless of their sincere view of the legal record?

RESPONSES:

0: Always.

1: Usually.

2: About half of the time.

3: Seldom.

4: Never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.10.7 Court packing (v2jupack)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2jupack

*Original tag:* v2jupack

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: The size of the judiciary is sometimes increased for very good reasons, as when judges are added to manage an increasing caseload; however, sometimes judges are added purely for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe any increases in the size of the judiciary that occurred this calendar year.

CLARIFICATION: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited court packing efforts (*i.e.* when relatively few judgeships are added) by the political importance of the packing. For example, you may consider the packing of the high court to be more important than the packing of a lower court.

RESPONSES:

0: There was a massive, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships across the entire judiciary.

1: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships on very important courts.

2: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships.

3: Judgeships were added to the judiciary, but there is no evidence that the increase was politically motivated; or there was no increase.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: A previous version of the variable contained category "4: There was no increase". As of November 2014, all responses in category "4" are assigned to category "3", since the two responses have the same meaning in practice.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.10.8 Government attacks on judiciary (v2jupoatk)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2jupoatk

*Original tag:* v2jupoatk

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often did the government attack the judiciary's integrity in public?

CLARIFICATION: Attacks on the judiciary's integrity can include claims that it is corrupt, incompetent or that decisions were politically motivated. These attacks can manifest in various ways including, but not limited to prepared statements reported by the media, press conferences, interviews, and stump speeches.

RESPONSES:

0: Attacks were carried out on a daily or weekly basis.

1: Attacks were common and carried out in nearly every month of the year.

2: Attacks occurred more than once.

3: There were attacks, but they were rare.

4: There were no attacks on the judiciary's integrity.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.2.10.9 Judicial purges (v2jupurge)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2jupurge

*Original tag:* v2jupurge

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Judges are sometimes removed from their posts for cause, as when there is strong evidence of corruption; however, some judges are removed arbitrarily, typically for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe the removal of judges that occurred this calendar year.

CLARIFICATION: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited arbitrary removals (*i.e.*, when only a few judges are targeted) by the political importance of the removal. For example, you may consider the arbitrary removal of a few high court judges as more important than the arbitrary removal of a few lower court judges.

RESPONSES:

0: There was a massive, arbitrary purge of the judiciary.

1: There were limited but very important arbitrary removals.

2: There were limited arbitrary removals.

3: Judges were removed from office, but there is no evidence that the removals were arbitrary.

4: Judges were not removed from their posts.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.10.10 Judicial reform (v2jureform)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2jureform

*Original tag:* v2jureform

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Were the judiciary's formal powers altered this year in ways that affect its ability to control the arbitrary use of state authority?  
CLARIFICATION: Evidence of this kind of reform could include the creation or removal of various forms of constitutional review, new rules increasing or decreasing access to the judiciary, changes in available judicial remedies, and any other formal institution (procedural or otherwise) that influences the ability of courts to control the arbitrary use of power.  
RESPONSES:  
0: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was *reduced* via institutional reform.  
1: There was no change to the judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power via institutional review.  
2: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was *enhanced* via institutional reform.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.10.11 Judicial review (v2jureview)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2jureview

*Original tag:* v2jureview

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Does any court in the judiciary have the legal authority to invalidate governmental policies (*e.g.* statutes, regulations, decrees, administrative actions) on the grounds that they violate a constitutional provision?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.11 V-Dem Indicators - The Legislature

##### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **The Legislature:**

The following questions pertain to the legislature, an assembly of deputies or representatives with powers to consider, pass, amend, or repeal laws. If there is no legislature in the country you are coding for some period of years, do not code any questions for those year. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory such as a colony please answer this question with respect to the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the Parliament in London). A popular election need not involve universal suffrage; indeed, suffrage may be highly restricted. A "direct election" can include seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election.

Frequently, it is important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..."

Please pay close attention to these cues. Note that sometimes we ask different coders to code different aspects of a question. So, you might get a question about the *de facto* state of affairs, but another source might provide the answer to the *de jure* state of affairs.

#### 2.2.11.1 Lower chamber committees (v2lgcomslo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2lgcomslo

*Original tag:* v2lgcomslo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have a functioning committee system?

RESPONSES:

0: No, there are no committees.

1: Yes, but there are only special (not permanent) committees.

2: Yes, there are permanent committees, but they are not very significant in affecting the course of policy.

3: Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.11.2 Legislature corrupt activities (v2lgcrrpt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2lgcrrpt

*Original tag:* v2lgcrrpt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?

CLARIFICATION: This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.

Please make your best estimate, based upon what is known or suspected to be true.

RESPONSES:

0: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.

1: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.

2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.

3: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.

4: Never, or hardly ever.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: For reasons of consistency, as of December, 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).



CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.11.3 Legislature dominant chamber (v2lgdomchm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2lgdomchm

*Original tag:* v2lgdomchm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the legislature is bicameral, which chamber is dominant?

RESPONSES:

0: The lower chamber is clearly dominant.

1: The lower chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.

2: They are roughly co-equal in power.

3: The upper chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.

4: The upper chamber is clearly dominant.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 2.2.11.4 Representation of disadvantaged social groups (v2lgdsadlo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2lgdsadlo

*Original tag:* v2lgdsadlo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Considering all disadvantaged social groups in the country, how well represented are these groups, as a whole, in the national legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

RESPONSES:

0 (1): They have no representation at all.

1 (2): They are highly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

2 (3): They are slightly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

3 (4): They are represented roughly equal relative to their proportion of the general population.

4 (5): They are over-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: As of December 2014, the former category 0: There are no disadvantaged groups in the society, is coded as a separate variable (v2lgdsadlobin). The variable is then rebased to zero.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*

(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.11.5 Representation of disadvantaged groups binary (v2lgdsadlobin)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2lgdsadlobin

*Original tag:* v2lgdsadlobin

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are there disadvantaged groups in the society?

CLARIFICATION: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.11.6 Legislature controls resources (v2lgfunds)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2lgfunds

*Original tag:* v2lgfunds

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal operations and the perquisites of its members?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature's operation depend on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.11.7 Legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2lginvstp

*Original tag:* v2lginvstp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity,

how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.

2: As likely as not.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.11.8 Lower chamber legislates in practice (v2lglegplo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2lglegplo

*Original tag:* v2lglegplo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.11.9 Upper chamber legislates in practice (v2lglegpup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2lglegpup

*Original tag:* v2lglegpup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the upper chamber of the legislature.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.11.10 Legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2lgoppart

*Original tag:* v2lgoppart

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?

RESPONSES:

0: No, not at all.

1: Occasionally.

2: Yes, for the most part.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.11.11 Executive oversight (v2lgotovst)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2lgotovst

*Original tag:* v2lgotovst

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body *other than the legislature*, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.

2: Very uncertain.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### **2.2.11.12 Legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2lgqstexp

*Original tag:* v2lgqstexp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?

CLARIFICATION: By "question" we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain its policies or testify.

RESPONSES:

0: No — never or very rarely.

1: Yes — routinely.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.2.11.13 Lower chamber members serve in government (v2lgsrvlo)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2lgsrvlo

*Original tag:* v2lgsrvlo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, are members of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature able to serve simultaneously as ministers in the government?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.2.11.14 Lower chamber staff (v2lgstafflo)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2lgstafflo

*Original tag:* v2lgstafflo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does each member of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have

at least one staff member with policy expertise?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

## 2.2.12 V-Dem Indicators - The Media

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Media:** Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and broadcast (radio and television), and (2) online media. We ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. Thus, "the print and broadcast media" can provide a wide range of perspectives in a country even when individual publications or programs take a consistently narrow perspective.

**Historical clarification:** Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and (2) broadcast (radio) media. The latter is, however, only for reference to the contemporary era, and should of course be ignored before it appeared. But when applicable, we ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. If there is no print or broadcast media at all in a given time period, leave the following questions blank (missing) for this time period. Please also explicitly note in the comments section at the end for which years there was no print or broadcast media at all.

### 2.2.12.1 Media bias (v2mebias)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2mebias

*Original tag:* v2mebias

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates?

CLARIFICATION: We ask you to take particular care in rating the year-to-year variation on this question if media bias tends to increase or decrease in election years. Coverage can be considered "more or less impartial" when the media as a whole present a mix of positive and negative coverage of each party or candidate.

RESPONSES:

0: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage, or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover.

1: The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage.

2: The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate.

3: The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated *amount* of coverage to the governing party or candidates.

4: The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.12.2 Internet censorship effort (v2mecenefi)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2mecenefi

*Original tag:* v2mecenefi

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet?

CLARIFICATION: Censorship attempts include Internet filtering (blocking access to certain websites or browsers), denial-of-service attacks, and partial or total Internet shutdowns. We are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions. We are also not concerned with the *extent* of internet access, unless there is absolutely no access at all (in which case the coding should be 0).

RESPONSES:

0 (1): The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content.

1 (2): The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls.

2 (3): The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues.

3 (4): The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned above.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: As of December 2014, the former category "0 There is no internet" is coded separately as v2mecenefibin. The variable is then rebased to zero.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*  
(see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1993-2021

#### 2.2.12.3 Internet binary (v2mecenefibin)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2mecenefibin

*Original tag:* v2mecenefibin

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there Internet in this country?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*

(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1993-2021

#### 2.2.12.4 Government censorship effort - Media (v2mecenefm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2mecenefm

*Original tag:* v2mecenefm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?

CLARIFICATION: Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery.

We are not concerned with censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political speech.

RESPONSES:

0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine.

1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.

2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.

3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.

4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*)

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.12.5 Media corrupt (v2mecorrpt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2mecorrpt

*Original tag:* v2mecorrpt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?

RESPONSES:

0: The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage.

1: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

2: It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

3: It is not normal for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally, without anyone being punished.

4: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments, and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.



DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.2.12.6 Print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2mecrit

*Original tag:* v2mecrit

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?

RESPONSES:

0: None.

1: Only a few marginal outlets.

2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do.

3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.2.12.7 Percent (percent) Female Journalists (v2mefemjrn)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2mefemjrn

*Original tag:* v2mefemjrn

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Please estimate the percentage (percent) of journalists in the print and broadcast media who are women.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bootstrapped.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.2.12.8 Harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2meharjrn

*Original tag:* v2meharjrn

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are individual journalists harassed — *i.e.*, threatened with libel, arrested,

imprisoned, beaten, or killed — by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities?

RESPONSES:

0: No journalists dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.

1: Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually are forced to stop.

2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.

3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished.

4: Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.12.9 Print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2merange

*Original tag:* v2merange

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives?

RESPONSES:

0: The major media represent only the government's perspective.

1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party.

2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.

3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.12.10 Media self-censorship (v2meslfcen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2meslfcen

*Original tag:* v2meslfcen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive?

RESPONSES:

0: Self-censorship is complete and thorough.  
1: Self-censorship is common but incomplete.  
2: There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues.  
3: There is little or no self-censorship among journalists.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.13 V-Dem Indicators - Political Equality

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Political Equality:** This section pertains to political equality, that is, the extent to which members of a polity possess equal political power. It does not refer to the inevitable differentiation in power that occurs in all large societies between those who hold positions of power within the state (political elites) and lay citizens. It is, rather, about the distribution of political power among identifiable groups within the population.

What does it mean for a group of individuals to wield real political power? Although political power cannot be directly observed, one can infer that groups possess power to the extent that they: (a) actively participate in politics (by voting, etc.), (b) are involved in civil society organizations, (c) secure representation in government, (d) are able to set the political agenda, (e) influence political decisions, and (f) influence the implementation of those decisions. Please consider all these factors when answering the following questions. (Of course, the picture across these different dimensions may be mixed; your response should indicate the overall picture, taking all aspects of political power into account.)

#### 2.2.13.1 Educational equality (v2peedueq)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2peedueq

*Original tag:* v2peedueq

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?

CLARIFICATION: Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

1: Unequal. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but ten to 25 percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

3: Relatively equal. Basic education is overall equal in quality but five to ten percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.2.13.2 Health equality (v2pehealth)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2pehealth

*Original tag:* v2pehealth

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens?

CLARIFICATION: Poor-quality healthcare can make citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed).

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 75 percent (percent) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

1: Unequal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 25 percent (percent) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

2: Somewhat equal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, ten to 25 percent (percent) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

3: Relatively equal. Basic health care is overall equal in quality but because of poor-quality healthcare, five to ten percent (percent) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

4: Equal. Basic health care is equal in quality and less than five percent (percent) of citizens cannot exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.2.13.3 Power distributed by gender (v2pepwrgen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2pepwrgen

*Original tag:* v2pepwrgen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is political power distributed according to gender?

RESPONSES:

0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power.

1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.

2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.

3: Men have somewhat more political power than women.

4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.13.4 Power distributed by sexual orientation (v2pepwrort)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2pepwrort

*Original tag:* v2pepwrort

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent is political power distributed according to sexual orientation?

CLARIFICATION: This question contrasts (A) the political power of heterosexuals and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are not open about their sexuality with (B) the political power of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are open about their sexuality. (A) will be referred to as "heterosexual" and (B) as "LGBT."

Note that in comparing the political power of these two groups we are comparing their power per person. So, when we say that LGBT have less, equal, or more power than heterosexuals we mean relative to their share of the population (as near as this can be estimated).

RESPONSES:

0: LGBTs are entirely excluded from the public sphere and thus deprived of any real political power (even though they may possess formal powers such as the ballot).

1: LGBTs have much less political power than heterosexuals. LGBTs enjoy formal rights to participate in politics but are subject to informal norms that often serve to exclude them from the halls of power.

2: LGBTs have somewhat less political power than heterosexual citizens.

3: LGBTs have about the same political power as heterosexuals. Each group enjoys a degree of political power that is roughly proportional to their population.

4: LGBTs enjoy somewhat more political power than heterosexuals by virtue of greater wealth, education, and high level of organization and mobilization.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.13.5 Power distributed by socioeconomic position (v2pepwrse)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2pepwrse

*Original tag:* v2pepwrse

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?

CLARIFICATION: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power.

RESPONSES:

0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence.

1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence.

2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.

3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.

4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.13.6 Power distributed by social group (v2pepwsoc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2pepwsoc

*Original tag:* v2pepwsoc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is political power distributed according to social groups?

CLARIFICATION: A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does *not* include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, *i.e.*, as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood — by those residing within that society — to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant.

RESPONSES:

0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, *i.e.*, not subject to frequent change.

1: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, *i.e.*, not subject to frequent change.

2: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, *i.e.*, not subject to frequent change.

3: Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another — but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.

4: All social groups have roughly equal political power *or* there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

## 2.2.14 V-Dem Indicators - Political Parties

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

#### Political parties:

A "political party" refers to an organization that nominates candidates for public office. A party may refer to a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party. Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party/coalition changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituency then it should be considered the same organization. Our notion of a party includes loose factional groupings such as the Tories and Whigs in the 19th-century Britain or the Caps and Hats in 18th-century Sweden. Unless stated otherwise the following questions pertain to parties that compete for seats in the national legislature or for the presidency.

Most of the questions in the following section ask you to generalize across parties in a particular country (and at a particular point in time). We realize that practices vary from party to party; these are, after all, highly diverse organizations. However, for our purposes it is important to consider what the most common practices are.

In answering these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them. And if there is no clarification of the issue, assume that the question is referring to practices rather than formal rules.

#### 2.2.14.1 Party ban target (v2psbantar)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2psbantar

*Original tag:* v2psbantar

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: If any parties are banned, what label best describes these parties?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Ethnic party. [v2psbantar\_0]

1: Religious party. [v2psbantar\_1]

2: Regional/local party. [v2psbantar\_2]

3: Leftist extremist party. [v2psbantar\_3]

4: Rightist extremist party. [v2psbantar\_4]

5: Other. [v2psbantar\_5]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

NOTES: The answer categories for contemporary and historical differ in the inclusion of the word "extremist". In contemporary it is included while excluded in the historical answer categories.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.14.2 Barriers to parties (v2psbars)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2psbars

*Original tag:* v2psbars

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?

CLARIFICATION: Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits, as well as harassment.

RESPONSES:

0: Parties are not allowed.

1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally).

2: There are significant obstacles (*e.g.* party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities).

3: There are modest barriers (*e.g.* party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities).

4: There are no substantial barriers.

ORDERING: If your answer is 1-4, proceed to the next question [v2psoppaut]. If your answer is 0, skip to the question about Party organization [v2psorgs].

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.14.3 Candidate selection–National/local (v2pscnslnl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2pscnslnl

*Original tag:* v2pscnslnl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How centralized is legislative candidate selection within the parties?

CLARIFICATION: The power to select candidates for national legislative elections is often divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organizations, and national party leaders. One level usually dominates the selection process, while sometimes candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organization.

RESPONSES:

0: National legislative candidates are selected exclusively by national party leaders.

1: National legislative candidate selection is dominated by national party leaders but with some limited influence from local or state level organizations.

2: National legislative candidates are chosen through bargaining across different levels of party organization.

3: National legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level organizations, perhaps with some input from local party organizations or constituency groups.

4: National legislative candidates are chosen by a small cadre of local or municipal level actors.

5: National legislative candidates are chosen by constituency groups or direct primaries.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.2.14.4 Legislative party cohesion (v2pscohesv)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2pscohesv



*Original tag:* v2pscohesv

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their party on important bills?

RESPONSES:

0: Not really. Many members are elected as independents and party discipline is very weak.

1: More often than not. Members are more likely to vote with their parties than against them, but defections are common.

2: Mostly. Members vote with their parties most of the time.

3: Yes, absolutely. Members vote with their parties almost all the time.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.2.14.5 Party competition across regions (v2pscomprg)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2pscomprg

*Original tag:* v2pscomprg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following best describes the nature of electoral support for major parties (those gaining over 10 percent of the vote)?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

0: Most major parties are competitive in only one or two regions of the country, *i.e.*, their support is heavily concentrated in a few areas.

1: Most major parties are competitive in some regions of the country, but not in others.

2: Most major parties are competitive in most regions of the country.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.2.14.6 National party control (v2psnatpar)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2psnatpar

*Original tag:* v2psnatpar

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How unified is party control of the national government?

CLARIFICATION: With respect to the executive, consider only those offices that have effective power over policymaking. (If there is a monarch or president with very little policymaking power, this office should not be considered.) With respect to bicameral

legislatures, consider only the chamber, or chambers, that have effective policymaking power. (If the upper chamber is inactive or clearly subordinate, consider only the lower chamber.) Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

0: Unified coalition control. A single multi-party coalition controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single coalition gathers together a majority of seats.).

1: Divided party control. (A) Different parties or individuals (unconnected to parties) control the executive and the legislature or (B) Executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each of which belongs to different parties; or between a non-partisan monarch and a prime minister.

2: Unified party control. A single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single party has a majority of seats.).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.2.14.7 Opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2psoppaut

*Original tag:* v2psoppaut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?

CLARIFICATION: An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government, *i.e.*, that has no control over the executive.

RESPONSES:

0: Opposition parties are not allowed.

1: There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co-opted by the ruling regime.

2: At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

3: Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

4: All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.14.8 Party organizations (v2psorgs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2psorgs

*Original tag:* v2psorgs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?

CLARIFICATION: A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season.

RESPONSES:

0: No parties.

1: Fewer than half of the parties.

2: About half of the parties.

3: More than half of the parties.

4: All parties.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.14.9 Party Ban (v2psparban)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2psparban

*Original tag:* v2psparban

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are any parties banned?

CLARIFICATION: This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet registration requirements or support thresholds.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned.

1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties.

2: Yes. Many parties are banned.

3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned.

4: No. No parties are officially banned.

ORDERING: If your answer is 4, skip the next question [v2psbantar].

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.14.10 Distinct party platforms (v2psplats)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2psplats

*Original tag:* v2psplats

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How many political parties with representation in the national legislature or presidency have publicly available party platforms (manifestos) that are publicized and relatively distinct from one another?

CLARIFICATION: In order to be counted in the affirmative, parties must have platforms that are both distinct (either in terms of content or generalized ideology) and publicly disseminated.

This question is *not* intended to measure how much the public actually knows about these platforms or whether they are important in structuring policymaking.

RESPONSES:

0: None, or nearly none.

1: Fewer than half.

2: About half.

3: More than half.

4: All, or nearly all.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

**2.2.14.11 Party Branches (v2psprbrch)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2psprbrch

*Original tag:* v2psprbrch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How many parties have permanent local party branches?

RESPONSES:

0: None.

1: Fewer than half.

2: About half.

3: More than half.

4: All.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.2.14.12 Party linkages (v2psprlnks)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2psprlnks

*Original tag:* v2psprlnks

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their constituents?

CLARIFICATION: A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of "good" that the party offers in exchange for political support and participation in party activities.

RESPONSES:

0: Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs.

1: Mixed clientelistic and local collective.

2: Local collective. Constituents are rewarded with local collective goods, *e.g.*, wells, toilets, markets, roads, bridges, and local development.

3: Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic.

4: Policy/programmatic. Constituents respond to a party's positions on national policies, general party programs, and visions for society.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.2.14.13 Subnational party control (v2pssunpar)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2pssunpar

*Original tag:* v2pssunpar

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does a single party control important policymaking bodies across subnational units (regional and local governments)?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

0: In almost all subnational units (at least 90percent), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

1: In most subnational units (66percent-90percent), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

2: In few subnational units (less than 66percent), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.15 Digital Society Survey - Social Cleavages

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

##### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual’s use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization’s digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### 2.2.15.1 Arrests for political content (v2smarrest)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smarrest

*Original tag:* v2smarrest

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If a citizen posts political content online that would run counter to the government and its policies, what is the likelihood that citizen is arrested?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely likely.

1: Likely.

2: Unlikely.

3: Extremely unlikely.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.2.15.2 Party/candidate use of social media in campaigns (v2smcamp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smcamp

*Original tag:* v2smcamp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do major political parties and candidates use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents?

RESPONSES:

0: None. Major political parties and candidates do not use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

1: A little. Major political parties and candidates rarely use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

2: Somewhat. Major political parties and candidates sometimes use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

3: Substantial. Major political parties and candidates frequently use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.2.15.3 Online harassment groups (v2smhargr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smhargr

*Original tag:* v2smhargr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which groups are targets of hate speech or harassment in online media?

CLARIFICATION: Multiple selection. Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Women [v2smhargr\_0]

1: LGBTQ groups and individuals [v2smhargr\_1]

2: Specific religious groups [v2smhargr\_2]

3: Specific ethnic groups [v2smhargr\_3]

4: Specific caste [v2smhargr\_4]

5: Specific language groups [v2smhargr\_5]

6: Specific race [v2smhargr\_6]

7: People with physical or cognitive disabilities [v2smhargr\_7]

8: People from specific regions [v2smhargr\_8]

9: Other (specify in the next question) [v2smhargr\_9]

10: No group is a specific target [v2smhargr\_10]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.15.4 Average people's use of social media to organize offline action (v2smorgavgact)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smorgavgact

*Original tag:* v2smorgavgact

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do average people use social media to organize offline political action of any kind?

RESPONSES:

0: Never or almost never. Average people have almost never used social media to organize offline political action.

1: Rarely. Average people do not typically use social media to organize offline political action.

2: Sometimes. There are a few cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

3: Often. There have been several cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

4: Regularly. There are numerous cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.15.5 Elites' use of social media to organize offline action (v2smorgelitact)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smorgelitact

*Original tag:* v2smorgelitact

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do domestic elites use social media to organize offline political action of any kind?

RESPONSES:

0: Never or almost never. Elites have almost never used social media to organize offline political action.

1: Rarely. Elites do not typically use social media to organize offline political action.

2: Sometimes. There are a few cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.

3: Often. There have been several cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.

4: Regularly. There are numerous cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021



#### 2.2.15.6 Types of organization through social media (v2smorgtypes)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smorgtypes

*Original tag:* v2smorgtypes

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: What types of offline political action are most commonly mobilized on social media?

CLARIFICATION: Multiple selection. Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Petition signing [v2smorgtypes\_0]

1: Voter turnout [v2smorgtypes\_1]

2: Street protests [v2smorgtypes\_2]

3: Strikes/labor actions [v2smorgtypes\_3]

4: Riots [v2smorgtypes\_4]

5: Organized rebellion [v2smorgtypes\_5]

6: Vigilante Justice (e.g., mob lynching, stalking harassment) [v2smorgtypes\_6]

7: Terrorism [v2smorgtypes\_7]

8: Ethnic cleansing/genocide [v2smorgtypes\_8]

9: Other (specify in the next question) [v2smorgtypes\_9]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.15.7 Use of social media to organize offline violence (v2smorgviol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smorgviol

*Original tag:* v2smorgviol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do people use social media to organize offline violence?

RESPONSES:

0: Frequently. There are numerous cases in which people have used social media to organize offline violence.

1: Sometimes. There are a few cases in which people have used social media to organize offline violence.

2: Never. People have never used social media to organize offline violence.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.15.8 Political parties hate speech (v2smpolhate)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smpolhate

*Original tag:* v2smpolhate

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do major political parties use hate speech as part of their rhetoric?

CLARIFICATION: Hate speech is any speech that is intended to insult, offend, or intimidate members of specific groups, defined by race, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, disability, or similar trait.

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often.

1: Often.

2: Sometimes.

3: Rarely.

4: Never, or almost never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.2.15.9 Polarization of society (v2smpolsoc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smpolsoc

*Original tag:* v2smpolsoc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you characterize the differences of opinions on major political issues in this society?

CLARIFICATION: While plurality of views exists in all societies, we are interested in knowing the extent to which these differences in opinions result in major clashes of views and polarization or, alternatively, whether there is general agreement on the general direction this society should develop.

RESPONSES:

0: Serious polarization. There are serious differences in opinions in society on almost all key political issues, which result in major clashes of views.

1: Moderate polarization. There are differences in opinions in society on many key political issues, which result in moderate clashes of views.

2: Medium polarization. Differences in opinions are noticeable on about half of the key political issues, resulting in some clashes of views.

3: Limited polarization. There are differences in opinions on only a few key political issues, resulting in few clashes of views.

4: No polarization. There are differences in opinions but there is a general agreement on the direction for key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.16 Digital Society Survey - State Internet Regulation Capacity and Approach

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media

freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

#### **Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)**

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual’s use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization’s digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### **2.2.16.1 Abuse of defamation and copyright law by elites (v2smdefabu)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smdefabu

*Original tag:* v2smdefabu

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do elites abuse the legal system (e.g., defamation and copyright law) to censor political speech online?

RESPONSES:

0: Regularly. Elites abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet as regular practice.

1: Often. Elites commonly abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.

2: Sometimes. Elites abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet about half the time.

3: Rarely. Elites occasionally abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.

4: Never, or almost never. Elites do not abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### **2.2.16.2 Defamation protection (v2smlawpr)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smlawpr

*Original tag:* v2smlawpr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the legal framework provide protection against defamatory online content, or hate speech?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The law provides no protection against Internet defamation and hate speech.

1: Not really. The law provides a weak protection and to very limited range of circumstances.

2: Somewhat. The law provides some protection against Internet defamation and hate speech but in limited circumstances, or only to particular groups of people.

3: Mostly. The law provides protection against Internet defamation and hate speech under many circumstances, and to most groups of people.

4: Yes. The law provides comprehensive protection against Internet defamation and hate speech.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### **2.2.16.3 Privacy protection by law content (v2smprivcon)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smprivcon

*Original tag:* v2smprivcon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What does the legal framework to protect Internet users' privacy and their data stipulate?

RESPONSES:

0: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access any type of personal data on the Internet.

1: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access most types of personal data on the Internet.

2: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access many types of personal data on the Internet.

3: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access only a few types of personal information on the Internet.

4: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access personal information on the Internet only in extraordinary circumstances.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.16.4 Privacy protection by law exists (v2smprivex)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smprivex

*Original tag:* v2smprivex

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does a legal framework to protect Internet users' privacy and their data exist?

RESPONSES:

0: No. (Skip to v2smregcap)

1: Yes

ORDERING: if 0 no, Skip to v2smregcap

SCALE: yes/no

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.16.5 Government online content regulation approach (v2smregapp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smregapp

*Original tag:* v2smregapp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government use its own resources and institutions to monitor and regulate online content or does it distribute this regulatory burden to private actors such as Internet service providers?

RESPONSES:

0: All online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state.

1: Most online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state, though the state involves private actors in a limited way.

2: Some online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state, but the state also

involves private actors in monitoring and regulation in various ways.

3: The state does little online content monitoring and regulation, and entrusts most of the monitoring and regulation to private actors.

4: The state off-loads all online content monitoring and regulation to private actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.16.6 Government capacity to regulate online content (v2smregcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smregcap

*Original tag:* v2smregcap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government have sufficient staff and resources to regulate Internet content in accordance with existing law?

RESPONSES:

0: No, almost all online activity happens outside of reach of the state, where it lacks the capacity to remove illegal content.

1: Not really. The state has extremely limited resources to regulate online content.

2: Somewhat. The state has the capacity to regulate only some online content or some portions of the law.

3: Mostly. The state has robust capacity to regulate online content, though not enough to regulate all content and all portions of the law.

4: Yes, the government has sufficient capacity to regulate all online content.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.2.16.7 Internet legal regulation content (v2smregcon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smregcon

*Original tag:* v2smregcon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What type of content is covered in the legal framework to regulate Internet?

RESPONSES:

0: The state can remove any content at will.

1: The state can remove most content, and the law protects speech in only specific, and politically uncontroversial contexts.

2: The legal framework is ambiguous. The state can remove some politically sensitive content, while other is protected by law.

3: The law protects most political speech, but the state can remove especially politically

controversial content.

4: The law protects political speech, and the state can only remove content if it violates well-established legal criteria.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.2.17 Digital Society Survey - Coordinated Information Operations

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

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Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual’s use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization’s digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in

emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### **2.2.17.1 Foreign governments ads (v2smforads)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smforads

*Original tag:* v2smforads

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use paid advertisements on social media in order to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Foreign governments disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Foreign governments disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Foreign governments never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### **2.2.17.2 Foreign governments dissemination of false information (v2smfordom)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smfordom

*Original tag:* v2smfordom

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Foreign governments disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.



3: Rarely. Foreign governments disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Foreign governments never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.2.17.3 Government dissemination of false information abroad (v2smgovab)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smgovab

*Original tag:* v2smgovab

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence citizens of other countries abroad?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. The government disseminates false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. The government disseminates false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. The government disseminates false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. The government disseminates false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. The government never disseminates false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.2.17.4 Government dissemination of false information domestic (v2smgovdom)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smgovdom

*Original tag:* v2smgovdom

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence its own population?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. The government disseminates false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. The government disseminates false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. The government disseminates false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. The government disseminates false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. The government never disseminates false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.17.5 Party dissemination of false information abroad (v2smparab)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smparab

*Original tag:* v2smparab

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence citizens of other countries abroad?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Major political parties and candidates never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.17.6 Party dissemination of false information domestic (v2smpardom)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smpardom

*Original tag:* v2smpardom

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence their own population?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Major political parties and candidates never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

## 2.2.18 Digital Society Survey - Digital Media Freedom

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual’s use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization’s digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a

website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### 2.2.18.1 Government cyber security capacity (v2smgovcapsec)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smgovcapsec

*Original tag:* v2smgovcapsec

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government have sufficiently technologically skilled staff and resources to mitigate harm from cyber-security threats?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The government does not have the capacity to counter even unsophisticated cyber security threats.

1: Not really. The government has the resources to combat only unsophisticated cyber attacks.

2: Somewhat. The government has the resources to combat moderately sophisticated cyber attacks.

3: Mostly. The government has the resources to combat most sophisticated cyber attacks.

4: Yes. The government has the resources to combat sophisticated cyber attacks, even those launched by highly skilled actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.18.2 Government Internet filtering capacity (v2smgovfilcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smgovfilcap

*Original tag:* v2smgovfilcap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Independent of whether it actually does so in practice, does the government have the technical capacity to censor information (text, audio, images, or video) on the Internet by filtering (blocking access to certain websites) if it decided to?

RESPONSES:

0: The government lacks any capacity to block access to any sites on the Internet.

1: The government has limited capacity to block access to a few sites on the Internet.

2: The government has adequate capacity to block access to most, but not all, specific sites on the Internet if it wanted to.

3: The government has the capacity to block access to any sites on the Internet if it wanted to.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein

*et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.2.18.3 Government Internet filtering in practice (v2smgovfilprc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smgovfilprc

*Original tag:* v2smgovfilprc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How frequently does the government censor political information (text, audio, images, or video) on the Internet by filtering (blocking access to certain websites)?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to remove political content, except to sites that are pro-government.

1: Often. The government commonly removes online political content, except sites that are pro-government.

2: Sometimes. The government successfully removes about half of the critical online political content.

3: Rarely. There have been only a few occasions on which the government removed political content.

4: Never, or almost never. The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.2.18.4 Government Internet shut down in practice (v2smgovshut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smgovshut

*Original tag:* v2smgovshut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often does the government shut down domestic access to the Internet?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to shut down domestic access to the Internet.

1: Often. The government shut down domestic access to the Internet numerous times this year.

2: Sometimes. The government shut down domestic access to the Internet several times this year.

3: Rarely but there have been a few occasions throughout the year when the government shut down domestic access to Internet.

4: Never, or almost never. The government does not typically interfere with the domestic access to the Internet.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.18.5 Government Internet shut down capacity (v2smgovshutcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smgovshutcap

*Original tag:* v2smgovshutcap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Independent of whether it actually does so in practice, does the government have the technical capacity to actively shut down domestic access to the Internet if it decided to?

CLARIFICATION: A domestic Internet connection is any connection originating physically within the country, whether over wired, wireless, or satellite networks. This question asks what proportion of potential Internet connections of domestic origin the government has the capacity to render inoperable.

RESPONSES:

0: The government lacks the capacity to shut down any domestic Internet connections.

1: The government has the capacity to shut down roughly a quarter of domestic access to the Internet.

2: The government has the capacity to shut down roughly half of domestic access to the Internet.

3: The government has the capacity to shut down roughly three quarters of domestic access to the Internet.

4: The government has the capacity to shut down all, or almost all, domestic access to the Internet.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.18.6 Government social media shut down in practice (v2smgovsm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smgovsm

*Original tag:* v2smgovsm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often does the government shut down access to social media platforms?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to shut down access to social media.

1: Often. The government shuts down access to social media numerous times this year.

2: Sometimes. The government shuts down access to social media several times this year.

3: Rarely. There have been a few occasions throughout the year when the government shuts down access to social media.

4: Never, or almost never. The government does not interfere with the access to social media, except in the cases mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.18.7 Government social media alternatives (v2smgovsmalt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smgovsmalt

*Original tag:* v2smgovsmalt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How prevalent is the usage of social media platforms that are wholly controlled by either the government or its agents in this country?

RESPONSES:

0: Essentially all social media usage takes place on platforms controlled by the state.

1: Most usage of social media is on state-controlled platforms, although some groups use non-state-controlled alternatives.

2: There is significant usage of both state-controlled and non-state-controlled social media platforms.

3: While some state-controlled social media platforms exist, their usage only represents a small share of social media usage in the country.

4: Practically no one uses state-controlled social media platforms.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.2.18.8 Government social media censorship in practice (v2smgovsmcenprc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smgovsmcenprc

*Original tag:* v2smgovsmcenprc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what degree does the government censor political content (i.e., deleting or filtering specific posts for political reasons) on social media in practice?

RESPONSES:

0: The government simply blocks all social media platforms.

1: The government successfully censors all social media with political content.

2: The government successfully censors a significant portion of political content on social media, though not all of it.

3: The government only censors social media with political content that deals with especially sensitive issues.

4: The government does not censor political social media content, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.18.9 Government social media monitoring (v2smgovsmmon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smgovsmmon

*Original tag:* v2smgovsmmon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How comprehensive is the surveillance of political content in social media by the government or its agents?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely comprehensive. The government surveils virtually all content on social media.

1: Mostly comprehensive. The government surveils most content on social media, with comprehensive monitoring of most key political issues.

2: Somewhat comprehensive. The government does not universally surveil social media but can be expected to surveil key political issues about half the time.

3: Limited. The government only surveils political content on social media on a limited basis.

4: Not at all, or almost not at all. The government does not surveil political content on social media, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.2.18.10 Political parties cyber security capacity (v2smpolcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smpolcap

*Original tag:* v2smpolcap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major political parties have sufficiently technologically skilled staff and resources to mitigate harm from cyber security threats?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The government does not have the capacity to counter even unsophisticated cyber security threats.

1: Not really. The government has the resources to combat only unsophisticated cyber attacks.

2: Somewhat. The government has the resources to combat moderately sophisticated cyber attacks.

3: Mostly. The government has the resources to combat most sophisticated cyber attacks.

4: Yes. The government has the resources to combat sophisticated cyber attacks, even those launched by highly skilled actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.2.19 Digital Society Survey - Online Media Polarization

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded



surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

#### **Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)**

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual’s use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization’s digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### **2.2.19.1 Online media fractionalization (v2smmefra)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smmefra

*Original tag:* v2smmefra

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major (political) news?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The major domestic online media outlets give opposing presentation of major events.

1: Not really. The major domestic online media outlets differ greatly in the presentation of major events.

2: Sometimes. The major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major events about half the time.

3: Mostly. The major domestic online media outlets mostly give a similar presentation of major events.

4: Yes. Although there are small differences in representation, the major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 2.2.19.2 Online media existence (v2smonex)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smonex

*Original tag:* v2smonex

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do people consume domestic online media?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. No one consumes domestic online media. Skip next question if this answer is selected.

1: Limited. Domestic online media consumption is limited.

2: Relatively extensive. Domestic online media consumption is common.

3: Extensive. Almost everyone consumes domestic online media.

ORDERING: if 0, skip v2smonper

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.2.19.3 Online media perspectives (v2smonper)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2smonper

*Original tag:* v2smonper

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major domestic online media outlets represent a wide range of political perspectives?

RESPONSES:

0: The major domestic online media outlets represent only the government's perspective.

1: The major domestic online media outlets represent only the perspectives of the government and a government approved, semi-official opposition party.

2: The major domestic online media outlets represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.

3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major domestic online media outlets.

4: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in many major domestic online media outlets.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

## 2.2.20 V-Dem Indicators - Sovereignty and State

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Sovereignty:** This section addresses a number of issues concerning the sovereignty of the state. A state is political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis. With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from other actors in the system. The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

**Sovereignty – Historical clarification:** This section addresses a number of issues concerning the state. A state is a political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis. The questions concern two general themes: state sovereignty and state administration.

With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from and recognition by other actors in the system. The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

A second attribute of states is the state administration: the set of institutions that administer and implement governmental decisions. Here we are mainly interested in the professionalization, or lack thereof, of the state administrative staff – in this context termed the state administrators.

**The State:** "This section addresses a number of issues concerning the state. A state is a political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis. The questions concern two general themes: state sovereignty and state administration.

With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from and recognition by other actors in the system. The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

A second attribute of states is the state administration: the set of institutions that administer and

implement governmental decisions. Here we are mainly interested in the professionalization, or lack thereof, of the state administrative staff—in this context termed the state administrators.”

#### 2.2.20.1 Criteria for appointment decisions in the armed forces (v2stcritapparm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2stcritapparm

*Original tag:* v2stcritapparm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Agnes Cornell, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are appointment decisions in the armed forces based on personal or political connections or alternatively based on skills and merit?

CLARIFICATION: Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotions in the armed forces. Note that the question refers to the typical *de facto* (rather than *de jure*) situation obtaining in the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the armed forces or between top and lower level ranks please try to consider the average when answering the question.

RESPONSES:

0: All appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit.

1: Most appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit.

2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit.

3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Most are based on skills and merit.

4: None of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit.

ORDERING: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.2.20.2 Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration (v2stcritrecadm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2stcritrecadm

*Original tag:* v2stcritrecadm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Agnes Cornell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are appointment decisions in the state administration based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit?

CLARIFICATION: Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotion in the state administration. Note that the question refers to the typical *de facto* (rather than *de jure*) situation obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the state administration or between top and lower level state administrators please try to consider the average when answering the question.

RESPONSES:

0: All appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit.

1: Most appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit.  
2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit.  
3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Most appointment decisions are based on skills and merit.  
4: None of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit.  
SCALE: Ordinal.  
DATA RELEASE: 9-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.20.3 State fiscal source of revenue (v2stfisccap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2stfisccap

*Original tag:* v2stfisccap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: On which of the following sources of revenue does the central government primarily rely to finance its activities?

RESPONSES:

0: The state is not capable of raising revenue to finance itself.

1: The state primarily relies on external sources of funding (loans and foreign aid) to finance its activities.

2: The state primarily relies on directly controlling economic assets (natural resource rents, public monopolies, and the expropriation of assets within and outside the country) to finance its activities.

3: The state primarily relies on taxes on property (land taxes) and trade (customs duties).

4: The state primarily relies on taxes on economic transactions (such as sales taxes) and/or taxes on income, corporate profits and capital.

SCALE: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.20.4 Bureaucratic remuneration (v2strenadm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2strenadm

*Original tag:* v2strenadm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are state administrators salaried employees?

CLARIFICATION: A state administrator is anyone who works for the state administration. By "salaried employee", we mean someone who is employed on a contract and paid a regular allowance directly out of the state coffers. It does not include unpaid work; work paid for through a private collection of fees, material perquisites or bribes; private employment by a higher-ranking "patron" within the administration; contractors being paid on an irregular

basis; or "parastatals" (those working for state-owned companies), since the latter are not paid directly out of the state coffers. Note that the question refers to the practices obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces.

RESPONSES:

- 0: None or almost none are salaried state employees.
- 1: A small share is salaried state employees.
- 2: About half are salaried state employees.
- 3: A substantial number are salaried state employees.
- 4: All or almost all are salaried state employees.

SCALE: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.20.5 Remuneration in the Armed Forces (v2strenarm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2strenarm

*Original tag:* v2strenarm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell, Agnes Cornell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are members of the armed forces salaried employees?

CLARIFICATION: By members of the armed forces, we mean members of all ranks, excluding conscripts. By "salaried employee", we mean someone who is employed on a contract and paid a regular allowance directly out of the state coffers. It does not include unpaid work, work paid for through a private collection of fees, material perquisites or bribes, or private employment by a higher-ranking "patron" within the armed forces.

RESPONSES:

- 0: None or almost none are salaried employees
- 1: A small share is salaried employees
- 2: About half are salaried employees
- 3: A substantial number are salaried employees
- 4: All or almost all are salaried employees

ORDERING: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.20.6 Domestic Autonomy (v2svdomaut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2svdomaut

*Original tag:* v2svdomaut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy?

CLARIFICATION: The question of domestic autonomy does not include restrictions emanating from treaties (*e.g.*, NATO), international organizations (*e.g.*, the WTO), or confederations (*e.g.*, the European Union) if these agreements are freely negotiated by the state and if the

state is free to exit from that treaty, organization, or confederation. Nor does it include restrictions on policymaking emanating from international market forces and trans-national corporations.

RESPONSES:

0: Non-autonomous. National level authority is exercised by an external power, either by law or in practice. The most common examples of this are direct colonial rule and military occupation (*e.g.* quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). It also includes situations in which domestic actors provide *de jure* cover for *de facto* control by a foreign power (*e.g.* Vichy France). However, control of some part of the territory of a state by an enemy during war is not considered control by external actors if the sovereign government remains on scene and continues to wage conventional war (*e.g.*, the USSR during WW II).

1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to rule, decides who can or cannot rule through formal rules or informal understandings, or precludes certain policies through explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples include Soviet "satellite" states in Eastern Europe, and situations where colonial powers grant limited powers of national self-government to their possessions (*e.g.*, protectorates and limited home government).

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise political authority free of the direct control of external political actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

## 2.2.20.7 International autonomy (v2svinlaut)

Long tag: vdem\_coder\_level\_v2svinlaut

Original tag: v2svinlaut

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of its foreign policy?

RESPONSES:

0: Non-autonomous. Foreign policy is controlled by an external power, either *de facto* or *de jure*. The most common examples of this are colonial rule and military occupation (*e.g.* quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). Situations in which domestic actors provide *de jure* cover for *de facto* control by a foreign power should not be construed as semi-autonomy (*e.g.* Vichy France). Governments in exile that control underground forces waging unconventional warfare are not considered as mitigating an occupation regime (*e.g.* countries under German occupation during WWII).

1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to pursue an independent foreign policy course in some important areas. This may be the product of explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples would include Soviet strictures over rule in so-called "satellite" states in Eastern Europe, and explicitly negotiated postwar settlements (*e.g.* Austria following WWII).

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise foreign policy free of the direct control of external political actors. Direct control is meant to exclude the exercise of constraint or the impact of interdependence in the international system. Treaties in which states concede some part of that control to a supra- or international organization voluntarily, and from which there is a possibility of exit should not be interpreted as a violation of autonomy.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.20.8 State authority over territory (v2svstterr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v2svstterr

*Original tag:* v2svstterr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Over what percentage (percent) of the territory does the state have effective control?

CLARIFICATION: With this question we seek to judge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its territory. We are not interested here in perfect control by the state, or whether it is relatively effective in comparison to other states, but an assessment of the areas over which it is hegemonic, *e.g.* where it is recognized as the preeminent authority and in a contest of wills it can assert its control over political forces that reject its authority. Several illustrative examples may help in this coding. During civil wars the claim of the state to rule is effectively neutralized by insurgent groups (*e.g.*, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka). There are also situations in which criminals or warlords exert control in contravention of state authority (*e.g.* opium growers in parts of Indochina). There are also cases of failed states where the central government cannot assert control over a share of its territory (*e.g.*, contemporary Somalia). Here, we ask you to estimate the size of the territory that the state has effective control over, as a percentage (percent) of the total territory that is officially part of the country.

By "officially part of the country" we refer to international law. In cases where international law is not entirely clear, we refer you to general understandings. For example, China claims sovereignty over Taiwan, but it remains under the control of its own government. For purposes of this question, Taiwan should not be considered a failure to control its territory by the government of the PRC.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 1-6, 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bootstrapped.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2svindep is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.2.21 Historical V-Dem - Civil Liberty

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - Civil Liberty*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as



a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 2.2.21.1 Labor rights (v3cllabrig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3cllabrig

*Original tag:* v3cllabrig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does labor enjoy the right to organize freely and bargain collectively?

CLARIFICATION: Refers to actual practice not formal (*de jure*) rights. If practices vary across the country, or across sectors, please consider the overall situation of labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Independent labor unions (free from state or ruling party control) are not allowed.

1: Independent labor unions are allowed, at least in some sectors of the economy or some sections of the country. However, they are subject to harassment by the police, paramilitary groups, business associations, or other groups. Harassment refers to systematic beatings, imprisonment, outlawing of specific unions, and other actions that seriously impinge upon the ability of unions to organize and bargain collectively.

2: Independent labor unions are allowed and they do not face violent repression but the legal climate is not friendly (*e.g.*, "closed shop" rules are widespread), making it difficult to organize and bargain collectively.

3: Independent labor unions are allowed and may organize freely in all sectors of the economy.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.22 Historical V-Dem - Elections

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem Elections*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 2.2.22.1 Voting, voice or ballot (v3elbalpap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3elbalpap

*Original tag:* v3elbalpap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How are votes cast?

RESPONSES:

0: Votes are cast verbally (viva voce).

1: Both voice votes and paper ballots are used, but verbal voting is more common.

2: Voice voting and paper ballots are both common.

3: Both voice votes and paper ballots are used, but paper ballots are more common.

4: All votes are cast on paper ballots.

ORDERING: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following question (v3elbalstat), meaning: jump to v3elecsedf.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### **2.2.22.2 Ballot printing (v3elbalstat)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3elbalstat

*Original tag:* v3elbalstat

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Who prints ballot papers?

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if all or nearly all voting is verbal (viva voce).

RESPONSES:

0: Political parties or candidates print all (or nearly all) the ballot papers.

1: Both the state and parties or candidates print the ballot papers.

2: The state prints all (or nearly all) ballot papers.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3elbalpap is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### **2.2.22.3 Compulsory voting (H) (v3elcomvot)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3elcomvot

*Original tag:* v3elcomvot

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is voting compulsory (for those eligible to vote) in national elections?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced.

2: Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter.

3: Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.22.4 Secret ballot, de facto (v3elecsedf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3elecsedf

*Original tag:* v3elecsedf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are polling stations organized to guarantee voters a secret, anonymous choice?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Voters cannot make a secret, anonymous choice.

1: No. Some voters can make a secret, anonymous choice, but voting secrecy is in most instances violated.

2: Mixed. Voting secrecy and anonymity is assured to roughly the same extent as it is violated.

3: Yes. Most voters can make a secret, anonymous choice, but voting secrecy is in some instances violated.

4: Yes. All voters can make a secret, anonymous choice.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.22.5 Malapportionment legislature/lower chamber (v3elmalalc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3elmalalc

*Original tag:* v3elmalalc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Daniel Ziblatt

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there a large discrepancy in the vote/seat ratio across electoral districts for the lower (or unicameral) chamber?

CLARIFICATION: "Malapportionment" characterizes a situation in which voters in some districts have more power by virtue of a more favorable vote/seat ratio. For example, if seats have not been reapportioned in a long time rural areas may be over-represented relative to urban areas simply because the latter have grown more rapidly than the former. (This question does not address inequality of votes based on class or other criteria.) Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.

RESPONSES:

0: There is a high degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 50:1.

1: There is a substantial degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ as much as 10:1.

2: There is some degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 2:1.

3: There is modest or no malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by less than 2:1.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.22.6 Malapportionment upper chamber (v3elmalauc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3elmalauc

*Original tag:* v3elmalauc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Daniel Ziblatt

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the electoral system (including the size of electoral districts) involve large differences in the ratios of votes to representatives in elections for the upper chamber?

CLARIFICATION: This question does not address inequality of votes based on class or other criteria but only the relationship between votes and seats. Leave blank if no upper chamber.

RESPONSES:

0: There is a high degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 50:1.

1: There is a substantial degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ as much as 10:1.

2: There is some degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 2:1.

3: There is modest or no malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by less than 2:1.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.22.7 Reapportionment legislature/lower chamber (v3elreapplc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3elreapplc

*Original tag:* v3elreapplc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Daniel Ziblatt

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there a legal or constitutional statute, upheld in practice, stating that seats or electoral boundaries for elections to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature should be regularly reapportioned?

CLARIFICATION: Reapportionment is the process of reallocating the number of seats or the boundaries of a district in order to reflect its relative share of the population. Answering yes does not imply perfect apportionment (see later question). Leave blank if no lower (or unicameral) chamber. (This question is not about suffrage or informal restrictions to suffrage.)

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law but not upheld in practice.

2: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law and upheld in practice.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.22.8 Reapportionment upper chamber (v3elreappuc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3elreappuc

*Original tag:* v3elreappuc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Daniel Ziblatt

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there a legal or constitutional statute, upheld in practice, stating that seats or electoral boundaries for elections to the upper chamber of the legislature should be regularly reapportioned?

CLARIFICATION: Reapportionment is the process of reallocating the number of seats or the boundaries of a district in order to reflect its relative share of the population. Answering yes does not imply perfect apportionment (see later question). Leave blank if no upper chamber. (This question is not about suffrage or informal restrictions to suffrage.)

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law but not upheld in practice.

2: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law and upheld in practice.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.23 Historical V-Dem - Political Equality

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - Political Equality* section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

##### 2.2.23.1 Equal vote legislature/lower chamber (v3equavolc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3equavolc

*Original tag:* v3equavolc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are ballots in elections for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature counted differently for different social groups? (Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.

RESPONSES:

0: No. All ballots are counted equally, regardless of social group. [v3equavolc\_0]

1: Yes. There is a curial/estate voting system where voters are separated into categories by, for example, class criteria and assigned a disproportionate numbers of deputies. [v3equavolc\_1]

2: Yes. There is census/plural vote for particular groups (*e.g.*, votes cast by individuals with higher incomes or tax contributions are given more weight) [v3equavolc\_2]

3: Yes. Some voters are allowed to vote in several constituencies. [v3equavolc\_3]

SCALE: Nominal

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.2.23.2 Equal vote upper chamber (v3equavouc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3equavouc

*Original tag:* v3equavouc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are ballots in elections for the upper chamber of the national legislature counted differently for different social groups? (Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.

RESPONSES:

0: No. All ballots are counted equally, regardless of social group. [v3equavouc\_0]

1: Yes. There is a curial/estate voting system where voters are separated into categories by, for example, class criteria and assigned a disproportionate numbers of deputies. [v3equavouc\_1]

2: Yes. There is census/plural vote for particular groups (*e.g.*, votes cast by individuals with higher incomes or tax contributions are given more weight) [v3equavouc\_2]

3: Yes. Some voters are allowed to vote in several constituencies. [v3equavouc\_3]

SCALE: Nominal

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.2.24 Historical V-Dem - The Legislature

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - The Legislature*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also

includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 2.2.24.1 Lower chamber budget (v3lgbudglo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3lgbudglo

*Original tag:* v3lgbudglo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is the lower chamber of the legislature required to approve the budget?

CLARIFICATION: The budget refers to major revenue (appropriations) and expenditure (spending) bills. Typically, these are passed annually or bi-annually. Approval is understood to mean a formal vote on the floor of the chamber in which at least 50percent of those voting approve the measure.

RESPONSES:

0: No. Includes situations in which (a) there are no formal budget bills, or (b) the executive entirely by-passes the lower house or ignores its actions.

1: Yes. Includes situations in which (a) the executive exercises selective ("line-item") vetoes, and (b) there is a prolonged period in which no budget is passed and the executive is unable to raise and spend money, or must operate under the terms of the previous budget.

SCALE: Dichotomous

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.24.2 Upper chamber budget (v3lgbudgup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3lgbudgup

*Original tag:* v3lgbudgup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is the upper chamber of the legislature required to approve the budget?

CLARIFICATION: The budget refers to major revenue (appropriations) and expenditure (spending) bills. Typically, these are passed annually or bi-annually. Approval is understood to mean a formal vote on the floor of the chamber in which at least 50percent of those voting approve the measure.

RESPONSES:

0: No. Includes situations in which (a) there are no formal budget bills, or (b) the executive entirely by-passes the upper house or ignores its actions.

1: Yes. Includes situations in which (a) the executive exercises selective ("line-item") vetoes, and (b) there is a prolonged period in which no budget is passed and the executive is unable to raise and spend money, or must operate under the terms of the previous budget.

SCALE: Dichotomous

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*

(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.24.3 Lower chamber in session (v3lginses)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3lginses

*Original tag:* v3lginses

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: During the year, for how long was the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature in session?

CLARIFICATION: If there is only one session during the year, your answer should reflect the length of this session. If there are multiple sessions, your answer should reflect the total time spent in session, adding together the length of all session during the year.

RESPONSES:

0: It did not convene at all during the year.

1: It did convene, and was in session for less than 1 month, in total.

2: It did convene, and was in session for 1-2 months, in total.

3: It did convene, and was in session for 3-5 months, in total.

4: It did convene, and was in session for 6-8 months, in total.

5: It did convene, and was in session for 9 months or more, in total.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.24.4 Upper chamber in session (v3lginsesup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3lginsesup

*Original tag:* v3lginsesup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: During the year, for how long was the upper chamber of the legislature in session?

CLARIFICATION: If there is only one session during the year, your answer should reflect the length of this session. If there are multiple sessions, your answer should reflect the total time spent in session, adding together the length of all sessions during the year.

RESPONSES:

0: It did not convene at all during the year.

1: It did convene, and was in session for less than 1 month, in total.

2: It did convene, and was in session for 1-2 months, in total.

3: It did convene, and was in session for 3-5 months, in total.

4: It did convene, and was in session for 6-8 months, in total.

5: It did convene, and was in session for 9 months or more, in total.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).



YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.2.25 Historical V-Dem - Historical V-Dem Modified

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

V-Dem indicators that are different to their contemporary counterparts, for the purpose of gathering additional relevant information for the historical period in Historical V-Dem. These variables are also merged into their v2 equivalents.

First, In contrast to contemporary V-Dem, Historical V-Dem codes upper chamber elections and thus also includes eltype category 2. Those observations are treated as missing in the historical-contemporary merged version of v2eltype. Due to election specific variables being cleaned by v2eltype, these do not include upper chamber elections either. In order to include historical data on upper chamber elections we thus also provide v3eltype and v3 election specific variables that are cleaned by v3eltype.

Second, Historical V-Dem codes additional chambers compared to contemporary V-Dem. When merging v2lgbicam and v3lgbicam the categories get recoded as follows:

- Categories 3 (tricameral) and 4 (quadricameral) become category 2 for the merged v2lgbicam.
- Category 9 (Other types of legislature) becomes category 0 for the merged v2lgbicam.

In order to include historical data on additional chambers, we thus also provide v3lgbicam and v3 chamber specific variables that are cleaned by v3lgbicam.

#### 2.2.25.1 Lower chamber committees (v3lgcomslo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3lgcomslo

*Original tag:* v3lgcomslo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have a functioning committee system?

RESPONSES:

0: No, there are no committees.

1: Yes, but there are only special (not permanent) committees.

2: Yes, there are permanent committees, but they are not very significant in affecting the course of policy.

3: Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.25.2 Legislature corrupt activities (v3lgcrrpt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3lgcrrpt

*Original tag:* v3lgcrrpt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?

CLARIFICATION: This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.

Please make your best estimate, based upon what is known or suspected to be true.

RESPONSES:

0: Never, or hardly ever.

1: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.

2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.

3: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.

4: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.25.3 Legislature dominant chamber (v3lgdomchm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3lgdomchm

*Original tag:* v3lgdomchm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the legislature is bicameral, which chamber is dominant?

RESPONSES:

0: The lower chamber is clearly dominant.

1: The lower chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.

2: They are roughly co-equal in power.

3: The upper chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.

4: The upper chamber is clearly dominant.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.25.4 Legislature controls resources (v3lgfunds)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3lgfunds

*Original tag:* v3lgfunds

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal operations and the perquisites of its members?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature's operation depend on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive.  
1: Yes  
DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).  
CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0  
CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.25.5 Legislature investigates in practice (v3lginvstp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3lginvstp

*Original tag:* v3lginvstp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.

2: As likely as not.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.25.6 Lower chamber legislates in practice (v3lglegplo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3lglegplo

*Original tag:* v3lglegplo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### **2.2.25.7 Upper chamber legislates in practice (v3lglegpup)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3lglegpup

*Original tag:* v3lglegpup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the upper chamber of the legislature.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### **2.2.25.8 Legislature opposition parties (v3lgoppart)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3lgoppart

*Original tag:* v3lgoppart

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?

RESPONSES:

0: No, not at all.

1: Occasionally.

2: Yes, for the most part.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### **2.2.25.9 Executive oversight (v3lgotovst)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3lgotovst

*Original tag:* v3lgotovst

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.

2: Very uncertain.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### **2.2.25.10 Legislature questions officials in practice (v3lgqstexp)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3lgqstexp

*Original tag:* v3lgqstexp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?

CLARIFICATION: By "question" we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain its policies or testify.

RESPONSES:

0: No - never or very rarely.

1: Yes - routinely.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### **2.2.25.11 Lower chamber members serve in government (v3lgsrvlo)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3lgsrvlo

*Original tag:* v3lgsrvlo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, are members of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature able to serve simultaneously as ministers in the government?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

## 2.2.26 Historical V-Dem - Political Parties

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - Political Parties*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

### 2.2.26.1 Party identification (v3partyid)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3partyid

*Original tag:* v3partyid

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do voters identify with a political party?

CLARIFICATION: When party identification is strong, vote choice is largely determined by a voter's party affiliation (and his/her affiliation with that party) rather than attachments to particular candidates, non-partisan issue-positions, or material incentives (*e.g.*, vote-buying). Likewise, when party identification is strong, voters retain loyalty to a single party rather than switching from one party to another across elections or across offices in the same election (ticket-splitting). In this fashion we can somewhat crudely distinguish between partisans and non-partisans. Note that this question refers only to voters, not to members of the population who do not vote (because they are disenfranchised, choose not to vote, or are discouraged from voting). Leave this question blank if there are no national elections.

RESPONSES:

0: There are national elections, but there are no political parties.

1: Only one party is allowed to participate in national elections.

2: More than one party participates, and nearly all voters are non-partisans.

3: More than one party participates, and most voters are non-partisans.

4: More than one party participates, and voters are equally divided between partisans and non-partisans.

5: More than one party participates, and most voters are partisans.

6: More than one party participates, and nearly all voters are partisans.

SCALE: Nominal, but categories 2—6 constitute ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.2.27 Historical V-Dem - Sovereignty and State

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - Sovereignty and State*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 2.2.27.1 Rulers involvement in the state administration (v3struinvadm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3struinvadm

*Original tag:* v3struinvadm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Agnes Cornell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are day-to-day decisions made by state administrators subject to intervention from political elites?

CLARIFICATION: By political elites we mean members of the executive, members of the legislature and political elites at local and regional levels. Note that the focus on the day-to-day decisions of the state administration implies interference in specific operational decisions in a meticulous manner. Decisions taken by rulers about the general direction of the state administration should not be considered. Note that the question refers to the *de facto* situation.

RESPONSES:

0: Constantly. Day-to-day decisions taken by state administrators are constantly subject to intervention.

1: Often. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are often subject to intervention.

2: About half. Approximately half of the day-to-day decisions in the state administration are subject to intervention.

3: Occasionally. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are occasionally subject to intervention.

4: Never, or hardly ever. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are never or hardly ever subject to intervention.

SCALE: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.2.27.2 State steering capacity (v3ststeecap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_coder\_level\_v3ststeecap

*Original tag:* v3ststeecap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Can the state oversee and regulate the economy?

CLARIFICATION: This refers to the state's ability to keep track of economic activities in its territory and potentially influence them by shaping the incentives and constraints that private firms face to do business; *e.g.*, through licensing, granting exploitation rights, taxing, imposing market barriers, building infrastructure, offering subsidies, adjudicating conflicts, or enforcing regulations.

RESPONSES:

0: Most economic activities happen outside the reach of the state

1: The state steers some economic activities

2: The state steers a substantial share – but less than half – of the national economy

3: The state steers about half or more than half, of the national economy

4: The state steers all or almost all economic activities

SCALE: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

## 2.3 V-Dem Country-Year: V-Dem Full+Others

**Dataset tag:** `vdem_cy`

**Description:** All 483 V-Dem indicators and indices + 59 other indicators from other data sources. For R users, we recommend to install our `vdemdata` R package which includes the most recent V-Dem dataset and some useful functions to explore the data.

**Dataset citation:** Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Nazifa Alizada, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Katrin Kinzelbach, Joshua Krusell, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Oskar Rydén, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson and Daniel Ziblatt. 2022. "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v12" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds22>.

and:

Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Juraj Medzihorsky, Joshua Krusell, Farhad Miri, and Johannes von Römer. 2022. "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data". V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 7th edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.

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<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode>

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page: <https://www.v-dem.net/vdemds.html>

### 2.3.1 Identifier Variables in the V-Dem Datasets

Variables in this section identify the observations in the dataset.



**2.3.1.1 Country Name (country\_\_name)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_country\_name*Original tag:* country\_name*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Name of coded country.

CLARIFICATION: A V-Dem country is a political unit enjoying at least some degree of functional and/or formal sovereignty.

RESPONSES:

Text

NOTES: For more details on country units consult the *V-Dem Country Coding Units* document.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).**2.3.1.2 Country Name Abbreviation (country\_\_text\_id)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_country\_text\_id*Original tag:* country\_text\_id*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Abbreviated country names.

RESPONSES:

Text

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).**2.3.1.3 V-Dem Country ID (country\_\_id)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_country\_id*Original tag:* country\_id*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Unique country ID designated for each country.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

NOTES: A list of countries and their corresponding IDs used in the V-Dem dataset can be found in the country table in the codebook, as well as in the *V-Dem Country Coding Units* document.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).**2.3.1.4 Year (year)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_year*Original tag:* year*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Four-digit designation of the year for which an observation is given that ranges from the start to the end of the coding period.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

NOTES: This variable is included in the V-Dem Country Year as well as Country Date datasets.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).**2.3.1.5 Historical Date (historical\_\_date)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_historical\_date

*Original tag:* historical\_date

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Variable designating the date for which observation is given.

CLARIFICATION: The date is coded in YYYY-MM-DD format. December 31 observation always refers to the situation at the end of the year. There can be observations on other dates signifying other events, i.e. elections or executive appointments.

RESPONSES:

Date

NOTES: This variable is included in the V-Dem Country Date dataset.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 2.3.1.6 V-Dem Project (project)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_project

*Original tag:* project

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Indication what project team has coded country in respective year.

RESPONSES:

0: Contemporary.

1: Historical.

2: Both (overlap).

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 2.3.1.7 Historical V-Dem coding (historical)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_historical

*Original tag:* historical

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Binary indication whether the country in question has been coded by the team of Historical V-Dem project.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 2.3.1.8 Start of Coding Period (codingstart)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_codingstart

*Original tag:* codingstart

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Year in which coding of the country in question starts.

CLARIFICATION: V-Dem country coding starts in 1789, or from when a country first enjoyed at least some degree of functional and/or formal sovereignty.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

NOTES: For detailed information, please see the *V-Dem Country Coding Units* document.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 2.3.1.9 End of Coding Period (codingend)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_codingend

*Original tag:* codingend

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Either a maximum year of country coding period or the year when the country ceased to exist because it lost functional or formal sovereignty.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

NOTES: For more details about V-Dem country coding periods, please see the *V-Dem Country Coding Units* document.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### **2.3.1.10 Contemporary Start of Coding Period (codingstart\_contemp)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_codingstart\_contemp

*Original tag:* codingstart\_contemp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Year in which the coding of Contemporary V-Dem project starts.

CLARIFICATION: Variables from “Contemporary” project can have different question formulation, variable type, or number of coders as opposed to the “Historical” one.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### **2.3.1.11 Contemporary End of Coding Period (codingend\_contemp)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_codingend\_contemp

*Original tag:* codingend\_contemp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Year in which the coding of Contemporary V-Dem project ends.

CLARIFICATION: Variables from “Contemporary” project can have different question formulation, variable type, or number of coders as opposed to the “Historical” one.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### **2.3.1.12 Historical Start of Coding Period (codingstart\_hist)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_codingstart\_hist

*Original tag:* codingstart\_hist

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Year in which the coding of Historical V-Dem project starts.

CLARIFICATION: Variables from “Historical” project can have different question formulation, variable type, or number of coders as opposed to the “Contemporary” one.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### **2.3.1.13 Historical End of Coding Period (codingend\_hist)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_codingend\_hist

*Original tag:* codingend\_hist

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Year in which the coding of Historical V-Dem project ends.

CLARIFICATION: Variables from “Historical” project can have different question formulation, variable type, or number of coders as opposed to the “Contemporary” one.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 2.3.1.14 Gap index (gap\_index)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_gap\_index

*Original tag:* gap\_index

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

CLARIFICATION: Indication that party was not present in national legislature.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

#### 2.3.1.15 Country code (cowcode)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_cowcode

*Original tag:* COWcode

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Correlates of War (COW) project country codes.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SOURCE(S): Correlates of War Project (2017)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Correlates of War Project (2017)

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.2 V-Dem Democracy Indices - V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices

This section groups together macro-level indices that describe features of democracy at the highest (most abstract) level. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.3.2.1 Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_polyarchy

*Original tag:* v2x\_polyarchy

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media

capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy — liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_freexp\_altinf v2x\_frassoc\_thick v2x\_suffr v2xel\_frefair v2x\_elecoff

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. Release 1-5 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x\_frassoc\_thick), clean elections (v2xel\_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x\_freexp\_altinf), elected officials (v2x\_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x\_suffr) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation formulas in the literature, both allowing partial "compensation" in one sub-component for lack of polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to the "weakest link" argument. The aggregation is done at the level of Dahl's sub-components with the one exception of the non-electoral component. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v2x\_polyarchy &= .5 * MPI + .5 * API \\
 &= .5 * (v2x\_elecoff * v2xel\_frefair * v2x\_frassoc\_thick * \\
 &\quad * v2x\_suffr * v2x\_freexp\_altinf) \\
 &\quad + .5 * ((1/8) * v2x\_elecoff + (1/4) * v2xel\_frefair \\
 &\quad + (1/4) * v2x\_frassoc\_thick + (1/8) * v2x\_suffr \\
 &\quad + (1/4) * v2x\_freexp\_altinf)
 \end{aligned}$$

CITATION: Teorell *et al.* (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.2.2 Liberal Democracy Index (v2x\_libdem)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_libdem

*Original tag:* v2x\_libdem

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_liberal v2x\_polyarchy

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. Release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

AGGREGATION: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$v2x\_libdem =$

$.25 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x\_liberal + .5 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x\_liberal$

CITATION: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.2.3 Participatory Democracy Index (v2x\_partipdem)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_partipdem

*Original tag:* v2x\_partipdem

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_polyarchy v2x\_partip

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. Release 1-3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

AGGREGATION: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$v2x\_partipdem =$

$.25 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x\_partip + .5 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x\_partip$

CITATION: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.2.4 Deliberative Democracy Index (v2x\_delibdem)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_delibdem

*Original tag:* v2x\_delibdem

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of deliberative democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To make it a measure of not only the deliberative principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xdl\_delib v2x\_polyarchy

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. Release 1-3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

AGGREGATION: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$v2x\_delibdem =$

$.25 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2xdl\_delib + .5 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2xdl\_delib$

CITATION: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook*

(see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.2.5 Egalitarian Democracy Index (v2x\_egalDEM)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_egalDEM

*Original tag:* v2x\_egalDEM

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when 1 rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; and 2 resources are distributed equally across all social groups; 3 groups and individuals enjoy equal access to power. To make it a measure of egalitarian democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_egal v2x\_polyarchy

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. Release 1-4 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

AGGREGATION: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$v2x\_egalDEM =$

$.25 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x\_egal + .5 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x\_egal$

CITATION: Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); Coppedge *et al.* 2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.3 V-Dem Democracy Indices - V-Dem Mid-Level Indices: Components of the Democracy Indices

This section includes the V-Dem mid-level indices, subcomponents of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.3.3.1 Additive polyarchy index (v2x\_api)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_api

*Original tag:* v2x\_api

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_frassoc\_thick v2x\_suffr v2xel\_frefair v2x\_elecoff v2x\_freexp\_altinf

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is operationalized by taking the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x\_frassoc\_thick), clean elections (v2xel\_frefair),

freedom of expression (*v2x\_freexp\_altinf*), elected executive (*v2x\_elecoff*), and suffrage (*v2x\_suffr*). The weights are constructed so as to sum to 1 and weigh elected executive and suffrage half as much as the other three, respectively.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x\_api = (1/4) * v2x\_frassoc\_thick + (1/4) * v2xel\_frefair + (1/4) * v2x\_freexp\_altinf + (1/8) * v2x\_elecoff + (1/8) * v2x\_suffr$$

CITATION: Teorell *et al.* (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.3.2 Multiplicative polyarchy index (*v2x\_mpi*)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_mpi

*Original tag:* v2x\_mpi

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): *v2x\_frassoc\_thick* *v2x\_suffr* *v2xel\_frefair* *v2x\_elecoff* *v2x\_freexp\_altinf*

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link. Specifically, the index is formed by multiplying indices measuring freedom of association thick (*v2x\_frassoc\_thick*), clean elections (*v2xel\_frefair*), freedom of expression (*v2x\_freexp\_altinf*), elected executive (*v2x\_elecoff*), and suffrage (*v2x\_suffr*), or

$$v2x\_mpi = v2x\_frassoc\_thick * v2xel\_frefair * v2x\_freexp\_altinf * v2x\_elecoff * v2x\_suffr$$

CITATION: Teorell *et al.* (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.3.3 Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information Index (*v2x\_freexp\_altinf*)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_freexp\_altinf

*Original tag:* v2x\_freexp\_altinf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

CLARIFICATION: This index includes all variables in the two indices *v2x\_freexp* and *v2xme\_altinf*.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): *v2mecenefm* *v2meharjrn* *v2meslfcen* *v2xcl\_disc* *v2clacfree* *v2mebias* *v2mecrit* *v2merange*

DATA RELEASE: 4-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media censorship effort (*v2mecenefm*), harassment of journalists (*v2meharjrn*), media bias (*v2mebias*), media self-censorship (*v2meslfcen*),



print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange), freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), and freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.3.4 Freedom of association index (thick) (v2x\_frassoc\_thick)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_frassoc\_thick

*Original tag:* v2x\_frassoc\_thick

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken, Michael Bernhard, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2x\_elecreg

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. Release 1-3 used a different aggregation formula for the thinner index v2x\_frassoc.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x\_elecreg.

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.3.5 Share of population with suffrage (v2x\_suffr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_suffr

*Original tag:* v2x\_suffr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What share of adult citizens as defined by statute has the legal right to vote in national elections?

CLARIFICATION: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal *de jure* restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice *de facto*. The adult population as defined by statute is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded as 100percent. Universal male suffrage only is coded as 50percent. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0percent. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or 'economic independence', estimates have been calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc., secondary country-specific sources, and — in the case of very poor information — the conditions in similar countries or colonies. The scores reflect *de jure* provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of

the calendar year the law was enacted.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2elsuffrage

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: v2elsuffrage/100

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.3.6 Clean elections index (v2xel\_frefair)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xel\_frefair

*Original tag:* v2xel\_frefair

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan Lindberg, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are elections free and fair?

CLARIFICATION: Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elvotbuy v2elirreg v2elintim v2elpeace v2elfrfair v2x\_elecreg

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap), election voter registry (v2elrgstry), election vote buying (v2elvotbuy), election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), non-state electoral violence (v2elpeace), and election free and fair (v2elfrfair). Since the bulk of these indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x\_elecreg. If a country is recorded as an electoral regime (v2x\_elecreg) at the beginning of the time series until the first election that we record, then the scores for this election are backfilled towards the beginning of the time series.

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.3.7 Elected officials index (v2x\_elecoff)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_elecoff

*Original tag:* v2x\_elecoff

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections?

CLARIFICATION: This index attempts to measure (a) whether the chief executive is elected, either directly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive; and (b) whether the legislature, in presidential systems with a directly elected president that is also chief executive, is directly or indirectly elected. Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, "appointment" by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss. This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): v2ex\_elechos v2ex\_elechog v2exdfcbhs\_rec v2ex\_hosw v2xex\_elecleg v2lgbicam v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lginello v2lginelup v2exaphos v2expathhs v2exaphogp v2expathhg v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdsghg v2exhoshog v2exapupap v2exapup

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. 1-3 preliminary aggregation formula, 4-6 as v2x\_accex, 7 renamed to v2x\_elecoff and modified aggregation, 8.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed in two steps. First, there are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in constructing this index, all of which are scaled to vary from 0 to 1. First, whether the head of state is directly elected  $a = 1$  or not  $a = 0$ . Second, the extent to which the legislature is popularly elected  $b$ . If the legislature is unicameral,  $b$  is measured as the proportion of legislators directly elected + half of the proportion that are indirectly elected. If the legislature is bicameral and the upper house is involved in the appointment of the chief executive, the same proportion of directly and half of the indirectly elected legislators is calculated for the upper house; the scores for the lower and upper houses are then averaged. Third, whether the head of state is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of state  $c1 = 1$ , otherwise 0. Fourth, whether the head of government is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of government  $c2 = 1$ , otherwise 0. Fifth, whether the head of government is appointed by the head of state  $d = 1$  or not  $d = 0$ . Sixth, whether the head of government is directly elected  $e = 1$  or not  $e = 0$ .

In the second step, the extent to which the legislature is elected ( $b$ ) is also independently taken into account in order to penalize presidential systems with unelected legislatures, or legislatures with a large share of presidential appointees, for example.

Define  $hosw$  as the weight for the head of state. If the head of state is also head of government  $v2exhoshog = 1$ ,  $hosw = 1$ . If the head of state has more power than the head of government over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, then  $hosw = 1$ ; if the reverse is true,  $hosw = 0$ . If they share equal power,  $hosw = .5$ . Define the weight for the head of government as  $hogw = 1 - hosw$ . The formula then is:

$$v2x\_elecoff = \&hosw \times \max(a1, b \times c1) + hogw \times \max(a \times d, b \times c1 \times d, e, b \times c2),$$

unless the head of state is directly elected ( $v2ex\_elechos = 1$ ) and the chief executive ( $v2ex\_hosw = 1$ ), in case of which:

$$v2x\_elecoff = \&[hosw \times \max(a1, b \times c1) + hogw \times \max(a \times d, b \times c1 \times d, e, b \times c2) + b]/2)$$

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.3.8 Liberal Component Index (v2x\_liberal)

Long tag: vdem\_cy\_v2x\_liberal

Original tag: v2x\_liberal

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xcl\_rol v2x\_jucon v2xlg\_legcon v2lgbicam

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equality before the law and individual liberties (v2xcl\_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x\_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive (v2xlg\_legcon). Prior to the calculation v2xlg\_legcon gets set to 0 whenever v2lgbicam is 0.

CITATION: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.3.9 Equality before the law and individual liberty index (v2xcl\_rol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xcl\_rol

*Original tag:* v2xcl\_rol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2xcl\_acjst v2xcl\_prpty v2cltort v2clkill v2xcl\_slave v2clrelig v2clfmov v2xcl\_dmove

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for men/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), freedom from torture (v2cltort), freedom from political killings (v2clkill), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmov), and freedom of domestic movement for men/women (v2cldmovew, v2cldmovew).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.3.10 Judicial constraints on the executive index (v2x\_jucon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_jucon

*Original tag:* v2x\_jucon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exrescon v2jucomp v2juhccomp v2juhcind v2juncind

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), and lower court independence (v2juncind).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.3.11 Legislative constraints on the executive index (v2xlg\_legcon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xlg\_legcon

*Original tag:* v2xlg\_legcon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are the legislature and government agencies *e.g.*, comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2lgqstexp v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgoppart

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

### 2.3.3.12 Participatory Component Index (v2x\_partip)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_partip

*Original tag:* v2x\_partip

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the participatory principle achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_cspart v2xdd\_dd v2xel\_locelec v2xel\_regelec

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: civil society participation (v2x\_cspart), elected local government power (v2xel\_locelec) or elected regional government power (v2xel\_regelec) — whichever has higher score — and direct popular vote (v2xdd\_dd).

CITATION: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.3.13 Civil society participation index (v2x\_cspart)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_cspart

*Original tag:* v2x\_cspart

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymakers; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative

candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?

CLARIFICATION: The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations CSOs. CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations if they are engaged in civic or political activities, social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.

The core civil society index CCSI is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2csptrcpt v2csgender

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for candidate selection — national/local (v2pscnslnl), CSO consultation (v2cscnsult), CSO participatory environment (v2csptrcpt), and CSO women participation (v2csgender).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.3.14 Direct Popular Vote Index (v2xdd\_dd)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xdd\_dd

*Original tag:* v2xdd\_dd

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: To what extent is the direct popular vote utilized?

CLARIFICATION: Direct popular voting refers here to an institutionalized process by which citizens of a region or country register their choice or opinion on specific issues through a ballot. It is intended to embrace initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites, as those terms are usually understood. It captures some aspects of the more general concept of direct democracy at the national level. The term does not encompass recall elections, deliberative assemblies, or settings in which the vote is not secret or the purview is restricted. Likewise, it does not apply to elections for representatives.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2ddlexci v2ddsigpci v2ddsiglci v2ddsigdci v2ddpartci v2ddapprci v2ddspmc i v2ddadmci v2ddyrci v2ddlexrf v2ddsigprf v2ddsigdrf v2ddpartrf v2ddapprrf v2ddspmr f v2ddadmrf v2ddyrrf v2ddpartpl v2ddapprpl v2ddspmpl v2ddadmpl v2ddlexpl v2ddy rpl v2ddlexor v2ddpartor v2ddappor v2ddspmor v2ddadmor v2ddyror v2ddthreor v2ddthrer f v2ddthrepl

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. New aggregation formula in version 7.

AGGREGATION: This index results from the addition of the weighted scores of each type of popular votes studied (popular initiatives  $\times 1.5$ , referendums  $\times 1.5$ , plebiscites, and obligatory referendums). Each type of popular vote receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of two terms (easiness of initiation and easiness of approval), where each term obtains a maximum value of one. As we are studying four types of popular votes, the minimum value is 0, and the maximum is 8. In the v2xdd\_dd all scores are normalized to range between 0 and 1. For an elaboration of the weighting factor of each component, see: Altman, David. 2017.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd\_dd = \&(v2xdd\_i\_ci) \times 1.5 + (v2xdd\_i\_rf) \times 1.5$$

$$\& + (v2xdd\_i\_pl) + (v2xdd\_i\_or)$$

Regarding each type of citizen initiated popular vote (i.e., popular initiative), the ease of initiation is measured by (a) the existence of a direct democracy process (*v2ddlexci*), (b) the number of signatures needed (*v2ddsigpci*), and (c) time-limits to circulate the signatures (*v2ddsigdci*). Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by (a) participation quorum (*v2ddsigdci*), (b) approval quorum (*v2ddpartci*), and (c) supermajority (*v2ddspmc*). The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority (*v2ddadmci*). Consequences are measured by (a) the legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or merely consultative) (*v2ddlexci*), and (b) the frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past (*v2ddthreci*). The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd\_dd = \&[(IF\ v2ddlexci > 0, 1, 0) \times (1 - (v2ddsigpci)) \times (IF\ v2ddsigdci$$

$$\& = 0, 1, .5 + (2 \times v2ddsigdci/365)) +$$

$$\&(v2ddsigdci) \cap (v2ddpartci) \cap (v2ddspmc)]$$

$$\& \times (0.5 + ((100 - v2ddadmci)/100))/2]$$

$$\& \times (IF\ v2ddlexci = 2, 1, IF\ v2ddlexci = 1, 0.75, v2ddlexci = 0, 0)$$

$$\& \times (IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful\ event < 6,$$

$$\&v2ddthreci = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06\ units\ per\ year$$

$$\&until\ 0.1; if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful$$

$$\&during\ the\ first\ years\ v2ddapprci$$

$$\& = 0.9, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.1\ units\ per\ year\ until\ 0.1)$$

In case the vote originates from above (i.e., authorities), there is no need to account for *v2ddsigpci* and *v2ddsigdci*. For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, (*v2ddsigdci*)  $\cap$  (*v2ddpartci*)  $\cap$  (*v2ddspmc*), see Altman, David. 2017.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.3.15 Local government index (*v2xel\_locelec*)

*Long tag:* *vdem\_cy\_v2xel\_locelec*

*Original tag:* *v2xel\_locelec*

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Are there elected local governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

CLARIFICATION: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the local level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body. A high score would be accorded to a country in which local governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local level with the exception of judicial bodies. Naturally, local governments remain subordinate to the regional and national governments.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2ellocelc v2ellocpwr v2ellocgov

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: First, local government elected (v2ellocelc) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected.

This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1. v2xel\_locelec is set to 0 whenever v2ellocgov is 0 (there is no local government).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.3.16 Regional government index (v2xel\_regelec)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xel\_regelec

*Original tag:* v2xel\_regelec

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Are there elected regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level?

CLARIFICATION: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected regional governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected regional governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the regional level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body. A high score would be accorded to a country in which regional governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the regional level with the exception of judicial bodies. Naturally, regional governments remain subordinate to the national government.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2elsrgel v2elrgpwr v2elreggov

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: First, regional government elected (v2elsrgel) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected.

This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1. v2xel\_regelec is set to 0 whenever v2elreggov is 0 (there is no regional government).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.3.17 Deliberative Component Index (v2xdl\_delib)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xdl\_delib

*Original tag:* v2xdl\_delib

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D



PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion.

To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2dlreason v2dlcommon v2dlcountr v2dlconslt v2dlengage

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: reasoned justification (v2dlreason), common good justification (v2dlcommon), respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr), range of consultation (v2dlconslt), and engaged society (v2dlengage).

CITATION: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

### 2.3.3.18 Egalitarian Component Index (v2x\_egal)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_egal

*Original tag:* v2x\_egal

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the egalitarian principle achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when 1 rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; 2 resources are distributed equally across all social groups; and 3 access to power is equally distributed by gender, socioeconomic class and social group.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xeg\_eqprotec v2xeg\_eqaccess v2xeg\_eqdr

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. Release 1-4 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula, 5-8 modified aggregation formula including v2xeg\_eqaccess.

AGGREGATION: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equal protection index (v2xeg\_eqprotec), equal access index (v2xeg\_eqaccess) and equal distribution of resources (v2xeg\_eqdr).

CITATION: Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); Coppedge *et al.* 2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.3.19 Equal protection index (v2xeg\_eqprotec)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xeg\_eqprotec

*Original tag:* v2xeg\_eqprotec

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How equal is the protection of rights and freedoms across social groups by the state?

CLARIFICATION: Equal protection means that the state grants and protects rights and freedoms evenly across social groups. To achieve equal protection of rights and freedoms, the state itself must not interfere in the ability of groups to participate and it must also take action to ensure that rights and freedoms of one social group are not threatened by the actions of another group or individual.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2clacjust v2clsocgrp v2clsnlpct

DATA RELEASE: 5-12. Release 7 modified excluding v2xcl\_acjst.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for social class equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clacjust), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp) and percent of population with weaker civil liberties (v2clsnlpct); reversed scale.

CITATION: Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.3.20 Equal access index (v2xeg\_eqaccess)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xeg\_eqaccess

*Original tag:* v2xeg\_eqaccess

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How equal is access to power?

CLARIFICATION: The Equal Access subcomponent is based on the idea that neither the protections of rights and freedoms nor the equal distribution of resources is sufficient to ensure adequate representation. Ideally, all groups should enjoy equal *de facto* capabilities to participate, to serve in positions of political power, to put issues on the agenda, and to influence policymaking.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2pepwrngen v2pepwr soc v2pepwr ses

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by socioeconomic position (v2pepwr ses), power distributed by social group (v2pepwr soc), and power distributed by gender (v2pepwr gen).

CITATION: Sigman and Lindberg (2017); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.3.21 Equal distribution of resources index (v2xeg\_eqdr)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xeg\_eqdr

*Original tag:* v2xeg\_eqdr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How equal is the distribution of resources?

CLARIFICATION: This component measures the extent to which resources — both tangible

and intangible — are distributed in society. An equal distribution of resources supports egalitarian democracy in two ways. First, lower poverty rates and the distribution of goods and services such as food, water, housing, education and healthcare ensure that all individuals are capable of participating in politics and government. In short, basic needs must be met in order for individuals to effectively exercise their rights and freedoms see, for example, Sen 1999, Maslow 1943. Second, high levels of resource inequality undermine the ability of poorer populations to participate meaningfully Aristotle, Dahl 2006. Thus, it is necessary to include not only measures of poverty and the distribution of goods and services, but also the levels of inequality in these distributions, and the proportion of the population who are not eligible for social services *i.e.* means-tests, particularistic distribution, etc.. This principle also implies that social or economic inequalities can translate into political inequalities, an issue addressed most notably by Walzer 1983, who argues that overlapping "spheres" of inequality are particularly harmful to society. To address these overlapping "spheres", this component also includes measures of the distribution of power in society amongst different socio-economic groups, genders, etc.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2dlencmps v2dlunivl v2peedueq v2pehealth

DATA RELEASE: 5, 7-12. Release 7 modified: v2pepwrses, v2pepwrsoc and v2pepwrgen now form a separate subcomponent index.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for particularistic or public goods v2dlencmps, means tested vs. universalistic welfare policies v2dlunivl, educational equality v2peedueq and health equality v2pehealth.

CITATION: Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.4 V-Dem Indicators - Elections

**Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys) Elections:** Among national elections we distinguish elections to: (i) the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature (including constituent or constitutional assemblies), (ii) the upper chamber of the legislature, and (iii) the presidency. For present purposes an executive who is elected by a legislature is considered a *prime minister*, not a president. In order to be considered a *president*, an executive must, under ordinary circumstances, be chosen directly by the electorate (perhaps mediated by an electoral college).

**Non-election specific coding:** The following questions are not election-specific and should be coded for every year from 1900 (or when applicable) to the present.

**Election specific questions:** The following questions pertain to specific national elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date. If you have coded for V-Dem in the past, your previous scores will be displayed in the survey. You are welcome to revise previously submitted scores in all surveys. For this section, we kindly ask you make sure that you have coded all election years.

**Election specific questions – Historical clarification:** The following questions pertain to specific national elections. National elections include elections to the presidency (if applicable) and legislature (lower and upper house, whatever applies), whether direct or indirect, as well as constituent assembly elections. It does not include other elections, *e.g.*, subnational elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referendums, or by-elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date."

**Subnational elections and offices:** This section of the survey asks a small number of questions about *subnational* elections and offices. You will be instructed to identify two subnational levels, referred to as "regional government" and "local government". Questions in this section should be answered for every year, rather than for specific elections.

**Lower chamber election:** The following questions pertain to specific lower chamber or

unicameral legislative elections. The dates of these elections have been pre-coded.

#### **Executive and legislative versions of Election specific variables**

- In order to subset election specific variables for executive elections only (previously \*\_ex) – keep only those observations where v2xel\_elecpres is 1.
- In order to subset election specific variables for legislative elections only (previously \*\_leg) – keep only those observations where v2xel\_elecparl is 1.

#### **2.3.4.1 Election type (v2eltype)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2eltype

*Original tag:* v2eltype

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: What type of election was held on this date?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply. Whenever possible, specify the exact date of each election. If the election unfolds across more than one day, enter the date for the first day. If the precise date is unavailable, enter the first of the month; if the month is unknown, enter January 1. Multiple-round elections (*e.g.*, two-round elections) are counted separately. (More than one election in a single year can be accommodated.)

RESPONSES:

0: Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_0]

1: Legislative, lower, sole, or both chambers, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_1]

2: Legislative, upper chamber only, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_2] (Not yet coded)

3: Legislative, upper chamber only, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_3] (Not yet coded)

4: Constituent Assembly, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_4]

5: Constituent Assembly, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_5]

6: Presidential, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_6]

7: Presidential, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_7]

8: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_8] (Not yet coded)

9: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_9] (Not yet coded)

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple selection.

SOURCE(S): NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IFES; IDEA; Reif (2011, 2012); Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers 2007); *Keesings Records*; *CIA Factbook*; Wikipedia.

NOTES: All direct elections and elections by an electoral college that is elected by the people and has the sole purpose of electing an executive or members of parliament are coded. Note that single-party elections, elections held under limited suffrage and for only parts of a parliament, as well as elections of which the results are subsequently cancelled are included. Elections for constituent assemblies that come to perform functions beyond drafting and adopting a new constitution (*e.g.* legislating, electing president, adopting budget, etc) are also included and coded under category 0 and 1 (Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers; first or second round). Excluded are elections that are not decisive, i. e. when the HOS alone is selecting the candidate(s). The variable includes elections where results were declared invalid after the fact, *e.g.* by a constitutional court, since they also provide information on the quality of democracy.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.3.4.2 Suffrage (v2asuffrage)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2asuffrage

*Original tag:* v2asuffrage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised adults older than the minimal voting age?

CLARIFICATION: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, being in the military service or being legally incompetent.

This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see v2x\_elecrag), v2asuffrage is zero while v2elsuffrage may still be 100.

The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Bilinski (2015); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); constituteproject.org; v2x\_elecrag.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.4.3 Minimum voting age (v2elage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elage

*Original tag:* v2elage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Megan Reif

QUESTION: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote in national elections?

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): IFES; IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Furtak (1990); KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Paxton *et al.* (2003); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012). See Reif GVED and Reif EDATES (2011, 2012 for additional country-specific sources).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.4 Compulsory voting (v2elcomvot)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elcomvot

*Original tag:* v2elcomvot

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: Is voting compulsory (for those eligible to vote) in national elections?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced.  
 2: Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter.  
 3: Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.  
 SCALE: Ordinal.  
 SOURCE(S): IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Constitute Project; IPU Parline; V-Dem Country coordinators.  
 NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.  
 DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
 COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
 CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
 YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.4.5 Female suffrage restricted (v2elfemrst)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elfemrst

*Original tag:* v2elfemrst

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Are women eligible to vote in national elections?

CLARIFICATION: If there are no (direct) national elections, observations are not coded (missing).

RESPONSES:

0: No female suffrage. No women are allowed to vote, but some or all males vote.

1: Restricted female suffrage. Some women are allowed to vote, and face more or different restrictions than men

2: Universal female suffrage. All women are allowed to vote.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Paxton *et al.* (2003); Paxton *et al.* (2008); Reif (GVED).

DATA RELEASE: 1-6, 10-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.6 Suffrage level (v2elgvsuffvl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elgvsuffvl

*Original tag:* v2elgvsuffvl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Megan Reif

QUESTION: What is the level of suffrage practiced?

CLARIFICATION: Note that this question applies to citizens only. Note also that we are interested in legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). In cases where married people are allowed to vote at a younger age than single people, the higher (older) age minimum for single voters is given (see v2elage).

RESPONSES:

0: Indirect suffrage and/or offices filled by appointment only

1: Propertied ethnic males

2: Ethnic males

3: Propertied/educated males

4: Ethnic males and females

5: Propertied/educated males and females

6: All males

7: Spatially variant

8: Universal  
 9: Occupational categories/Party membership  
 10: Only citizens of colonial metropole  
 11: Propertied/tax-paying colons and non-colons  
 12: Propertied males and military females  
 13: Propertied/landowning households  
 14: All households  
 15: All males and married Females  
 16: Age differential: Married people vote at younger age than single  
 SCALE: Nominal.  
 SOURCE(S): IFES; IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Furtak (1990); KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); IPU; constituteproject.org. See Reif GVED and Reif EDATES (2011, 2012 for additional country-specific sources).  
 DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
 COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
 DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).  
 CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
 YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.4.7 Percent of population with suffrage (v2elsuffrage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elsuffrage

*Original tag:* v2elsuffrage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What percentage (percent) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

CLARIFICATION: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, being in the military service or being legally incompetent. It covers legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies.

Universal suffrage is coded as 100percent. Universal male suffrage is only coded as 50percent. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0percent. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or 'economic independence'), estimates have been calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information (on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.), secondary country-specific sources, and — in the case of very poor information — the conditions in similar countries or colonies.

The scores reflect *de jure* provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); country-specific sources.

NOTES: In Version 3 of the dataset this variable was re-coded from scratch based on the modified criteria reflected in the clarification section (above).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
 YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.8 Fraud allegations by Western election monitors (v2elwestmon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elwestmon

*Original tag:* v2elwestmon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Were there allegations of significant vote-fraud by any Western monitors?

CLARIFICATION: If there were no Western monitors, or no international monitors, this variable is coded as missing.

RESPONSES:

0: No/Unclear

1: Yes

SOURCE(S): NELDA 47 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IDEA; websites by Western election monitors.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1945-2021

#### 2.3.4.9 Female suffrage (most can vote) (v2fsuffrage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2fsuffrage

*Original tag:* v2fsuffrage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised female adults older than the minimal voting age?

CLARIFICATION: This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see v2x\_elecreg), v2fsuffrage is zero while v2elsuffrage may still be 100.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Bilinski (2015); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); constituteproject.org; v2x\_elecreg.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.4.10 Male suffrage (most can vote) (v2msuffrage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2msuffrage

*Original tag:* v2msuffrage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised male adults older than the minimal voting age?

CLARIFICATION: This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was



interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see `v2x_elecreg`), `v2msuffrage` is zero while `v2elsuffrage` may still be 100.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Bilinski (2015); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); [constituteproject.org](http://constituteproject.org); `v2x_elecreg`.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.4.11 Disclosure of campaign donations (`v2eldonate`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_cy_v2eldonate`

*Original tag:* `v2eldonate`

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: `*_osp`, `*_ord`, `*_codelow`, `*_codehigh`, `*_sd`, `*_mean`, `*_nr`

QUESTION: Are there disclosure requirements for donations to national election campaigns?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There are no disclosure requirements.

1: Not really. There are some, possibly partial, disclosure requirements in place but they are not observed or enforced most of the time.

2: Ambiguous. There are disclosure requirements in place, but it is unclear to what extent they are observed or enforced.

3: Mostly. The disclosure requirements may not be fully comprehensive (some donations not covered), but most existing arrangements are observed and enforced.

4: Yes. There are comprehensive requirements and they are observed and enforced almost all the time.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.3.4.12 Public campaign finance (`v2elpubfin`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_cy_v2elpubfin`

*Original tag:* `v2elpubfin`

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: `*_osp`, `*_ord`, `*_codelow`, `*_codehigh`, `*_sd`, `*_mean`, `*_nr`

QUESTION: Is significant public financing available for parties' and/or candidates' campaigns for national office?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Public financing is not available.

1: Little. There is public financing but it is so small or so restricted that it plays a minor role in most parties' campaigns.

2: Ambiguous. There is some public financing available but it is unclear whether it plays a significant role for parties.

3: Partly. Public financing plays a significant role in the campaigns of many parties.

4: Yes. Public financing funds a significant share of expenditures by all, or nearly all parties.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.3.4.13 EMB autonomy (v2elembaut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elembaut

*Original tag:* v2elembaut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?

CLARIFICATION: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

RESPONSES:

0: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other *de facto* ruling body.

1: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the *de facto* ruling body.

2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election.

3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the *de facto* ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections.

4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.14 EMB capacity (v2elembcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elembcap

*Original tag:* v2elembcap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election?

CLARIFICATION: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

RESPONSES:

0: No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the

organization across the territory.

1: Not really. Deficits are not glaring but they nonetheless seriously compromised the organization of administratively well-run elections in many parts of the country.

2: Ambiguous. There might be serious deficiencies compromising the organization of the election but it could also be a product of human errors and co-incidence or other factors outside the control of the EMB.

3: Mostly. There are partial deficits in resources but these are neither serious nor widespread.

4: Yes. The EMB has adequate staff and other resources to administer a well-run election.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.3.4.15 Elections multiparty (v2elmulpar)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elmulpar

*Original tag:* v2elmulpar

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Was this national election multiparty?

RESPONSES:

0: No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few parties are legal but they are all *de facto* controlled by the dominant party).

1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency.

2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained — legally or informally.

3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (*de jure* or *de facto*) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory.

4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (*e.g.* far-right/left extremist parties, anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.16 Election voter registry (v2elrgstry)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elrgstry

*Original tag:* v2elrgstry

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There was no registry, or the registry was not used.

1: No. There was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20percent or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised or the outcome could have been affected significantly by double-voting and impersonation).

2: Uncertain. There was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes.

3: Yes, somewhat. The registry was imperfect but less than 10percent of eligible voters may have been disenfranchised, and double-voting and impersonation could not have affected the results significantly.

4: Yes. The voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 1percent of voters were affected by any flaws) and it was applied in a reasonable fashion.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.17 Election vote buying (v2elvotbuy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elvotbuy

*Original tag:* v2elvotbuy

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?

CLARIFICATION: Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, *i.e.*, "porkbarrel" legislation.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties.

2: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an 'entry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded.

3: Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.

4: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.18 Election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elirreg

*Original tag:* v2elirreg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was there evidence of other *intentional* irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud?

CLARIFICATION: Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions).

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country.

2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups.

3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups' access to participation.

4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.4.19 Election government intimidation (v2elintim)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elintim

*Original tag:* v2elintim

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents?

CLARIFICATION: Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should *not* be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately).

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet.

1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period.

2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated — harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents.

3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups.

4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

*V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.20 Election other electoral violence (v2elpeace)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elpeace

*Original tag:* v2elpeace

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types (*not* by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees.

1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily.

2: Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small.

3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured.

4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.3.4.21 Election boycotts (v2elboycot)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elboycot

*Original tag:* v2elboycot

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, did any registered opposition candidates or parties boycott?

CLARIFICATION: A boycott is a deliberate and public refusal to participate in an election by a candidate or party who is eligible to participate.

RESPONSES:

0: Total. All opposition parties and candidates boycotted the election.

1: Significant. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but they constituted a major opposition force.

2: Ambiguous. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but it is unclear whether they would have constituted a major electoral force.

3: Minor. A few opposition parties or candidates boycotted and they were relatively insignificant ones.

4: Nonexistent. No parties or candidates boycotted the elections.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.22 Election free campaign media (v2elfrcamp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elfrcamp

*Original tag:* v2elfrcamp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, did parties or candidates receive either free or publicly financed access to national broadcast media?

RESPONSES:

0: Either no parties or only the governing party receives free access.

1: Some parties in addition to the governing party receive free access.

2: All parties receive free access.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.4.23 Election paid campaign advertisements (v2elpdcamp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elpdcamp

*Original tag:* v2elpdcamp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, were parties or candidates able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor the government and its allies.

2: It is permitted without limit.

3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster fair competition.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.3.4.24 Election paid interest group media (v2elpaidig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elpaidig

*Original tag:* v2elpaidig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this election, were interest groups and individuals able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor groups allied with the government.

2: It is permitted without limit.

3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster representation of diverse perspectives.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.3.4.25 Election free and fair (v2elfrfair)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elfrfair

*Original tag:* v2elfrfair

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?

CLARIFICATION: The only thing that should *not* be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately).

RESPONSES:

0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (*i.e.*, who became president; or who won the legislative majority).

1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (*i.e.*, who became president; or who won the legislative majority).

2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above).

3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above).

4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.



SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.26 Election domestic election monitors (v2eldommon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2eldommon

*Original tag:* v2eldommon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: In this national election, were election monitors from all parties and independent domestic election monitors allowed to monitor the vote at polling stations across the country?

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

SCALE: Dichotomous.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.4.27 Election international monitors (v2elintmon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elintmon

*Original tag:* v2elintmon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: In this national election, were international election monitors present?

RESPONSES:

0: No/Unclear

1: Yes

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): NELDA 45 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IDEA; websites by international election monitors.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.4.28 Election international monitors denied (v2elmonden)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elmonden

*Original tag:* v2elmonden

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: In this national election, were some international election monitors denied opportunity to be present by the government holding the election?

RESPONSES:

0: No/Unclear

1: Yes

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): NELDA 48 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IDEA; websites by international election monitors.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1915-2021

#### 2.3.4.29 Monitors refuse to be present (v2elmonref)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elmonref

*Original tag:* v2elmonref

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Did any monitors refuse to go to an election because they believed that it would not be free and fair?

RESPONSES:

0: No/Unclear

1: Yes

SOURCE(S): NELDA 49 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); websites of election monitors.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1915-2021

#### 2.3.4.30 Candidate restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (v2elrstrct)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elrstrct

*Original tag:* v2elrstrct

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Is the eligibility of candidates for national legislative office (when elected) formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

CLARIFICATION: Language restriction should be understood as a restriction of spoken language, not literacy.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.

1: No, there are no such restrictions or the candidates are not elected.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem country coordinators; Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v221, v250; Constitute Project; ACE Electoral Knowledge Network.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.4.31 Election losers accept results (v2elaccept)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elaccept

*Original tag:* v2elaccept

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this national election within three months?

RESPONSES:

0: None. None of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results the election, or all opposition was banned.

1: A few. Some but not all losing parties or candidates accepted the results but those who constituted the main opposition force did not.

2: Some. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results but it is unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively insignificant.

3: Most. Many but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results and those who did not had little electoral support.

4: All. All parties and candidates accepted the results.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.32 Election assume office (v2elasmoff)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elasmoff

*Original tag:* v2elasmoff

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Following this national election, did winners assume office according to prescribed constitutional rules and norms?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The official winner of the election was prevented from assuming office by *unconstitutional* means.

1: Partially. The official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter was forced at least in part by unconstitutional means to share power, or delay assuming power for more than 6 months.

2: Yes. Constitutional rules and norms were followed and the official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter assumed office accordingly (or continued in office).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: The question text between contemporary and historical differ in inclusion of "within 12 months of the election". In contemporary it is excluded while included in historical.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.33 Election turnout (v2eltrnout)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2eltrnout

*Original tag:* v2eltrnout

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: In this national election, what percentage (percent) of all registered voters cast a vote according to official results?

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SOURCE(S): IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IPU Parline; Election Guide.

NOTES: In cases where executive and legislative elections were held on the same day but there is a different turnout for each election, the turnout for this date is coded for the executive elections only. The turnout data for the legislative elections, in these cases, can be found in the IDEA Voter turnout database (see references).

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021

#### 2.3.4.34 Election VAP turnout (v2elvaptrn)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elvaptrn

*Original tag:* v2elvaptrn

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: In this national election, what percentage (percent) of the adult voting-age population cast a vote according to official results?

CLARIFICATION: The VAP can reflect irregularities such as problems with the voters' register or registration system. VAP numbers are estimates since they do not take into account legal or systemic barriers to the exercise of the franchise or account for non-eligible members of the population. Thus, it can occur that VAP values surpass 100 which is not an error but reflects such conditions.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): IDEA (VAP figures are estimates and should be treated as such).

NOTES: In cases where executive and legislative elections were held on the same day but there is a different VAP turnout for each election, the VAP turnout for this date is coded for the executive elections only. The VAP turnout data for the legislative elections, in these cases, can be found in the IDEA Voter turnout database (see references).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1830-2021

#### 2.3.4.35 Name of largest party (v2lpname)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lpname

*Original tag:* v2lpname

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the name of the largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Based on seat share.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2020

#### 2.3.4.36 Name of second largest party (v2slpname)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2slpname

*Original tag:* v2slpname

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the name of the second largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Based on seat share.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2020

#### 2.3.4.37 Name of third largest party (v2tlpname)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2tlpname

*Original tag:* v2tlpname

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the name of the third largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Based on seat share.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1791-2020

#### 2.3.4.38 Presidential elections consecutive (v2elprescons)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elprescons

*Original tag:* v2elprescons

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: How many consecutive presidential elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

CLARIFICATION: This counts the consecutive number of presidential elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 whichever is more recent. Do not code if there is no office of the presidency.

SOURCE(S): v2eltype

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v2eltype\_6, v2eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.4.39 Presidential elections cumulative (v2elprescumul)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elprescumul*Original tag:* v2elprescumul*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: How many presidential elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

CLARIFICATION: This counts the cumulative number of presidential elections, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no office of the presidency. However, if there is a presidency, and no elections have ever occurred, this should be recorded as 0.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2eltype

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v2eltype\_6, v2eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.4.40 HOG restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (v2elrsthog)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elrsthog*Original tag:* v2elrsthog*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Is the eligibility of candidates for the office of head of government (when elected) formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

CLARIFICATION: Language restriction should be understood as a restriction of spoken language, not literacy.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.

1: No, there are no such restrictions or the candidates are not elected.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v221, v130 ; National constitutions; IPU Parline;

IDEA; ACE Electoral Knowledge Network.

DATA RELEASE: 4-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.4.41 HOS restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (v2elrsthos)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elrsthos*Original tag:* v2elrsthos*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Is the eligibility of candidates for the office of head of state (when elected) formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

CLARIFICATION: Language restriction should be understood as a restriction of spoken language, not literacy.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.

1: No, there are no such restrictions or the candidates are not elected.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v221, v95; Constitute Project; IPU Parline; IDEA;

ACE Electoral Knowledge Network.

DATA RELEASE: 4-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.4.42 Election HOG turnover ordinal (v2elturnhog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elturnhog

*Original tag:* v2elturnhog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Was there turnover in the office of the head of government (HOG) as a result of this national election?

CLARIFICATION: Turnover can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party. If the HOS and HOG are the same person, the coding is the same for the two variables. The second round of election is coded as the first.

RESPONSES:

0: No. The head of government- retained his/her position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the HOG.

1: Half. The head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party that was in power before the election, or a new independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership.

2: Yes. The executive(s) - head of state and head of government- lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party than before the election or an independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. This code also applies if this is the first head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; Election Guide; IDEA; IPU Parline; V-Dem Country Coordinators.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.4.43 Elections HOS turnover ordinal (v2elturnhos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elturnhos

*Original tag:* v2elturnhos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Was there turnover in the office of the head of state (HOS) as a result of this national election?

CLARIFICATION: Turnover can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party.

RESPONSES:

0: No. The head of state retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the HOS.

1: Half. The head of state is a different individual than before the election but from the same

party that was in power before the election, or a new independent candidate is elected.

2: Yes. The head of state lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party than before the election or an independent candidate is elected. This code also applies if this is the first head of state elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; Election Guide; IDEA; IPU Parline; V-Dem Country Coordinators.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.4.44 Election executive turnover ordinal (v2eltvrexo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2eltvrexo

*Original tag:* v2eltvrexo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Was there turnover in the executive office as a result of this national election?

CLARIFICATION: Turnover in the executive can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party. This question considers whether turnover occurs both in the office of head of state and head of government, even if one of the positions is not contested in the particular elections.

RESPONSES:

0: No. The executive(s) — head of state and head of government — retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the executive.

1: Half. The head of state or head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party (or independent) that was in power before the election. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership, or a new independent head of government. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when the elections result in co-habitation after a period when one party (or independent) has held both offices, or if one of the executive office holders — the head of state or head of government changes, while the other retains their position.

2: Yes. The executive(s) — head of state and head of government — lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party (or independent) than before the election. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when one party holds both the office of the head of state and head of government after a period of co-habitation, or if the holders of both offices change in terms of person and party (or independent) in the same election. This code also applies if this is the first head of state and/or head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; Election Guide; IDEA; IPU Parline; V-Dem Country Coordinators.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).



YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.3.4.45 Presidential election vote share of largest vote-getter (v2elvotlrg)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elvotlrg

*Original tag:* v2elvotlrg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: In the first (or only round) of this presidential election, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by candidate eventually winning office?

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IFES; Election Guide; IPU Parline.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v2eltype\_6, v2eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1792-2021

#### **2.3.4.46 Presidential election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (v2elvotsml)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elvotsml

*Original tag:* v2elvotsml

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: In this presidential election, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second most successful candidate in the first round?

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IFES; Election Guide; IPU Parline.

NOTES: In uncontested elections this question is coded 0.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v2eltype\_6, v2eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1792-2021

#### **2.3.4.47 Lower chamber election consecutive (v2ellocons)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellocons

*Original tag:* v2ellocons

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: How many consecutive lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

CLARIFICATION: This counts the consecutive number of lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 whichever is more recent. Do not code if there is no legislature.

SOURCE(S): v2eltype

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.4.48 Lower chamber election cumulative (v2ellocumul)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellocumul*Original tag:* v2ellocumul*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: How many lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

CLARIFICATION: This counts the cumulative number of elections to the lower chamber or unicameral legislature, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no legislature. However, if there is a legislature and no elections to that body have ever occurred, this should be coded as 0.

SOURCE(S): v2eltype

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.4.49 Lower chamber election district magnitude (v2elloeldm)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elloeldm*Original tag:* v2elloeldm*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

QUESTION: For this election, what was the average district magnitude for seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SOURCE(S): Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Colomer (2016).

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.4.50 Lower chamber electoral system (v2elloelsy)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elloelsy*Original tag:* v2elloelsy*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Mixed majoritarian systems were coded as a two-round system. Regarding multi-member districts we coded list PR with large multi-member districts when the mean district size = 7. Constituent Assembly elections are excluded from the coding, since they often use specifically designed electoral systems. Further information on the following electoral system types can be found in Reynolds/Reilly, *The New International IDEA Handbook* (2005), chapter two and Annex B (Glossary of Terms) — downloadable, free of charge, at [www.idea.int/publications/esd/](http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/).

RESPONSES:

0: First-past-the-post (FPP, aka plurality) in single-member constituencies. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat.

1: Two-round system in single-member constituencies. Like FPP except that a threshold —

usually 50percent + 1 — is required to avoid a runoff between the two top vote-getters.

2: Alternative vote in single-member districts. Voters rank-order their preferences for the candidates who compete for a single seat. If any candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, s/he is elected.

If not, then the least successful candidates (based on first-preferences) are eliminated and their votes reallocated to the second-preferences. This process is repeated until a candidate reaches 50percent +1 of the votes.

3: Block vote in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are seats within that district and can rank-order them (within or across parties) as they please.

4: Party block vote in multi-member districts. Voters cast a vote for a single party (but not for individual candidates within the party's list). The party with the most votes (*i.e.*, a plurality) wins all the seats in that district.

5: Parallel (SMD/PR). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are independent.

6: Mixed-member proportional (SMD with PR compensatory seats). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are not independent. Specifically, the multimember seats are used to rectify disproportionalities achieved in the single-member district election — by adding seats, as necessary.

This means that the representation of parties in the legislature is determined entirely by the PR ballot. It also means that the result of an MMP election is similar to the result of a PR election: parties achieve representation according to their nationwide vote share (on the PR ballot).

7: List PR with small multi-member districts (mean district size < 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is less than seven.

8: List PR with large multi-member districts (mean district size > 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is greater than seven.

9: Single-transferable vote (STV) in multi-member districts. Electors rank-order candidates nominated for a district. Candidates that surpass a specified quota of first-preference votes are elected. The remaining seats are chosen by reallocating the votes of the least successful candidates to elector's second- (or third-) preferences until the specified quota is reached. This process is repeated until all seats for that district are filled.

10: Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts. Each elector chooses a single candidate. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

11: Limited vote in multi-member districts.

Electors have more than one vote but fewer votes than the number of seats in the district. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

12: Borda Count in single- or multi-member districts. Electors use numbers to mark preferences among candidates and each preference is assigned a value. For example, in a ten-candidate field a first preference is worth one, a second preference is worth .9, and so forth. These are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are elected.

SOURCE(S): Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Colomer (2016).

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.51 Lower chamber election seats (v2elloseat)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elloseat

*Original tag:* v2elloseat

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats were there in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021

#### 2.3.4.52 Lower chamber election seats won by largest party (v2ellostlg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellostlg

*Original tag:* v2ellostlg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021

#### 2.3.4.53 Lower chamber election seat share won by largest party (v2ellostsl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellostsl

*Original tag:* v2ellostsl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: In this election, what percentage (percent) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021

#### 2.3.4.54 Lower chamber election seats won by second largest party (v2ellostsm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellostsm

*Original tag:* v2ellostsm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021

#### 2.3.4.55 Lower chamber election seat share won by second largest party (v2ellostss)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellostss

*Original tag:* v2ellostss

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election, what percentage (percent) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021

#### 2.3.4.56 Lower chamber election seats won by third largest party (v2ellosttm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellosttm

*Original tag:* v2ellosttm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1791-2021

**2.3.4.57 Lower chamber election seat share won by third largest party (v2ellostts)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellostts*Original tag:* v2ellostts*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, what percentage (percent) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1791-2021

**2.3.4.58 Lower chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (v2ellovtlg)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellovtlg*Original tag:* v2ellovtlg*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021

**2.3.4.59 Lower chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (v2ellovtsm)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellovtsm

*Original tag:* v2ellovtsm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021

#### **2.3.4.60 Lower chamber election vote share of third-largest vote-getter (v2ellovttm)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellovttm

*Original tag:* v2ellovttm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1795-2021

#### **2.3.4.61 Lower chamber electoral system (v2elparlel)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elparlel

*Original tag:* v2elparlel

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

RESPONSES:

0: Majoritarian.

1: Proportional.

2: Mixed.

3: Other (*e.g.* single non-transferable voting, limited voting)

SOURCE(S): Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Colomer (2016).

NOTES: Mixed majoritarian systems were coded as majoritarian systems. Category 3: Other

was introduced for data release 7.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.62 Lower chamber election statutory threshold (v2elthresh)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elthresh

*Original tag:* v2elthresh

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: B

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: For this election, what was the statutory threshold (percent share of votes) that a party needed to obtain in order to gain representation in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: If there is no statutory threshold, enter 0. (Some thresholds are applied at regional levels. Nonetheless, they are usually consistent across regions.) Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1816-2021

#### 2.3.4.63 Lower chamber election turnover (v2eltvrig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2eltvrig

*Original tag:* v2eltvrig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Did control of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The majority party or ruling coalition includes the same or substantially the same parties, even if some minor parties (holding less than 10 percent of the seats in the legislature) left or joined the coalition, or because the elections do not affect the lower chamber.

1: Half. A minority party or coalition who was not in control of the chamber before the elections assumed the leading position in the legislature but is dependent on other parties for support. Or, a post-election ruling coalition includes some old parties and some new parties and the new parties represent more than 10 percent of the seats in the legislature.

2: Yes. The incumbent party or coalition lost its majority or plurality-dominant position in the legislature and a different party or coalition assumes the majority position.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem country coordinators; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide; IDEA.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2021



**2.3.4.64 Regional government exists (v2elreggov)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elreggov*Original tag:* v2elreggov*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A,C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

QUESTION: Is there a regional government?

CLARIFICATION: Regional government is typically the second-highest level of government, just below the national government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are regions, provinces, states, departments, and cantons.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of regional government. If this is the case, for all questions about regional government please code the regional level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

Some countries are so small that, now or in earlier time periods, they have only local government and not regional government. If this is the case, please code this question as "0" for the appropriate time period.

If you have questions about identifying the regional government for your country, please send an email inquiry to your V-Dem contact.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

ORDERING: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions focused on regional government.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): Country expert coding (C data).

NOTES: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.4.65 Regional government name (v2elregnam)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elregnam*Original tag:* v2elregnam*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A,C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

QUESTION: What is the term(s) for the regional government units?

CLARIFICATION: If different types of units exist at this single level of regional government use multiple terms such as "provinces and federal city." If the language of politics in your country is not English, please use whatever language is commonly used. For example, in Germany regional units are called "Länder."

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Country expert coding (C data).

NOTES: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.66 Regional government elected (v2elsrgel)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elsrgel

*Original tag:* v2elsrgel

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A,C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

QUESTION: At the regional level, are government offices elected in practice?

CLARIFICATION: "Government offices" here refers to a regional executive and a regional assembly, *not* a judiciary and *not* minor bureaucrats. An *executive* is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a governor). An *assembly* is a larger body of officials, who may be divided into two chambers.

"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a regional elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office — including appointment by higher or lower levels of government — are considered to be *non-elected*.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

RESPONSES:

0: Generally, offices at the regional level are not elected.

1: Generally, the regional executive is elected but not the assembly.

2: Generally, the regional assembly is elected but not the executive.

3: Generally, the regional executive is elected and there is no assembly.

4: Generally, the regional assembly is elected and there is no executive.

5: Generally, the regional executive and assembly are elected.

SCALE: Nominal.

SOURCE(S): Country expert coding (C data).

NOTES: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2elreggov is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.67 Regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elrgpwr

*Original tag:* v2elrgpwr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the regional level?

CLARIFICATION: We are concerned with the relative power of regional offices to each other, *not* the power of regional offices relative to higher or lower levels of government.

Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, *not* those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)

An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

## RESPONSES:

0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.

1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.

2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the regional level.

3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.

4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2elreggov is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.4.68 Local government exists (v2ellocgov)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellocgov

*Original tag:* v2ellocgov

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A,C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

QUESTION: Is there a local government?

CLARIFICATION: Local government refers to the level of government below the regional government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are counties, communes, cities, municipalities, towns, rural municipalities, and villages.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of local government. If this is the case, please code the local level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

ORDERING: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions focused on local government.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

SOURCE(S): Country expert coding (C data).

NOTES: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.4.69 Local government name (v2ellocnam)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellocnam

*Original tag:* v2ellocnam

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A,C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

QUESTION: What is the term(s) for the local government units?

CLARIFICATION: If different types of units exist at this single level of local government, use multiple terms. For example, different terms may be needed for rural and urban units.

If the language of politics in your country is not English, please use whatever language is

commonly used. For example, in Mexico local units are called "Municipios."

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Country expert coding (C data).

NOTES: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.70 Local government elected (v2ellocelc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellocelc

*Original tag:* v2ellocelc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A,C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

QUESTION: At the local level, are government (local government) offices elected in practice?

CLARIFICATION: "Government offices" here refers to a local executive and a local assembly, *not* a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An *executive* is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a mayor). An *assembly* is a larger body of officials.

"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a local elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office — including appointment by a higher level of government — are considered to be *non-elected*.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

RESPONSES:

0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected.

1: Generally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly.

2: Generally, the local assembly is elected but not the executive.

3: Generally, the local executive is elected and there is no assembly.

4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no executive.

5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected.

ORDERING: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions on local offices relative power.

SCALE: Nominal.

SOURCE(S): Country expert coding (C data).

NOTES: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2ellocgov is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.71 Local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellocpwr

*Original tag:* v2ellocpwr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the local level?

CLARIFICATION: We are concerned with the relative power of local offices to *each other*, not the power of local offices relative to higher levels of government.

Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, *not* those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)

An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

RESPONSES:

0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.

1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.

2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local level.

3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.

4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2ellocgov is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.4.72 Subnational elections free and fair (v2elffelr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elffelr

*Original tag:* v2elffelr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider subnational elections (regional and local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average?

CLARIFICATION: This question refers to subnational levels that have elected offices and elections. It does not refer to subnational levels without elected offices and elections. If there were no subnational elections in any of the years covered in this survey, choose option 5.

"Free and fair" refers to all aspects of the election process *except* the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (we measure that issue separately).

RESPONSES:

0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (who won office).

1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the elections (who won office).

2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (who won office).

3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (who won office).

4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: As of December 2014, the former category "5" is recoded as a separate variable (v2elffelrbin).

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2elffelrbin\_ord is 0.

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.73 Subnational elections held (v2elffelrbin)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elffelrbin

*Original tag:* v2elffelrbin

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are subnational elections held?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: As of December 2014, the former category "5" from variable v2elffelr is recoded as a separate variable (v2elffelrbin). If a coder chose the 5th category in the original question, it receives 0 in the new "v2elffelrbin" variable (corresponding to the answer, no, there were no subnational elections); otherwise it receives 1 (yes, there are subnational elections held). The resulting series of 0-1 country-coder time-series is run in the measurement model, which calculates the final value of v2elffelrbin while taking into account background coder characteristics.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.74 Subnational election unevenness (v2elsnlsff)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elsnlsff

*Original tag:* v2elsnlsff

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the freeness and fairness of subnational elections vary across different areas of the country?

CLARIFICATION: Subnational elections refer to elections to regional or local offices, as specified above.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are significantly more free and fair (or, alternatively, significantly less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.

1: Somewhat. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are somewhat more free and fair (or, alternatively, somewhat less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.

2: No. Subnational elections in most or all areas of the country are equally free and fair (or, alternatively, equally not free and not fair).

ORDERING: If answer is "2", skip remaining questions in this section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.4.75 Subnational election area less free and fair characteristics (v2elsnlfc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elsnlfc

*Original tag:* v2elsnlfc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *less* free and fair?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_0]

1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_1]

2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_2]

3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_3]

4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_4]

5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_5]

6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_6]

7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_7]

8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_8]

9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_9]

10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_10]

11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_11]

12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_12]

13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_13]

14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_14]

15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_15]

16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_16]

17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_17]

18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_18]

19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_19]

20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_20]

21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_21]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.4.76 Subnational election area more free and fair characteristics (v2elsnmrfc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elsnmrfc

*Original tag:* v2elsnmrfc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are

significantly *more* free and fair?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

- 0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_0]
- 1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_1]
- 2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_2]
- 3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_3]
- 4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_4]
- 5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_5]
- 6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_6]
- 7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_7]
- 8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_8]
- 9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_9]
- 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_10]
- 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_11]
- 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_12]
- 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_13]
- 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_14]
- 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_15]
- 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_16]
- 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_17]
- 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_18]
- 19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_19]
- 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_20]
- 21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_21]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.5 V-Dem Indicators - Political Parties

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **Political parties:**

A "political party" refers to an organization that nominates candidates for public office. A party may refer to a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party. Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party/coalition changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituency then it should be considered the same organization. Our notion of a party includes loose factional groupings such as the Tories and Whigs in the 19th-century Britain or the Caps and Hats in 18th-century Sweden. Unless stated otherwise the following questions pertain to parties that compete for seats in the national legislature or for the presidency.

Most of the questions in the following section ask you to generalize across parties in a particular country (and at a particular point in time). We realize that practices vary from party to party; these are, after all, highly diverse organizations. However, for our purposes it is important to consider what the most common practices are.

In answering these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them. And if there is no clarification of the issue, assume that the question is referring to practices rather



than formal rules.

### 2.3.5.1 Barriers to parties (v2psbars)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psbars

*Original tag:* v2psbars

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?

CLARIFICATION: Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits, as well as harassment.

RESPONSES:

0: Parties are not allowed.

1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally).

2: There are significant obstacles (*e.g.* party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities).

3: There are modest barriers (*e.g.* party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities).

4: There are no substantial barriers.

ORDERING: If your answer is 1-4, proceed to the next question [v2psoppaut]. If your answer is 0, skip to the question about Party organization [v2psorgs].

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.5.2 Party Ban (v2psparban)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psparban

*Original tag:* v2psparban

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are any parties banned?

CLARIFICATION: This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet registration requirements or support thresholds.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned.

1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties.

2: Yes. Many parties are banned.

3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned.

4: No. No parties are officially banned.

ORDERING: If your answer is 4, skip the next question [v2psbantar].

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.5.3 Opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psoppaut*Original tag:* v2psoppaut*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?

CLARIFICATION: An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government, *i.e.*, that has no control over the executive.

RESPONSES:

0: Opposition parties are not allowed.

1: There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co-opted by the ruling regime.

2: At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

3: Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

4: All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.5.4 Party organizations (v2psorgs)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psorgs*Original tag:* v2psorgs*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?

CLARIFICATION: A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season.

RESPONSES:

0: No parties.

1: Fewer than half of the parties.

2: About half of the parties.

3: More than half of the parties.

4: All parties.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.5.5 Party Branches (v2psprbrch)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psprbrch*Original tag:* v2psprbrch*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How many parties have permanent local party branches?

RESPONSES:

0: None.

1: Fewer than half.

2: About half.

3: More than half.

4: All.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.5.6 Party linkages (v2psprlnks)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psprlnks

*Original tag:* v2psprlnks

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their constituents?

CLARIFICATION: A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of "good" that the party offers in exchange for political support and participation in party activities.

RESPONSES:

0: Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs.

1: Mixed clientelistic and local collective.

2: Local collective. Constituents are rewarded with local collective goods, *e.g.*, wells, toilets, markets, roads, bridges, and local development.

3: Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic.

4: Policy/programmatic. Constituents respond to a party's positions on national policies, general party programs, and visions for society.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 2.3.5.7 Distinct party platforms (v2psplats)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psplats

*Original tag:* v2psplats

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How many political parties with representation in the national legislature or presidency have publicly available party platforms (manifestos) that are publicized and relatively distinct from one another?

CLARIFICATION: In order to be counted in the affirmative, parties must have platforms that are both distinct (either in terms of content or generalized ideology) and publicly

disseminated.

This question is *not* intended to measure how much the public actually knows about these platforms or whether they are important in structuring policymaking.

RESPONSES:

0: None, or nearly none.

1: Fewer than half.

2: About half.

3: More than half.

4: All, or nearly all.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.3.5.8 Candidate selection–National/local (v2pscnslnl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pscnslnl

*Original tag:* v2pscnslnl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How centralized is legislative candidate selection within the parties?

CLARIFICATION: The power to select candidates for national legislative elections is often divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organizations, and national party leaders. One level usually dominates the selection process, while sometimes candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organization.

RESPONSES:

0: National legislative candidates are selected exclusively by national party leaders.

1: National legislative candidate selection is dominated by national party leaders but with some limited influence from local or state level organizations.

2: National legislative candidates are chosen through bargaining across different levels of party organization.

3: National legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level organizations, perhaps with some input from local party organizations or constituency groups.

4: National legislative candidates are chosen by a small cadre of local or municipal level actors.

5: National legislative candidates are chosen by constituency groups or direct primaries.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.3.5.9 Legislative party cohesion (v2pscohesv)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pscohesv

*Original tag:* v2pscohesv

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their party on important bills?

RESPONSES:

0: Not really. Many members are elected as independents and party discipline is very weak.

1: More often than not. Members are more likely to vote with their parties than against them, but defections are common.

2: Mostly. Members vote with their parties most of the time.

3: Yes, absolutely. Members vote with their parties almost all the time.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.5.10 Party competition across regions (v2pscomprg)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pscomprg*Original tag:* v2pscomprg*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following best describes the nature of electoral support for major parties (those gaining over 10 percent of the vote)?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

0: Most major parties are competitive in only one or two regions of the country, *i.e.*, their support is heavily concentrated in a few areas.

1: Most major parties are competitive in some regions of the country, but not in others.

2: Most major parties are competitive in most regions of the country.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.5.11 National party control (v2psnatpar)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psnatpar*Original tag:* v2psnatpar*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How unified is party control of the national government?

CLARIFICATION: With respect to the executive, consider only those offices that have effective power over policymaking. (If there is a monarch or president with very little policymaking power, this office should not be considered.) With respect to bicameral legislatures, consider only the chamber, or chambers, that have effective policymaking power.

(If the upper chamber is inactive or clearly subordinate, consider only the lower chamber.)  
Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

0: Unified coalition control. A single multi-party coalition controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single coalition gathers together a majority of seats.).

1: Divided party control. (A) Different parties or individuals (unconnected to parties) control the executive and the legislature or (B) Executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each of which belongs to different parties; or between a non-partisan monarch and a prime minister.

2: Unified party control. A single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single party has a majority of seats.).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.5.12 Subnational party control (v2pssunpar)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pssunpar

*Original tag:* v2pssunpar

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does a single party control important policymaking bodies across subnational units (regional and local governments)?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

0: In almost all subnational units (at least 90percent), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

1: In most subnational units (66percent-90percent), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

2: In few subnational units (less than 66percent), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.5.13 Party ban target (v2psbantar)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psbantar

*Original tag:* v2psbantar

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: If any parties are banned, what label best describes these parties?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

- 0: Ethnic party. [v2psbantar\_0]
- 1: Religious party. [v2psbantar\_1]
- 2: Regional/local party. [v2psbantar\_2]
- 3: Leftist extremist party. [v2psbantar\_3]
- 4: Rightist extremist party. [v2psbantar\_4]
- 5: Other. [v2psbantar\_5]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

NOTES: The answer categories for contemporary and historical differ in the inclusion of the word "extremist". In contemporary it is included while excluded in the historical answer categories.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

## 2.3.6 V-Dem Indicators - Direct Democracy

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Direct democracy:** This set of questions focuses on direct popular votes. Four mechanisms are distinguished: a. Measures placed on the ballot by the executive and/or the legislature for which the constitution or basic laws require a vote. These are referred to as *constitutional referendums* (*i.e. obligatory referendums*). b. Measures placed on the ballot by the executive and/or the legislature for which the constitution or basic laws does not require a vote. These are referred to as *plebiscites*. c. Measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process that concern the possible adoption of a new law or constitutional amendment. These are referred to as *popular initiatives*. d. Measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process that concern the possible rejection of a recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. These are referred to as *referendums*.

Note that we do not consider recall elections or citizen petitions to the legislature even they may also involve a gathering of signatures or a popular vote. Note also that in coding these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice. In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..."

### 2.3.6.1 Initiatives permitted (v2ddlexci)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddlexci

*Original tag:* v2ddlexci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: Is there legal provision for initiatives?

CLARIFICATION: These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either a new law or a constitutional amendment.

RESPONSES:

- 0: Not allowed.
- 1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).
- 2: Allowed and binding.

ORDERING: If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question "Referendums permitted" [v2ddlexrf].

SCALE: Ordinal.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.6.2 Initiatives signatures (v2ddsignci)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddsignci

*Original tag:* v2ddsignci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How many signatures are required in order to place an initiative on the ballot?

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.6.3 Initiatives signatures percent (v2ddsigpci)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddsigpci

*Original tag:* v2ddsigpci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How many signatures — expressed as the percentage (percent) of registered voters — are required in order to place an initiative on the ballot?

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.6.4 Initiatives signature-gathering period (v2ddsigdci)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddsigdci

*Original tag:* v2ddsigdci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: If you answered yes to the previous question, how long is the period allowed for gathering signatures (expressed as a number of days) for an initiative?

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

ORDERING: Answer only if answered 1 for previous question.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1919-2021

#### 2.3.6.5 Initiatives signature-gathering time limit (v2ddsiglci)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddsiglci



*Original tag:* v2ddsiglci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: Is there a limit on the time allowed for signature gathering prior to placing an initiative on the ballot?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: Yes.  
SCALE: Dichotomous.  
NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.3.6.6 Initiatives participation threshold (v2ddpartci)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddpartci

*Original tag:* v2ddpartci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: What threshold of participation — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for an initiative to be binding?  
CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.3.6.7 Initiatives approval threshold (v2ddapprci)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddapprci

*Original tag:* v2ddapprci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: What threshold of approval — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for an initiative to be binding?  
CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.3.6.8 Initiatives administrative threshold (v2ddadmci)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddadmci

*Original tag:* v2ddadmci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: What percentage of subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for an initiative to be approved?  
CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.6.9 Initiatives super majority (v2ddspmci)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddspmci

*Original tag:* v2ddspmci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: What percentage (percent) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of an initiative?  
CLARIFICATION: For 2/3, enter 66 percent.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.6.10 Popular initiative credible threat (v2ddthreci)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddthreci

*Original tag:* v2ddthreci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: How effective is the menace of a popular initiative?  
CLARIFICATION: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then v2ddthreci =1, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years v2ddthreci =0.9, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.6.11 Referendums permitted (v2ddlexrf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddlexrf

*Original tag:* v2ddlexrf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: Is there legal provision for referendums?

CLARIFICATION: These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either the rejection of a recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. (They do not include recall elections.)

RESPONSES:

0: Not allowed.

1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).

2: Allowed and binding.

ORDERING: If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question "Occurrence of plebiscite this year" [v2ddyrpl].

SCALE: Ordinal.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.6.12 Referendums signatures (v2ddsignrf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddsignrf

*Original tag:* v2ddsignrf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How many signatures are required in order to place a referendum on the ballot?

CLARIFICATION: If the law treats this as a percentage (percent) of registered voters, please leave this question blank and answer the next question instead.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.6.13 Referendums signatures percent (v2ddsigprf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddsigprf

*Original tag:* v2ddsigprf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How many signatures — expressed as the percentage (percent) of registered voters — are required in order to place a referendum on the ballot?

CLARIFICATION: If the law treats this as a raw number of registered voters, please leave this question blank and answer the previous question instead.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.6.14 Referendums signature-gathering period (v2ddsigdrf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddsigdrf

*Original tag:* v2ddsigdrf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: If you answered yes to the previous question, how long is period allowed for gathering signatures (expressed as a number of days) for a referendum?

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

ORDERING: Answer if previous question is coded 1.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.3.6.15 Referendums signature-gathering limit (v2ddsiglrf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddsiglrf

*Original tag:* v2ddsiglrf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: Is there a limit on the time allowed for signature gathering prior to placing a referendum on the ballot?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.3.6.16 Referendums participation threshold (v2ddpartrf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddpartrf

*Original tag:* v2ddpartrf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: What threshold of participation — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a referendum to be binding?

CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.3.6.17 Referendums approval threshold (v2ddapprf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddapprf

*Original tag:* v2ddapprf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: What threshold of approval — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a referendum to be binding?  
CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.3.6.18 Referendums administrative threshold (v2ddadmrf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddadmrf

*Original tag:* v2ddadmrf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: What percentage of subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for a referendum to be approved?  
CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.3.6.19 Referendums super majority (v2ddspmr)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddspmr

*Original tag:* v2ddspmr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: What percentage (percent) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of a referendum?  
CLARIFICATION: For 2/3, enter 66 percent.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.  
DATA RELEASE: 3-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.3.6.20 Popular referendum credible threat (v2ddthrerf)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddthrerf

*Original tag:* v2ddthrerf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: How effective is the menace of a popular referendum?  
CLARIFICATION: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then v2ddthrerf =1, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years v2ddthrerf =0.9, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.6.21 Constitutional changes popular vote (v2ddlexor)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddlexor

*Original tag:* v2ddlexor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: Is a popular and direct vote required in order for a constitutional change to be legally binding?  
CLARIFICATION: Unless otherwise stated, every question refers to direct democracy at the national level, *i.e.* it does not incorporate popular votes at the provincial or local level.  
RESPONSES:  
0: No, it is not required.  
1: Depends on the content of constitutional change (for some it is required, for others however it is not).  
2: Yes, any constitutional must be approved directly by the citizenry.  
SCALE: Ordinal.  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.6.22 Obligatory referendum participation threshold (v2ddpartor)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddpartor

*Original tag:* v2ddpartor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: Must some threshold of participation be reached in order for an obligatory referendum to be binding?  
CLARIFICATION: Specify the required turnout as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.  
RESPONSES:  
Percent.  
SCALE: Interval.  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.6.23 Obligatory referendum approval threshold (v2ddappor)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddappor

*Original tag:* v2ddappor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: Must some threshold of approval — among registered voters — be reached in order for an obligatory referendum to be binding?

CLARIFICATION: Express your answer as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.3.6.24 Obligatory referendum administrative threshold (v2ddadmor)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddadmor

*Original tag:* v2ddadmor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: What percentage of subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for an obligatory referendum to be approved?

CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.3.6.25 Obligatory referendum super majority (v2ddspmor)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddspmor

*Original tag:* v2ddspmor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: What percentage (percent) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of an obligatory referendum?

CLARIFICATION: For 2/3, enter 66 percent.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.3.6.26 Obligatory referendum credible threat (v2ddthreor)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddthreor

*Original tag:* v2ddthreor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How effective is the menace of an obligatory referendum?

CLARIFICATION: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then `v2ddthreor` =1, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years `v2ddthreci` =0.9, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.6.27 Plebiscite permitted (`v2ddlexpl`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_cy_v2ddlexpl`

*Original tag:* `v2ddlexpl`

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: Is there legal provision for plebiscites?

CLARIFICATION: These are measures placed on the ballot by the legislature and/or the executive.

RESPONSES:

0: Not allowed.

1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).

2: Allowed and binding.

ORDERING: If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question "Initiatives permitted" [`v2ddlexci`].

SCALE: Ordinal.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.6.28 Plebiscite participation threshold (`v2ddpartpl`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_cy_v2ddpartpl`

*Original tag:* `v2ddpartpl`

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: What threshold of participation — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a plebiscite to be binding?

CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.6.29 Plebiscite approval threshold (`v2ddapprpl`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_cy_v2ddapprpl`



*Original tag:* v2ddapprpl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: What threshold of approval — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a plebiscite to be binding?

CLARIFICATION: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### **2.3.6.30 Plebiscite administrative threshold (v2ddadmpl)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddadmpl

*Original tag:* v2ddadmpl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: Must a majority across subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) be attained in order for a plebiscite to be approved?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes — at least half of subnational districts.

2: Yes — more than half of subnational districts.

SCALE: Ordinal.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### **2.3.6.31 Plebiscite super majority (v2ddspmpl)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddspmpl

*Original tag:* v2ddspmpl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: What percentage (percent) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of a plebiscite?

CLARIFICATION: For 2/3, enter 66 percent.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### **2.3.6.32 Plebiscite credilbe threat (v2ddthrepl)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddthrepl

*Original tag:* v2ddthrepl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How effective is the menace of a plebiscite?

CLARIFICATION: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then v2ddthrepl =1, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years v2ddthrepl =0.9, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.6.33 Occurrence of citizen-initiative this year (v2ddyrcl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddyrcl

*Original tag:* v2ddyrcl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How many *citizen-initiative* occurred this year?

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.6.34 Occurrence of referendum this year (v2ddyrrf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddyrrf

*Original tag:* v2ddyrrf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How many *referendums* occurred this year?

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.6.35 Occurrence of obligatory referendum this year (v2ddyror)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddyror

*Original tag:* v2ddyror

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: How many *obligatory referendums* occurred this year?

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.6.36 Occurrence of plebiscite this year (v2ddyrpl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddyrpl

*Original tag:* v2ddyrpl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: How many *plebiscites* occurred this year?  
RESPONSES:  
Numeric.  
SCALE: Interval.  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.6.37 Number of popular votes this year (v2ddyral)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddyral

*Original tag:* v2ddyral

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: How many direct democracy elections (initiatives, referendums and/or plebiscites) occurred this year?  
RESPONSES:  
Numeric.  
SCALE: Interval.  
DATA RELEASE: 3, 7-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.6.38 Occurrence of any type of popular vote this year credible (v2ddcredal)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ddcredal

*Original tag:* v2ddcredal

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman  
QUESTION: If any direct democracy election occurred this year, was the official result of the vote, or votes (their success or failure) credible?  
CLARIFICATION: By credible, we mean whether the official results of the vote(s) reflect the actual vote (leaving aside issues of voter exclusion, intimidation, or vote-buying).  
RESPONSES:  
0: Not credible.  
1: Credible.  
SCALE: Dichotomous.  
NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.7 V-Dem Indicators - The Executive

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### Executive:

In this section, we distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG). The *head of state* is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. Sometimes this is a largely ceremonial role, *e.g.* a monarch who reigns but does not rule, or a president whose powers are strictly circumscribed. The *head of government* is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government, typically presiding over a cabinet. In a parliamentary system, this is usually the prime minister. In a presidential system, this is usually the president, who then serves as both, head of state and head of government. In a typical semi-presidential system, the president serves as head of state and the prime minister serves as head of government.

These definitions are grounded in the *functions* that each office performs, as described above. Titles can be confusing. Do not assume, for example, that simply because an individual holds the title of "president" s/he is serving as the chief public representative of the country. Likewise, it may be that the *effective* head of state/head of government is someone other than the *official* head of state/head of government. In this instance, the following questions apply to the person who effectively wields this power. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of state was a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country was the chairman of the communist party. It is the latter who is the "effective" head of state, and hence should be the focus of your answers. The same applies if the head of state/head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else. It is the latter person who is the effective head of state/head of government.

If you are considering a semi sovereign territory, such as a colony, an annexed territory or a member of the British Commonwealth, please answer the following questions with respect to the head of state and (if separate) the head of government who is located in the territory in question. Thus, in a typical British colony the governor-general—not the King/Queen of England—would be understood as the head of state. Likewise, in a British colony the local prime minister in the colony—not the prime minister in London—would be understood as the head of government.

In order to mitigate potential misunderstandings, the identities of the head of state and head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, "HOS name." This is your key to what we mean by "head of state" or "head of government."

Note also that when the two functions are fused in the same office, we ask you to code only the head of state section of the survey. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the precoded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your V-Dem contact. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question.

In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days.

#### 2.3.7.1 HOS name (v2exnamhos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exnamhos

*Original tag:* v2exnamhos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the name of the head of state?

CLARIFICATION: If the head of state is a collective body, provide the name of the person exercising the most effective power within this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the

expression "collective body." Do not include nicknames. If multiple Heads of State were appointed in a given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment and *reappointment* for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.2 HOS title (v2extithos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2extithos

*Original tag:* v2extithos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the title of the head of state?

CLARIFICATION: If the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, this and the following questions refer to both. Please provide a literal translation of the title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If the head of state temporarily fills the role, this will be excluded from the answer; they should be called i.e. "President" and not "Acting President". If the head of state is a collective body, provide the title of the person exercising the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression "collective body." If multiple Heads of State with different titles were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002); worldstatesmen.org.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.3 HOS removal by legislature in practice (v2exremhsp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exremhsp

*Original tag:* v2exremhsp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the

head of state from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity *and* without the involvement of any other agency?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

RESPONSES:

0: No, under no circumstances.

1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.

2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.

3: Yes, most likely.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.3.7.4 HOS dissolution in practice (v2exdfdshs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exdfdshs

*Original tag:* v2exdfdshs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of state took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. By "dissolving the legislature" we refer to the ability of the head of state to call a new election for the legislature.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as "once a year", by time point within term, such as "not within the last sixth months of the head of state's term", and by the requirement that the head of state must then himself/herself stand for election).

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.7.5 HOS appoints cabinet in practice (v2exdfcbhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exdfcbhs

*Original tag:* v2exdfcbhs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the head of state have the power to appoint — or is the approval of the head of state necessary for the appointment of — cabinet ministers?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOS controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet, and only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

2: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

3: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet.

4: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.6 HOS veto power in practice (v2exdfvths)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exdfvths

*Original tag:* v2exdfvths

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of state took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: By "veto", we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).

2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).

3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority — *e.g.*, 2/3 or 3/4 — of those voting).

4: Yes, with no possibility of override.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.7 HOS dismisses ministers in practice (v2exdfdmhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exdfdmhs

*Original tag:* v2exdfdmhs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of state took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (*e.g.*, vote of no confidence).

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of state proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, *i.e.*, so called "constructive dismissal").

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.8 HOS proposes legislation in practice (v2exdfpphs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exdfpphs

*Original tag:* v2exdfpphs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the head of state have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

CLARIFICATION: By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).

1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.

2: No. The head of state cannot propose legislation.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021



### 2.3.7.9 HOS = HOG? (v2exhoshog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exhoshog

*Original tag:* v2exhoshog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the head of state (HOS) also head of government (HOG)?

CLARIFICATION: Note that this question only pertains to whether the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, regardless of the relative powers of the two. Thus, in a constitutional monarchy, for example, the head of state and head of government are not the same even though the head of state may lack any real political power. If multiple head of states/head of governments were appointed in any year, please answer this question with respect to all of them by checking or unchecking the specific dates. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

ORDERING: If HOS=HOG (answer is yes: 1) for all years: skip to "Executive as whole introduction" [v2exintro3].

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v83-v87; Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.10 HOS age (v2exagehos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exagehos

*Original tag:* v2exagehos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: In what year was the head of state born?

RESPONSES:

date-year only

99: Not applicable, *e.g.* the HOS is a collective body.

SOURCE(S): worldstatesman.org.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.11 HOS selection by legislature in practice (v2exaphos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exaphos

*Original tag:* v2exaphos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Was approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?

CLARIFICATION: By "approval" we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of

confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of state has to have majority support (or should not be opposed by the majority) in the legislature even though no vote is taken on his/her appointment. We are *not* concerned with certification of electoral college votes (as in the US, Mexico).

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

ORDERING: Answer this question only for those years you selected 1-5 on question v2expathhs.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem country coordinators; constituteproject.org; IPU Parline.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2expathhs is 6 or 7

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.7.12 HOS directly elected (v2ex\_elechos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ex\_elechos

*Original tag:* v2ex\_elechos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the head of state HOS directly elected?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2expathhs

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.7.13 HOS female (v2exfemhos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exfemhos

*Original tag:* v2exfemhos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell, Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: What is the gender of the head of state?

CLARIFICATION: If the head of state is a collective body, provide the gender of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are female.

RESPONSES:

0: Male

1: Female

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): worldstatesman.org; Melander (2005); Paxton and Hughes (2007).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.7.14 HOS term length by law (v2exfxtmhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exfxtmhs

*Original tag:* v2exfxtmhs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the maximum term length of the Head of State, in years?

RESPONSES:

Numeric, number of years.

0: Term length not specified in constitution.

99: Not Applicable.

100: Term length for life or there is no term length.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); National constitutions.

NOTES: *De jure* term lengths for Head of State and Head of Government, coded for each head of state and head of government as coded in v2exnamhos and v2exnamhog. In the case of a single office representing both Head of State and Head of Government, HOS is coded to the appropriate term length while HOG is coded as 99. For colonies, if there was no official local constitution, HOS/HOG is coded by their constitutional status according to the colonial power. Finally, for sovereign states lacking a constitution or having suspended their constitution, HOS/HOG is coded to 99 as not applicable for those relevant years.

Changes to term lengths are recorded as occurring on the date that a new constitution or constitutional amendment takes force, or, if unavailable, date of promulgation.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.7.15 HOS appointment in practice (v2expathhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2expathhs

*Original tag:* v2expathhs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: How did the head of state reach office?

CLARIFICATION: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 7 should only be selected if the head of state is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election. We count as direct elections (category 7) also those indirect elections carried out by an electoral college, whose only purpose is to elect the president.

RESPONSES:

0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.

1: Appointed by a foreign power.

2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).

3: Appointed by a royal council.

4: Through hereditary succession.

5: Appointed by the military.

6: Appointed by the legislature.

7: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).

8: Other.

ORDERING: If you select 0 or 8, proceed to the next question [v2exothhs]. If you select 1-5, skip to question "HOS selection by legislature in practice [v2exaphos]". If you selected 6-7, skip to question [v2excomhs].

SCALE: Nominal (v2expathhs), or a series of dichotomous scales.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem country coordinators; constituteproject.org; IPU Parline.

NOTES: Converted from B to A coding. v2expathhs is coded according to appointment dates

of the Head of State. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOS was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.16 HOS control over (v2exctlhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exctlhs

*Original tag:* v2exctlhs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, from which of the following bodies must the head of state customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply. In case the HOS does not have the power to make important decisions on domestic policy, select 0 (None).

RESPONSES:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_4]

5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_5]

6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_6]

7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_7]

ORDERING: If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhs]. If you select 0-6, skip to question "HOS dissolution in practice" [v2exdfds].

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.17 HOS year of death (v2exdeathos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exdeathos

*Original tag:* v2exdeathos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: In what year did the head of state die?

RESPONSES:

Date — year only

SCALE: Interval

SOURCE(S): worldstatesman.org.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.18 HOS party (v2exparhos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exparhos

*Original tag:* v2exparhos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Nils Düpont

QUESTION: What is the name of the political party to which the head of state belongs?

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Leaders Global (Düpont, Döring, and Bederke 2021), Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019); worldstatesmen.org

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.7.19 HOS removal by other in practice (v2exrmhsol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exrmhsol

*Original tag:* v2exrmhsol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of state if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_4]

5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_5]

6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_6]

7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_7]

ORDERING: If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exrmhsnl]. If you select 0-6, skip to question "HOS dissolution in practice" [v2exctlhs].

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.20 Name of HOG (v2exnamhog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exnamhog

*Original tag:* v2exnamhog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the name of the head of government?

CLARIFICATION: If the head of government is a collective body, provide the name of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the

expression "collective body." Do not include nicknames. If multiple heads of government were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment and *reappointment* for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.7.21 Title of HOG (v2extithog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2extithog

*Original tag:* v2extithog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the title of the head of government (HOG)?

CLARIFICATION: Please provide a literal translation of the title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If the head of government temporarily fills the role, this will be excluded from the answer; they should be called i.e. "Prime Minister" and not "Acting Prime Minister". If the head of government is a collective body, provide the title of the person exercising the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, the name of the entire body. If multiple heads of government with different titles were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to all of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.7.22 HOG removal by legislature in practice (v2exremhog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exremhog

*Original tag:* v2exremhog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove

the head of government from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity *and* without the involvement of any other agency?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

RESPONSES:

0: No, under no circumstances.

1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.

2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.

3: Yes, most likely.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.23 HOG dissolution in practice (v2exdjdshg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exdjdshg

*Original tag:* v2exdjdshg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of government took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. By "dissolving the legislature" we refer to the ability of the head of government to call a new election for the legislature.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as "once a year", by time point within term, such as "not within the last sixth months of the head of government's term", and by the requirement that the head of government must then himself/herself stand for election).

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.24 HOG appoints cabinet in practice (v2exdjcbhg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exdjcbhg

*Original tag:* v2exdjcbhg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the head of government have the power to appoint — or is the approval of the head of government necessary for the appointment of — cabinet ministers?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOG controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

2: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.25 HOG dismisses ministers in practice (v2exdfdshg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exdfdshg

*Original tag:* v2exdfdshg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of government took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (*e.g.*, vote of no confidence).

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of government proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, *i.e.*, so called "constructive dismissal").

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.26 HOG veto power in practice (v2exdfvthg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exdfvthg



*Original tag:* v2exdfvthg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the head of government took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?

CLARIFICATION: By "veto", we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).

2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).

3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority — *e.g.*, 2/3 or 3/4 — of those voting).

4: Yes, with no possibility of override.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.27 HOG proposes legislation in practice (v2exdfpphg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exdfpphg

*Original tag:* v2exdfpphg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the head of government have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

CLARIFICATION: By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).

1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.

2: No. The head of government cannot propose legislation.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 2.3.7.28 HOG age (v2exagehog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exagehog

*Original tag:* v2exagehog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: In what year was the head of government born?

RESPONSES:

[date-year only]

99: Not applicable, *e.g.* the HOG is a collective body.

SOURCE(S): worldstatesman.org.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.7.29 HOG selection by legislature in practice (v2exaphogp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exaphogp

*Original tag:* v2exaphogp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Was the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of government?

CLARIFICATION: By "approval" we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of government has to have majority support in the legislature although no vote is taken on his/her appointment. If the same person or body is both head of state and head of government, they are only coded as head of state.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

ORDERING: Answer this question only if you selected 1-6 on question v2expathhg.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem country coordinators; constituteproject.org; IPU Parline.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. v2expathhg is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of Government. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOG was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1 or when v2expathhg is 7 or 8.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.7.30 HOG directly elected (v2ex\_elechog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ex\_elechog

*Original tag:* v2ex\_elechog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the head of government HOG directly elected?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2expathhg

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.31 HOG female (v2exfemhog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exfemhog

*Original tag:* v2exfemhog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the gender of the head of government?

CLARIFICATION: If the head of government is a collective body, provide the gender of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are female.

RESPONSES:

0: Male

1: Female

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): worldstatesmen.org; cf. Melander (2005); Paxton and Hughes (2007).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.32 HOG term length by law (v2exfxtmhg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exfxtmhg

*Original tag:* v2exfxtmhg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the maximum term length of the head of government?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

0: Term length not specified

99: Not Applicable

100: Term length is explicitly unlimited or the life of the office holder.

ORDERING: CCP ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM=3 or HOSHOG=2; Constitutions.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v126.

NOTES: Changes to term lengths are recorded as occurring on the date that a new constitution or constitutional amendment takes force, or, if unavailable, date of promulgation.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.7.33 Relative power of the HOG (v2ex\_hogw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ex\_hogw

*Original tag:* v2ex\_hogw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Does the head of government HOG have more relative power than the head of state HOS over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers?

CLARIFICATION: The relative power of the HOG is simply 1- v2ex\_hosw.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

0.5: The HOS and HOG share equal power.

0.75: See notes.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exdfcbhs v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg

NOTES: If the head of state is also head of government, v2ex\_hogw is 1.

From 1900-01-01 to 1960-08-09 Belgium has a score of 0.75.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.7.34 HOG appointed by HOS (v2ex\_hosconhog)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ex\_hosconhog*Original tag:* v2ex\_hosconhog*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the head of government HOG appointed by the head of state HOS?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2expathhg

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.7.35 HOG appointment in practice (v2expathhg)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2expathhg*Original tag:* v2expathhg*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: How did the head of government gain access to office?

CLARIFICATION: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 8 should only be selected if the head of government is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election. If the same person or body is both head of state and head of government, they are only coded as head of state.

RESPONSES:

0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.

1: Appointed by a foreign power.

2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).

3: Appointed by a royal council.

4: Through hereditary succession.

5: Appointed by the military.

6: Appointed by the head of state.

7: Appointed by the legislature.

8: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).

9: Other.

ORDERING: If you select 0 or 9, proceed to the next question [v2exothhgl]. If you selected 1-6, skip to question "HOG selection by legislature in practice" [v2exaphogp]. If you selected 7-8, skip to question [v2excomex].

SCALE: Nominal (v2expathhg), or a series of dichotomous scales.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem country coordinators; [constituteproject.org](http://constituteproject.org); IPU Parline.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. v2expathhg is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of Government. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOG was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.36 HOG control over (v2exctlhg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exctlhg

*Original tag:* v2exctlhg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, from which of the following bodies does the head of government customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply. In case the HOG does not have the power to make important decisions on domestic policy, select 0 (None).

RESPONSES:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_4]

5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_5]

6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_6]

7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_7]

8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_8]

ORDERING: If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhog]. If you select 0-7, skip to question HOG dissolution in practice [v2exdjdshg].

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.37 HOG year of death (v2exdeathog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exdeathog

*Original tag:* v2exdeathog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: In what year did the head of government die?

RESPONSES:

Date — year only

SCALE: Interval

SOURCE(S): worldstatesman.org.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.7.38 HOG party (v2expothog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2expothog

*Original tag:* v2expothog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Nils Düpont

QUESTION: What is the name of the political party to which the head of government belongs?

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Leaders Global (Düpont, Döring, and Bederke 2021), Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke et al. 2021); worldstatesmen.org

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.7.39 HOG removal by other in practice (v2exrmhgnp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exrmhgnp

*Original tag:* v2exrmhgnp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of government if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_4]

5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_5]

6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_6]

7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_7]

8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_8]

ORDERING: If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exrmhgop]. If you select 0-7,

skip to question HOG control [v2exctlhg].

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple selection

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.7.40 Executive respects constitution (v2exrescon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exrescon

*Original tag:* v2exrescon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution?

RESPONSES:

0: Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences.

1: Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but still must respect certain provisions.

2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution, but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences.

3: Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution, and when it happens they face legal charges.

4: Members of the executive never violate the constitution.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.7.41 Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exbribe

*Original tag:* v2exbribe

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

RESPONSES:

0: It is routine and expected.

1: It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive.

2: It happens but is unpredictable: those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be necessary.

3: It happens occasionally but is not expected.

4: It never, or hardly ever, happens.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.7.42 Executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembezz)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exembezz

*Original tag:* v2exembezz

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

RESPONSES:

0: Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.

1: Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.

2: About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.

3: Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.

4: Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.7.43 Public sector corrupt exchanges (v2excrptps)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2excrptps

*Original tag:* v2excrptps

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

CLARIFICATION: When responding to this question, we would like to you think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time.

1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees.

2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times.



3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time.

4: No. Never, or hardly ever.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.7.44 Public sector theft (v2exthftps)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exthftps

*Original tag:* v2exthftps

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

CLARIFICATION: When responding to this question, we would like you to think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

RESPONSES:

0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.

1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.

2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.

3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.

4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.7.45 Chief executive appointment by upper chamber (v2exapup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exapup

*Original tag:* v2exapup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the approval of the upper chamber (together with the lower chamber) necessary for the appointment of the chief executive?

CLARIFICATION: The chief executive is defined by whether the head of state or the head of government have more relative power (v2ex\_hosw, v2ex\_hogw). Answer v2exapup only if the legislature is playing a role in the appointment of the chief executive (if v2exaphos or v2exaphog are 1).

## RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): National constitutions; Websites of national governments.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.7.46 Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval (v2exapupap)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exapupap*Original tag:* v2exapupap*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the tacit or implicit approval of the upper chamber (alongside the lower chamber) necessary for the appointment of the chief executive?

CLARIFICATION: The chief executive is defined by whether the head of state or the head of government have more relative power (v2ex\_hosw, v2ex\_hogw). Answer v2exapupap only if the legislature is playing a role in the appointment of the chief executive (if v2exaphos or v2exaphogp are 1).

## RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): National constitutions; Websites of national governments.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.7.47 Regime information (v2reginfo)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2reginfo*Original tag:* v2reginfo*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

QUESTION: What is the regime name as well as start and end dates of this regime?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the identity of the regime, which is given a suggestive name, and its start and end dates have already been entered. We are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded information. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regime.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

**2.3.7.48 Regime end type (v2regendtype)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regendtype

*Original tag:* v2regendtype

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

QUESTION: Could you specify the type of process that you consider the most important in leading to the end of the regime?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that what is considered the most important process that eventually ended the relevant regime has already been entered. We are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded information. This means that the information has already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regime.

RESPONSES:

0: A military coup d'état.

1: A coup d'état conducted by other groups than the military.

2: A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader.

3: Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d'état)

4: Natural death of the sitting leader

5: Loss in civil war.

6: Loss in inter-state war.

7: Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war)

8: Popular uprising.

9: Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by sitting regime leaders

10: Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization/democratization)

11: Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for the sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1–10

12: Other process than those specified by categories 1–11.

13: The regime still exists

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### **2.3.7.49 Regime interregnum (v2regint)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regint

*Original tag:* v2regint

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

QUESTION: Does there exist an identifiable political regime?

CLARIFICATION: This question is used to identify so-called interregnum periods, where no political regime is in control over the entity. Different types of political situations can lead to periods of time under which there is no identifiable political regime, one example being a civil war in which none of the parties have clear control over political bodies and processes in the country. However, the interregnum coding is employed conservatively, meaning that partial control over political bodies and processes in fairly large parts of the country (which is often the case also during civil wars) is sufficient for a 0 score.

Please note that the expert coded (C) questions on support and opposition groups in the regime survey are only coded when v2regint=1.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): Encyclopedia Britannica; Wikipedia; various region- and country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.3.7.50 Regime ID (D) (v2regidnr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regidnr

*Original tag:* v2regidnr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the unique identifier number given to the current regime?

CLARIFICATION: This numeric regime identifier consists, first, of the country's V-Dem country code and, second, of a regime numeric counter that has at least two digits (hence the first regime identified for a country would be assigned 01).

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): v2reginfo

DATA RELEASE: 12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.3.7.51 Regime Duration (D) (v2regdur)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regdur

*Original tag:* v2regdur

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: How many days have passed since the current regime started?

CLARIFICATION: The variable pertains to the regime coded under v2reginfo, and is measured in number of calendar days.

SCALE: Interval

SOURCE(S): v2reginfo

DATA RELEASE: 12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.3.7.52 Regime most important support group (v2regimpgroup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regimpgroup

*Original tag:* v2regimpgroup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which (one) group does the current political regime rely on most strongly in order to maintain power?

CLARIFICATION: Choose the group that, if it were to retract its support to the regime, would most endanger the regime (most strongly increase the chance that it loses power).

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).

3: Business elites.

4: Civil servants.

5: The military.

6: An ethnic or racial group(s).

7: A religious group(s).

8: Local elites, including chiefs.

9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.

10: Urban middle classes

11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).

12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)

13: A foreign government or colonial power.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.3.7.53 Regime support groups size (v2regsupgroupssize)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regsupgroupssize

*Original tag:* v2regsupgroupssize

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In total, how large is the percentage share of the domestic adult (18+) population that belongs to the political regime's supporting groups?

CLARIFICATION: You should consider the sum of all the groups (excepting foreign governments and colonial powers) entered in v2regsupgroups. Hence, your answer should take into account the total size of the/those groups that are supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power. Regarding the issue of overlapping identities, and one individual potentially belonging to more than one groups: Individuals should only be "counted" once; thus if the two relevant supporting groups are (4) civil servants, which total about 5percent, and all of them belong to a particular ethnic group (6) also coded as a relevant, the overall total size of the supporting groups is still 5percent (presuming that no other members of that ethnic group are essential for the regime staying in power).

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely small

(About 1 percent of the population or less; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — a handful of higher-rank military officers, or by only a royal council and a few hundred landowners)

1: Very small

(Between 1 percent and 5 percent of the population; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — higher ranking civil servants and the military, or by moderately sized business and agrarian elites)

## 2: Small

(Between 5 percent and 15 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — relatively small ethnic groups, or by urban elites and the urban middle classes in predominantly rural societies)

## 3: Moderate

(Between 15 percent and 30 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — moderately sized ethnic groups, by rural middle classes in rural societies, or by urban middle classes in urban societies)

## 4: Large

(More than 30 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — large ethnic groups (and then not only the elites/leaders of such groups), or by rural working classes in rural societies.)

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

**2.3.7.54 Regime support location (v2regsuploc)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regsuploc

*Original tag:* v2regsuploc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: In which geographic area do the support groups for the current political regime mainly reside?

RESPONSES:

0: Abroad.

1: In the capital.

2: In urban areas outside the capital.

3: In rural areas.

4: The groups are not concentrated in any particular area.

SCALE: Nominal

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories receive the value 4.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

**2.3.7.55 Regime most important opposition group (v2regimpoppgroup)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regimpoppgroup

*Original tag:* v2regimpoppgroup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which (one) group constitutes the greatest threat to the current regime?

CLARIFICATION: Choose the one group (among those you registered as opposition groups under the v2regoppgroups question) that is the most dangerous threat to the regime in a given

year. That is, the group that could most strongly increase the chance that the regime loses power. The importance/danger associated with an opposition group will be affected both by its level of hostility towards the regime and its power resources/how capable it is of removing the regime should it try to do so. We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).

3: Business elites.

4: Civil servants.

5: The military.

6: An ethnic or racial group(s).

7: A religious group(s).

8: Local elites, including chiefs.

9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.

10: Urban middle classes

11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).

12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)

13: A foreign government or colonial power.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regoppgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.3.7.56 Regime opposition groups size (v2regoppgroupssize)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regoppgroupssize

*Original tag:* v2regoppgroupssize

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In total, how large is the share of the domestic adult (18+) population that are noteworthy opposition actors to the current political regime?

CLARIFICATION: Consider the sum total of all the groups (excepting foreign governments and colonial powers) entered in v2regoppgroups. Hence, your answer should take into account the total size/number of the actors that oppose the regime and pose a threat to the regime maintaining power.

We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year.

Regarding the issue of individuals potentially belonging to more than one "opposition group": Individuals should only be "counted" once for the purpose of this question. For example, if the two relevant opposition groups are (4) civil servants, which total about 5percent of the population, and all of them belong to a particular ethnic group (6) also coded as a relevant, the overall total size of the opposition groups is still 5percent (presuming that there are no other members of that ethnic group who oppose the regime).

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and

who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.  
RESPONSES:

- 0: Extremely small (About 1 percent of the population or less)
- 1: Very small (Between 1 percent and 5 percent of the population)
- 2: Small (Between 5 percent and 15 percent)
- 3: Moderate (Between 15 percent and 30 percent)
- 4: Large (More than 30 percent)

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 2.3.7.57 Regime opposition location (v2regopploc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regopploc

*Original tag:* v2regopploc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: In which geographic area do groups opposing the current political regime mainly reside?

CLARIFICATION: You should consider the groups entered in v2regoppgroups, hence groups that both want to see the regime removed and (at least under “favorable conditions”) are capable of removing the regime. We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

- 0: Abroad.
- 1: In the capital.
- 2: In urban areas outside the capital.
- 3: In rural areas.
- 4: The groups are not concentrated in any particular area.

SCALE: Nominal

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories receive the value 4.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.3.7.58 Strongest pro-regime preferences (v2regproreg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regproreg



*Original tag:* v2regproreg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which (one) group has the strongest pro-regime preferences, irrespective of the group's resources and capabilities for affecting the regime's hold on power?

CLARIFICATION: Consider only the pro-regime preferences of individuals in this group, and do not take into consideration the abilities of this group to actually affect regime survival. Hence, the group with the strongest pro-regime preferences need not be the most important support group.

One way to think about what pro-/anti-regime preferences means is: what would individuals hypothetically (honestly) answer if asked in a survey: "On a scale from 0-10, how pleased are you with the current political regime, with 10 indicating the strongest support." Select the group with the highest average score in this hypothetical survey.

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).

3: Business elites.

4: Civil servants.

5: The military.

6: An ethnic or racial group(s).

7: A religious group(s).

8: Local elites, including chiefs.

9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.

10: Urban middle classes

11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).

12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)

13: A foreign government or colonial power.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.3.7.59 Strongest anti-regime preferences (v2regantireg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regantireg

*Original tag:* v2regantireg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which (one) group has the strongest anti-regime preferences/antipathy against the current regime, irrespective of the group's resources and capabilities for affecting the regime's hold on power?

CLARIFICATION: Consider only the anti-regime preferences of the actors in this group, and do not take into consideration the abilities of this group to actually affect regime survival and change. Hence, the group with the strongest anti-regime preferences need not be the most

important opposition group. Both capable and incapable political actors may have strong anti-regime preferences and want to see the regime removed from power. We also remind that the group needs not be currently mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; individuals may strongly resent a regime, without taking particular actions, in a given year.

One way to think about what pro-/anti-regime preferences mean, independently of ability to affect regime survival is: what would individuals hypothetically (honestly) answer if asked in a survey: “On a scale from 0-10, how pleased are you with the current political regime”.

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).

3: Business elites.

4: Civil servants.

5: The military.

6: An ethnic or racial group(s).

7: A religious group(s).

8: Local elites, including chiefs.

9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.

10: Urban middle classes

11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).

12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)

13: A foreign government or colonial power.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regoppgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.3.7.60 Most powerful group in affecting regime duration and change (v2regpower)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regpower

*Original tag:* v2regpower

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Irrespective of its stance toward the regime (pro-, anti-, or neutral), which one group is the most important for affecting the current regime’s chances of staying in power?

CLARIFICATION: Here we ask you to disregard group preferences, and only consider a group’s resources and capabilities vis-a-vis affecting regime survival. In other words, do not consider whether this group is pro-regime, anti-regime, or neutral to the regime. Take only into consideration the capabilities of this group to affect regime survival, if key members of the group were to hypothetically mobilize the group in an effort to remove the regime. Politically neutral, as well as pro- and anti-regime groups, may have ample resources and be capable of organizing coordinated action. As a result, all three types of groups may have great influence over regime survival and change.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.

- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.3.7.61 Regime end type, multiple selection version (v2regendtypems)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regendtypems

*Original tag:* v2regendtypems

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

QUESTION: Could you specify the types of processes (one or more) that led to the end of the regime?

RESPONSES:

0: A military coup d'état. [v2regendtypems\_0]

1: A coup d'état conducted by other groups than the military. [v2regendtypems\_1]

2: A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader. [v2regendtypems\_2]

3: Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d'état). [v2regendtypems\_3]

4: Natural death of the sitting leader. [v2regendtypems\_4]

5: Loss in civil war. [v2regendtypems\_5]

6: Loss in inter-state war. [v2regendtypems\_6]

7: Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war). [v2regendtypems\_7]

8: Popular uprising. [v2regendtypems\_8]

9: Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by sitting regime leaders. [v2regendtypems\_9]

10: Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization/democratization). [v2regendtypems\_10]

11: Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for the sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1-10. [v2regendtypems\_11]

12: Other process than those specified by categories 1-11. [v2regendtypems\_12]

13: The regime still exists. [v2regendtypems\_13]

SCALE: Nominal

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple selection

SOURCE(S): Encyclopedia Britannica; Wikipedia; various region- and country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the

top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.3.7.62 Regime opposition groups (v2regoppgroups)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regoppgroups

*Original tag:* v2regoppgroups

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which groups include noteworthy opposition actors – that is, individuals (mobilized or not) who both want to and who could, under favorable circumstances, be able to remove the existing political regime?(Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: Consider which group(s) include a significant share of individuals who both oppose the regime and pose a non-negligible threat to the regime (either mobilized or dormant). In other words, these individuals must both want to see the regime removed and, at least under hypothetical “favorable conditions”, be capable of removing the regime. Groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; opposition groups also include individuals who oppose the regime without taking particular actions, at the moment. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regoppgroups\_0]

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regoppgroups\_1]

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regoppgroups\_2]

3: Business elites. [v2regoppgroups\_3]

4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regoppgroups\_4]

5: The military. [v2regoppgroups\_5]

6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regoppgroups\_6]

7: A religious group(s). [v2regoppgroups\_7]

8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regoppgroups\_8]

9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regoppgroups\_9]

10: Urban middle classes. [v2regoppgroups\_10]

11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regoppgroups\_11]

12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regoppgroups\_12]

13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regoppgroups\_13]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.3.7.63 Explicit and active regime opposition groups (v2regoppgroupsact)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regoppgroupsact

*Original tag:* v2regoppgroupsact

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sirianne Dahlum, Tore Wig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which (if any) groups include a significant share of individuals who explicitly and actively mobilize against the regime in a particular year? (Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: Consider which group(s) include a significant share of individuals who engage in active and explicit opposition to the regime to promote its removal. These actors make explicit statements of dissent from the regime, publicly voice their preference for regime change, and may possibly engage in other actions intended to further the removal of the regime such as anti-regime demonstrations, sit-ins, boycotts, strikes, the formation of anti-system parties, acts of sabotage, or armed rebellion. Please note that only years when anti-regime speech or activity occurs should be coded. In years when groups probably oppose the regime, but are not engaged in any explicit acts of opposition, the group should not be selected. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regoppgroupsact\_0]

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regoppgroupsact\_1]

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regoppgroupsact\_2]

3: Business elites. [v2regoppgroupsact\_3]

4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regoppgroupsact\_4]

5: The military. [v2regoppgroupsact\_5]

6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regoppgroupsact\_6]

7: A religious group(s). [v2regoppgroupsact\_7]

8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regoppgroupsact\_8]

9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regoppgroupsact\_9]

10: Urban middle classes. [v2regoppgroupsact\_10]

11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regoppgroupsact\_11]

12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regoppgroupsact\_12]

13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regoppgroupsact\_13]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 11-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2020

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 2.3.7.64 Regime support groups (v2regsupgroups)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regsupgroups

*Original tag:* v2regsupgroups

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which groups does the current political regime rely on in order to maintain power? (Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: Consider which group(s) is supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regsupgroups\_0]

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regsupgroups\_1]  
 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regsupgroups\_2]  
 3: Business elites. [v2regsupgroups\_3]  
 4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regsupgroups\_4]  
 5: The military. [v2regsupgroups\_5]  
 6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regsupgroups\_6]  
 7: A religious group(s). [v2regsupgroups\_7]  
 8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regsupgroups\_8]  
 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regsupgroups\_9]  
 10: Urban middle classes. [v2regsupgroups\_10]  
 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regsupgroups\_11]  
 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regsupgroups\_12]  
 13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regsupgroups\_13]  
 SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.  
 ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.  
 DATA RELEASE: 9-12.  
 CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.  
 CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.  
 CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
 YEARS: 1789-2020  
 DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 2.3.8 V-Dem Indicators - The Legislature

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **The Legislature:**

The following questions pertain to the legislature, an assembly of deputies or representatives with powers to consider, pass, amend, or repeal laws. If there is no legislature in the country you are coding for some period of years, do not code any questions for those years. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory such as a colony please answer this question with respect to the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the Parliament in London). A popular election need not involve universal suffrage; indeed, suffrage may be highly restricted. A "direct election" can include seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election.

Frequently, it is important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues. Note that sometimes we ask different coders to code different aspects of a question. So, you might get a question about the *de facto* state of affairs, but another source might provide the answer to the *de jure* state of affairs.

#### 2.3.8.1 Legislature bicameral (v2lgbicam)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgbicam

*Original tag:* v2lgbicam

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: How many chambers does the legislature contain?

CLARIFICATION: The number of chambers have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. This means that the score has already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating. If there is a change in the number of chambers, this is coded on the exact date of when the change occurred, for example the exact date of when a legislature was dissolved, or when the lower and/or upper chamber was established (usually coded on the date when the new legislature first meets; otherwise on the date of the legislative election where the composition of the new legislature was decided).

RESPONSES:

0: 0 chambers.

1: 1 chamber.

2: 2 or more chambers.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IFES; Websites of national parliaments; National constitutions; CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v191.

NOTES: For the country-year aggregation of the dataset, we have taken the minimum value of v2lgbicam. Constituent assemblies that perform other functions except for drafting and adopting a new constitution (*e.g.* legislating, electing president, adopting budget, etc) are coded as 1 (1 chamber). In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable "Lower chamber legislature name" (v2lgnamelow), while the others are listed in the variable "Upper chamber name" (v2lgnameup). South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable v2lgbicam is coded 2, v2lgnamelow is coded "House of Assembly", and v2lgnameup enlists "House of Representatives, House of Delegates".

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.8.2 Legislature dominant chamber (v2lgdomchm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgdomchm

*Original tag:* v2lgdomchm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the legislature is bicameral, which chamber is dominant?

RESPONSES:

0: The lower chamber is clearly dominant.

1: The lower chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.

2: They are roughly co-equal in power.

3: The upper chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.

4: The upper chamber is clearly dominant.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 2.3.8.3 Legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgqstexp

*Original tag:* v2lgqstexp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?

CLARIFICATION: By "question" we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain its policies or testify.

RESPONSES:

0: No — never or very rarely.

1: Yes — routinely.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.8.4 Legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lginvstp

*Original tag:* v2lginvstp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.

2: As likely as not.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.8.5 Executive oversight (v2lgotovst)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgotovst

*Original tag:* v2lgotovst

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body *other than the legislature*, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.

2: Very uncertain.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see



*V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 2.3.8.6 Legislature corrupt activities (v2lgcrrpt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgcrrpt

*Original tag:* v2lgcrrpt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?

CLARIFICATION: This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.

Please make your best estimate, based upon what is known or suspected to be true.

RESPONSES:

0: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.

1: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.

2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.

3: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.

4: Never, or hardly ever.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: For reasons of consistency, as of December, 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.8.7 Legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgoppart

*Original tag:* v2lgoppart

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?

RESPONSES:

0: No, not at all.

1: Occasionally.

2: Yes, for the most part.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.8.8 Legislature controls resources (v2lgbfunds)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgbfunds

*Original tag:* v2lgbfunds

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal operations and the perquisites of its members?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature's operation depend on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.8.9 Representation of disadvantaged social groups (v2lgdsadlo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgdsadlo

*Original tag:* v2lgdsadlo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Considering all disadvantaged social groups in the country, how well represented are these groups, as a whole, in the national legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

RESPONSES:

0 (1): They have no representation at all.

1 (2): They are highly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

2 (3): They are slightly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

3 (4): They are represented roughly equal relative to their proportion of the general population.

4 (5): They are over-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: As of December 2014, the former category 0: There are no disadvantaged groups in the society, is coded as a separate variable (v2lgdsadlobin). The variable is then rebased to zero.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.8.10 Representation of disadvantaged groups binary (v2lgdsadlobin)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgdsadlobin*Original tag:* v2lgdsadlobin*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are there disadvantaged groups in the society?

CLARIFICATION: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.8.11 Relative power of the HOS (v2ex\_hosw)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ex\_hosw*Original tag:* v2ex\_hosw*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Does the head of state HOS have more relative power than the head of government HOG over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

0.25: See notes.

0.5: The HOS and HOG share equal power.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Nominal.

SOURCE(S): v2exdfcbhs\_rec v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg v2exhoshog

NOTES: If the head of state is also head of government, v2ex\_hosw is 1.

From 1900-01-01 to 1960-08-09 Belgium has a score of 0.25.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.8.12 HOG appointed by legislature (v2ex\_legconhog)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ex\_legconhog*Original tag:* v2ex\_legconhog*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the head of government HOG appointed by the legislature, or is the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2expathhg v2exaphogp

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.8.13 HOS appointed by legislature (v2ex\_legconhos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ex\_legconhos

*Original tag:* v2ex\_legconhos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the head of state HOS appointed by the legislature, or is the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2expathhs v2exaphos

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.8.14 Legislature approval of treaties by law (v2lgtreaty)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgtreaty

*Original tag:* v2lgtreaty

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: By law, is the approval of the legislature necessary to ratify treaties with foreign countries?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v492; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

#### 2.3.8.15 Legislature declares war by law (v2lgwarlaw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgwarlaw

*Original tag:* v2lgwarlaw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to declare war?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v488; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

### 2.3.8.16 Upper chamber name (v2lgnameup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgnameup

*Original tag:* v2lgnameup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: What is the name of the upper chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the upper chamber of the legislature in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.

The legislature names have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. This means that the text and specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating.

RESPONSES:

Text.

NOTES: In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable "Lower chamber legislature name" (v2lgnameo), while the others are enlisted in the variable "Upper chamber name" (v2lgnameup). Example: South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable v2lgbicam is coded 2, v2lgnameo is coded "House of Assembly", and v2lgnameup enlists "House of Representatives, House of Delegates".

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.8.17 Upper chamber legislates in practice (v2lglegpup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lglegpup

*Original tag:* v2lglegpup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the upper chamber of the legislature.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

*V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.8.18 Upper chamber elected (v2lgelecup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgelecup

*Original tag:* v2lgelecup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

CLARIFICATION: Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body, and members who are indirectly elected by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Thus, if 10 percent of a upper chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90 percent.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

NOTES: Converted from B to A coding.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.8.19 Percentage of indirectly elected legislators upper chamber (v2lginelup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lginelup

*Original tag:* v2lginelup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

CLARIFICATION: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.

We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.8.20 Upper chamber introduces bills (v2lgintbup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgintbup

*Original tag:* v2lgintbup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: By law, does the upper chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

RESPONSES:

0: No, there are policy areas in which the upper chamber cannot introduce bills.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v263; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

### 2.3.8.21 Lower chamber legislature name (v2lgnamelo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgnamelo

*Original tag:* v2lgnamelo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: What is the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.

The legislature names have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. This means that the text and specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating.

RESPONSES:

Text.

NOTES: In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable "Lower chamber legislature name" (v2lgnamelo), while the others are enlisted in the variable "Upper chamber name" (v2lgnameup). Example: South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable v2lgbicam is coded 2, v2lgnamelo is coded "House of Assembly", and v2lgnameup enlists "House of Representatives, House of Delegates".

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.8.22 Lower chamber legislates in practice (v2lglegplo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lglegplo

*Original tag:* v2lglegplo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

## RESPONSES:

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.8.23 Lower chamber committees (v2lgcomslo)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgcomslo

*Original tag:* v2lgcomslo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have a functioning committee system?

## RESPONSES:

0: No, there are no committees.

1: Yes, but there are only special (not permanent) committees.

2: Yes, there are permanent committees, but they are not very significant in affecting the course of policy.

3: Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.8.24 Lower chamber members serve in government (v2lgsrvlo)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgsrvlo

*Original tag:* v2lgsrvlo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, are members of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature able to serve simultaneously as ministers in the government?

## RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see



*V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.8.25 Lower chamber staff (v2lgstafflo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgstafflo

*Original tag:* v2lgstafflo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does each member of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have at least one staff member with policy expertise?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.8.26 Lower chamber elected (v2lgello)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgello

*Original tag:* v2lgello

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

CLARIFICATION: Direct election includes seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election.

Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body, and members who are indirectly elected by local/ regional parliaments,

country/city councilors or similar. Thus, if 10percent of a lower chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90 percent.

We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.8.27 Lower chamber female legislators (v2lgfemleg)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgfemleg*Original tag:* v2lgfemleg*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: What percentage (percent) of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is female?

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Edgell (2014); Paxton *et al.* (2008); Carmichael *et al.* (2014); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); genderproject.org.

DATA RELEASE: 4-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.8.28 Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber (v2lginello)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lginello*Original tag:* v2lginello*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

CLARIFICATION: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.8.29 Lower chamber introduces bills (v2lgintblo)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgintblo*Original tag:* v2lgintblo*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

QUESTION: By law, does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

RESPONSES:

0: No, there are policy areas in which the lower (or unicameral) chamber cannot introduce bills.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v263; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2020

### 2.3.8.30 Lower chamber gender quota (v2lgqugen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgqugen

*Original tag:* v2lgqugen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: Is there a national-level gender quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: National-level quotas either reserve some seats for women in the legislature (as a whole or per district) or mandate through statutory law that all political parties must nominate a certain percentage of female candidates or candidates considered for nomination. A sanction for noncompliance imposes a penalty on a party that fails to meet the quota provisions. Examples of sanctions for noncompliance include rejection of the party list, loss of public campaign funds, or other financial penalties. Weak sanctions are those that parties may be able to ignore, such as a very weak financial penalty. Strong sanctions provide strong deterrents for noncompliance. An example of a strong sanction would be the rejection of a party's list. Countries with both candidate quotas and reserved seats are recorded at the stronger level. This variable records quotas from the date of implementation. The quota adoption date may be earlier, sometimes by several years. Data on quota adoption is available from the QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017) while the theoretical implications of adoption vs. implementation are discussed in Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018).  
RESPONSES:

0: No national level gender quota.

1: Yes, a statutory gender quota for all parties without sanctions for noncompliance.

2: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with weak sanctions for noncompliance.

3: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with strong sanctions for noncompliance.

4: Yes, there are reserved seats in the legislature for women.

ORDERING: If you answer 1-4, proceed to the next question [v2lgqugens]. If you answer 0, skip to question [v2lglegllo].

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017), Quota project (2018); International IDEA (2018a) ; Coding by project manager.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.8.31 Lower chamber gender quota placement mandate (v2lgqugens)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgqugens

*Original tag:* v2lgqugens

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: Does the national-level quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature contain a placement mandate?

CLARIFICATION: A placement mandate is a rule concerning rank order on the party list, usually to ensure that women are placed in electable positions on the party list. An example would be a rule stating that no more than three of the top five candidates can be of the same gender. Coded only for years where a gender quota was present.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

ORDERING: Only answer this question if you answered 1-4 on previous question [v2lgqugen].

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017), Quota project (2018); International IDEA (2018a); Coding by project manager.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgqugen is 0

CITATION: Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1947-2021

### 2.3.8.32 Lower chamber gender quota threshold (v2lgqugent)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgqugent

*Original tag:* v2lgqugent

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: What is the threshold of the quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: A quota is the minimum threshold, understood as a percentage (percent) of the total seats in the legislature. Coded only for years where a gender quota was present.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017), Quota project (2018); International IDEA (2018a); Coding by project manager.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgqugen is 0

CITATION: Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1947-2021

## 2.3.9 V-Dem Indicators - Deliberation

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

#### **Deliberation:**

The following questions address the deliberative or non-deliberative nature of a country's politics, with particular focus on elite levels. Some of these questions focus on the quality of discourse and others focus on public policies.

### 2.3.9.1 Reasoned justification (v2dlreason)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2dlreason

*Original tag:* v2dlreason

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, *i.e.* before a decision has

been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?

CLARIFICATION: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

RESPONSES:

0: No justification. Elites almost always only dictate that something should or should not be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, "We must cut spending."

1: Inferior justification. Elites tend to give reasons why someone should or should not be for doing or not doing something, but the reasons tend to be illogical or false, although they may appeal to many voters. For example, "We must cut spending. The state is inefficient." [The inference is incomplete because addressing inefficiencies would not necessarily reduce spending and it might undermine essential services.]

2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current programs."

3: Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex, nuanced and complete justification. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurt economic growth, and deficit spending would lead to inflation."

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.9.2 Common good (v2dlcommon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2dlcommon

*Original tag:* v2dlcommon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?

CLARIFICATION: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

RESPONSES:

0: Little or no justification in terms of the common good is usually offered.

1: Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part offered as justifications.

2: Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other.

3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests and on appeals to the common good.

4: Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping the least advantaged in a society.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.9.3 Respect counterarguments (v2dlcountr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2dlcountr

*Original tag:* v2dlcountr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?

CLARIFICATION: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

RESPONSES:

0: Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished.

1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored.

2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them.

3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them.

4: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they ultimately reject them for the most part.

5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently also even accept them and change their position.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 2.3.9.4 Range of consultation (v2dlconslt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2dlconslt

*Original tag:* v2dlconslt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at *elite levels*?

CLARIFICATION: Because practices vary greatly from policy to policy, base your answer on the style that is most typical of policymaking.

RESPONSES:

0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (*e.g.* military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own.

1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites.

2: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such as the ruling party's or parties' local executives and/or women, youth and other branches.

3: Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties.

4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives.

5: Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.9.5 Engaged society (v2dlengage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2dlengage

*Original tag:* v2dlengage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?

CLARIFICATION: This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media.

RESPONSES:

0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.

1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.

2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.

3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.

4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.

5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.9.6 Particularistic or public goods (v2dlencmps)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2dlencmps

*Original tag:* v2dlencmps

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how "particularistic" or "public goods" are most expenditures?

CLARIFICATION: Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as "pork", "clientelistic", or "private goods."

Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-test are allowed to receive the benefit.

Your answer should consider the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending. We are interested in the relative value of particularistic and public-goods spending, not the number of

bills or programs that fall into either category.

RESPONSES:

0: Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic.

1: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (*e.g.* 1/4 or 1/3) is public-goods.

2: Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs.

3: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion (*e.g.*, 1/4 or 1/3) is particularistic.

4: Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.9.7 Means-tested vs. universalistic (v2dlunivl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2dlunivl

*Original tag:* v2dlunivl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity?

CLARIFICATION: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested.

A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these programs (*e.g.*, when people with higher salaries get higher unemployment benefits). The key point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary, or potential beneficiary.

The purpose of this question is not to gauge the size of the welfare state but rather its quality. So, your answer should be based on whatever programs exist.

RESPONSES:

0: There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health, retirement, unemployment, poverty programs).

1: Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested.

2: Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion (*e.g.* 1/4 or 1/3) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population.

3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic.

4: Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion (*e.g.*, 1/4 or 1/3) are means-tested.

5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is means-tested.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021



### 2.3.10 V-Dem Indicators - The Judiciary

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Judiciary:** This set of questions pertains to the judiciary. Before you proceed, we would like to clarify several general points. First, some questions below refer to the judiciary in general, whereas others ask for specific evaluations of particular courts or types of courts. Unless otherwise prompted, please consider the judiciary as a whole. This includes all courts in the judicial system at every level, both general jurisdiction courts and more specialized courts. However, with potentially one exception, it excludes specialized courts that are located outside the judiciary, *e.g.* an immigration court that lies inside the executive branch. The one potential exception is the peak constitutional court of the country. Please include this court in your considerations, even though it will be located outside of the judiciary in some countries. If the country you are coding is a federal state, please focus only on the federal judiciary and the federal government.

Seven of the questions about the judiciary concern high courts. By "high court" we are asking you to consider the country's constitutional court, if one exists. If there is no constitutional court, please consider the court of last resort for constitutional matters. If there is no court in your country with constitutional jurisdiction, please consider the highest ordinary court of the state.

For example, in Mexico in 2004, you would consider the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and not the Electoral Tribunal for the Federal Judiciary. In Russia in the same year, you would consider the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and not the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. In Sweden, you would ignore the Supreme Administrative Court and instead focus on the Supreme Court. Germany has both a constitutional court, the Federal Constitutional Court, and a court of last resort for ordinary matters, the Federal Court of Justice. The Federal Constitutional Court is the high court for our purposes. In the United States, there is no separate constitutional court or review body. The Supreme Court is both the highest ordinary court and the highest court in the state with constitutional jurisdiction. Therefore, we consider it to be the high court of the United States. If your country's highest judicial body has separate divisions, only one of which is dedicated to final constitutional review, please consider that division to be the high court if its judges are permanently assigned to that division only. For example, the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica has four chambers. The Fourth Chamber reviews constitutional matters, its judges are appointed to it specifically and the other judges of the Supreme Court do not rotate onto the Fourth Chamber. Therefore, the high court for Costa Rica is the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.

If a new high court was established in a given year, please consider that court as the high court for the purposes of these questions only if the court was functioning for the majority of the calendar year. If a new high court was established in a given year, but did not start functioning until a subsequent year, please do not consider the new court as the high court until it was functioning for the majority of the given calendar year. If you are considering a semi sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to the government or judicial bodies seated within the territory in question (*e.g.*, the governor-general and his local administration in a British colony or a Commonwealth country), not abroad (*e.g.*, the King/Queen or government of England).

In coding the following questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens "on the ground"). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them.

#### 2.3.10.1 Judicial reform (v2jreform)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2jreform

*Original tag:* v2jreform

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Were the judiciary's formal powers altered this year in ways that affect its ability to control the arbitrary use of state authority?

CLARIFICATION: Evidence of this kind of reform could include the creation or removal of various forms of constitutional review, new rules increasing or decreasing access to the judiciary, changes in available judicial remedies, and any other formal institution (procedural or otherwise) that influences the ability of courts to control the arbitrary use of power.

RESPONSES:

0: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was *reduced* via institutional reform.

1: There was no change to the judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power via institutional review.

2: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was *enhanced* via institutional reform.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.10.2 Judicial purges (v2jupurge)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2jupurge

*Original tag:* v2jupurge

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Judges are sometimes removed from their posts for cause, as when there is strong evidence of corruption; however, some judges are removed arbitrarily, typically for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe the removal of judges that occurred this calendar year.

CLARIFICATION: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited arbitrary removals (*i.e.*, when only a few judges are targeted) by the political importance of the removal. For example, you may consider the arbitrary removal of a few high court judges as more important than the arbitrary removal of a few lower court judges.

RESPONSES:

0: There was a massive, arbitrary purge of the judiciary.

1: There were limited but very important arbitrary removals.

2: There were limited arbitrary removals.

3: Judges were removed from office, but there is no evidence that the removals were arbitrary.

4: Judges were not removed from their posts.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.10.3 Government attacks on judiciary (v2jupoatk)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2jupoatk

*Original tag:* v2jupoatk

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often did the government attack the judiciary's integrity in public?

CLARIFICATION: Attacks on the judiciary's integrity can include claims that it is corrupt, incompetent or that decisions were politically motivated. These attacks can manifest in

various ways including, but not limited to prepared statements reported by the media, press conferences, interviews, and stump speeches.

RESPONSES:

0: Attacks were carried out on a daily or weekly basis.

1: Attacks were common and carried out in nearly every month of the year.

2: Attacks occurred more than once.

3: There were attacks, but they were rare.

4: There were no attacks on the judiciary's integrity.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.3.10.4 Court packing (v2jupack)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2jupack

*Original tag:* v2jupack

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: The size of the judiciary is sometimes increased for very good reasons, as when judges are added to manage an increasing caseload; however, sometimes judges are added purely for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe any increases in the size of the judiciary that occurred this calendar year.

CLARIFICATION: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited court packing efforts (*i.e.* when relatively few judgeships are added) by the political importance of the packing. For example, you may consider the packing of the high court to be more important than the packing of a lower court.

RESPONSES:

0: There was a massive, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships across the entire judiciary.

1: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships on very important courts.

2: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships.

3: Judgeships were added to the judiciary, but there is no evidence that the increase was politically motivated; or there was no increase.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: A previous version of the variable contained category "4: There was no increase". As of November 2014, all responses in category "4" are assigned to category "3", since the two responses have the same meaning in practice.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.10.5 Judicial accountability (v2juacct)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2juacct

*Original tag:* v2juacct

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct, how often are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined?

RESPONSES:

0: Never.

1: Seldom.

2: About half of the time.

3: Usually.

4: Always.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.10.6 Judicial corruption decision (v2jucorrdc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2jucorrdc

*Original tag:* v2jucorrdc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?

RESPONSES:

0: Always.

1: Usually.

2: About half of the time.

3: Not usually.

4: Never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: For reasons of consistency, as of December, 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.10.7 High court name (v2juhcname)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2juhcname

*Original tag:* v2juhcname

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

QUESTION: Please enter the name of the high court.

CLARIFICATION: As accurately as possible, please provide a literal translation of the name of the court in English, followed by the name in the native language, or a transcription transliteration thereof, within parentheses.

RESPONSES:

Text.

NOTES: Converted from (C) to (A(C)) from version 7. Where possible, data was pre-coded, and CEs were asked to add their answers to the remaining gaps.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.10.8 High court independence (v2juhcind)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2juhcind

*Original tag:* v2juhcind

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When the high court in the judicial system is ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record?

CLARIFICATION: We are seeking to identify autonomous judicial decision-making and its absence. Decisions certainly can reflect government wishes without "merely reflecting" those wishes, *i.e.* a court can be autonomous when its decisions support the government's position. This is because a court can be fairly persuaded that the government's position is meritorious. By "merely reflect the wishes of the government" we mean that the court's own view of the record, its sincere evaluation of the record, is irrelevant to the outcome. The court simply adopts the government's position regardless of its sincere view of the record.

RESPONSES:

0: Always.

1: Usually.

2: About half of the time.

3: Seldom.

4: Never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: The historical version of the variable is set to missing when v3juhcourt is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.10.9 Lower court independence (v2juncind)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2juncind

*Original tag:* v2juncind

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When judges *not* on the high court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record?

RESPONSES:

0: Always.

1: Usually.

2: About half of the time.

3: Seldom.

4: Never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.10.10 Compliance with high court (v2juhccomp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2juhccomp

*Original tag:* v2juhccomp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions of the high court with which it disagrees?

RESPONSES:

0: Never.

1: Seldom.

2: About half of the time.

3: Usually.

4: Always.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: The historical version of the variable is set to missing when v3juhcourt is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.10.11 Compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2jucomp

*Original tag:* v2jucomp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees?

CLARIFICATION: We are looking for a summary judgment for the entire judiciary, excluding the high court. You should consider judges on both ordinary courts and specialized courts.

RESPONSES:

0: Never.

1: Seldom.

2: About half of the time.

3: Usually.

4: Always.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.10.12 Judicial review (v2jureview)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2jureview

*Original tag:* v2jureview

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does any court in the judiciary have the legal authority to invalidate governmental policies (*e.g.* statutes, regulations, decrees, administrative actions) on the grounds that they violate a constitutional provision?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.10.13 Codeable (v2jucodable)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2jucodable

*Original tag:* v2jucodable

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

QUESTION: Can we generate a flowchart describing the appointment process from this constitutional event?

CLARIFICATION: This variable indicates the reasons we could or could not create a visual flowchart representing the selection procedure.

RESPONSES:

1. Yes

2. No, the event is in a language the coder can not read

3. No, there is no appointment or removal information

4. No, the process is explicitly left to be developed via a statute

5. Yes, but much of the process is left to law

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1901-2015

#### 2.3.10.14 Corresponding flowchart (v2jufLOW)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2jufLOW

*Original tag:* v2jufLOW

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

QUESTION: Is a flowchart of the process available?

CLARIFICATION: This variable indicates if a flowchart summarizing the appointment process was generated and is available.

RESPONSES:

0. No

1. Yes

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1901-2015

### 2.3.10.15 Language (v2julanguage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2julanguage

*Original tag:* v2julanguage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

QUESTION: In which language is the constitutional event written?

CLARIFICATION: If the Comparative Constitutions Project had the same constitutional event in both an English and a non-English language, we used the English version.

RESPONSES:

1. English
2. French
3. German
4. Spanish
27. Arabic
43. Azerbaijani
82. Czech
229. Korean
245. Latvian
249. Lithuanian
282. Maltese
306. Nepali
312. Norwegian Nynorsk; Nynorsk, Norwegian
343. Polish
345. Portuguese
357. Romanian; Moldavian; Moldovan
382. Slovak
409. Swahili
410. Swedish
441. Turkish
485. Greek
113. German
121. Dutch; Flemish
130. Estonian
136. Persian
151. Georgian
170. Hebrew
180. Hungarian
185. Icelandic

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1901-2015

### 2.3.10.16 Team translated (v2juteamtr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2juteamtr

*Original tag:* v2juteamtr



*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

QUESTION: For constitutions not available in English, did our coders translate the relevant sections of a non-English event?

CLARIFICATION: This variable indicates whether someone on our coding team read the constitutional event in a non-English language and translated information in order to collect the necessary information.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes, this event was translated by our team

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1901-2015

**2.3.11 V-Dem Indicators - Civil Liberty****Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)**

**Civil Liberty:** The following questions are focused on actual practices (*de facto*) rather than formal legal or constitutional rights (*de jure*). Note that if there is significant variation in the respect for a particular civil liberty across the territory, the score should reflect the "average situation" across the territorial scope of the country unit (for each period) as defined in the coder instructions.

**2.3.11.1 Freedom from torture (v2cltort)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cltort*Original tag:* v2cltort*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there freedom from torture?

CLARIFICATION: Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, with an aim to extract information or intimidate victims, who are in a state of incarceration. Here, we are concerned with torture practiced by state officials or other agents of the state (*e.g.*, police, security forces, prison guards, and paramilitary groups).

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of government.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by top leaders of government. At the same time, leaders of government are not actively working to prevent it.

2: Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by top leaders of government.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by top government leaders.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. Torture is non-existent.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.2 Freedom from political killings (v2clkill)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clkill

*Original tag:* v2clkill

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there freedom from political killings?

CLARIFICATION: Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state (including paramilitary groups).

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced systematically and they are typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced frequently and top leaders of government are not actively working to prevent them.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced in a few isolated cases but they are not incited or approved by top leaders of government.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings are non-existent.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.3 Freedom from forced labor for men (v2clslavem)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clslavem

*Original tag:* v2clslavem

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are adult men free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

CLARIFICATION: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

RESPONSES:

0: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.

1: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.

2: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.

3: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.

4: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

*V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.11.4 Freedom from forced labor for women (v2cls slavef)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cls slavef

*Original tag:* v2cls slavef

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

CLARIFICATION: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women from forced labor. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (0) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes.

RESPONSES:

0: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.

1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.

2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.

3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.

4: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.11.5 Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cltrnslw

*Original tag:* v2cltrnslw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner?

CLARIFICATION: This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land.

RESPONSES:

0: Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion.

1: Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion.

2: Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly

created in a non-arbitrary fashion but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country.

3: Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

4: Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.6 Rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clrspct

*Original tag:* v2clrspct

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?

CLARIFICATION: This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (*i.e.*, nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination).

The question covers the public officials that handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies.

RESPONSES:

0: The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant.

1: The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread.

2: The law is modestly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate.

3: The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited.

4: The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is very limited.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.7 Access to justice for men (v2clacjstm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clacjstm

*Original tag:* v2clacjstm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do men enjoy secure and effective access to justice?

CLARIFICATION: This question specifies the extent to which men can bring cases before the

courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and men have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely limited — access to justice.

RESPONSES:

0: Secure and effective access to justice for men is non-existent.

1: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually not established or widely respected.

2: Secure and effective access to justice for men is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.

3: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually observed.

4: Secure and effective access to justice for men is almost always observed.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.8 Access to justice for women (v2clacjstw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clacjstw

*Original tag:* v2clacjstw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice?

CLARIFICATION: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely limited — access to justice.

RESPONSES:

0: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent.

1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected.

2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.

3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed.

4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.9 Social class equality in respect for civil liberty (v2clacjust)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clacjust

*Original tag:* v2clacjust

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do?

CLARIFICATION: This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socioeconomic groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Poor people enjoy much fewer civil liberties than rich people.

1: Poor people enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than rich people.

2: Poor people enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than rich people.

3: Poor people enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than rich people.

4: Poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.10 Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clsocgrp

*Original tag:* v2clsocgrp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

CLARIFICATION: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population.

1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population.

2: Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population.

3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population.

4: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.11 Subnational civil liberties unevenness (v2clrgunev)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clrgunev

*Original tag:* v2clrgunev

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
 QUESTION: Does government respect for civil liberties vary across different areas of the country?

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties significantly more (or, alternatively, significantly less) than government officials in other areas of the country.

1: Somewhat. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties somewhat more (or, alternatively, somewhat less) than government officials in other areas of the country.

2: No. Government officials in most or all areas of the country equally respect (or, alternatively, equally do not respect) civil liberties.

ORDERING: If answer is "2" skip remaining civil liberties questions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.12 Weaker civil liberties pop percent (v2clsnpct)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clsnpct

*Original tag:* v2clsnpct

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What percentage (percent) of the total population of the country lives in the areas where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *weaker* than the country average?

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bootstrapped.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.11.13 Stronger civil liberties characteristics (v2clrgstch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clrgstch

*Original tag:* v2clrgstch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you describe the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *stronger*?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_0]

1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_1]

2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_2]

3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_3]

4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_4]

5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_5]

6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_6]  
 7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_7]  
 8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_8]  
 9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_9]  
 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_10]  
 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_11]  
 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_12]  
 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_13]  
 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_14]  
 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_15]  
 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_16]  
 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_17]  
 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_18]  
 19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_19]  
 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_20]  
 21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_21]  
 SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.  
 ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.  
 DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
 CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.  
 CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
 YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.11.14 Weaker civil liberties characteristics (v2clrgwkch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clrgwkch

*Original tag:* v2clrgwkch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you describe the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *weaker*?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_0]  
 1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_1]  
 2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_2]  
 3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_3]  
 4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_4]  
 5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_5]  
 6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_6]  
 7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_7]  
 8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_8]  
 9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_9]  
 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_10]  
 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_11]  
 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_12]  
 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_13]  
 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_14]  
 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_15]  
 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_16]  
 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_17]  
 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_18]



19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_19]  
 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_20]  
 21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_21]  
 SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.  
 ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.  
 DATA RELEASE: 1-12.  
 CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.  
 CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
 YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.11.15 Freedom of discussion for men (v2cldiscm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cldiscm

*Original tag:* v2cldiscm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are men able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which men are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — rights to freedom of discussion.

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for men. Men are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.

1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.

2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.

3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if men make political statements.

4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech for men in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.16 Freedom of discussion for women (v2cldiscw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cldiscw

*Original tag:* v2cldiscw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public

spaces?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — rights to freedom of discussion.

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.

1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.

2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.

3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements.

4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.17 Freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clacfree

*Original tag:* v2clacfree

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted or controlled by the government.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*

(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.18 Freedom of religion (v2clrelig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clrelig

*Original tag:* v2clrelig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there freedom of religion?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion, and practice that religion in private or in public as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to public authorities, who control the activities of religious communities in some detail.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. But significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, voluntary conversions are restricted, and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Yet, minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, and/or instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion occur occasionally.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions against proselytizing, or hindrance to access to or construction of places of worship.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. The population enjoys the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select, and train personnel; solicit and receive contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without undue interference. If religious communities have to register, public authorities do not abuse the process to discriminate against a religion and do not constrain the right to worship before registration.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.19 Freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmmove)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clfmmove

*Original tag:* v2clfmmove

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there freedom of foreign travel and emigration?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by public

authorities.

RESPONSES:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from traveling.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular social groups. This can take the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/refusals of visas.

2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular social groups is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only met minor restrictions.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from traveling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family.

4: Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by public authorities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.20 Freedom of domestic movement for men (v2cldmovem)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cldmovem

*Original tag:* v2cldmovem

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do men enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which all men are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals.

Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no men enjoy full freedom of movement (*e.g.*, North Korea).

1: Some men enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (*e.g.*, Apartheid South Africa).

2: Most men enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all men enjoy partial freedom of movement.

3: Most men enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.

4: Virtually all men enjoy full freedom of movement.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.11.21 Freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cldmovew

*Original tag:* v2cldmovew

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (*e.g.*, North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban).

1: Some women enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (*e.g.*, Apartheid South Africa).

2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all women enjoy partial freedom of movement.

3: Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.

4: Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.11.22 State ownership of economy (v2clstown)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clstown

*Original tag:* v2clstown

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the state own or directly control important sectors of the economy?

CLARIFICATION: This question gauges the degree to which the state owns and controls capital (including land) in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors.

It does *not* measure the extent of government revenue and expenditure as a share of total output; indeed, it is quite common for states with expansive fiscal policies to exercise little direct control (and virtually no ownership) over the economy.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually all valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state. Private property may be officially prohibited.

1: Most valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

2: Many sectors of the economy either belong to the state or are directly controlled by the state, but others remain relatively free of direct state control.

3: Some valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state, but most remains free of direct state control.

4: Very little valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.23 Property rights for men (v2clprptym)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clprptym

*Original tag:* v2clprptym

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do men enjoy the right to private property?

CLARIFICATION: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and very minimal — property rights.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no men enjoy private property rights of any kind.

1: Some men enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.

2: Many men enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.

3: More than half of men enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of men have much more restricted rights.

4: Most men enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.

5: Virtually all men enjoy all, or almost all property rights.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.11.24 Property rights for women (v2clprptyw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clprptyw

*Original tag:* v2clprptyw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do women enjoy the right to private property?

CLARIFICATION: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal

— and very minimal — property rights.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no women enjoy private property rights of any kind.

1: Some women enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.

2: Many women enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.

3: More than half of women enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of women have much more restricted rights.

4: Most women enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.

5: Virtually all women enjoy all, or almost all, property rights.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.12 V-Dem Indicators - Sovereignty and State

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Sovereignty:** This section addresses a number of issues concerning the sovereignty of the state. A state is political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis. With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from other actors in the system. The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

**Sovereignty – Historical clarification:** This section addresses a number of issues concerning the state. A state is a political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis. The questions concern two general themes: state sovereignty and state administration.

With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from and recognition by other actors in the system. The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

A second attribute of states is the state administration: the set of institutions that administer and implement governmental decisions. Here we are mainly interested in the professionalization, or lack thereof, of the state administrative staff – in this context termed the state administrators.

**The State:** “This section addresses a number of issues concerning the state. A state is a political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis. The questions concern two general themes: state sovereignty and state administration.

With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from and recognition by other actors in the system. The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

A second attribute of states is the state administration: the set of institutions that administer and implement governmental decisions. Here we are mainly interested in the professionalization, or lack thereof, of the state administrative staff—in this context termed the state administrators.”

### 2.3.12.1 Domestic Autonomy (v2svdomaut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2svdomaut

*Original tag:* v2svdomaut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy?

CLARIFICATION: The question of domestic autonomy does not include restrictions emanating from treaties (*e.g.*, NATO), international organizations (*e.g.*, the WTO), or confederations (*e.g.*, the European Union) if these agreements are freely negotiated by the state and if the state is free to exit from that treaty, organization, or confederation. Nor does it include restrictions on policymaking emanating from international market forces and trans-national corporations.

RESPONSES:

0: Non-autonomous. National level authority is exercised by an external power, either by law or in practice. The most common examples of this are direct colonial rule and military occupation (*e.g.* quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). It also includes situations in which domestic actors provide *de jure* cover for *de facto* control by a foreign power (*e.g.* Vichy France). However, control of some part of the territory of a state by an enemy during war is not considered control by external actors if the sovereign government remains on scene and continues to wage conventional war (*e.g.*, the USSR during WW II).

1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to rule, decides who can or cannot rule through formal rules or informal understandings, or precludes certain policies through explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples include Soviet "satellite" states in Eastern Europe, and situations where colonial powers grant limited powers of national self-government to their possessions (*e.g.*, protectorates and limited home government).

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise political authority free of the direct control of external political actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.12.2 International autonomy (v2svinlaut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2svinlaut

*Original tag:* v2svinlaut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of its foreign policy?

RESPONSES:

0: Non-autonomous. Foreign policy is controlled by an external power, either *de facto* or *de jure*. The most common examples of this are colonial rule and military occupation (*e.g.* quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). Situations in which domestic actors provide *de jure* cover for *de facto* control by a foreign power should not be construed as semi-autonomy (*e.g.* Vichy France). Governments in exile that control underground forces waging unconventional warfare are not considered as mitigating an occupation regime (*e.g.* countries under German occupation during WWII).



1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to pursue an independent foreign policy course in some important areas. This may be the product of explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples would include Soviet strictures over rule in so-called "satellite" states in Eastern Europe, and explicitly negotiated postwar settlements (*e.g.* Austria following WWII).

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise foreign policy free of the direct control of external political actors. Direct control is meant to exclude the exercise of constraint or the impact of interdependence in the international system. Treaties in which states concede some part of that control to a supra- or international organization voluntarily, and from which there is a possibility of exit should not be interpreted as a violation of autonomy.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.12.3 State authority over territory (v2svstterr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2svstterr

*Original tag:* v2svstterr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Over what percentage (percent) of the territory does the state have effective control?

CLARIFICATION: With this question we seek to judge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its territory. We are not interested here in perfect control by the state, or whether it is relatively effective in comparison to other states, but an assessment of the areas over which it is hegemonic, *e.g.* where it is recognized as the preeminent authority and in a contest of wills it can assert its control over political forces that reject its authority. Several illustrative examples may help in this coding. During civil wars the claim of the state to rule is effectively neutralized by insurgent groups (*e.g.*, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka). There are also situations in which criminals or warlords exert control in contravention of state authority (*e.g.* opium growers in parts of Indochina). There are also cases of failed states where the central government cannot assert control over a share of its territory (*e.g.*, contemporary Somalia). Here, we ask you to estimate the size of the territory that the state has effective control over, as a percentage (percent) of the total territory that is officially part of the country.

By "officially part of the country" we refer to international law. In cases where international law is not entirely clear, we refer you to general understandings. For example, China claims sovereignty over Taiwan, but it remains under the control of its own government. For purposes of this question, Taiwan should not be considered a failure to control its territory by the government of the PRC.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 1-6, 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bootstrapped.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2svindep is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.12.4 State fiscal source of revenue (v2stfiscap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2stfiscap

*Original tag:* v2stfiscap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: On which of the following sources of revenue does the central government primarily rely to finance its activities?

RESPONSES:

0: The state is not capable of raising revenue to finance itself.

1: The state primarily relies on external sources of funding (loans and foreign aid) to finance its activities.

2: The state primarily relies on directly controlling economic assets (natural resource rents, public monopolies, and the expropriation of assets within and outside the country) to finance its activities.

3: The state primarily relies on taxes on property (land taxes) and trade (customs duties).

4: The state primarily relies on taxes on economic transactions (such as sales taxes) and/or taxes on income, corporate profits and capital.

SCALE: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.12.5 Bureaucratic remuneration (v2strenadm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2strenadm

*Original tag:* v2strenadm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are state administrators salaried employees?

CLARIFICATION: A state administrator is anyone who works for the state administration. By "salaried employee", we mean someone who is employed on a contract and paid a regular allowance directly out of the state coffers. It does not include unpaid work; work paid for through a private collection of fees, material perquisites or bribes; private employment by a higher-ranking "patron" within the administration; contractors being paid on an irregular basis; or "parastatals" (those working for state-owned companies), since the latter are not paid directly out of the state coffers. Note that the question refers to the practices obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces.

RESPONSES:

0: None or almost none are salaried state employees.

1: A small share is salaried state employees.

2: About half are salaried state employees.

3: A substantial number are salaried state employees.

4: All or almost all are salaried state employees.

SCALE: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.12.6 Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration (v2stcritrecadm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2stcritrecadm

*Original tag:* v2stcritrecadm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Agnes Cornell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are appointment decisions in the state administration based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit?

CLARIFICATION: Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotion in the state administration. Note that the question refers to the typical *de facto* (rather than *de jure*) situation obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the state administration or between top and lower level state administrators please try to consider the average when answering the question.

RESPONSES:

0: All appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit.

1: Most appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit.

2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit.

3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Most appointment decisions are based on skills and merit.

4: None of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit.

SCALE: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.12.7 Criteria for appointment decisions in the armed forces (v2stcritapparm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2stcritapparm

*Original tag:* v2stcritapparm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Agnes Cornell, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are appointment decisions in the armed forces based on personal or political connections or alternatively based on skills and merit?

CLARIFICATION: Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotions in the armed forces. Note that the question refers to the typical *de facto* (rather than *de jure*) situation obtaining in the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the armed forces or between top and lower level ranks please try to consider the average when answering the question.

RESPONSES:

0: All appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit.

1: Most appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit.

2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit.

3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Most are based on skills and merit.

4: None of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit.

ORDERING: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.12.8 Remuneration in the Armed Forces (v2strenarm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2strenarm

*Original tag:* v2strenarm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell, Agnes Cornell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are members of the armed forces salaried employees?

CLARIFICATION: By members of the armed forces, we mean members of all ranks, excluding conscripts. By "salaried employee", we mean someone who is employed on a contract and paid a regular allowance directly out of the state coffers. It does not include unpaid work, work paid for through a private collection of fees, material perquisites or bribes, or private employment by a higher-ranking "patron" within the armed forces.

RESPONSES:

0: None or almost none are salaried employees

1: A small share is salaried employees

2: About half are salaried employees

3: A substantial number are salaried employees

4: All or almost all are salaried employees

ORDERING: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.12.9 Independent states (v2svindep)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2svindep

*Original tag:* v2svindep

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Michael Bernhard

QUESTION: Is the polity an independent state?

CLARIFICATION: We use Gleditsch and Ward's (1999) coding of independent states. Their definition recognizes that listing independent states relies at least in part on subjective evaluations. A state is considered to be an independent polity if it (a) has a relatively autonomous administration over some territory, (b) is considered a distinct entity by local actors or the state it is dependent on. Polities excluded from the list are: colonies; states that have some form of limited autonomy (*e.g.* Scotland); are alleged to be independent but are contiguous to the dominant entity (Ukraine and Belarus prior to 1991); *de facto* independent polities but recognized by at most one other state (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). Occupations or foreign rule are considered to be an actual loss of statehood when they extend beyond a decade. This means that cases such as the Baltic Republic during Soviet occupation are not considered independent states, but independent statehood is retained for European countries occupied during World War II.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): Gleditsch and Ward (1999; 2013); IPU Parline; IDEA.

NOTES: V-Dem uses the updated List of independent states (v.5.0), including the tentative list of microstates, posted on Gleditsch's webpage on 14 March 2013. We have reconciled Gleditsch and Ward's data with the V-Dem country definitions (see the document "V-Dem Countries v1.1").

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.13 V-Dem Indicators - Civil Society

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **Civil society organization:**

The following set of questions focus on civil society organizations (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but *not* businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

**Civil society organization – Historical clarification:** The following set of questions focus on civil society organizations (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but not businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

If no CSOs exist at all for a particular time period, code the following relevant questions as giving the "lowest score" (indicating, for instance, strong repression or no consultation, a 0).

**Religious organizations:** In this section, we ask two questions regarding religious organizations. These may be religiously inspired civil society organizations (CSOs) or organizations whose purpose is primarily spiritual.

#### 2.3.13.1 CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cseeorgs

*Original tag:* v2cseeorgs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?

RESPONSES:

0: Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes, or publicly commenting on public officials and policies are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity.

1: Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them

from any political activity.

2: Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expedience.

3: Minimal control. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, there exist constitutional provisions that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action in the past (*e.g.* the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and conditions of judicial independence.

4: Unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.13.2 CSO repression (v2csreprss)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2csreprss

*Original tag:* v2csreprss

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)?

RESPONSES:

0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of CSOs. They seek not only to deter the activity of such groups but to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China.

1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in responses 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional CSOs who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property). Examples include Mugabe's Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law, Serbia under Milosevic.

2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in response 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s, the late Franco period in Spain.

3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Government Organized Movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. One example would be Singapore in the post-Yew phase or Putin's Russia.

4: No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: For reasons of consistency, as of December 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 2.3.13.3 CSO consultation (v2cscnsult)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cscnsult

*Original tag:* v2cscnsult

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies.

1: To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.

2: Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.13.4 CSO participatory environment (v2csprtpt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2csprtpt

*Original tag:* v2csprtpt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

RESPONSES:

0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary.

1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them.

2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal.

3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.13.5 CSO womens participation (v2csgender)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2csgender

*Original tag:* v2csgender

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

CLARIFICATION: Please pay attention to both (A) whether women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs) because of their gender and (B) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life.

RESPONSES:

0: Almost always.

1: Frequently.

2: About half the time.

3: Rarely.

4: Almost never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.13.6 CSO anti-system movements (v2csantimv)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2csantimv

*Original tag:* v2csantimv

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Among civil society organizations, are there anti-system opposition movements?

CLARIFICATION: An anti-system opposition movement is any movement — peaceful or armed — that is based in the country (not abroad) and is organized in opposition to the current political system. That is, it aims to change the polity in fundamental ways, *e.g.*, from democratic to autocratic (or vice-versa), from capitalist to communist (or vice-versa), from secular to fundamentalist (or vice-versa). This movement may be linked to a political party that competes in elections but it must also have a "movement" character, which is to say a mass base and an existence separate from normal electoral competition.

If there are several movements, please answer in a general way about the relationship of those movements to the regime.

RESPONSES:

0: No, or very minimal. Anti-system movements are practically nonexistent.

1: There is only a low-level of anti-system movement activity but it does not pose much of a threat to the regime.

2: There is a modest level of anti-system movement activity, posing some threat to the regime.

3: There is a high level of anti-system movement activity, posing substantial threat to the regime.



4: There is a very high level of anti-system movement activity, posing a real and present threat to the regime.

ORDERING: If coded "0", skip the following questions focused on anti-system movements.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 2.3.13.7 Religious organization repression (v2csrlgrep)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2csrlgrep

*Original tag:* v2csrlgrep

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government attempt to repress religious organizations?

RESPONSES:

0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of religious organizations. It seeks not only to deter the activity of such groups but also to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia and Maoist China.

1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional religious organizations who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property).

2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of religious civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar religious civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts.

3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new religious civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize parallel religious organizations to crowd out independent religious organizations.

4: No. Religious civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.13.8 Religious organization consultation (v2csrlgcon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2csrlgcon

*Original tag:* v2csrlgcon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are major religious organizations routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from input from religious organizations. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize religious organizations after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But typically, it does not consult with them in formulating policies.

1: To some degree. Religious organizations are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.

2: Yes. Important religious organizations are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.13.9 CSO anti-system movement character (v2csanmvch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2csanmvch

*Original tag:* v2csanmvch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you characterize the anti-system movement(s) identified in the previous question?

CLARIFICATION: Check all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Works through legal channels, for the most part. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_0]

1: Participates in elections. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_1]

2: Works through a mix of legal and extra-legal channels. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_2]

3: Insurrectionary. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_3]

4: Democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as willing to play by the rules of the democratic game, willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_4]

5: Anti-democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as unwilling to play by the rules of the democratic game, not willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and/or not willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_5]

6: Leftist, socialist, communist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_6]

7: Rightist, conservative, party of order. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_7]

8: Ethnolinguistic, tribe, kinship, clan. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_8]

9: Separatist or autonomist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_9]

10: Religious. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_10]

11: Paramilitary. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_11]

12: Heavily engaged in criminal activity, *e.g.*, narcotics, bootlegging, illegal exploitation of natural resources, extortion, kidnapping. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_12]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015 *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.13.10 CSO structure (v2csstruc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2csstruc

*Original tag:* v2csstruc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Civil societies inevitably involve a mix of larger and smaller organizations. Please characterize the relative influence of large mass constituency civil society organizations (CSOs) versus smaller, more local, or narrowly construed CSOs.

RESPONSES:

0: The state does not allow autonomous CSOs. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_0]

1: Large encompassing organizations dominate. The government and CSOs are linked formally through a corporatist system of interest intermediation; or, due to historical circumstances, particular large CSOs are highly influential. The voice of such organizations is recognized by the government and is accorded special weight by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_1]

2: Neither large encompassing nor small CSOs dominate. Influence is contingent on circumstances. Organizations, both large and small, contend with one another to have their voice considered by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_2]

3: Small CSOs dominate. Many small organizations contend with one another to have their voices heard by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_3]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.14 V-Dem Indicators - The Media

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Media:** Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and broadcast (radio and television), and (2) online media. We ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. Thus, "the print and broadcast media" can provide a wide range of perspectives in a country even when individual publications or programs take a consistently narrow perspective.

**Historical clarification:** Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and (2) broadcast (radio) media. The latter is, however, only for reference to the contemporary era, and should of course be ignored before it appeared. But when applicable, we ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. If there is no print or broadcast media at all in a given time period, leave the following questions blank (missing) for this time period. Please also explicitly note in the comments section at the end for which years there was no print or broadcast media at all.

#### 2.3.14.1 Government censorship effort - Media (v2mecenefm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mecenefm

*Original tag:* v2mecenefm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?

CLARIFICATION: Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery.

We are not concerned with censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political speech.

RESPONSES:

0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine.

1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.

2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.

3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.

4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*)

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.14.2 Internet censorship effort (v2mecenefi)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mecenefi

*Original tag:* v2mecenefi

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet?

CLARIFICATION: Censorship attempts include Internet filtering (blocking access to certain websites or browsers), denial-of-service attacks, and partial or total Internet shutdowns. We are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions. We are also not concerned with the *extent* of internet access, unless there is absolutely no access at all (in which case the coding should be 0).

RESPONSES:

0 (1): The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content.

1 (2): The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls.

2 (3): The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues.

3 (4): The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned above.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: As of December 2014, the former category "0 There is no internet" is coded separately as v2mecenefibin. The variable is then rebased to zero.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

*V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1993-2021

#### 2.3.14.3 Internet binary (v2mecenefibin)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mecenefibin

*Original tag:* v2mecenefibin

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there Internet in this country?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1993-2021

#### 2.3.14.4 Print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mecrit

*Original tag:* v2mecrit

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?

RESPONSES:

0: None.

1: Only a few marginal outlets.

2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do.

3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.14.5 Print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2merange

*Original tag:* v2merange

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political

perspectives?

RESPONSES:

0: The major media represent only the government's perspective.

1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party.

2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.

3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.14.6 Percent (percent) Female Journalists (v2mefemjrn)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mefemjrn

*Original tag:* v2mefemjrn

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Please estimate the percentage (percent) of journalists in the print and broadcast media who are women.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bootstrapped.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.14.7 Harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2meharjrn

*Original tag:* v2meharjrn

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are individual journalists harassed — *i.e.*, threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed — by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities?

RESPONSES:

0: No journalists dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.

1: Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually are forced to stop.

2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.

3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished.

4: Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.14.8 Media self-censorship (v2meslfcen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2meslfcen

*Original tag:* v2meslfcen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive?

RESPONSES:

0: Self-censorship is complete and thorough.

1: Self-censorship is common but incomplete.

2: There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues.

3: There is little or no self-censorship among journalists.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.14.9 Media bias (v2mebias)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mebias

*Original tag:* v2mebias

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates?

CLARIFICATION: We ask you to take particular care in rating the year-to-year variation on this question if media bias tends to increase or decrease in election years. Coverage can be considered "more or less impartial" when the media as a whole present a mix of positive and negative coverage of each party or candidate.

RESPONSES:

0: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage, or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover.

1: The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage.

2: The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate.

3: The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated *amount* of coverage to the governing party or candidates.

4: The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.14.10 Media corrupt (v2mecorrpt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mecorrpt

*Original tag:* v2mecorrpt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?

RESPONSES:

0: The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage.

1: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

2: It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

3: It is not normal for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally, without anyone being punished.

4: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments, and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.15 V-Dem Indicators - Political Equality

##### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Political Equality:** This section pertains to political equality, that is, the extent to which members of a polity possess equal political power. It does not refer to the inevitable differentiation in power that occurs in all large societies between those who hold positions of power within the state (political elites) and lay citizens. It is, rather, about the distribution of political power among identifiable groups within the population.

What does it mean for a group of individuals to wield real political power? Although political power cannot be directly observed, one can infer that groups possess power to the extent that they: (a) actively participate in politics (by voting, etc.), (b) are involved in civil society organizations, (c) secure representation in government, (d) are able to set the political agenda, (e) influence political decisions, and (f) influence the implementation of those decisions. Please consider all these factors when answering the following questions. (Of course, the picture across these different dimensions may be mixed; your response should indicate the overall picture, taking all aspects of political power into account.)

##### 2.3.15.1 Power distributed by socioeconomic position (v2pepwrses)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pepwrses

*Original tag:* v2pepwrses



*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?

CLARIFICATION: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power.

RESPONSES:

0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence.

1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence.

2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.

3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.

4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.15.2 Power distributed by social group (v2pepwrSOC)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pepwrSOC

*Original tag:* v2pepwrSOC

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is political power distributed according to social groups?

CLARIFICATION: A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does *not* include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, *i.e.*, as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood — by those residing within that society — to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant.

RESPONSES:

0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, *i.e.*, not subject to frequent change.

1: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, *i.e.*, not subject to frequent change.

2: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, *i.e.*, not subject to frequent change.

3: Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another — but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.

4: All social groups have roughly equal political power *or* there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.15.3 Power distributed by gender (v2pepwrgen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pepwrgen

*Original tag:* v2pepwrgen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is political power distributed according to gender?

RESPONSES:

0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power.

1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.

2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.

3: Men have somewhat more political power than women.

4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.15.4 Power distributed by sexual orientation (v2pepwrtort)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pepwrtort

*Original tag:* v2pepwrtort

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent is political power distributed according to sexual orientation?

CLARIFICATION: This question contrasts (A) the political power of heterosexuals and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are not open about their sexuality with (B) the political power of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are open about their sexuality. (A) will be referred to as "heterosexual" and (B) as "LGBT."

Note that in comparing the political power of these two groups we are comparing their power per person. So, when we say that LGBT have less, equal, or more power than heterosexuals we mean relative to their share of the population (as near as this can be estimated).

RESPONSES:

0: LGBTs are entirely excluded from the public sphere and thus deprived of any real political power (even though they may possess formal powers such as the ballot).

1: LGBTs have much less political power than heterosexuals. LGBTs enjoy formal rights to participate in politics but are subject to informal norms that often serve to exclude them from the halls of power.

2: LGBTs have somewhat less political power than heterosexual citizens.

3: LGBTs have about the same political power as heterosexuals. Each group enjoys a degree of political power that is roughly proportional to their population.

4: LGBTs enjoy somewhat more political power than heterosexuals by virtue of greater wealth, education, and high level of organization and mobilization.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.15.5 Educational equality (v2peedueq)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peedueq

*Original tag:* v2peedueq

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?

CLARIFICATION: Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

1: Unequal. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but ten to 25 percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

3: Relatively equal. Basic education is overall equal in quality but five to ten percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.15.6 Health equality (v2pehealth)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pehealth

*Original tag:* v2pehealth

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens?

CLARIFICATION: Poor-quality healthcare can make citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed).

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 75 percent (percent) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

1: Unequal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 25 percent (percent) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

2: Somewhat equal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, ten to 25 percent (percent) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

3: Relatively equal. Basic health care is overall equal in quality but because of poor-quality healthcare, five to ten percent (percent) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

4: Equal. Basic health care is equal in quality and less than five percent (percent) of citizens cannot exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.15.7 Primary school enrollment (v2peprisch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peprisch

*Original tag:* v2peprisch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

QUESTION: What percentage of the primary school-aged population is enrolled in primary school?

CLARIFICATION: This is based on Barro and Lee's (2016) long-term data on primary school enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). The time series is interpolated to impute values for all years between the five-year intervals.

SOURCE(S): Barro and Lee Long-Run Enrollment Ratios by Country.

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1820-2010

### 2.3.15.8 Secondary school enrollment (v2pesecsch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pesecsch

*Original tag:* v2pesecsch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

QUESTION: What percentage of the secondary school-aged population is enrolled in secondary school?

CLARIFICATION: This is based on Barro and Lee's (2016) long-term data on secondary school enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). The time series is interpolated to impute values for all years between the five-year intervals.

SOURCE(S): Barro and Lee Long-Run Enrollment Ratios by Country.

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1820-2010

### 2.3.15.9 Secondary tertiary enrollment (v2petersch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2petersch

*Original tag:* v2petersch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

QUESTION: What percentage of the tertiary school-aged population is enrolled in tertiary school?

CLARIFICATION: This is based on Barro and Lee's (2016) long-term data on tertiary school enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). The time series is interpolated to impute values for all years between the five-year intervals.

SOURCE(S): Barro and Lee Long-Run Enrollment Ratios by Country.

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1820-2010

### 2.3.16 V-Dem Indicators - Exclusion

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **Exclusion:**

The following survey contains questions pertaining to exclusion. Political, economic and social well-being may depend on whether groups or individuals are excluded from positions of power, the state's protection of rights and freedoms, access to public goods and services, and opportunities to work or do business with the state.

Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

*Exclusion* is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. It is not necessary for all members of a group to be excluded in order for group-based exclusion to occur. Exclusion occurs even when only a single individual is excluded based on her or his identity or membership (perceived or actual) in a particular group.

*Political groups* are defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. A common form of partisan exclusion is when state services or regulations are implemented in a way that seeks to reward the incumbent's political supporters and punish non-supporters.

*Socio-Economic position* defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property. Exclusion of economic groups occurs when, for example, those who are not property owners are restricted from voting, or when fees associated with justice, health or education are set at a rate that is unaffordable for poorer individuals.

*Social group* is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood - by those residing within that society - to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant. Contrast Identity group.

*Geographic group* refers to those living in rural or urban areas. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer and there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54).

#### 2.3.16.1 Access to public services distributed by socio-economic position (v2peapsecon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peapsecon

*Original tag:* v2peapsecon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally according to socioeconomic position?

CLARIFICATION: This question asks if socio-economic position is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular socio-economic position, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a socio-economic group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 2.3.16.2 Access to state jobs by socio-economic position (v2peasjsoecon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peasjsoecon

*Original tag:* v2peasjsoecon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of socio-economic position?

CLARIFICATION: Socio-economic position defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income, makes 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 2.3.16.3 Access to state business opportunities by socio-economic position (v2peasbecon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peasbecon

*Original tag:* v2peasbecon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals regardless of socio-economic position?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Socio-economic position defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income makes 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income makes 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income makes 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income makes 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income makes less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.16.4 Gender equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgencl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clgencl

*Original tag:* v2clgencl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do women enjoy the same level of civil liberties as men?

CLARIFICATION: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Women enjoy much fewer civil liberties than men.

1: Women enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than men.

2: Women enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than men.

3: Women enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than men.

4: Women enjoy the same level of civil liberties as men.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.16.5 Access to public services distributed by gender (v2peapsgen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peapsgen

*Original tag:* v2peapsgen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally according to gender?

CLARIFICATION: This question asks if gender is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between gender, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that women are denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75 percent (percent) or more of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25 percent (percent) or more of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because of their gender, less than 5 percent (percent) of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.16.6 Access to state jobs by gender (v2peasjgen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peasjgen

*Original tag:* v2peasjgen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of gender?

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75 percent (percent) or more of women, even if qualified,



lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25 percent (percent) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because of their gender, less than 5 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.16.7 Access to state business opportunities by gender (v2peasbgen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peasbgen

*Original tag:* v2peasbgen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of gender?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75 percent (percent) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25 percent (percent) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of their gender, 5 percent (percent) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.16.8 Power distributed by urban-rural location (v2pepwrgeo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pepwrgeo

*Original tag:* v2pepwrgeo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is political power distributed according to urban-rural location?

CLARIFICATION: Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54)

RESPONSES:

0: People living in urban areas have a near-monopoly on political power.

1: People living in urban areas have a dominant hold on political power. Those living in rural areas have only marginal influence.

2: People living in urban areas have much more political power but those living in rural areas have some areas of influence.

3: People living in urban areas have somewhat more political power than those living in rural areas.

4: People living in any area have roughly equal political power or people living in rural areas have more access to political power than those in urban areas.

5: People living in rural areas have much more political power but those living in urban areas have some areas of influence.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.16.9 Urban-rural location equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgeocl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clgeocl

*Original tag:* v2clgeocl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do those who reside in rural areas enjoy same level of civil liberties as those residing in urban areas?

CLARIFICATION: This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across geographic areas. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road (World Development Report, 2009: 54). Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Those who live in rural areas enjoy much fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.

1: Those who live in rural areas enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.

2: Those who live in rural areas enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.

3: Those who live in rural areas enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.

4: Residents of rural areas enjoy the same level of civil liberties as those in urban areas.

5: Residents of rural areas enjoy more civil liberties than those in urban areas.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.16.10 Access to public services distributed by urban-rural location (v2peapsgeo)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peapsgeo*Original tag:* v2peapsgeo*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across urban and rural areas?

CLARIFICATION: Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54). This question asks if geographic group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between urban and rural areas, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a geographic group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, only 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

5: Rural-Bias: Because they live in urban areas, 25percent or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.16.11 Access to state jobs by urban-rural location (v2peasjgeo)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peasjgeo*Original tag:* v2peasjgeo*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of their rural or urban location?

CLARIFICATION: Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54)

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, only 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

5: Rural-Bias. Because they live in urban areas, 25 percent or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 2.3.16.12 Access to state business opportunities by urban-rural location (v2peasbegeo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peasbegeo

*Original tag:* v2peasbegeo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of their rural or urban locations?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54)

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

5: Rural-Bias. Because they live in urban areas, 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.16.13 Political group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clpolcl)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clpolcl*Original tag:* v2clpolcl*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do members of all political groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

CLARIFICATION: A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates that can be distinguished from others in terms of enjoyment of civil liberties. Responses should not reflect which party controls the legislature and executive. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Some political groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

1: Some political groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

2: Some political groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

3: Some political groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

4: All political groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.16.14 Access to public services distributed by political group (v2peapspol)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peapspol*Original tag:* v2peapspol*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across political groups?

CLARIFICATION: A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. This question asks if political group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular political groups, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a political group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation 75 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation 25 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation only 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation less than 5 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 2.3.16.15 Access to state jobs by political group (v2peasjpol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peasjpol

*Original tag:* v2peasjpol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of their association with a political group?

CLARIFICATION: A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.16.16 Access to state business opportunities by political group (v2peasbepol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peasbepol

*Original tag:* v2peasbepol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of an individual's association with a political group?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates that can be distinguished from others in terms of access to power. Responses should not reflect which party controls the legislature and executive.

## RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack equal access to state business opportunities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.16.17 Access to public services distributed by social group (v2peapssoc)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peapssoc

*Original tag:* v2peapssoc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across social groups?

CLARIFICATION: This question asks if social group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular social groups, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a social group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

## RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because of their social group, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group, only 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because of their social group, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.16.18 Access to state jobs by social group (v2peasjsoc)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peasjsoc

*Original tag:* v2peasjsoc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of social group?

CLARIFICATION: Social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.)

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because of their social group identity, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group identity, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group identity, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because of their social group identity, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.16.19 Access to state business opportunities by social group (v2peasbsoc)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peasbsoc*Original tag:* v2peasbsoc*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of social group?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.)

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of their social group, 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of their social group, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*



(see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.17 V-Dem Indicators - Legitimation

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **Legitimation strategies:**

Governments make legitimacy claims—provide justifications for the form of rule under which they govern. In the following section we are interested in the nature of the legitimacy claims made by the sitting government. Please note that the government's claims to legitimacy - their legitimation strategies - are the object of inquiry here. We are not asking you to assess how ordinary people judge the legitimacy of their rulers. Do not assume that governments make legitimacy claims on only one basis. We are interested in multi-track and hybrid legitimation strategies. The regime is understood as a set of formal and/or informal rules that govern the choice of political leaders and their exercise of power. The government is understood as the chief executive along with the cabinet, ministries, and top civil servants.

#### **2.3.17.1 Ideology (v2exl\_legitideol)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exl\_legitideol

*Original tag:* v2exl\_legitideol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the current government promote a specific ideology or societal model (an officially codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular set of social, political, and economic relations; for example, socialism, nationalism, religious traditionalism, etc.) in order to justify the regime in place?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: To a small extent.

2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.

3: To a large extent but not exclusively.

4: Almost exclusively.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### **2.3.17.2 Person of the leader (v2exl\_legitlead)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exl\_legitlead

*Original tag:* v2exl\_legitlead

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent is the Chief Executive portrayed as being endowed with extraordinary personal characteristics and/or leadership skills (e.g. as father or mother of the nation, exceptionally heroic, moral, pious, or wise, or any other extraordinary attribute valued by the society)?

CLARIFICATION: The Chief Executive refers to the Head of State or the Head of Government, depending on the relative power of each office. We are interested in the key

leadership figure.

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: To a small extent.

2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.

3: To a large extent but not exclusively.

4: Almost exclusively.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.17.3 Performance legitimization (v2exl\_legitperf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exl\_legitperf

*Original tag:* v2exl\_legitperf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the government refer to performance (such as providing economic growth, poverty reduction, effective and non-corrupt governance, and/or providing security) in order to justify the regime in place?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: To a small extent.

2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.

3: To a large extent but not exclusively.

4: Almost exclusively.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.17.4 Rational-legal legitimization (v2exl\_legitratio)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exl\_legitratio

*Original tag:* v2exl\_legitratio

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the current government refer to the legal norms and regulations in order to justify the regime in place?

CLARIFICATION: This question pertains to legal norms and regulations as laid out for instance in the constitution regarding access to power (e.g. elections) as well as exercise of power (e.g. rule of law). Electoral regimes may score high on this question as well as non-electoral regimes that emphasize their rule-boundedness.

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: To a small extent.

2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.

3: To a large extent but not exclusively.

4: Almost exclusively.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.17.5 Ideology character (v2exl\_legitideolcr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exl\_legitideolcr

*Original tag:* v2exl\_legitideolcr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you characterize the ideology/ideologies identified in the previous question?

CLARIFICATION: Check all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Nationalist (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr\_0]

1: Socialist or communist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_1]

2: Restorative or conservative. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_2]

3: Separatist or autonomist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_3]

4: Religious. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_4]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

## 2.3.18 V-Dem Indicators - Civic and Academic Space

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

#### **Civic and Academic Space:**

In this survey, we ask you to assess several issues concerning the space for and state of civil society and academia. First, we ask about some general issues such as polarization and peaceful assembly. Then, we probe into mobilization for mass events and associations. Finally, we ask you to consider questions related to academia.

### 2.3.18.1 Political polarization (v2cacamps)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cacamps

*Original tag:* v2cacamps

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is society polarized into antagonistic, political camps?

CLARIFICATION: Here we refer to the extent to which political differences affect social relationships beyond political discussions. Societies are highly polarized if supporters of

opposing political camps are reluctant to engage in friendly interactions, for example, in family functions, civic associations, their free time activities and workplaces

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a friendly manner.

1: Mainly not. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a friendly than a hostile manner.

2: Somewhat. Supporters of opposing political camps are equally likely to interact in a friendly or hostile manner.

3: Yes, to noticeable extent. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a hostile than friendly manner.

4: Yes, to a large extent. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a hostile manner.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.18.2 Political violence (v2caviol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2caviol

*Original tag:* v2caviol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often have non-state actors used political violence against persons this year?

CLARIFICATION: We understand political violence as the use of physical force to achieve political objectives by non-state actors. The restriction to political objectives excludes profit-driven crime-related violence, for instance. By non-state actors we refer to individuals or entities that are not formally part of the state. Thus, politically oriented militias and youth groups count as non-state actors even though they might potentially be informally affiliated with the ruling party or the state. Political violence against persons excludes psychological and symbolic violence (e.g. destruction of objects).

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. Non-state actors did not use political violence.

1: Rare. Non-state actors rarely used political violence.

2: Occasionally. Non-state actors occasionally used political violence.

3: Frequently. Non-state actors frequently used political violence.

4: Often. Non-state actors often used political violence.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.18.3 Freedom of peaceful assembly (v2caassemb)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2caassemb

*Original tag:* v2caassemb

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

**QUESTION:** To what extent do state authorities respect and protect the right of peaceful assembly?

**CLARIFICATION:** This question focuses on the ability to assemble publically in practice. An assembly is “an intentional and temporary presence of a number of individuals in a public place, for a common expressive purpose” (ODIHR and Venice Commission of the Council of Europe 2010). Authorities may limit the right to assembly only if limitations are necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and are lawful, necessary, and proportionate to the aim pursued. Such reasonable and legal restrictions should not be considered when answering. However, if there is evidence that restrictions are used as a pretext for political reasons, this evidence should be considered.

**RESPONSES:**

0: Never. State authorities do not allow peaceful assemblies and are willing to use lethal force to prevent them.

1: Rarely. State authorities rarely allow peaceful assemblies, but generally avoid using lethal force to prevent them.

2: Sometimes. State authorities sometimes allow peaceful assemblies, but often arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully.

3: Mostly. State authorities generally allow peaceful assemblies, but in rare cases arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully.

4: Almost always. State authorities almost always allow and actively protect peaceful assemblies except in rare cases of lawful, necessary, and proportionate limitations.

**SCALE:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**DATA RELEASE:** 10-12.

**CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

**CITATION:** Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**YEARS:** 1900-2021

#### 2.3.18.4 State of emergency (v2casoe)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2casoe

*Original tag:* v2casoe

*Description:*

**VARIABLE TYPE:** C

**PROJECT MANAGER(S):** Katrin Kinzelbach

**ADDITIONAL VERSIONS:** \*\_nr

**QUESTION:** Was a national state of emergency in place at any point this year?

**CLARIFICATION:** A state of emergency is a formal legal act that enables state actors and institutions to change their roles during times of international or domestic crisis. Our definition of state of emergency includes the application of martial law. If there was more than one state of emergency, code the one that was in place for the longer time. Select one option.

**RESPONSES:**

0: The legal framework does not allow for a declaration of a national state of emergency. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_0]

1: There was no state of emergency in place at any point this year, even though provisions for a declaration of a national state of emergency exist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_1]

2: A national state of emergency was in place due to a natural disaster. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_2]

3: A national state of emergency was in place due to a terrorist attack. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_3]

4: A national state of emergency was in place due to an armed conflict/war, domestically or internationally. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_4]

5: A national state of emergency was in place due to mass protest/popular uprising. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_5]

6: A national state of emergency was in place for reasons other than those listed above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_6]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.18.5 Mass mobilization (v2cagenmob)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cagenmob

*Original tag:* v2cagenmob

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization been?

CLARIFICATION: This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

RESPONSES:

0: There have been virtually no events.

1: There have been several small-scale events.

2: There have been many small-scale events.

3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.

4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.18.6 Mass mobilization concentration (v2caconmob)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2caconmob

*Original tag:* v2caconmob

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Were mass mobilization events concentrated in the capital?

CLARIFICATION: This question is about the geographic location of the events and not their intensity. In the unlikely event that no event at all took place, code option 2. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. Events of mass mobilization were much more frequent in the capital.

1: Somewhat. Events of mass mobilization were somewhat more frequent in the capital.

2: No. Events of mass mobilization were as common in many cities across the country as in the capital or did not take place at all.

3: No. Events of mass mobilization were more common in cities other than the capital.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*

(see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 2.3.18.7 Mobilization for democracy (v2cademmob)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cademmob

*Original tag:* v2cademmob

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization for pro-democratic aims been?

CLARIFICATION: Events are pro-democratic if they are organized with the explicit aim to advance and/or protect democratic institutions such as free and fair elections with multiple parties, and courts and parliaments; or if they are in support of civil liberties such as freedom of association and speech. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins.

RESPONSES:

0: There have been virtually no events.

1: There have been several small-scale events.

2: There have been many small-scale events.

3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.

4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Hellmeier and Bernhard (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:128); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 2.3.18.8 Mobilization for autocracy (v2caautmob)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2caautmob

*Original tag:* v2caautmob

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization for pro-autocratic aims been?

CLARIFICATION: Events are pro-autocratic if they are organized explicitly in support of non-democratic rulers and forms of government such as a one-party state, monarchy, theocracy or military dictatorships. Events are also pro-autocratic if they are organized in support of leaders that question basic principles of democracy, or are generally aiming to undermine democratic ideas and institutions such as the rule of law, free and fair elections, or media freedom. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes, sit. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns also count state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

RESPONSES:

0: There have been virtually no events.

1: There have been several small-scale events.

2: There have been many small-scale events.

3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.

4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Hellmeier and Bernhard (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:128); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.18.9 Engagement in state-administered mass organizations (v2castate)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2castate

*Original tag:* v2castate

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What share of the population is regularly active in state-administered mass associations, such as women, worker or youth leagues?

CLARIFICATION: State-administered mass associations are civilian organizations created and led by the government or the ruling party. Large shares of specific societal groups are voluntary or compulsory members of these associations. Examples include youth leagues such as the Hitlerjugend in Nazi Germany and the pioneers in the Soviet Union, women leagues such as the Women's Federation in China or the Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas and official trade unions in the Soviet Union. Such organizations are formally or informally affiliated with the state and/or with the ruling party. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no one.

1: A small share of the population (less than 5percent).

2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 percent).

3: A large share of the population (about 16 percent to 25percent).

4: A very large share of the population (about 26percent or more).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 2.3.18.10 Engagement in independent trade unions (v2catrauni)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2catrauni

*Original tag:* v2catrauni

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What share of the population is regularly active in independent trade unions?

CLARIFICATION: An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no one.



1: A small share of the population (less than 5percent).

2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 percent).

3: A large share of the population (about 16 percent to 25percent).

4: A very large share of the population (about 26percent or more).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 2.3.18.11 Engagement in independent political associations (v2capolit)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2capolit

*Original tag:* v2capolit

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What share of the population is regularly active in independent political interest associations, such as environmental associations, animal rights groups, or LGBT rights groups?

CLARIFICATION: Political associations include all associations whose main purpose is the change of policy or practice at the state or societal level. It does NOT include political parties or trade unions. An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no one.

1: A small share of the population (less than 5percent).

2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 percent).

3: A large share of the population (about 16 percent to 25percent).

4: A very large share of the population (about 26percent or more).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.18.12 Engagement in independent non-political associations (v2canonpol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2canonpol

*Original tag:* v2canonpol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What share of the population is regularly active in independent non-political associations, such as sports clubs, literary societies, charities, fraternal groups, or support groups?

CLARIFICATION: Non-political associations include all associations whose main purpose is not the change of policy or practice at the state or societal level. It does NOT include political parties, or trade unions. An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they

attend a meeting activity or event at least twice a year.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no one.

1: A small share of the population (less than 5percent).

2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 percent).

3: A large share of the population (about 16 percent to 25percent).

4: A very large share of the population (about 26percent or more).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.18.13 Existence of Universities (v2cauni)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cauni

*Original tag:* v2cauni

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Alicja Polakiewicz, Janika Spannagel

QUESTION: Have universities existed in this country?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator captures if universities have (ever) existed in this country. Thus, even if all universities were temporarily closed in a given year, this indicator is coded as 1 (“yes”).

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): Apfeld (2019) drawing on 4icu.org (Atuzzo 2019); whed.net; various country-specific sources.

NOTES: Country-specific sources were consulted where 4icu.org and whed.net suggested conflicting years of establishment of first university.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, *V-Dem Users’ Working Paper Series*); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.18.14 Total number of universities (v2canuni)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2canuni

*Original tag:* v2canuni

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring, Brendan Apfeld

QUESTION: What is the total number of universities?

CLARIFICATION: The total number of universities founded in or before the given year. Universities are considered to be degree-granting institutions of higher education that grant at least one bachelor’s degree or its equivalent, corresponding to International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels 6-8.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval

SOURCE(S): Apfeld (2019)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Apfeld (2019) drawing on Atuzzo (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2016

### 2.3.18.15 Constitutional Protection for Academic Freedom (v2caprotac)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2caprotac

*Original tag:* v2caprotac

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach

QUESTION: Do constitutional provisions for the protection of academic freedom exist?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

95: Constitution suspended.

97: Other, or undetermined.

99: Missing.

SCALE: Ordinal

SOURCE(S): Elkins et al. (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.18.16 Freedom to research and teach (v2cafres)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cafres

*Original tag:* v2cafres

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are scholars free to develop and pursue their own research and teaching agendas without interference?

CLARIFICATION: Examples of interference include research agendas or teaching curricula being drafted, restricted, or fully censored by a non-academic actor; scholars being externally induced, through possible reprisals, to self-censor; or the university administration abusing its position of power to impose research or teaching agendas on individual academics. It also includes public pressure on academics - offline and online. We do not consider as interference restrictions that are due to research priorities, as well as ethical and quality standards, freely defined by the scholarly community as well as the development of standardized curricula by academics that aim to structure and enhance teaching.

RESPONSES:

0: Completely restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are, across all disciplines, consistently subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

1: Severely restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are, in some disciplines, consistently subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

2: Moderately restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are occasionally subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

3: Mostly free. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are rarely subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

4: Fully free. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are not subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

*V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.18.17 Freedom of academic exchange and dissemination (v2cafexch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cafexch

*Original tag:* v2cafexch

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are scholars free to exchange and communicate research ideas and findings?

CLARIFICATION: Free academic exchange includes uncensored access to research material, unhindered participation in national or international academic conferences, and the uncensored publication of academic material. Free dissemination refers to the unrestricted possibility for scholars to share and explain research findings in their field of expertise to non-academic audiences through media engagement or public lectures.

RESPONSES:

0: Completely restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is, across all disciplines, consistently subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

1: Severely restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is, in some disciplines, consistently subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

2: Moderately restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is occasionally subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

3: Mostly free. Academic exchange and dissemination is rarely subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

4: Fully free. Academic exchange and dissemination is not subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.18.18 Institutional autonomy (v2cainsaut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cainsaut

*Original tag:* v2cainsaut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do universities exercise institutional autonomy in practice?

CLARIFICATION: Institutional autonomy “means the independence of institutions of higher education from the State and all other forces of society, to make decisions regarding its internal government, finance, administration, and to establish its policies of education, research, extension work and other related activities” (Lima Declaration). Note that institutional autonomy does not preclude universities from accepting state or third party funding, but does require that they remain in charge of all types of decisions listed above. Institutional autonomy does also not preclude a public oversight role by the state over universities' spending of public funds.

## RESPONSES:

0: No autonomy at all. Universities do not exercise any degree of institutional autonomy; non-academic actors control decision-making.

1: Minimal autonomy. Universities exercise only very limited institutional autonomy; non-academic actors interfere extensively with decision-making.

2: Moderate autonomy. Universities exercise some institutional autonomy; non-academic actors interfere moderately with decision-making.

3: Substantial autonomy. Universities exercise institutional autonomy to a large extent; non-academic actors have only rare and minimal influence on decision-making.

4: Complete autonomy. Universities exercise complete institutional autonomy from non-academic actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.18.19 Campus integrity (v2casurv)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2casurv

*Original tag:* v2casurv

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are campuses free from politically motivated surveillance or security infringements?

CLARIFICATION: "Campus" refers to all university buildings as well as digital research and teaching platforms. Campus integrity means the preservation of an open learning and research environment marked by an absence of an externally induced climate of insecurity or intimidation on campus. Examples of infringements of campus integrity are politically motivated on-campus or digital surveillance, presence by intelligence or security forces, presence of student militias, or violent attacks by third parties, if specifically targeting universities to repress academic life on campus. Note that we are only interested in politically motivated infringements and targeted attacks on campus integrity, not in non-political security concerns or proportionate security measures taken on campus to address these.

## RESPONSES:

0: Completely restricted. Campus integrity is fundamentally undermined by extensive surveillance and severe intimidation, including violence or closures.

1: Severely restricted. Campus integrity is to a large extent undermined by surveillance and intimidation, at times including violence or closures.

2: Moderately restricted. Campus integrity is challenged by some significant cases of surveillance or intimidation.

3: Mostly free. Campus integrity is to a large extent respected, with only minor cases of surveillance or intimidation.

4: Fully free. Campus integrity is comprehensively respected; there are no cases of surveillance or intimidation.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.18.20 Academics as critics (v2cacritic)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cacritic

*Original tag:* v2cacritic

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do scholars and university students publicly criticize government policies?

CLARIFICATION: This question is only about the extent scholars and students actually criticize government policies – irrespective of how free they are to do so and whether they are met with repression or not. We ask you simply to consider to what extent scholars and students are noticeable as government critics in the public discourse.

Public criticism of government policies can be conveyed for example through the publication of op-eds or social media posts on current affairs, the signing of open letters or petitions, the taking part in or organization of public protests, or the holding of critical lectures to students or the public.

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. Scholars and university students do not publicly express criticism of government policies.

1: To a small extent. Scholars and university students publicly express minor criticism of government policies.

2: To a moderate extent. Scholars and university students publicly express moderate criticism of government policies.

3: To a large extent. Scholars and university students publicly express substantive criticism of government policies.

4: To a major extent. Scholars and university students publicly express fundamental criticism of government policies.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.18.21 International legal commitment to academic freedom (v2caacadfree)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2caacadfree

*Original tag:* v2caacadfree

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Alicja Polakiewicz, Janika Spannagel

QUESTION: Is the state party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) without reservations to article 15 (right to science)?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator captures the country's international legal commitment to academic freedom. It indicates whether the country is party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights without having made explicit reservations to its article 15 (right to science), which stipulates, among other things, that states parties "undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research".

RESPONSES:

0: State not a party to ICESCR, or made reservations to article 15.

1: State is party to ICESCR without reservations to article 15, but treaty not yet in force.

2: ICESCR in force and signed without reservations to article 15.

3: ICESCR in force and ratified without reservations to article 15.

SCALE: Ordinal.  
SOURCE(S): <https://treaties.un.org/>  
NOTES: Coded is the ratification status as of December 31st of each year.  
DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1966-2021

### 2.3.19 Historical V-Dem - Elections

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem Elections*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 2.3.19.1 Minimum candidate age lower chamber (v3canagelc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3canagelc

*Original tag:* v3canagelc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to serve in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1968

#### 2.3.19.2 Minimum candidate age upper chamber (v3canageuc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3canageuc

*Original tag:* v3canageuc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to serve in the upper chamber?

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1962

### 2.3.19.3 Minimum voting age presidency (v3elagepr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elagepr

*Original tag:* v3elagepr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote for presidential elections?

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if there are no presidential elections.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v3eltype\_6, v3eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1792-1920

### 2.3.19.4 Minimum voting age upper chamber (v3elageuc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elageuc

*Original tag:* v3elageuc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote for the upper chamber of the national parliament?

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Upper chamber election dates (v3eltype\_2, v3eltype\_3)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1849-1920

### 2.3.19.5 Voting, voice or ballot (v3elbalpap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elbalpap

*Original tag:* v3elbalpap



*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How are votes cast?

RESPONSES:

0: Votes are cast verbally (viva voce).

1: Both voice votes and paper ballots are used, but verbal voting is more common.

2: Voice voting and paper ballots are both common.

3: Both voice votes and paper ballots are used, but paper ballots are more common.

4: All votes are cast on paper ballots.

ORDERING: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following question (v3elbalstat), meaning: jump to v3elecsedf.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**2.3.19.6 Ballot printing (v3elbalstat)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elbalstat*Original tag:* v3elbalstat*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Who prints ballot papers?

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if all or nearly all voting is verbal (viva voce).

RESPONSES:

0: Political parties or candidates print all (or nearly all) the ballot papers.

1: Both the state and parties or candidates print the ballot papers.

2: The state prints all (or nearly all) ballot papers.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3elbalpap is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**2.3.19.7 Compulsory voting (H) (v3elcomvot)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elcomvot*Original tag:* v3elcomvot*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is voting compulsory (for those eligible to vote) in national elections?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced.

2: Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter.

3: Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.19.8 Direct lower chamber (unicameral) elections (v3eldirelc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3eldirelc

*Original tag:* v3eldirelc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What is the mode of election of the parliament/lower chamber?

RESPONSES:

0: Indirect

1: Direct

2: Mixed (differs depending on individual or collective characteristics).

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources. Constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1930

### 2.3.19.9 Direct presidential elections (v3eldirepr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3eldirepr

*Original tag:* v3eldirepr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What is the mode of election of the president in popular elections?

CLARIFICATION: Cases in which the constitution provides that the president is elected by the legislature, including those in which the legislature elects only if none of the candidates obtains some minimum threshold of votes, should be coded according to the provisions concerning popular elections.

RESPONSES:

0: Indirect

1: Direct

2: Mixed (differs depending on individual or collective characteristics).

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources. Constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1792-1920

### 2.3.19.10 Direct upper chamber elections (v3eldireuc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3eldireuc

*Original tag:* v3eldireuc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: What is the mode of election of the upper chamber?

RESPONSES:

0: Indirect

1: Direct

2: Mixed (differs depending on individual or collective characteristics).

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources. Constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

### 2.3.19.11 Secret ballot, de facto (v3elecsedf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elecsedf

*Original tag:* v3elecsedf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are polling stations organized to guarantee voters a secret, anonymous choice?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Voters cannot make a secret, anonymous choice.

1: No. Some voters can make a secret, anonymous choice, but voting secrecy is in most instances violated.

2: Mixed. Voting secrecy and anonymity is assured to roughly the same extent as it is violated.

3: Yes. Most voters can make a secret, anonymous choice, but voting secrecy is in some instances violated.

4: Yes. All voters can make a secret, anonymous choice.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.19.12 Malapportionment legislature/lower chamber (v3elmalalc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elmalalc

*Original tag:* v3elmalalc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Daniel Ziblatt

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there a large discrepancy in the vote/seat ratio across electoral districts for the lower (or unicameral) chamber?

CLARIFICATION: "Malapportionment" characterizes a situation in which voters in some districts have more power by virtue of a more favorable vote/seat ratio. For example, if seats have not been reapportioned in a long time rural areas may be over-represented relative to urban areas simply because the latter have grown more rapidly than the former. (This question does not address inequality of votes based on class or other criteria.) Leave blank if

there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.

RESPONSES:

0: There is a high degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 50:1.

1: There is a substantial degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ as much as 10:1.

2: There is some degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 2:1.

3: There is modest or no malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by less than 2:1.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.19.13 Malapportionment upper chamber (v3elmalauc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elmalauc

*Original tag:* v3elmalauc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Daniel Ziblatt

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the electoral system (including the size of electoral districts) involve large differences in the ratios of votes to representatives in elections for the upper chamber?

CLARIFICATION: This question does not address inequality of votes based on class or other criteria but only the relationship between votes and seats. Leave blank if no upper chamber.

RESPONSES:

0: There is a high degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 50:1.

1: There is a substantial degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ as much as 10:1.

2: There is some degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 2:1.

3: There is modest or no malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by less than 2:1.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.19.14 Minority or majority government (v3elnbmaaj)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elnbmaaj

*Original tag:* v3elnbmaaj

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In the first cabinet after this national election, did the political parties that were represented in the cabinet hold a majority of the seats in the (lower chamber of) the legislature?

RESPONSES:

0: Parties are not allowed.

1: No, the parties represented in cabinet held less than half of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

2: Yes, the parties represented in cabinet held half, or more than half, of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

3: Parties are allowed but nonexistent or so diffuse as to be more like factions, and the factions represented in government hold less than half of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

4: Parties are allowed but nonexistent or so diffuse as to be more like factions, but the factions represented in government hold half, or more than half, of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): <http://www.countrystudies.us>, various country specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.19.15 Reapportionment legislature/lower chamber (v3elreapplc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elreapplc

*Original tag:* v3elreapplc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Daniel Ziblatt

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there a legal or constitutional statute, upheld in practice, stating that seats or electoral boundaries for elections to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature should be regularly reapportioned?

CLARIFICATION: Reapportionment is the process of reallocating the number of seats or the boundaries of a district in order to reflect its relative share of the population. Answering yes does not imply perfect apportionment (see later question). Leave blank if no lower (or unicameral) chamber. (This question is not about suffrage or informal restrictions to suffrage.)

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law but not upheld in practice.

2: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law and upheld in practice.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.19.16 Reapportionment upper chamber (v3elreappuc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elreappuc

*Original tag:* v3elreappuc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Daniel Ziblatt

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there a legal or constitutional statute, upheld in practice, stating that seats or electoral boundaries for elections to the upper chamber of the legislature should be regularly reapportioned?

CLARIFICATION: Reapportionment is the process of reallocating the number of seats or the boundaries of a district in order to reflect its relative share of the population. Answering yes does not imply perfect apportionment (see later question). Leave blank if no upper chamber. (This question is not about suffrage or informal restrictions to suffrage.)

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law but not upheld in practice.

2: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law and upheld in practice.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.19.17 Candidate exclusions (de jure) lower (unicameral) chamber (v3elstrlc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elstrlc

*Original tag:* v3elstrlc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Is the right to run as a candidate to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons? (Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

RESPONSES:

0: Literacy [v3elstrlc\_0]

1: Property [v3elstrlc\_1]

2: Income [v3elstrlc\_2]

3: Tax payment [v3elstrlc\_3]

4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elstrlc\_4]

5: Slave [v3elstrlc\_5]

6: Ethnicity, race [v3elstrlc\_6]

7: Religion [v3elstrlc\_7]

8: Region [v3elstrlc\_8]

9: "Bad moral character" [v3elstrlc\_9]

10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elstrlc\_10]

11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elstrlc\_11]

12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elstrlc\_12]

13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elstrlc\_13]

SCALE: Nominal

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1968

### 2.3.19.18 Candidate exclusions (de jure) presidential elections (v3elstrpr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elstrpr

*Original tag:* v3elstrpr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Is the right to run as a candidate in presidential elections restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

CLARIFICATION: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if there is no direct presidential elections. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

RESPONSES:

- 0: Literacy [v3elrstrpr\_0]
- 1: Property [v3elrstrpr\_1]
- 2: Income [v3elrstrpr\_2]
- 3: Tax payment [v3elrstrpr\_3]
- 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elrstrpr\_4]
- 5: Slave [v3elrstrpr\_5]
- 6: Ethnicity, race [v3elrstrpr\_6]
- 7: Religion [v3elrstrpr\_7]
- 8: Region [v3elrstrpr\_8]
- 9: "Bad moral character" [v3elrstrpr\_9]
- 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elrstrpr\_10]
- 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elrstrpr\_11]
- 12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elrstrpr\_12]
- 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elrstrpr\_13]

SCALE: Nominal

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1804-1938

### 2.3.19.19 Candidate exclusions (de jure) upper chamber (v3elrstrup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elrstrup

*Original tag:* v3elrstrup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Is the right to run as a candidate to the upper chamber of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

CLARIFICATION: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if there is no upper chamber. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

RESPONSES:

- 0: Literacy [v3elrstrup\_0]
- 1: Property [v3elrstrup\_1]
- 2: Income [v3elrstrup\_2]
- 3: Tax payment [v3elrstrup\_3]
- 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elrstrup\_4]
- 5: Slave [v3elrstrup\_5]
- 6: Ethnicity, race [v3elrstrup\_6]

7: Religion [v3elrstrup\_7]

8: Region [v3elrstrup\_8]

9: "Bad moral character" [v3elrstrup\_9]

10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elrstrup\_10]

11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elrstrup\_11]

12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elrstrup\_12]

13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elrstrup\_13]

SCALE: Nominal

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1795-1962

### 2.3.19.20 De jure ballot secrecy (v3elsec)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elsec

*Original tag:* v3elsec

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: Is there ballot secrecy by law?

RESPONSES:

0: no.

1: Yes.

2: Secrecy optional.

3: Varies spatially and/or hierarchically.

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): IFES; IDEA; [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret\\_ballot](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_ballot), various country specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.19.21 Upper chamber election turnover (v3eltvriguc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3eltvriguc

*Original tag:* v3eltvriguc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Did control of the upper chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The same party/group/coalition remained in control of the majority of seats.

1: Partly. The leading position within a coalition changed. Or, a new coalition includes some old groups/parties and some new groups/parties.

2: Yes. Another party/group/coalition gained control of the majority of seats.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various



country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1831-1900

### 2.3.19.22 Upper chamber election seats (v3elupseat)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elupseat

*Original tag:* v3elupseat

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats were there in the upper chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1900

### 2.3.19.23 Upper chamber election seats won by largest party (v3elupstsl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elupstsl

*Original tag:* v3elupstsl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1900

### 2.3.19.24 Upper chamber election seats won by second largest party (v3elupstsm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elupstsm

*Original tag:* v3elupstsm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats in the upper chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank

if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1900

### 2.3.19.25 Upper chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (v3elupvtlg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elupvtlg

*Original tag:* v3elupvtlg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1894-1900

### 2.3.19.26 Upper chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (v3elupvtsm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elupvtsm

*Original tag:* v3elupvtsm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1894-1900

### 2.3.19.27 Suffrage exclusions (de jure) lower (unicameral) chamber (v3elvstrlc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elvstrlc

*Original tag:* v3elvstrlc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Is the right to vote for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons?

CLARIFICATION: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*).

It applies to direct elections and not indirect elections (except situations where the electors are merely executing the will of the voters such as US presidential elections after 1800).

If there is variation across regions of a country, for each category try to estimate the modal (most common) category. Thus, if most regions of a country imposed restrictions based on property, choose answer #2.

Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) parliament.

RESPONSES:

0: Literacy [v3elvstrlc\_0]

1: Property [v3elvstrlc\_1]

2: Income [v3elvstrlc\_2]

3: Tax payment [v3elvstrlc\_3]

4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elvstrlc\_4]

5: Slave [v3elvstrlc\_5]

6: Ethnicity, race [v3elvstrlc\_6]

7: Religion [v3elvstrlc\_7]

8: Region [v3elvstrlc\_8]

9: "Bad moral character" [v3elvstrlc\_9]

10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elvstrlc\_10]

11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elvstrlc\_11]

12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elvstrlc\_12]

13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elvstrlc\_13]

SCALE: Nominal

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1968

### 2.3.19.28 Suffrage exclusions (de jure) presidential elections (v3elvstrpr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elvstrpr

*Original tag:* v3elvstrpr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Is the right to vote in the presidential election restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

CLARIFICATION: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if the head of state is not directly elected. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

RESPONSES:

0: Literacy [v3elvstrpr\_0]

1: Property [v3elvstrpr\_1]

2: Income [v3elvstrpr\_2]

3: Tax payment [v3elvstrpr\_3]  
 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elvstrpr\_4]  
 5: Slave [v3elvstrpr\_5]  
 6: Ethnicity, race [v3elvstrpr\_6]  
 7: Religion [v3elvstrpr\_7]  
 8: Region [v3elvstrpr\_8]  
 9: "Bad moral character" [v3elvstrpr\_9]  
 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elvstrpr\_10]  
 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elvstrpr\_11]  
 12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elvstrpr\_12]  
 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elvstrpr\_13]  
 SCALE: Nominal  
 ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.  
 SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.  
 DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
 COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
 CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
 YEARS: 1789-1938

### 2.3.19.29 Suffrage exclusions (de jure) upper chamber (v3elvstruc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elvstruc

*Original tag:* v3elvstruc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Is the right to vote for the upper house of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

CLARIFICATION: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). It applies to direct elections and not indirect elections (except situations where the electors are merely executing the will of the voters such as US presidential elections after 1800). If there is variation across regions of a country, for each category try to estimate the modal (most common) situation. Thus, if most regions imposed restrictions based on property, choose answer #2. Leave blank if there is no upper chamber or if upper chamber is not directly elected. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

RESPONSES:

0: Literacy [v3elvstruc\_0]  
 1: Property [v3elvstruc\_1]  
 2: Income [v3elvstruc\_2]  
 3: Tax payment [v3elvstruc\_3]  
 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elvstruc\_4]  
 5: Slave [v3elvstruc\_5]  
 6: Ethnicity, race [v3elvstruc\_6]  
 7: Religion [v3elvstruc\_7]  
 8: Region [v3elvstruc\_8]  
 9: "Bad moral character" [v3elvstruc\_9]  
 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elvstruc\_10]  
 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elvstruc\_11]  
 12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elvstruc\_12]  
 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elvstruc\_13]  
 SCALE: Nominal

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

SOURCE(S): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1795-1962

### 2.3.19.30 Election women in the cabinet (v3elwomcab)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elwomcab

*Original tag:* v3elwomcab

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: In the first cabinet after this national election, what percentage (percent) of the ministers was female?

CLARIFICATION: A "minister" is defined as a person with a specific set of duties (a portfolio). It excludes ministers without portfolio and no specific responsibilities. Please provide an estimate if you do not know the exact figure.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): <http://countrystudies.us>, various country specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v3eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.19.31 Total votes (v3ttlvote)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ttlvote

*Original tag:* v3ttlvote

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the total number of votes cast in this election.

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

### 2.3.20 Historical V-Dem - Political Parties

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more

information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - Political Parties*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

### 2.3.20.1 Party identification (v3partyid)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3partyid

*Original tag:* v3partyid

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do voters identify with a political party?

CLARIFICATION: When party identification is strong, vote choice is largely determined by a voter's party affiliation (and his/her affiliation with that party) rather than attachments to particular candidates, non-partisan issue-positions, or material incentives (*e.g.*, vote-buying). Likewise, when party identification is strong, voters retain loyalty to a single party rather than switching from one party to another across elections or across offices in the same election (ticket-splitting). In this fashion we can somewhat crudely distinguish between partisans and non-partisans. Note that this question refers only to voters, not to members of the population who do not vote (because they are disenfranchised, choose not to vote, or are discouraged from voting). Leave this question blank if there are no national elections.

RESPONSES:

0: There are national elections, but there are no political parties.

1: Only one party is allowed to participate in national elections.

2: More than one party participates, and nearly all voters are non-partisans.

3: More than one party participates, and most voters are non-partisans.

4: More than one party participates, and voters are equally divided between partisans and non-partisans.

5: More than one party participates, and most voters are partisans.

6: More than one party participates, and nearly all voters are partisans.

SCALE: Nominal, but categories 2—6 constitute ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.20.2 Party age largest (v3psagefirst)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3psagefirst

*Original tag:* v3psagefirst

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: How many years have passed since the party that holds the most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

CLARIFICATION: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the

number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): <http://countrystudies.us>

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.20.3 Party age executive (v3psagepm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3psagepm

*Original tag:* v3psagepm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: How many years have passed since the party controlling the executive was formed?

CLARIFICATION: If there is a coalition government, you should count the party of the prime minister was counted. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): <http://countrystudies.us>

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.20.4 Party age second largest (v3psagesecond)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3psagesecond

*Original tag:* v3psagesecond

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: How many years have passed since the party that holds the second most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

CLARIFICATION: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): <http://countrystudies.us>

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.20.5 Party age third largest (v3psagethird)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3psagethird

*Original tag:* v3psagethird

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: How many years have passed since the party that holds the third most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

CLARIFICATION: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): <http://countrystudies.us>

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1791-1920

### 2.3.21 Historical V-Dem - The Legislature

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - The Legislature*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 2.3.21.1 Lower chamber budget (v3lgbudglo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgbudglo

*Original tag:* v3lgbudglo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is the lower chamber of the legislature required to approve the budget?

CLARIFICATION: The budget refers to major revenue (appropriations) and expenditure (spending) bills. Typically, these are passed annually or bi-annually. Approval is understood to mean a formal vote on the floor of the chamber in which at least 50percent of those voting approve the measure.

RESPONSES:

0: No. Includes situations in which (a) there are no formal budget bills, or (b) the executive entirely by-passes the lower house or ignores its actions.

1: Yes. Includes situations in which (a) the executive exercises selective ("line-item") vetoes, and (b) there is a prolonged period in which no budget is passed and the executive is unable to raise and spend money, or must operate under the terms of the previous budget.

SCALE: Dichotomous

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).



CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.21.2 Upper chamber budget (v3lgbudgup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgbudgup

*Original tag:* v3lgbudgup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is the upper chamber of the legislature required to approve the budget?

CLARIFICATION: The budget refers to major revenue (appropriations) and expenditure (spending) bills. Typically, these are passed annually or bi-annually. Approval is understood to mean a formal vote on the floor of the chamber in which at least 50percent of those voting approve the measure.

RESPONSES:

0: No. Includes situations in which (a) there are no formal budget bills, or (b) the executive entirely by-passes the upper house or ignores its actions.

1: Yes. Includes situations in which (a) the executive exercises selective ("line-item") vetoes, and (b) there is a prolonged period in which no budget is passed and the executive is unable to raise and spend money, or must operate under the terms of the previous budget.

SCALE: Dichotomous

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.21.3 Legislature other than uni- or bicameral (v3lgcamoth)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgcamoth

*Original tag:* v3lgcamoth

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the cameral structure of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Please provide the names of all chambers, as well as how they are grouped into a "upper" and "lower" chamber. For example, in Sweden prior to 1866, the names would be Estates of Nobility, Clergy, Burghers and Peasantry, where the Estates of Nobility and Clergy are grouped into the "upper" chamber, those of the Burghers and Peasantry into the "lower" chamber.

SCALE: Nominal

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1919

### 2.3.21.4 Lower chamber in session (v3lginses)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lginses

*Original tag:* v3lginses

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: During the year, for how long was the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature in session?

CLARIFICATION: If there is only one session during the year, your answer should reflect the length of this session. If there are multiple sessions, your answer should reflect the total time spent in session, adding together the length of all session during the year.

RESPONSES:

0: It did not convene at all during the year.

1: It did convene, and was in session for less than 1 month, in total.

2: It did convene, and was in session for 1-2 months, in total.

3: It did convene, and was in session for 3-5 months, in total.

4: It did convene, and was in session for 6-8 months, in total.

5: It did convene, and was in session for 9 months or more, in total.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.21.5 Upper chamber in session (v3lginsesup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lginsesup

*Original tag:* v3lginsesup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: During the year, for how long was the upper chamber of the legislature in session?

CLARIFICATION: If there is only one session during the year, your answer should reflect the length of this session. If there are multiple sessions, your answer should reflect the total time spent in session, adding together the length of all sessions during the year.

RESPONSES:

0: It did not convene at all during the year.

1: It did convene, and was in session for less than 1 month, in total.

2: It did convene, and was in session for 1-2 months, in total.

3: It did convene, and was in session for 3-5 months, in total.

4: It did convene, and was in session for 6-8 months, in total.

5: It did convene, and was in session for 9 months or more, in total.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.21.6 Lower chamber quota for social groups (v3lgqumin)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgqumin

*Original tag:* v3lgqumin

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: Is there a national-level quota for any social groups in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: These quotas are sometimes informally known as "minority quotas." Do not record gender quotas here (as gender is not part of what we mean by a social group). Also, do not include special rules that benefit parties defined by social group but do not guarantee seats for these groups. For example, do not count a rule exempting parties from threshold requirements. Code "yes" only if the groups covered by the quota have full voting rights in the legislature.

RESPONSES:

0: No national level quota for any social group.

1: Yes, there are reserved seats for at least one social group.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>;  
<https://en.wikipedia.org>

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.22 Historical V-Dem - The Judiciary

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - The Judiciary*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 2.3.22.1 High court existence (v3juhcourt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3juhcourt

*Original tag:* v3juhcourt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is there a high court?

CLARIFICATION: Note that in some cases we consider an institution to be the Highest Court in a given country, even though we acknowledge that its jurisdiction covers most though not all the territory of the country. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the rating and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

ORDERING: If answer is "0", skip to v2juncind.

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.23 Historical V-Dem - Civil Liberty

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - Civil Liberty*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 2.3.23.1 Labor rights (v3cllabrig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3cllabrig

*Original tag:* v3cllabrig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does labor enjoy the right to organize freely and bargain collectively?

CLARIFICATION: Refers to actual practice not formal (*de jure*) rights. If practices vary across the country, or across sectors, please consider the overall situation of labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Independent labor unions (free from state or ruling party control) are not allowed.

1: Independent labor unions are allowed, at least in some sectors of the economy or some sections of the country. However, they are subject to harassment by the police, paramilitary groups, business associations, or other groups. Harassment refers to systematic beatings, imprisonment, outlawing of specific unions, and other actions that seriously impinge upon the ability of unions to organize and bargain collectively.

2: Independent labor unions are allowed and they do not face violent repression but the legal climate is not friendly (*e.g.*, "closed shop" rules are widespread), making it difficult to organize and bargain collectively.

3: Independent labor unions are allowed and may organize freely in all sectors of the economy.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.3.23.2 Slavery (v3clslavery)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3clslavery

*Original tag:* v3clslavery

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: Is slavery legal?

CLARIFICATION: Refers to the *de jure* status of slavery, not its actual practice.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes.

1: No.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): Various country specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

### 2.3.23.3 Serfdom de jure/slavery de jure (v3serfdeju)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3serfdeju

*Original tag:* v3serfdeju

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: Is serfdom legal?

CLARIFICATION: Refers to the *de jure* status of serfdom, not its actual practice.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes.

1: No.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): Various country specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

### 2.3.24 Historical V-Dem - Sovereignty and State

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - Sovereignty and State*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 2.3.24.1 Census (v3stcensus)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3stcensus

*Original tag:* v3stcensus

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

QUESTION: Was there a national census in this year?

CLARIFICATION: In order to count as a "census", the following four criteria needs to be satisfied:

1. UNIVERSALITY: the census attempted to cover the entire population and not just a sample.
2. INDIVIDUAL ENUMERATION: the census enumerates each individual separately and records his or her characteristics separately. If the census only produces aggregate or summarised information, it is only a population count and should not count as a census. For example, A population count of a household with 4 people would produce the following results:

Age—Adults: 2; Children: 2

Sex—Males: 2; Females: 2

Instead, an individual enumeration would look like this:

Head of household-male-adult

Spouse-female-adult

Son-male-child

Daughter-female-child

The key difference is that only in the individual enumeration the data on various characteristics can be cross-tabulated.

3. DEFINED TERRITORY: The territory covered, along with any changes in its area is clearly stated.

4. SIMULTANEITY AND SPECIFIED TIME: Each person is enumerated as nearly as possible to the same well-defined point in time, and the collected data should refer to a well-defined reference period.

Code "1" if a national census was completed in this year – but not if it was aborted or was not national in scope.

RESPONSES:

0. No.

1. Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

### 2.3.24.2 Citizenship laws (v3stcitlaw)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3stcitlaw

*Original tag:* v3stcitlaw

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: Are there laws specifying who is a citizen and who is not and establishing procedures for naturalization?

RESPONSES:

0. No.

1. Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): CCP (v543); <https://globalcit.eu/country-profiles/>; various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.24.3 Flag (v3stflag)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3stflag

*Original tag:* v3stflag

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: Is there a national flag?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): CCP (v68); Whitney Smith (1975), *Flags Through the Ages and Across the World*; Wikipedia; World Fact Book, CIA.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

### 2.3.24.4 National anthem (v3stnatant)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3stnatant

*Original tag:* v3stnatant

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: Is there a national anthem?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There may be popular songs identified with the nation but there is no official, state-recognized national anthem.

1: Yes. There is an official, state-recognized national anthem.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): CCP (v67); Bristow, Michael Jamieson (ed). 2006. *National Anthems of the World*, Eleventh Edition. Casell. [www.nationalanthems.info](http://www.nationalanthems.info); <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/>; [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_historical\\_national\\_anthems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_historical_national_anthems).

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

### 2.3.24.5 National bank (v3stnatbank)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3stnatbank

*Original tag:* v3stnatbank

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: Is there a national bank?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

#### 2.3.24.6 Rulers involvement in the state administration (v3struinvadm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3struinvadm

*Original tag:* v3struinvadm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Agnes Cornell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are day-to-day decisions made by state administrators subject to intervention from political elites?

CLARIFICATION: By political elites we mean members of the executive, members of the legislature and political elites at local and regional levels. Note that the focus on the day-to-day decisions of the state administration implies interference in specific operational decisions in a meticulous manner. Decisions taken by rulers about the general direction of the state administration should not be considered. Note that the question refers to the *de facto* situation.

RESPONSES:

0: Constantly. Day-to-day decisions taken by state administrators are constantly subject to intervention.

1: Often. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are often subject to intervention.

2: About half. Approximately half of the day-to-day decisions in the state administration are subject to intervention.

3: Occasionally. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are occasionally subject to intervention.

4: Never, or hardly ever. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are never or hardly ever subject to intervention.

SCALE: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.3.24.7 Statistical agency (v3ststatag)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ststatag

*Original tag:* v3ststatag

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

QUESTION: Is there a national statistical agency?

CLARIFICATION: A statistical agency is an official government organization exclusively devoted to gathering numerical information in a variety of subjects about the country. This may be a completely independent agency or a distinguishable office or department within another governmental agency.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of



this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

### 2.3.24.8 State steering capacity (v3ststeecap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ststeecap

*Original tag:* v3ststeecap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Can the state oversee and regulate the economy?

CLARIFICATION: This refers to the state's ability to keep track of economic activities in its territory and potentially influence them by shaping the incentives and constraints that private firms face to do business; *e.g.*, through licensing, granting exploitation rights, taxing, imposing market barriers, building infrastructure, offering subsidies, adjudicating conflicts, or enforcing regulations.

RESPONSES:

0: Most economic activities happen outside the reach of the state

1: The state steers some economic activities

2: The state steers a substantial share – but less than half – of the national economy

3: The state steers about half or more than half, of the national economy

4: The state steers all or almost all economic activities

SCALE: Ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.24.9 Statistical yearbook covered (v3ststybcov)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ststybcov

*Original tag:* v3ststybcov

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

QUESTION: Was this year covered by a published statistical yearbook?

CLARIFICATION: By "covered" we mean whether, based on the title of the yearbook, information about this year was included in a statistical yearbook. For example, if a yearbook was published in 1914, according to its title covering 1911-1914, then v3ststybpub should be coded as 1 for 1914 only, 0 for 1911-1913, but v3ststybcov as 1 for 1911-1914.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

### 2.3.24.10 Statistical yearbook published (v3ststybpub)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ststybpub

*Original tag:* v3ststybpub

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

QUESTION: Was there a statistical yearbook issued this year?

CLARIFICATION: A statistical yearbook is a recurrent publication of a government agency published annually or less frequently which contain statistical tables in more than one of the following categories:

1. Physical environment; 2. Demography; 3. Economic Affairs; 4. Political Affairs; and 5. Cultural Affairs.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

### 2.3.25 Historical V-Dem - Political Equality

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - Political Equality*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 2.3.25.1 Equal vote legislature/lower chamber (v3equavolc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3equavolc

*Original tag:* v3equavolc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are ballots in elections for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature counted differently for different social groups? (Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.

RESPONSES:

0: No. All ballots are counted equally, regardless of social group. [v3equavolc\_0]

1: Yes. There is a curial/estate voting system where voters are separated into categories by, for example, class criteria and assigned a disproportionate numbers of deputies. [v3equavolc\_1]

2: Yes. There is census/plural vote for particular groups (*e.g.*, votes cast by individuals with

higher incomes or tax contributions are given more weight) [v3equavolc\_2]

3: Yes. Some voters are allowed to vote in several constituencies. [v3equavolc\_3]

SCALE: Nominal

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.25.2 Equal vote upper chamber (v3equavouc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3equavouc

*Original tag:* v3equavouc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are ballots in elections for the upper chamber of the national legislature counted differently for different social groups? (Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.

RESPONSES:

0: No. All ballots are counted equally, regardless of social group. [v3equavouc\_0]

1: Yes. There is a curial/estate voting system where voters are separated into categories by, for example, class criteria and assigned a disproportionate numbers of deputies. [v3equavouc\_1]

2: Yes. There is census/plural vote for particular groups (*e.g.*, votes cast by individuals with higher incomes or tax contributions are given more weight) [v3equavouc\_2]

3: Yes. Some voters are allowed to vote in several constituencies. [v3equavouc\_3]

SCALE: Nominal

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.25.3 Child labor laws (v3pechilabl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3pechilabl

*Original tag:* v3pechilabl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: Is there national regulation prohibiting child labor?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: For nonagricultural employment only.

2: For all sectors.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Child Labor: A Global View (A World View of Social Issues) Hardcover—October 30, 2004 by Cathryne L. Schmitz (Editor), Elizabeth K. Collardey (Editor), Desi Larson (Editor). CCP (v592) asks Does the constitution place limits on child employment? The Routledge History of Childhood in the Western World, 2013, Paula S. Fass (editor). The World of Child Labor: An Historical and Regional Survey, 2009 by Hugh D. Hindman.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.25.4 Minimum wage (v3peminwage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3peminwage

*Original tag:* v3peminwage

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: Is there a minimum wage?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, the state imposes a minimum wage (legislation, regulations).

2: Yes, there are corporate bargaining arrangements that effectively ensure a minimum wage.

3: Yes, there is a tripartite committee that sets the wage (representatives from union, employer, government).

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): ILO; East Asia Pacific at Work: Employment, Enterprise, and Well-being, By World Bank, 2014.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2015

### 2.3.25.5 Minimum wage restriction (v3peminwagerestr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3peminwagerestr

*Original tag:* v3peminwagerestr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: If there is a minimum wage provision, are there any explicit exceptions based on one or more of the following categories?

CLARIFICATION: Code as missing if there is no minimum wage.

RESPONSES:

0: Rural/urban area [v3peminwagerestr\_0]

1: Region of the country [v3peminwagerestr\_1]

2: Trade (industry) [v3peminwagerestr\_2]

3: Gender [v3peminwagerestr\_3]

4: Ethnicity [v3peminwagerestr\_4]

5: Age [v3peminwagerestr\_5]

6: Public/private sector [v3peminwagerestr\_6]

7: Other characteristic [v3peminwagerestr\_7]

8: There are no exceptions. [v3peminwagerestr\_8]

SCALE: Nominal

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

SOURCE(S): ILO; East Asia Pacific at Work: Employment, Enterprise, and Well-being By World Bank, 2014; National minimum wage: Low Pay Commission report 2011, Low Pay Commission.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1899-2015

### 2.3.26 Historical V-Dem - Historical V-Dem Modified

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these

indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

V-Dem indicators that are different to their contemporary counterparts, for the purpose of gathering additional relevant information for the historical period in Historical V-Dem. These variables are also merged into their v2 equivalents.

First, In contrast to contemporary V-Dem, Historical V-Dem codes upper chamber elections and thus also includes eltype category 2. Those observations are treated as missing in the historical-contemporary merged version of v2eltype. Due to election specific variables being cleaned by v2eltype, these do not include upper chamber elections either. In order to include historical data on upper chamber elections we thus also provide v3eltype and v3 election specific variables that are cleaned by v3eltype.

Second, Historical V-Dem codes additional chambers compared to contemporary V-Dem. When merging v2lgbicam and v3lgbicam the categories get recoded as follows:

- Categories 3 (tricameral) and 4 (quadricameral) become category 2 for the merged v2lgbicam.
- Category 9 (Other types of legislature) becomes category 0 for the merged v2lgbicam.

In order to include historical data on additional chambers, we thus also provide v3lgbicam and v3 chamber specific variables that are cleaned by v3lgbicam.

### 2.3.26.1 Lower chamber electoral system (v3elloelsy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elloelsy

*Original tag:* v3elloelsy

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Further information on the following electoral system types can be found in Reynolds/Reilly, The New International IDEA Handbook (2005), chapter two and Annex B (Glossary of Terms) – downloadable, free of charge, at [www.idea.int/publications/esd/](http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/).

RESPONSES:

0: First-past-the-post (FPP, aka plurality) in single-member constituencies. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat.

1: Two-round system in single-member constituencies. Like FPP except that a threshold — usually 50percent + 1 — is required to avoid a runoff between the two top vote-getters.

2: Alternative vote in single-member districts. Voters rank-order their preferences for the candidates who compete for a single seat. If any candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, s/he is elected. If not, then the least successful candidates (based on first-preferences) are eliminated and their votes reallocated to the second-preferences. This process is repeated until a candidate reaches 50percent +1 of the votes.

3: Block vote in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are seats within that district and can rank-order them (within or across parties) as they please.

4: Party block vote in multi-member districts. Voters cast a vote for a single party (but not for individual candidates within the party's list). The party with the most votes (*i.e.*, a plurality) wins all the seats in that district.

5: Parallel (SMD/PR). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are independent.

6: Mixed-member proportional (SMD with PR compensatory seats). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are not independent. Specifically, the multimember seats are used to rectify disproportionalities achieved in the single-member district election — by adding seats, as necessary. This means that the representation of parties in the legislature is determined entirely by the PR ballot. It also means that the result of an MMP election is similar to the result of a PR election: parties achieve representation according to their nationwide vote share (on the PR ballot)

7: List PR with small multi-member districts (mean district size < 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is less than seven.

8: List PR with large multi-member districts (mean district size > 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is greater than seven.

9: Single-transferable vote (STV) in multi-member districts. Electors rank-order candidates nominated for a district. Candidates that surpass a specified quota of first-preference votes are elected. The remaining seats are chosen by reallocating the votes of the least successful candidates to elector's second- (or third-) preferences until the specified quota is reached. This process is repeated until all seats for that district are filled.

10: Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts. Each elector chooses a single candidate. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

11: Limited vote in multi-member districts.

Electors have more than one vote but fewer votes than the number of seats in the district. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

12: Borda Count in single- or multi-member districts. Electors use numbers to mark preferences among candidates and each preference is assigned a value. For example, in a ten-candidate field a first preference is worth one, a second preference is worth .9, and so forth. These are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are elected.

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): Golder (2006); CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2011); Colomer (2004); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; IFES; Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1902

### 2.3.26.2 Lower chamber election seats (v3elloseat)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elloseat

*Original tag:* v3elloseat

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats were there in the lower (or unicameral) chamber

of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

### 2.3.26.3 Lower chamber election seats won by largest party (v3ellostlg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ellostlg

*Original tag:* v3ellostlg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

### 2.3.26.4 Lower chamber election seat share won by largest party (v3ellostsl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ellostsl

*Original tag:* v3ellostsl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, what percentage (percent) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

### 2.3.26.5 Lower chamber election seats won by second largest party (v3ellostsm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ellostsm

*Original tag:* v3ellostsm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

#### **2.3.26.6 Lower chamber election seat share won by second largest party (v3ellostss)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ellostss

*Original tag:* v3ellostss

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, what percentage (percent) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

#### **2.3.26.7 Lower chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (v3ellovtlg)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ellovtlg

*Original tag:* v3ellovtlg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.



DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

### 2.3.26.8 Lower chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (v3ellovtsm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ellovtsm

*Original tag:* v3ellovtsm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

### 2.3.26.9 Effective number of cabinet parties (v3elnbpr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elnbpr

*Original tag:* v3elnbpr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: In the first cabinet after this national election, how many political parties were represented in the cabinet?

RESPONSES:

0: Parties are not allowed.

1: One party.

2: Two parties.

3: Three parties.

4: Four or more parties.

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): <http://www.countrystudies.us>, various country specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v3eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

### 2.3.26.10 Lower chamber electoral system (v3elparlel)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elparlel

*Original tag:* v3elparlel

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

RESPONSES:

0: Majoritarian.

1: Proportional.

2: Mixed.

3: Other (*e.g.* single non-transferable voting, limited voting)

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): Golder (2006); CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2011); Colomer (2004); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; IFES; Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1902

### 2.3.26.11 Election turnout (v3eltrnout)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3eltrnout

*Original tag:* v3eltrnout

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this national election, what percentage (percent) of all registered voters cast a vote according to official results?

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): IDEA; Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); NELDA (Hyde, Marinov 2012). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v3eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

### 2.3.26.12 Lower chamber election turnover (v3eltvrig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3eltvrig

*Original tag:* v3eltvrig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: Did control of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The majority party or ruling coalition includes the same or substantially the same parties, even if some minor parties (holding less than 10 percent of the seats in the legislature) left or joined the coalition, or because the elections do not affect the lower chamber.

1: Half. A minority party or coalition who was not in control of the chamber before the elections assumed the leading position in the legislature but is dependent on other parties for support. Or, a post-election ruling coalition includes some old parties and some new parties and the new parties represent more than 10 percent of the seats in the legislature.

2: Yes. The incumbent party or coalition lost its majority or plurality-dominant position in the legislature and a different party or coalition assumes the majority position.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources. Constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1912

### 2.3.26.13 Election type (v3eltype)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3eltype

*Original tag:* v3eltype

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What type of election was held on this date?

CLARIFICATION: The date and type of each election has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same elections.

If the election unfolds across more than one day, the date for the first day is entered. If the precise date was unavailable, the first of the month is entered. If the month is unknown, January 1 is entered. Multiple-round elections (*e.g.*, two-round elections) are counted separately, *i.e.*, as separate elections. More than one election in a single year is accommodated by listing each election with a separate calendar date. When elections to more than one office occur on the same day these are listed separately (though naturally with the same date).

RESPONSES:

0: Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers, first or only round. [v3eltype\_0]

1: Legislative, lower, sole, or both chambers, second round. [v3eltype\_1]

2: Legislative, upper chamber only, first or only round. [v3eltype\_2]

3: Legislative, upper chamber only, second round. [v3eltype\_3]

4: Constituent Assembly, first or only round. [v3eltype\_4]

5: Constituent Assembly, second round. [v3eltype\_5]

6: Presidential, first or only round. [v3eltype\_6]

7: Presidential, second round. [v3eltype\_7]

8: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, first or only round. [v3eltype\_8]

9: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, second round. [v3eltype\_9]

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Lindvall-Larson (2000); websites of national parliaments; Wikipedia;

Election Politique Citoyen (<http://www.election-politique.com>); CLEA (<https://electiondataarchive.org/data-and-documentation/>); various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.26.14 Presidential election vote share of largest vote-getter (v3elvotlrg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elvotlrg

*Original tag:* v3elvotlrg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this presidential election, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the winning candidate in the first round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Record only direct presidential elections. Cases where the presidents are elected indirectly by the legislature (*i.e.* Germany) are not being coded since there is no popular vote share. However, in countries where electoral college is present (*i.e.* U.S.), the percentage of popular vote should be recorded if available.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v3eltype\_6, v3eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1792-1919

### 2.3.26.15 Presidential election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (v3elvotsml)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elvotsml

*Original tag:* v3elvotsml

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this presidential election, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second most successful candidate in the first round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Record only direct presidential elections. Cases where the presidents are elected indirectly by the legislature (*i.e.* Germany) are not being coded since there is no popular vote share. However, in countries where electoral college is present (*i.e.* U.S.), the percentage of popular vote should be recorded if available.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v3eltype\_6, v3eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1792-1919

### 2.3.26.16 Legislature bicameral (H) (v3lgbicam)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgbicam

*Original tag:* v3lgbicam

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: How many chambers does the legislature contain?

CLARIFICATION: The answer to this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the code and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

## RESPONSES:

0: No legislature exists (or the legislature is shut down).

1: Unicameral

2: Bicameral

3: Tricameral

4: Quadricameral

9: Other type of legislature

ORDERING: If all years are (0), skip to The Judiciary (v2juintro). If (1) is chosen, skip to v2lgintro2.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Lindvall-Larson (2000); CCP (<http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/>); websites of National Parliaments; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**2.3.26.17 Lower chamber committees (v3lgcomslo)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgcomslo

*Original tag:* v3lgcomslo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have a functioning committee system?

RESPONSES:

0: No, there are no committees.

1: Yes, but there are only special (not permanent) committees.

2: Yes, there are permanent committees, but they are not very significant in affecting the course of policy.

3: Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**2.3.26.18 Legislature corrupt activities (v3lgcrrpt)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgcrrpt

*Original tag:* v3lgcrrpt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?

CLARIFICATION: This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.

Please make your best estimate, based upon what is known or suspected to be true.

RESPONSES:

0: Never, or hardly ever.

1: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.

2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.

3: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.

4: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.26.19 Legislature dominant chamber (v3lghdomchm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lghdomchm

*Original tag:* v3lghdomchm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the legislature is bicameral, which chamber is dominant?

RESPONSES:

0: The lower chamber is clearly dominant.

1: The lower chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.

2: They are roughly co-equal in power.

3: The upper chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.

4: The upper chamber is clearly dominant.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.26.20 Upper chamber elected (v3lgelecup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgelecup

*Original tag:* v3lgelecup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

CLARIFICATION: Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body. Thus, if 10percent of a upper chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90percent.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.26.21 Lower chamber elected (v3lghello)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lghello

*Original tag:* v3lghello

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

CLARIFICATION: Direct election includes seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election. Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body. Thus, if 10percent of a lower chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90percent.

We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1917

### 2.3.26.22 Legislature controls resources (v3lghfunds)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lghfunds

*Original tag:* v3lghfunds

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal operations and the perquisites of its members?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature's operation depend on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive.

1: Yes

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.26.23 Lower chamber indirectly elected (v3lghinello)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lghinello

*Original tag:* v3lghinello

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What percentage of the lower chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

CLARIFICATION: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.

We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.26.24 Upper chamber indirectly elected (v3lginelup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lginelup

*Original tag:* v3lginelup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

CLARIFICATION: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.

We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.26.25 Legislature investigates in practice (v3lginvstp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lginvstp

*Original tag:* v3lginvstp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.



2: As likely as not.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.26.26 Lower chamber legislates in practice (v3lglegplo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lglegplo

*Original tag:* v3lglegplo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.26.27 Upper chamber legislates in practice (v3lglegpup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lglegpup

*Original tag:* v3lglegpup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the upper chamber of the legislature.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook*

(see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.26.28 Lower chamber legislature name (H) (v3lgnamelo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgnamelo

*Original tag:* v3lgnamelo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: An as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the lower chamber of the legislature in English, and where possible with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Lindvall-Larson (2000); CCP (<http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/>); websites of National Parliaments; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.26.29 Upper chamber name (H) (v3lgnameup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgnameup

*Original tag:* v3lgnameup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the name of the upper chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: An as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the upper chamber of the legislature in English, and where possible with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); CCP (<http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/>); websites of National Parliaments; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.26.30 Legislature opposition parties (v3lgoppart)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgoppart

*Original tag:* v3lgoppart

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?

RESPONSES:

0: No, not at all.

1: Occasionally.

2: Yes, for the most part.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.26.31 Executive oversight (v3lgotovst)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgotovst

*Original tag:* v3lgotovst

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.

2: Very uncertain.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.26.32 Legislature questions officials in practice (v3lgqstexp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgqstexp

*Original tag:* v3lgqstexp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?

CLARIFICATION: By "question" we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain its policies or testify.

RESPONSES:

0: No - never or very rarely.

1: Yes - routinely.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.26.33 Lower chamber members serve in government (v3lgsrvlo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgsrvlo

*Original tag:* v3lgsrvlo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, are members of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature able to serve simultaneously as ministers in the government?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.27 Historical V-Dem - Overlap Period Discrepancies

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

This section includes A and A\* variables where there is a discrepancy in the coding of some observations between the Historical and Contemporary V-Dem coding for the overlap period (typically 1900-1920). The v2-versions of these variables, reported elsewhere in the codebook, report the Contemporary V-Dem scores in cases of discrepancies in the overlap period.

Remaining inconsistencies in the Historical and Contemporary V-Dem coding, that are not due to substantive differences in the indicators, will be sorted out for version 10 of the dataset.

#### 2.3.27.1 Local government elected (v3ellocelc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ellocelc

*Original tag:* v3ellocelc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: At the local level, are government offices elected in practice?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent

questions for the same local governments.

"Government offices" here refers to a local executive and a local assembly, not a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An executive is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a mayor). An assembly is a larger body of officials.

"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a local elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including appointment by a higher level of government – are considered to be non-elected.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

RESPONSES:

0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected.

1: Generally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly.

2: Generally, the local assembly is elected but not the executive.

3: Generally, the local executive is elected and there is no assembly.

4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no executive.

5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.27.2 Local government exists (v3ellocgov)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ellocgov

*Original tag:* v3ellocgov

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: Is there a local government?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same local governments.

Local government refers to the level of government below the regional government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are counties, communes, cities, municipalities, towns, rural municipalities, and villages.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of local government. If this is the case, please code the local level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

SOURCE(S): Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.27.3 Local government name (v3ellocnam)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ellocnam

*Original tag:* v3ellocnam

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the term(s) for the local government units?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same local governments.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### **2.3.27.4 Regional government exists (v3elreggov)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elreggov

*Original tag:* v3elreggov

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: Is there a regional government?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regional governments.

Regional government is typically the second-highest level of government, just below the national government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are regions, provinces, states, departments, and cantons.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of regional government. If this is the case, for all questions about regional government please code the regional level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

Some countries are so small that, now or in earlier time periods, they have only local government and not regional government. If this is the case, this question is coded as "0" for the appropriate time period.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

ORDERING: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions focused on regional government.

SOURCE(S): Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### **2.3.27.5 Regional government name (v3elregnam)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elregnam

*Original tag:* v3elregnam

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the term(s) for the regional government units?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regional governments.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**2.3.27.6 Regional government elected (v3elsrgel)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elsrgel*Original tag:* v3elsrgel*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: At the regional level, are government offices elected in practice?

CLARIFICATION: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regional governments.

"Government offices" here refers to a regional executive and a regional assembly, not a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An executive is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a governor). An assembly is a larger body of officials, who may be divided into two chambers.

"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a regional elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including appointment by higher or lower levels of government – are considered to be non-elected.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

RESPONSES:

0: Generally, offices at the regional level are not elected.

1: Generally, the regional executive is elected but not the assembly.

2: Generally, the regional assembly is elected but not the executive.

3: Generally, the regional executive is elected and there is no assembly.

4: Generally, the regional assembly is elected and there is no executive.

5: Generally, the regional executive and assembly are elected.

SOURCE(S): Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**2.3.27.7 HOS age (v3exagehos)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3exagehos*Original tag:* v3exagehos*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: In what year was the head of state born?

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Date - year only

SOURCE(S): worldstatesman.org.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v3exnamhos).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1938

### 2.3.27.8 HOS = HOG? (H) (v3exhoshog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3exhoshog

*Original tag:* v3exhoshog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the head of state (HOS) also head of government (HOG)?

CLARIFICATION: Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Note that this question only pertains to whether the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, regardless of the relative powers of the two. Thus, in a constitutional monarchy, for example, the head of state and head of government are not the same even though the head of state may lack any real political power. If multiple head of states/head of governments were appointed in any year, the question pertains to each one of them.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

ORDERING: If HOS=HOG (answer is "yes") for all years: skip to "Introduction to entire executive." (v2exintro3)

SOURCE(S): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v83-v87; Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002).

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.27.9 Name of HOG (H) (v3exnamhog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3exnamhog

*Original tag:* v3exnamhog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the name of the head of government?

CLARIFICATION: The identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.



Only heads of government in office for 100 or more days are listed. If the head of government is a collective body, the name provided is of the person exercising the most effective power within this body, or, if no such person exists, the expression "collective body" is used. If multiple heads of government were appointed in a given year, this question pertains to each one of them, including the specific date of appointment and reappointment for each one of them.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1990

### 2.3.27.10 HOS name (H) (v3exnamhos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3exnamhos

*Original tag:* v3exnamhos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the name of the head of state?

CLARIFICATION: The identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Only heads of states in office for 100 or more days are listed. If the head of state is a collective body, the name provided is of the person exercising the most effective power within this body, or, if no such person exists, the expression "collective body" is used. If multiple Heads of State were appointed in a given year, this question pertains to each one of them, including the specific date of appointment and reappointment for each one of them.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; ARCHIGOS.

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.27.11 HOS appointment in practice (v3expathhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3expathhs

*Original tag:* v3expathhs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: How did the head of state reach office?

CLARIFICATION: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 7 should only be selected if the head of state is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election.

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v3exnamhos).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 1789-1933

### 2.3.27.12 Title of HOG (H) (v3extithog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3extithog

*Original tag:* v3extithog

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the title of the head of government (HOG)?

CLARIFICATION: Again, the titles of the heads of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1990

### 2.3.27.13 HOS title (H) (v3extithos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3extithos

*Original tag:* v3extithos

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What is the title of the head of state?

CLARIFICATION: Again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002).

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

### 2.3.27.14 High court name (v3juhcname)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3juhcname

*Original tag:* v3juhcname

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Please enter the name of the high court.

CLARIFICATION: An as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the court in English, and where possible with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not

want you to change the rating.

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3juhcourt is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1995

### 2.3.27.15 Legislature amends constitution (v3lgamend)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgamend

*Original tag:* v3lgamend

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: By law, can the legislature (including both chambers of the legislature) change the constitution without the involvement of any other body?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>;  
<https://en.wikipedia.org>; various country specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.27.16 Legislature amnesties (v3lgamnsty)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgamnsty

*Original tag:* v3lgamnsty

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: By law, does the legislature have the power to grant amnesty or pardon?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>;  
<https://en.wikipedia.org>

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.27.17 Lower chamber introduces bills (v3lgintblo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgintblo

*Original tag:* v3lgintblo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: By law, does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>;  
<https://en.wikipedia.org>  
 DATA RELEASE: 8-12.  
 COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last  
 CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
 YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.27.18 Lower chamber legislates by law (v3lglegllo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lglegllo

*Original tag:* v3lglegllo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to pass legislation?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>;  
<https://en.wikipedia.org>

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.27.19 Upper chamber legislates by law (v3lgleglup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgleglup

*Original tag:* v3lgleglup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: By law, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature necessary to pass legislation?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>;  
<https://en.wikipedia.org>

DATA RELEASE: 8-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 2.3.28 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Regimes of the World (RoW)

The *Regimes of the World Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.3.28.1 Regimes of the world - the RoW Measure (v2x\_regime)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_regime

*Original tag:* v2x\_regime

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenbergs, Staffan I Lindberg

QUESTION: How can the political regime overall be classified considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles?

RESPONSES:

0: Closed autocracy: No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature.

1: Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature, but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy).

2: Electoral democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy), but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x\_liberal).

3: Liberal democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy) are guaranteed as well as access to justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x\_liberal).

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_elecreg v2xlg\_elecreg v2xex\_elecreg v2elmpar\_osp\_ex v2elmpar\_osp\_leg v2elmpar\_osp v2elfrfair\_osp v2elfrfair\_osp\_leg v2elfrfair\_osp\_ex v2expathhg v2expathhs v2ex\_legconhos v2ex\_hosw v2x\_polyarchy v2x\_liberal v2clacjstm\_osp v2clacjstw\_osp v2cltrnslw\_osp v2exaphogp

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: Electoral democracies score above 2 on the indicators for multi-party (v2elmpar\_osp) and free and fair elections (v2elfrfair\_osp), as well as above 0.5 on the Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy). Liberal democracy meets the criteria for Electoral democracy but also satisfy the liberal dimensions by a score above 0.8 on the V-Dem Liberal Component index (v2x\_liberal), as well as a score above 3 on transparent law enforcement (v2cltrnslw\_osp), access to justice for men (v2clacjstm\_osp) and women (v2clacjstw\_osp). Electoral autocracies fail to meet one or more of the above-mentioned criteria of electoral democracies, but subject the chief executive and the legislature to de-jure multiparty elections as indicated by a score above 1 on the V-Dem multiparty elections indicator (v2elmpar\_osp). Closed autocracy if either no multiparty elections for the legislature take place (v2xlg\_elecreg == 0) or the chief executive is not elected in direct or indirect multiparty elections. To identify whether this is the case, we take into account if there is no basic multiparty competition in elections (v2elmpar\_osp < 1) and the relative power of the Head of State (HoS) and the Head of Government (HoG) as well as the appointment procedures. The V-Dem variable v2ex\_hosw identifies if the HoS (v2ex\_hosw > 0.5) or HoG (v2ex\_hosw < or equal to 0.5) is the chief executive. If the HoG is the chief executive, the variable v2expathhg indicates whether the HoG is directly (8) or indirectly (7) elected or appointed by the HoS (6). In the first case, we consider whether executive elections (v2xex\_elecreg == 0) take place, in the second case whether legislative elections take place (v2xlg\_elecreg == 0) and in the third case how HoS is selected as follows. The variable v2expathhs indicates whether the HoS is directly (7) or indirectly (6) elected. Thus, in the first case, we consider whether executive elections (v2xex\_elecreg) take place, in the second case whether legislative elections take place and the legislature approves on HoG (v2xlg\_elecreg == 0 and v2exaphog == 0). This also applies for the cases if the HoS is the chief executive.

CITATION: Lührmann *et al.* (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.28.2 Regimes of the world – the RoW measure with categories for ambiguous cases (v2x\_regime\_amb)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_regime\_amb

*Original tag:* v2x\_regime\_amb

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenberg, Staffan I Lindberg, Valeriya Mechkova

QUESTION: How can the political regime overall be classified considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles?

RESPONSES:

0: Closed autocracy: No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature.

1: Closed autocracy upper bound: Same as closed autocracy, but the confidence intervals of the multiparty election indicators overlap the level of electoral autocracies.

2: Electoral autocracy lower bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the confidence intervals of one or both of the multiparty election indicators overlap the level of closed autocracies.

3: Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature, but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy).

4: Electoral autocracy upper bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the upper bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair and multiparty elections and the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral democracies.

5: Electoral democracy lower bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the lower bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair, or multiparty or the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral autocracies.

6: Electoral democracy: Free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy), but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x\_liberal).

7: Electoral democracy upper bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the confidence intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law enforcement, and the liberal component index overlap the level of liberal democracies.

8: Liberal democracy lower bound: Same as liberal democracy, but the confidence intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law enforcement, and the liberal component index reaches the level of electoral democracies.

9: Liberal democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy) are guaranteed as well as access to justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x\_liberal).

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_elecreg v2xlg\_elecreg v2xex\_elecreg v2elmulpar\_osp\_ex v2elmulpar\_osp\_leg v2elmulpar\_osp v2elfrfair\_osp v2elfrfair\_osp\_leg v2elfrfair\_osp\_ex v2expathhg v2expathhs v2ex\_legconhos v2ex\_hosw v2x\_polyarchy v2x\_liberal v2clacjstw\_osp v2clacjstw\_osp v2cltrnslw\_osp

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: Same as for "Regimes of the World Measure– the RoW Measure " (v2x\_regime) above. In order to account for ambiguity this version of the regime type index reflects the upper and lower bounds of the point estimates used to aggregate the index in intermediate categories.

CITATION: Lührmann *et al.* (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.29 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Accountability

The *Accountability Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.3.29.1 Accountability index (v2x\_accountability)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_accountability

*Original tag:* v2x\_accountability

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of government accountability achieved?

CLARIFICATION: Government accountability is understood as constraints on the government's use of political power through requirements for justification for its actions and potential sanctions. We organize the sub-types of accountability spatially. Vertical accountability refers to the ability of a state's population to hold its government accountable through elections, horizontal accountability refers to checks and balances between institutions; and diagonal accountability captures oversight by civil society organizations and media activity.

SCALE: We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by \*\_osp, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_elecreg v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elirreg v2elintim v2elmulpar v2elfrfair v2elsuffrage v2expathhs v2ex\_legconhos v2expathhg v2exaphogp v2ex\_hosw v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2exrescon v2lginvstp v2lgqstexp v2lgbicam v2lgotovst v2mecenefm v2mecenefi v2meharjrn v2mecrit v2mebias v2merange v2meslfcen v2csprcpt v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree v2dlengage v2x\_suffr v2xex\_elecreg v2xlg\_elecreg

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: To create an aggregate measure of accountability, we conduct a hierarchical analysis using all variables included in the three sub-indices of accountability: vertical (v2x\_veracc), horizontal (v2x\_horacc) and diagonal accountability (v2x\_diagacc). This strategy assumes that overall accountability is a function of all variables included in each sub-index, though the sub-indices structure this relationship.

CITATION: Lührmann *et al.* (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.29.2 Vertical accountability index (v2x\_veracc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_veracc

*Original tag:* v2x\_veracc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of vertical government accountability achieved?

CLARIFICATION: Vertical accountability captures the extent to which citizens have the power to hold the government accountable. The mechanisms of vertical accountability include

formal political participation on part of the citizens — such as being able to freely organize in political parties — and participate in free and fair elections, including for the chief executive. SCALE: We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by `*_osp`, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): `v2x_elecreg v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elirreg v2elintim v2elmulpar v2elfrfair v2expathhs v2ex_legconhos v2expathhg v2x_suffr v2exaphogp v2ex_hosw v2x_suffr v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut`

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: Vertical accountability consists of two main components: elections and political parties. We operationalize electoral accountability with three components: 1) an aggregate measure the quality of elections; 2) the percent of enfranchised population and 3) whether the chief executive is directly or indirectly elected. We model non-electoral regimes as having no suffrage and the quality of elections as a function of having an electoral regime (`v2x_elecreg`). Quality of elections consists of seven variables measuring different aspects of national elections for the executive and legislature. Specifically, we include autonomy and capacity of the electoral management body (`v2elembaut`) and (`v2elembcap`); accuracy of the voter registry (`v2elrgstry`), intentional irregularities conducted by the government and opposition (`v2elirreg`); intimidation and harassment by the government and its agents (`v2elintim`); to what extent the elections were multi-party in practice (`v2elmulpar`); and an overall measure for the freedom and fairness of elections (`v2elfrfair`). This is a modified version of the V-Dem Clean elections index (`v2xel_frefair`). We added the variable `v2elmulpar`, which is theoretically important for accountability, and we removed `v2elvotbuy` and `v2elpeace`, as they have low loadings.

We measure suffrage as the percentage of people that have the legal right to vote (`v2x_suffr`) to proxy the inclusivity of the exercise of electoral accountability. To account for the differences between states which have an executive subject to elections, we include a dichotomous indicator of whether or not the head of the executive either the head of state or head of government — whoever has more relative power over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers as measured by `v2ex_hosw` is subjected to direct or indirect elections (`v2expathhs v2ex_legconhos v2expathhg v2exaphogp`).

The second form of vertical accountability focuses on political parties, which we model as a hierarchical node. This node includes variables that capture whether there are barriers to forming a party and how restrictive they are (`v2psparban`) and (`v2psbars`), as well as the degree to which opposition parties are independent of the ruling regime (`v2psoppaut`).

CITATION: Lührmann *et al.* (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.29.3 Diagonal accountability index (`v2x_diagacc`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_cy_v2x_diagacc`

*Original tag:* `v2x_diagacc`

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: `*_osp`, `*_codelow`, `*_codehigh`

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of diagonal government accountability achieved?

CLARIFICATION: Diagonal accountability covers the range of actions and mechanisms that citizens, civil society organizations CSOs, and an independent media can use to hold the government accountable. These mechanisms include using informal tools such as social mobilization and investigative journalism to enhance vertical and horizontal accountability.

SCALE: We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by `*_osp`, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): `v2mecenefm v2mecenefi v2meharjrn v2mecrit v2mebias v2merange v2meslfcen`



v2csprtcpt v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree v2dlengage  
DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: We model this form of accountability as a function of four hierarchical nodes: media freedom, civil society characteristics, freedom of expression, and the degree to which citizens are engaged in politics.

The media freedom node incorporates variables representing two broad dimensions. The first dimension regards the extent to which the government attempts to censor the media (v2mecenefm) and information on the Internet (v2mecenefi), as well as the extent to which government and other powerful actors harass journalists (v2meharjrn). The second dimension concerns the work of the media itself, namely the extent to which: the media criticizes the government at least occasionally (v2mecrit); there is bias against opposition candidates (v2mebias); the media offers a wide array of political perspectives in their coverage (v2merange); and there is self-censorship on salient issues for the government (v2meslfcen). The media freedom node is an expanded version of the V-Dem Alternative sources of information index (v2xme\_altinf).

Finally, we use the components of the V-Dem core index of civil society to account for the opportunity of citizens to channel their interests and potentially oppose the government and its policies in an organized way through a robust, self-organized and autonomous civil society organizations. The indicators included in this node are: popular and voluntary participation in CSOs, (v2csprtcpt), government control to the entry and exit of CSOs into the public life, (v2cseeorgs), and government oppression of CSOs (v2csreprss).

The freedom of expression node incorporates variables regarding the degree to which men and women are free to discuss political issues without fear of harassment (v2cldiscm and v2cldiscw), as well as an indicator on the freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

Finally, we incorporate a variable representing engaged society (v2dlengage), which gives information on the width and depth of public deliberations when important policy changes are being considered.

CITATION: Lührmann *et al.* (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.29.4 Horizontal accountability index (v2x\_horacc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_horacc

*Original tag:* v2x\_horacc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of horizontal government accountability achieved?

CLARIFICATION: Horizontal accountability concerns the power of state institutions to oversee the government by demanding information, questioning officials and punishing improper behavior. This form of accountability ensures checks between institutions and prevents the abuse of power. The key agents in horizontal government accountability are: the legislature; the judiciary; and specific oversight agencies such as ombudsmen, prosecutor and comptroller generals.

SCALE: We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by \*\_osp, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgbicam v2lgqstexp

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: We capture the extent to which the judiciary, the legislature and other oversight agencies hold the government to account by modeling each of these factors as separate hierarchical nodes.

The judiciary node speaks to the degree to which members of the executive compromise

horizontal accountability by "unlawfully encroaching" on the legitimate authority of the judiciary branch. To capture that we use the indicators from the V-Dem judicial constraints on the executive index (v2x\_jucon).

To model the degree to which a legislature facilitates horizontal accountability we model whether or not a legislature exists a dichotomized version of v2lgbicam, and legislature activities as a function of this variable. The key function of a legislature in terms of horizontal accountability is to scrutinize government officials' potential misconduct by demanding information for their policies and decisions, and taking specific actions in case of irregularities. We use as baseline the indicators from the V-Dem legislative constraints on the executive index (v2xlg\_legcon): the degree to which: 1 the legislature routinely questions the executive (v2lgqstexp); and 2 a legislature is likely to investigate and produce a decision unfavorable to the executive, if the latter were engaged in an illegal or unethical activity (v2lginvstp). We exclude the legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart) as this aspect is part of vertical accountability.

Finally, we include a variable regarding the degree to which other state bodies comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman are likely to investigate and report on potential illegal or unethical activities on part of the executive (v2lgotovst).

CITATION: Lührmann *et al.* (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.30 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Executive Bases of Power

The *Executive Bases of Power Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V -Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.3.30.1 Confidence dimension index (v2x\_ex\_confidence)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_ex\_confidence

*Original tag:* v2x\_ex\_confidence

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: To what extent is the power base of the chief executive' determined by the confidence of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which the dismissal of the chief executive depends on the confidence of the legislature.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp\_ord v2exrmhsol\_2 v2exrmhsol\_3 v2exrmhsol\_4 v2exhoshog v2ex\_hosw

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is based on whether the "chief executive" can be dismissed by the legislature (without having to level accusations of unlawful activity and without the involvement of any other agency). In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the "chief executive" by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

CITATION: Teorell, Jan, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2019. "Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789-2016". *Perspectives on Politics* 17(1):66-84; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.30.2 Direct election dimension index (v2x\_ex\_direlect)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_ex\_direlect

*Original tag:* v2x\_ex\_direlect

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by direct election?

CLARIFICATION: Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which the chief executive is appointed through direct popular election (regardless of the quality or extension of suffrage of that election).

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp\_ord v2exrmhsol\_2 v2exrmhsol\_3 v2exrmhsol\_4 v2exhoshog v2ex\_hosw

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is based on whether the "chief executive" was directly elected. In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the "chief executive" by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

CITATION: Teorell, Jan, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2019. "Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789-2016". Perspectives on Politics 17(1):66-84; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.30.3 Hereditary dimension index (v2x\_ex\_hereditary)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_ex\_hereditary

*Original tag:* v2x\_ex\_hereditary

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by hereditary succession?

CLARIFICATION: Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which the appointment and dismissal of the chief executive is based on hereditary rule.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp\_ord v2exrmhsol\_2 v2exrmhsol\_3 v2exrmhsol\_4 v2exhoshog v2ex\_hosw

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is based on whether the "chief executive" was (a) appointed through hereditary succession or by a royal council, and (b) can be dismissed by a royal council. Both condition (a) and (b) are coded as present (1) or not (0); we then average across the two. In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the "chief executive" by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

CITATION: Teorell, Jan, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2019. "Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789-2016". Perspectives on Politics 17(1):66-84; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.30.4 Military dimension index (v2x\_ex\_military)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_ex\_military

*Original tag:* v2x\_ex\_military

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by the military?

CLARIFICATION: Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which the appointment and dismissal of the chief executive is based on the threat or actual use of military force.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp\_ord v2exrmhsol\_2 v2exrmhsol\_3 v2exrmhsol\_4 v2exhoshog v2ex\_hosw v2exremhog v2exrmhgnp\_2 v2exrmhgnp\_3 v2exrmhgnp\_4 v2ex\_elechos v2ex\_elechog v2ex\_hogw

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is based on whether the "chief executive" was (a) appointed through a coup, rebellion or by the military, and (b) can be dismissed by the military. Both condition (a) and (b) are coded as present (1) or not (0); we then average across the two. In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the "chief executive" by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

CITATION: Teorell, Jan, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2019. "Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789-2016". Perspectives on Politics 17(1):66-84; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document). YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.30.5 Ruling party dimension index (v2x\_ex\_party)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_ex\_party

*Original tag:* v2x\_ex\_party

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by a ruling party?

CLARIFICATION: Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which a ruling party appoints and dismisses the chief executive.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp\_ord v2exrmhsol\_2 v2exrmhsol\_3 v2exrmhsol\_4 v2exhoshog v2ex\_hosw

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is based on whether the "chief executive" was (a) appointed by the ruling party, and (b) can be dismissed by the ruling party. Both condition (a) and (b) are coded as present (1) or not (0); we then average across the two. In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the "chief executive" by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

CITATION: Teorell, Jan, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2019. "Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789-2016". Perspectives on Politics 17(1):66-84; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document). YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.31 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Neopatrimonialism

The *Neopatrimonialism Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.3.31.1 Neopatrimonial Rule Index (v2x\_neopat)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_neopat

*Original tag:* v2x\_neopat

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is rule based on personal authority?

CLARIFICATION: Neopatrimonial rule reflects the idea that personalistic forms of authority pervade formal regime institutions (Clapham, 1985). According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) a neopatrimonialism regime is one that combines clientelistic political relationships, strong and unconstrained presidents and the use of public resources for political legitimation. The index is constructed using Bayesian Factor Analysis of 16 indicators representing these three concepts. The sixteen indicators are those included in the three sub-indices: Clientelism, Presidentialism and Regime Corruption. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2elvotbuy v2dlencmps v2psprlnks v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lgfunds v2lginvst v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2elembaut v2exembev v2exbribe v2lgcrrpt v2jucorrdc v2x\_elecreg

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more neopatrimonialism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for vote buying (v2elvotbuy), particularistic vs. public goods (v2dlencmps), party linkages (v2psprlnks), executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature controls resources (v2lgfunds), legislature investigates the executive in practice (v2lginvst), high court independence (v2juhcind), low court independence (v2juncind), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), electoral management body autonomy (v2elembaut), executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembev), executive bribes and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe), legislative corruption (v2lgcrrpt) and judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc).

CITATION: Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

#### 2.3.31.2 Clientelism Index (v2xnp\_client)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xnp\_client

*Original tag:* v2xnp\_client

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are politics based on clientelistic relationships?

CLARIFICATION: Clientelistic relationships include the targeted, contingent distribution of

resources (goods, services, jobs, money, etc) in exchange for political support. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2elvotbuy v2dlencmps v2psprlnks v2x\_elecreg

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more clientelism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for vote-buying (v2elvotbuy), particularistic vs. public goods (v2dlencmps) and whether party linkages are programmatic or clientelistic (v2psprlnks).

CITATION: Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.31.3 Presidentialism Index (v2xnp\_pres)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xnp\_pres

*Original tag:* v2xnp\_pres

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the regime characterized by presidentialism?

CLARIFICATION: Presidentialism means the "systemic concentration of political power in the hands of one individual who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision making tasks" (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 63). It relates closely to V-Dem's index of Horizontal Accountability (v2x\_horacc) but focuses more specifically on the extent to which the President is free from constraints by other institutions or actors. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lgfunds v2lginvstp v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2elembaut v2lgbicam

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more presidentialism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respect for the constitution (v2exrescon), whether there are mechanisms for oversight of the executive other than the legislature (v2lgotovst). For legislative constraints, the index includes an indicator of whether the legislature controls its own resources (v2lgfunds) and investigates the executive in practice (v2lginvstp). There are four indicators of judicial constraints on the executive: high court independence (v2juhcind), lower court independence (v2juncind), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp) and compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp). Finally, the index includes a measure of autonomy of the electoral management body (v2elembaut) that captures whether or not the President can influence its decisions and actions.

CITATION: Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

#### 2.3.31.4 Regime corruption (v2xnp\_regcorr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xnp\_regcorr

*Original tag:* v2xnp\_regcorr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent do political actors use political office for private or political gain?

CLARIFICATION: In systems of neopatrimonial rule, politicians use their offices for private and/or political gain. This index relates closely to V-Dem's political corruption index (v2x\_corr), but focuses on a more specific set of actors – those who occupy political offices – and a more specific set of corrupt acts that relate more closely to the conceptualization of corruption in literature on neopatrimonial rule. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exembev v2exbribe v2lgcrpt v2jucorrdc

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more regime corruption) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive embezzlement (v2exembev), executive bribes (v2exbribe), legislative corruption (v2lgcrpt) and judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc).

CITATION: Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.32 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Civil Liberties

The *Civil Liberties Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

##### 2.3.32.1 Civil liberties index (v2x\_civlib)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_civlib

*Original tag:* v2x\_civlib

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is civil liberty respected?

CLARIFICATION: Civil liberty is understood as liberal freedom, where freedom is a property of individuals. Civil liberty is constituted by the absence of physical violence committed by government agents and the absence of constraints of private liberties and political liberties by the government.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_clpriv v2x\_clphy v2x\_clpol

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the average of physical violence index (v2x\_clphy), political civil liberties index (v2x\_clpol), and private civil liberties (v2x\_clpriv).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
 YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.32.2 Physical violence index (v2x\_clphy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_clphy

*Original tag:* v2x\_clphy

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is physical integrity respected?

CLARIFICATION: Physical integrity is understood as freedom from political killings and torture by the government. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect violence committed by government agents and that are not directly referring to elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cltort v2clkill

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom from torture (v2cltort) and freedom from political killings (v2clkill).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.32.3 Political liberties index (v2x\_clpol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_clpol

*Original tag:* v2x\_clpol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are political liberties respected?

CLARIFICATION: Political liberties are understood as freedom of association and freedom of expression. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xcl\_disc v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2clacfree v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: government censorship effort — media (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men and women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree), party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.32.4 Private liberties index (v2x\_clpriv)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_clpriv

*Original tag:* v2x\_clpriv

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D



PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are private liberties respected?

CLARIFICATION: Private liberties are understood as freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom from forced labor, and property rights. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xcl\_slave v2xcl\_prpty v2clfmmove v2xcl\_dmove v2clrelig v2csrlgrep

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig), religious organization repression (v2csrlgrep), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmmove), and freedom of domestic movement for men/women (v2cldmovem, v2cldmovew).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.33 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Exclusion

The *Exclusion Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.3.33.1 Exclusion by Socio-Economic Group (v2xpe\_exlecon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xpe\_exlecon

*Original tag:* v2xpe\_exlecon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Index of (political) exclusion by socio-economic group

CLARIFICATION: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

SOURCE(S): v2pepwrses v2clacjust v2peapsecon v2peasjsoecon v2peasbecon

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by socio-economic group (v2pepwrses), socio-economic position equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clacjust), access to public services by socio-economic group (v2peapsecon), access to state jobs by socio-economic group (v2peasjsoecon), and access to state business opportunities by socio-economic group (v2peasbecon).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

#### 2.3.33.2 Exclusion by Gender (v2xpe\_exlgender)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xpe\_exlgender

*Original tag:* v2xpe\_exlgender

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Index of (political) exclusion by gender

CLARIFICATION: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

SOURCE(S): v2pepwrgen v2clgencl v2peapsge v2peasjge v2peasbge

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by gender (v2pepwrgen), equality in respect for civil liberties by gender (v2clgencl), access to public services by gender (v2peapsge), access to state jobs by gender (v2peasjge), and access to state business opportunities by gender (v2peasbge).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.33.3 Exclusion by Urban-Rural Location (v2xpe\_exlgeo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xpe\_exlgeo

*Original tag:* v2xpe\_exlgeo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Index of (political) exclusion by urban-rural location

CLARIFICATION: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

SOURCE(S): v2pepwrgeo v2clgeoel v2peapsgeo v2peasjgeo v2peasbegeo

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by urban-rural location (v2pepwrgeo), urban-rural equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgeoel), access to public services by urban-rural location (v2peapsgeo), access to state jobs by urban-rural location (v2peasjgeo), and access to state business opportunities by urban-rural location (v2peasbegeo).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept, measurement

standard error.

#### 2.3.33.4 Exclusion by Political Group (v2xpe\_exlpol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xpe\_exlpol

*Original tag:* v2xpe\_exlpol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Index of (political) exclusion by political group

CLARIFICATION: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

SOURCE(S): v2clpolcl v2peapspol v2peasjpol v2peasbepol

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators political group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clpolcl), access to public services by political group (v2peapspol), access to state jobs by political group (v2peasjpol), and access to state business opportunities by political group (v2peasbepol).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

#### 2.3.33.5 Exclusion by Social Group (v2xpe\_exlsocgr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xpe\_exlsocgr

*Original tag:* v2xpe\_exlsocgr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Index of (political) exclusion by social group

CLARIFICATION: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

SOURCE(S): v2pepwr soc v2clsocgrp v2peapssoc v2peasjsoc v2peasbsoc

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by social group (v2pepwr soc), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), access to public services by social group (v2peapssoc), access to state jobs by social group (v2peasjsoc), and access to state business opportunities by social group (v2peasbsoc).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.34 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Corruption

The *Corruption Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.3.34.1 Political corruption (v2x\_corr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_corr

*Original tag:* v2x\_corr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How pervasive is political corruption?

CLARIFICATION: The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt unlike the other V-Dem variables that generally run from less democratic to more democratic situation. The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the executive realm, the measures also distinguish between corruption mostly pertaining to bribery and corruption due to embezzlement. Finally, they differentiate between corruption in the highest echelons of the executive at the level of the rulers/cabinet on the one hand, and in the public sector at large on the other. The measures thus tap into several distinguished types of corruption: both 'petty' and 'grand'; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and influencing law making and that affecting implementation.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_pubcorr v2x\_execorr v2lgcrrpt v2jucorrdc

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is arrived at by taking the average of (a) public sector corruption index (v2x\_pubcorr); (b) executive corruption index (v2x\_execorr); (c) the indicator for legislative corruption (v2lgcrrpt); and (d) the indicator for judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc). In other words, these four different government spheres are weighted equally in the resulting index. We replace missing values for countries with no legislature by only taking the average of a, b and d.

CITATION: McMann *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:23); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.34.2 Executive corruption index (v2x\_execorr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_execorr

*Original tag:* v2x\_execorr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

CLARIFICATION: The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g.

less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exbribe v2exembe

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: executive bribery (v2exbribe) and executive embezzlement (v2exembe).

CITATION: McMann *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:23); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.34.3 Public sector corruption index (v2x\_\_pubcorr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_\_pubcorr

*Original tag:* v2x\_\_pubcorr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

CLARIFICATION: The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2excrtps v2exthtps

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: public sector bribery (v2excrtps) and embezzlement (v2exthtps).

CITATION: McMann *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:23); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.35 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Women's Empowerment

The *Women's Empowerment Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.3.35.1 Women political empowerment index (v2x\_\_gender)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_\_gender

*Original tag:* v2x\_\_gender

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How politically empowered are women?

CLARIFICATION: Women's political empowerment is defined as a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making. It is understood to incorporate three equally-weighted dimensions: fundamental civil liberties, women's open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_genc1 v2x\_gencs v2x\_genpp

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the average of women's civil liberties index (v2x\_genc1), women's civil society participation index (v2x\_gencs), and women's political participation index (v2x\_genpp).

CITATION: Sundström *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:19); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.35.2 Women civil liberties index (v2x\_genc1)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_genc1

*Original tag:* v2x\_genc1

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Do women have the ability to make meaningful decisions in key areas of their lives?

CLARIFICATION: Women's civil liberties are understood to include freedom of domestic movement, the right to private property, freedom from forced labor, and access to justice.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cldmovew v2cls slavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew), freedom from forced labor for women (v2cls slavef), property rights for women (v2clprptyw), and access to justice for women (v2clacjstw).

CITATION: Sundström *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:19); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.35.3 Women civil society participation index (v2x\_gencs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_gencs

*Original tag:* v2x\_gencs

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Do women have the ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups?

CLARIFICATION: Women's civil society participation is understood to include open discussion of political issues, participation in civil society organizations, and representation in the ranks of journalists.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cldiscw v2csgender v2mefemjrn

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for freedom of discussion for women (v2cldiscw), CSO women's participation (v2csgender), and female journalists (v2mefemjrn).

CITATION: Sundström *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:19); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.35.4 Women political participation index (v2x\_genpp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_genpp

*Original tag:* v2x\_genpp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Are women descriptively represented in formal political positions?

CLARIFICATION: Women's political participation is understood to include women's descriptive representation in the legislature and an equal share in the overall distribution of power.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2lgfemleg v2pepwrngen v2lgbicam

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the average of the indicators for lower chamber female legislators (v2lgfemleg, standardized) and power distributed by gender (v2pepwrngen).

CITATION: Sundström *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:19); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.36 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Rule of Law

The *Rule of Law Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

##### 2.3.36.1 Rule of law index (v2x\_rule)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_rule

*Original tag:* v2x\_rule

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning and Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are laws transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent do the actions of government officials comply with the law?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exrescon v2exbribe v2exembev v2excrptps v2exthtfts v2juacct v2jucorrdr v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2cltrslw v2clrspct v2xcl\_acjst

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), lower court independence (v2juncind), executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrslw), access to justice for men (v2clacjstm), access to justice for women (v2clacjstw), judicial accountability (v2juacct), judicial corruption decision (v2jucorrdr), public sector corrupt exchanges (v2excrptps), public sector theft (v2exthtfts), executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe), executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembev).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

##### 2.3.36.2 Access to justice (v2xcl\_acjst)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xcl\_acjst

*Original tag:* v2xcl\_acjst

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Do citizens enjoy secure and effective access to justice?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2clacjstm v2clacjstw

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: access to justice for men (v2clacjstm) and women (v2clacjstw).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.36.3 Property rights (v2xcl\_prpty)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xcl\_prpty

*Original tag:* v2xcl\_prpty

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Do citizens enjoy the right to private property?

CLARIFICATION: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them; customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2clprptym v2clprptyw

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: property rights for men (v2clprptym) and women (v2clprptyw).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.37 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Direct Democracy

The *Direct Democracy Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.3.37.1 Popular initiative index (v2xdd\_i\_ci)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xdd\_i\_ci

*Original tag:* v2xdd\_i\_ci

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: To what extent is the *popular initiative* utilized?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2ddlexci v2ddsigpci v2ddsiglci v2ddsigdci v2ddpartci v2ddapprci v2ddspmc i v2ddadmci v2ddyr ci v2ddthreci

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of popular initiatives, where each



term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process  $v2ddlexci$ ,
- The number of signatures needed  $v2ddsigpci$ , and
- Time-limits to circulate the signatures  $v2ddsigdci$ .

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum  $v2ddpartci$ ,
- Approval quorum  $v2ddapprci$ , and
- Supermajority  $v2ddspmc$ .

For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman (2017). The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority  $v2ddadmci$ .

Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens binding or merely consultative  $v2ddlexci$ , and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past  $v2ddthreci$ . The baseline for those countries that have the legal apparatus to hold a particular MDD but have never experienced one is 0.1.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd\_i\_ci = \&[(IF\ v2ddlexci > 0, 1, 0) \times (1 - v2ddsigpci)]$$

$$\& \times (IF\ v2ddsigdci = 0, 1, 0.5 + v2ddsigdci/365/2)$$

$$\& + (v2ddsigdci) \cap (v2ddpartci) \cap (v2ddspmc)]$$

$$\& \times (0.5 + 1 - v2ddadmci/2)]$$

$$\& \times (IF\ v2ddlexci = 1, 0.75, 1 \times IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful$$

$$\&event < 6, then\ v2ddthreci = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06$$

$$\&then\ v2ddthreci = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06\ units\ per\ year$$

$$\&until\ 0.1; if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years$$

$$\&v2ddthreci=0.9, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.1$$

$$\&units\ per\ year\ until\ 0.1)$$

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.37.2 Popular referendum index (v2xdd\_i\_rf)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xdd\_i\_rf*Original tag:* v2xdd\_i\_rf*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: To what extent is the *referendum* utilized?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2ddlexrf v2ddsigprf v2ddsigdrf v2ddpartrf v2ddapprf v2ddspmrfrf v2ddadmrfrf v2ddyrrf v2ddthrerf

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of referendums, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process v2ddlexrf,
- The number of signatures needed v2ddsigprf,
- Time-limits to circulate the signatures v2ddsigdrf.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum v2ddpartrf,
- Approval quorum v2ddapprf, and
- Supermajority v2ddspmrfrf. For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman 2016.

The resulting score is then multiplied with d district majority v2ddadmrfrf.

Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens binding or merely consultative v2ddlexrf, and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past v2ddthrerf. The baseline for those countries that have the legal apparatus to hold a particular MDD but have never experienced one is 0.1.

The index is aggregated using this *formula*:

$$v2xdd\_i\_rf = \&[(IF\ v2ddlexrf > 0, 1, 0) \times (1 - v2ddsigprf)$$

$$\& \times (IF\ v2ddsigdrf = 0, 1, .5 + (v2ddsigdrf \times 2)/365)$$

$$\& + (v2ddpartrf \cap v2ddapprf \cap v2ddspmrfrf)] \times (0.5 + (1 - v2ddadmrfrf)/2)$$

$$\& \times (IF\ v2ddlexrf = 1, .75, 1) \times (IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful\ event < 6,$$

$$\& then\ v2ddthrerf = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ .06 units\ per\ year\ until\ .1,$$

$$\& if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years\ v2ddthrerf = .9,$$

$$\& afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.1 units\ per\ year\ until\ .1)$$

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.37.3 Obligatory referendum index (v2xdd\_i\_or)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xdd\_i\_or*Original tag:* v2xdd\_i\_or*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: To what extent is the *obligatory referendum* utilized?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2ddlexor v2ddpartor v2ddappor v2ddspmor v2ddadmor v2ddthreor

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of obligatory referendums, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process v2ddlexor.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum v2ddpartor
- Approval quorum v2ddappor, and
- Supermajority V2ddspmor. For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman 2017.

The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority v2ddadmor.

Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens binding or merely consultative v2ddlexor, and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past v2ddthreor.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd\_i\_or = \&(IF\ v2ddlexor > 0, 1, 0) + (v2ddpartor) \cap v2ddappor \cap V2ddspmor)$$

$$\& \times ((.5 + (1 - v2ddadmor)/2) \times (IF\ v2ddlexor = 1, .75, 1)$$

$$\& \times (IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful\ event < 6, then\ v2ddthreor = 1,$$

$$\& afterwards\ decreases\ by\ .06\ units\ per\ year\ until\ .1,$$

$$\& if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years\ v2ddthreor = .9,$$

$$\& afterwards\ decreases\ by\ .1\ units\ per\ year\ until\ .1)$$

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

**2.3.37.4 Plebiscite index (v2xdd\_i\_pl)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xdd\_i\_pl

*Original tag:* v2xdd\_i\_pl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: To what extent is the *plebiscite* utilized?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2ddlexpl v2ddpartpl v2ddapprpl v2ddspmpl v2ddadmpl v2ddyrpl v2ddthrepl

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of plebiscites, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process v2ddlexpl.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum v2ddpartpl,
- Approval quorum v2ddapprpl, and
- Supermajority v2ddspmpl. For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman 2017.

The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority v2ddadmpl.

Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or merely consultative) (v2ddlexpl), and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past (v2ddthrepl). The baseline for those countries that have the legal apparatus to hold a particular MDD but have never experienced one is 0.1.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd\_i\_pl = \&(IF\ v2ddlexpl > 0, 1, 0) + (v2ddpartpl \cap v2ddapprpl \cap v2ddspmpl)$$

$$\& \times ((0.5 + (1 - v2ddadmpl)/2)) \times (IF\ v2ddlexpl = 1, 0.75, 1)$$

$$\& \times (IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful\ event < 6, then\ v2ddthrepl = 1,$$

$$\& afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06\ units\ per\ year\ until\ 0.1,$$

$$\& if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years\ v2ddthrepl = 0.9,$$

$$\& afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.1\ units\ per\ year\ until\ 0.1)$$

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.37.5 Citizen-initiated component of direct popular vote index (v2xdd\_cic)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xdd\_cic

*Original tag:* v2xdd\_cic

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: To what extent is the Citizen Initiated Component utilized?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xdd\_i\_ci v2xdd\_i\_rf

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: This index is the normalized average of the scores of both indices of citizen-initiated mechanism of direct democracy popular initiatives and referendums. For an elaboration of the weighting factor of each component, see David Altman 2017. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd\_cic = [v2xdd\_i\_ci + v2xdd\_i\_rf]/4$$

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.37.6 Top-Down component of direct popular vote index (v2xdd\_toc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xdd\_toc

*Original tag:* v2xdd\_toc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): David Altman

QUESTION: To what extent is the Top-Down Component utilized?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xdd\_i\_pl v2xdd\_i\_or

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: This index is the normalized average of the scores of both indices of mechanism of direct democracy which are not citizen-initiated obligatory referendums and plebiscites. For an elaboration of the weighting factor of each component, see David Altman 2016. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd\_toc = [v2xdd\_i\_pl + v2xdd\_i\_or]/4$$

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.38 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Civil Society

The *Civil Society Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.3.38.1 Core Civil Society Index (v2xcs\_ccsi)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xcs\_ccsi

*Original tag:* v2xcs\_ccsi

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How robust is civil society?

CLARIFICATION: The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private

sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations CSOs. CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations if they are engaged in civic or political activities, social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.

The core civil society index CCSI is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2csprtcpt

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs), CSO repression (v2csreprss) and CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.39 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Elections

The *Elections Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.3.39.1 Electoral Regime Index (v2x\_elecreg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_elecreg

*Original tag:* v2x\_elecreg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

QUESTION: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

CLARIFICATION: Coded 0 until an executive or legislative election is held, defined by v2x\_elecpres and v2x\_elecparl, then set to 1 until any of the following two events occur (if they occur): (a) that the election was "aborted", meaning that those elected did not resume power, as defined by v2x\_hosabort and v2x\_legabort; or (b) an "electoral interruption", meaning that either the legislature was shut down, as defined by v2x\_leginter, or there was an executive coup, as defined by v2x\_hosinter; in the case of (a) or (b), v2x\_elecreg is set to 0 until there is another election. The operational indicator of an "aborted" executive election (v2x\_hosabort) is that v2expathhs did not turn 7 within 12 months after the election, for a legislative election (v2x\_legabort) that v2lgbicam did not turn positive within 12 months after the election. An interruption of the electoral regime occurring through the HOS, *e.g.* a coup d'état, is indicated by v2x\_hosinter as a change in v2x\_elecpres, meaning v2expathhs turned from 7 to something else, with the exception of 6, approval by the legislature (in case the legislature remained in place). An interruption of the electoral regime occurring through the legislature is defined by v2xlg\_leginter based on v2lgbicam turning 0. We note that the coding of v2x\_elecreg does not merely follow mechanically from the scores on these other variables, as the coding of v2x\_elecreg has also been cross-checked and validated by research assistants. An executive and a legislative electoral regime cannot be separated since they form an integral part, where an aborted legislature is interpreted as a signal that also the executive is not standing for election any longer, and vice versa.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2xel\_elecparl v2xlg\_leginter v2xel\_elecpres v2x\_hosinter v2x\_hosabort

v2x\_legabort v2ex\_elechos v2ex\_elechog

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.39.2 Executive electoral regime index (v2xex\_elecreg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xex\_elecreg

*Original tag:* v2xex\_elecreg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

QUESTION: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on the executive on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

CLARIFICATION: Although we advice against it, since the executive and legislative electoral regime should be considered an integral part, for completeness we also provide this separate measure of executive electoral regimes. Coded 0 until an executive election is held, defined by v2x\_elecpres, then set to 1 until any of the following two events occur (if they occur): (a) that the election was "aborted", meaning that those elected did not resume power, as defined by v2x\_hosabort; or (b) an "electoral interruption", meaning that there was an executive coup, as defined by v2x\_hosinter; in the case of (a) or (b), v2xex\_elecreg is set to 0 until there is another election.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2xel\_elecpres v2x\_hosinter v2x\_hosabort v2ex\_elechog

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.39.3 Legislative electoral regime index (v2xlg\_elecreg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xlg\_elecreg

*Original tag:* v2xlg\_elecreg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

QUESTION: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on the legislature on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

CLARIFICATION: Although we advice against it, since the executive and legislative electoral regime should be considered an integral part, for completeness we also provide this separate measure of legislative electoral regimes. Coded 0 until a legislative election is held, defined by v2x\_elecparl, then set to 1 until any of the following two events occur (if they occur): (a) that the election was "aborted", meaning that those elected did not resume power, as defined by v2x\_legabort; or (b) an "electoral interruption", meaning that the legislature was shut down, as defined by v2x\_leginter; in the case of (a) or (b), v2x\_elecreg is set to 0 until there is another election.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2xel\_elecparl v2xlg\_leginter v2x\_legabort

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.39.4 Electoral Component Index (v2x\_edcomp\_thick)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_edcomp\_thick*Original tag:* v2x\_EDcomp\_thick*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_frassoc\_thick v2x\_suffr v2xel\_frefair v2x\_elecoff

DATA RELEASE: 3-12.

AGGREGATION: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link of freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, and elected executive. The index is thus aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x\_EDcomp\_thick =$$

$$.125 * v2x\_frassoc\_thick + .125 * v2x\_suffr + .125 * v2xel\_frefair + .125 * v2x\_elecoff + .5 * v2x\_frassoc\_thick * v2x\_suffr * v2xel\_frefair * v2x\_elecoff$$
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.39.5 Freedom of expression index (v2x\_freexp)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_freexp*Original tag:* v2x\_freexp*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2xcl\_disc v2clacfree

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for print/broadcast censorship effort (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw) and freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.39.6 Presidential election aborted (v2x\_hosabort)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_hosabort*Original tag:* v2x\_hosabort*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D



PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Have presidential election results been aborted?

CLARIFICATION: Aborted election results usually occur when the President-elect does not reach office from the direct elections, *e.g.* if results are nullified or a coup d'état interferes with inaugural passage.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2exhoshog v2expathhg v2expathhs v2xel\_elecpres

DATA RELEASE: 2-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.39.7 Chief executive no longer elected (v2x\_hosinter)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_hosinter

*Original tag:* v2x\_hosinter

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Is the chief executive no longer elected?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2exhoshog v2expathhg v2expathhs

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.39.8 Legislative or constituent assembly election aborted (v2x\_legabort)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_legabort

*Original tag:* v2x\_legabort

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Have legislative election results been aborted?

CLARIFICATION: Aborted election results usually occur when the elected members do not reach office after election occurs, *e.g.* if results are nullified or a coup d'état interferes with inaugural session.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2lgbicam v2xel\_elecparl v2expathhs

DATA RELEASE: 2-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.39.9 Freedom of discussion (v2xcl\_disc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xcl\_disc

*Original tag:* v2xcl\_disc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Are citizens able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc. without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cldiscm v2cldiscw

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom of discussion for men (v2cldiscm) and women (v2cldiscw).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.39.10 Freedom of domestic movement (v2xcl\_dmove)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xcl\_dmove

*Original tag:* v2xcl\_dmove

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Do citizens enjoy freedom of movement and residence?

CLARIFICATION: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary non-political criminals.

Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cldmovem v2cldmovew

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom of domestic movement for men (v2cldmovem) and women (v2cldmovew).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.39.11 Freedom from forced labor (v2xcl\_slave)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xcl\_slave

*Original tag:* v2xcl\_slave

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Are adult citizens free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

CLARIFICATION: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2clslavem v2clslavef

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom from forced

labor for men (v2clslavem) and women (v2clslavef).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.39.12 Legislative or constituent assembly election (v2xel\_elecparl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xel\_elecparl

*Original tag:* v2xel\_elecparl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Did a legislative or constituent assembly election take place this year?

CLARIFICATION: In the country-date data set v2xel\_elecparl is coded only on the specific election date.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2eltype\_0 v2eltype\_1 v2eltype\_4 v2eltype\_5

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.39.13 Presidential election (v2xel\_elecpres)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xel\_elecpres

*Original tag:* v2xel\_elecpres

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Did a presidential election take place this year?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2eltype\_6 v2eltype\_7

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.39.14 Legislature directly elected (v2xex\_elecleg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xex\_elecleg

*Original tag:* v2xex\_elecleg

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: To what extent is the legislature directly or indirectly elected?

CLARIFICATION: If the legislature is unicameral, v2xex\_elecleg is measured as the proportion of legislators directly elected + half of the proportion that are indirectly elected. If the legislature is bicameral and the upper house is involved in the appointment of the chief executive, the same proportion of directly and half of the indirectly elected legislators is calculated for the upper house; the scores for the lower and upper houses are then averaged. Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition.

This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not necessarily

be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right. Since the variables coding the share of directly and indirectly elected legislators are not yet fully in sync for all country dates, a few observations now receive an index value larger than 1.

RESPONSES:

Proportion.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lginello v2lginelup v2exapup v2exapupap

DATA RELEASE: 5, 7-12.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.39.15 Legislature closed down or aborted (v2xlg\_leginter)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xlg\_leginter

*Original tag:* v2xlg\_leginter

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: Has the legislature been closed down or aborted?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): v2lgbicam v2lgello

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.39.16 Alternative source information index (v2xme\_altinf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xme\_altinf

*Original tag:* v2xme\_altinf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage or lack of coverage of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media bias (v2mebias), print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

## 2.3.40 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Party Institutionalization

The *Party Institutionalization Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

### 2.3.40.1 Party institutionalization index (v2xps\_party)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xps\_party

*Original tag:* v2xps\_party

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

QUESTION: To what extent are political parties institutionalized?

CLARIFICATION: Party institutionalization refers to various attributes of the political parties in a country, *e.g.*, level and depth of organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party supporters within the electorate, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, party-line voting among representatives within the legislature. A high score on these attributes generally indicates a more institutionalized party system.

This index considers the attributes of all parties with an emphasis on larger parties, *i.e.*, those that may be said to dominate and define the party system.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2psorgs v2psprbrch v2psprlnks v2psplats v2pscohesv v2lgello

DATA RELEASE: 1-12. Release 1-6 Party system institutionalization index, release 7 changed to Party institutionalization index.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by adding scaled indicators for party organizations (v2psorgs), party branches (v2psprbrch), party linkages (v2psprlnks), distinct party platforms (v2psplats), and legislative party cohesion (v2pscohesv, set to missing when the lower chamber of legislature (v2lgello) does not exist). The index is then converted to its CDF in order to range from 0 to 1.

CITATION: Bizzarro *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:48); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.41 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Consensual Democracy Dimensions

The *Consensual Democracy Dimensions Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.3.41.1 Divided party control index (v2x\_divparctrl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_divparctrl

*Original tag:* v2x\_divparctrl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Are the executive and legislature controlled by different political parties?

CLARIFICATION: This variable is a reordered version of the continuous measurement model estimates for indicator v2psnatpar: National party control. After reordering, the positive extreme signifies Divided party control. A Different parties or individuals unconnected to parties control the executive and the legislature or B Executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each of which belongs to different parties; or between a non-partisan monarch and a prime minister. The intermediate values signify Unified coalition control. A single multi-party coalition controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single coalition gathers together a majority of seats. And the negative extreme signifies "Unified party control. A single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single party has a majority of seats."

SCALE: Interval, from low to high.

SOURCE(S): v2psnatpar v2psnatpar\_ord

NOTES: V-Dem originally intended to generate indices to measure concepts inspired by Arend Lijphart's two dimensions of consensus vs. majoritarian democracy. The project no

longer plans to produce such indices. Instead, it offers the two indices, the Divided party control index and the Division of power index, which are conceptually thinner than Lijphart's concepts and not equivalent substitutes for them. However, these alternatives are useful for some purposes.

DATA RELEASE: 6-12. For Version 6 as Divided party control of legislature index `v2x_lgdivparctrl`, 7 modified to Divided party control index.

AGGREGATION: The reordering is accomplished in two steps. First, 5 is subtracted from `v2psnatpar` when the ordinal version of this variable, `v2psnatpar_ord`, is 2. This moves the ordinal score corresponding to unified party control to the lowest values. Then the result is standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.41.2 Division of power index (`v2x_feduni`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_cy_v2x_feduni`

*Original tag:* `v2x_feduni`

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Are there elected local and regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

CLARIFICATION: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local or regional governments, or where all or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at any local or regional level that exists. A high score would be accorded to a country in which both local and regional governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local or regional level with the exception of judicial bodies. A medium score can be achieved in various ways: there are strong elected governments at the local level but not the regional level, or vice versa; or both local and regional governments elect an executive but not an assembly; or elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local and regional levels; or various combinations of these scenarios.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): `v2ellocgov` `v2elreggov` `v2ellocelc` `v2elsrgel` `v2ellocpwr` `v2elrgpwr`

NOTES: V-Dem originally intended to generate indices to measure concepts inspired by Arend Lijphart's two dimensions of consensus vs. majoritarian democracy. The project no longer plans to produce such indices. Instead, it offers the two indices, the Divided party control index and the Division of power index, which are conceptually thinner than Lijphart's concepts and not equivalent substitutes for them. However, these alternatives are useful for some purposes.

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: This index is an equally weighted average of a local government index and a regional government index. The local government index is the product of a dummy variable for the existence of local government (`v2ellocgov`), a recoded version of Local government elected (`v2ellocelc`), and a CDF of local offices relative power (`v2ellocpwr`). Local governments are recoded as unelected 0 if they did not exist or if data is missing. They are coded 0.5 if an executive is elected but no assembly, and 1 if an assembly is elected, with or without an executive. The regional government index is calculated the same way but using the existence of regional government (`v2elreggov`), regional government elected (`v2elsrgel`), and regional offices relative power (`v2elrgpwr`).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.42 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Academic Freedom

The *Academic Freedom Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

### 2.3.42.1 Academic Freedom Index (v2xca\_academ)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xca\_academ

*Original tag:* v2xca\_academ

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is academic freedom respected?

CLARIFICATION: Academic freedom is understood as the right of academics, without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies (UNESCO 1997 Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel). The Academic Freedom Index is designed to provide an aggregated measure that captures the de facto realization of academic freedom, including the degree to which higher-education institutions are autonomous.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cafres v2cafexch v2cainsaut v2casurv v2clacfree

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: freedom to research and teach (v2cafres), freedom of academic exchange and dissemination (v2cafexch), institutional autonomy (v2cainsaut), campus integrity (v2casurv), freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

CITATION: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2021

### 2.3.43 Digital Society Survey - Coordinated Information Operations

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times' website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual's use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization's digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss "censorship" or "censoring" content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### 2.3.43.1 Government dissemination of false information domestic (v2smgovdom)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovdom

*Original tag:* v2smgovdom

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence its own population?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. The government disseminates false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. The government disseminates false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. The government disseminates false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. The government disseminates false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. The government never disseminates false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021



#### 2.3.43.2 Government dissemination of false information abroad (v2smgovab)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovab

*Original tag:* v2smgovab

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence citizens of other countries abroad?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. The government disseminates false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. The government disseminates false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. The government disseminates false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. The government disseminates false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. The government never disseminates false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.3.43.3 Party dissemination of false information domestic (v2smpardom)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smpardom

*Original tag:* v2smpardom

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence their own population?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Major political parties and candidates never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.3.43.4 Party dissemination of false information abroad (v2smparab)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smparab

*Original tag:* v2smparab

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence citizens of other countries abroad?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Major political parties and candidates never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

**2.3.43.5 Foreign governments dissemination of false information (v2smfordom)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smfordom*Original tag:* v2smfordom*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Foreign governments disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Foreign governments disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Foreign governments never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

**2.3.43.6 Foreign governments ads (v2smforads)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smforads

*Original tag:* v2smforads

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use paid advertisements on social media in order to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Foreign governments disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Foreign governments disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Foreign governments never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.3.44 Digital Society Survey - Digital Media Freedom

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram,

Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times' website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual's use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization's digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss "censorship" or "censoring" content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### 2.3.44.1 Government Internet filtering capacity (v2smgovfilcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovfilcap

*Original tag:* v2smgovfilcap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Independent of whether it actually does so in practice, does the government have the technical capacity to censor information (text, audio, images, or video) on the Internet by filtering (blocking access to certain websites) if it decided to?

RESPONSES:

0: The government lacks any capacity to block access to any sites on the Internet.

1: The government has limited capacity to block access to a few sites on the Internet.

2: The government has adequate capacity to block access to most, but not all, specific sites on the Internet if it wanted to.

3: The government has the capacity to block access to any sites on the Internet if it wanted to.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.3.44.2 Government Internet filtering in practice (v2smgovfilprc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovfilprc

*Original tag:* v2smgovfilprc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How frequently does the government censor political information (text, audio, images, or video) on the Internet by filtering (blocking access to certain websites)?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to remove political content, except to sites that are pro-government.

1: Often. The government commonly removes online political content, except sites that are pro-government.

2: Sometimes. The government successfully removes about half of the critical online political content.

3: Rarely. There have been only a few occasions on which the government removed political content.

4: Never, or almost never. The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

**2.3.44.3 Government Internet shut down capacity (v2smgovshutcap)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovshutcap*Original tag:* v2smgovshutcap*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Independent of whether it actually does so in practice, does the government have the technical capacity to actively shut down domestic access to the Internet if it decided to?

CLARIFICATION: A domestic Internet connection is any connection originating physically within the country, whether over wired, wireless, or satellite networks. This question asks what proportion of potential Internet connections of domestic origin the government has the capacity to render inoperable.

RESPONSES:

0: The government lacks the capacity to shut down any domestic Internet connections.

1: The government has the capacity to shut down roughly a quarter of domestic access to the Internet.

2: The government has the capacity to shut down roughly half of domestic access to the Internet.

3: The government has the capacity to shut down roughly three quarters of domestic access to the Internet.

4: The government has the capacity to shut down all, or almost all, domestic access to the Internet.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

**2.3.44.4 Government Internet shut down in practice (v2smgovshut)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovshut

*Original tag:* v2smgovshut

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often does the government shut down domestic access to the Internet?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to shut down domestic access to the Internet.

1: Often. The government shut down domestic access to the Internet numerous times this year.

2: Sometimes. The government shut down domestic access to the Internet several times this year.

3: Rarely but there have been a few occasions throughout the year when the government shut down domestic access to Internet.

4: Never, or almost never. The government does not typically interfere with the domestic access to the Internet.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### **2.3.44.5 Government social media shut down in practice (v2smgovsm)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovsm

*Original tag:* v2smgovsm

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often does the government shut down access to social media platforms?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to shut down access to social media.

1: Often. The government shuts down access to social media numerous times this year.

2: Sometimes. The government shuts down access to social media several times this year.

3: Rarely. There have been a few occasions throughout the year when the government shuts down access to social media.

4: Never, or almost never. The government does not interfere with the access to social media, except in the cases mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### **2.3.44.6 Government social media alternatives (v2smgovsmalt)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovsmalt

*Original tag:* v2smgovsmalt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
 QUESTION: How prevalent is the usage of social media platforms that are wholly controlled by either the government or its agents in this country?

RESPONSES:

- 0: Essentially all social media usage takes place on platforms controlled by the state.
- 1: Most usage of social media is on state-controlled platforms, although some groups use non-state-controlled alternatives.
- 2: There is significant usage of both state-controlled and non-state-controlled social media platforms.
- 3: While some state-controlled social media platforms exist, their usage only represents a small share of social media usage in the country.
- 4: Practically no one uses state-controlled social media platforms.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 2.3.44.7 Government social media monitoring (v2smgovsmmon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovsmmon

*Original tag:* v2smgovsmmon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How comprehensive is the surveillance of political content in social media by the government or its agents?

RESPONSES:

- 0: Extremely comprehensive. The government surveils virtually all content on social media.
- 1: Mostly comprehensive. The government surveils most content on social media, with comprehensive monitoring of most key political issues.
- 2: Somewhat comprehensive. The government does not universally surveil social media but can be expected to surveil key political issues about half the time.
- 3: Limited. The government only surveils political content on social media on a limited basis.
- 4: Not at all, or almost not at all. The government does not surveil political content on social media, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.3.44.8 Government social media censorship in practice (v2smgovsmcenprc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovsmcenprc

*Original tag:* v2smgovsmcenprc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what degree does the government censor political content (i.e., deleting or

filtering specific posts for political reasons) on social media in practice?

RESPONSES:

0: The government simply blocks all social media platforms.

1: The government successfully censors all social media with political content.

2: The government successfully censors a significant portion of political content on social media, though not all of it.

3: The government only censors social media with political content that deals with especially sensitive issues.

4: The government does not censor political social media content, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.3.44.9 Government cyber security capacity (v2smgovcapsec)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovcapsec

*Original tag:* v2smgovcapsec

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government have sufficiently technologically skilled staff and resources to mitigate harm from cyber-security threats?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The government does not have the capacity to counter even unsophisticated cyber security threats.

1: Not really. The government has the resources to combat only unsophisticated cyber attacks.

2: Somewhat. The government has the resources to combat moderately sophisticated cyber attacks.

3: Mostly. The government has the resources to combat most sophisticated cyber attacks.

4: Yes. The government has the resources to combat sophisticated cyber attacks, even those launched by highly skilled actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.3.44.10 Political parties cyber security capacity (v2smpolcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smpolcap

*Original tag:* v2smpolcap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major political parties have sufficiently technologically skilled staff and resources to mitigate harm from cyber security threats?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The government does not have the capacity to counter even unsophisticated cyber security threats.



1: Not really. The government has the resources to combat only unsophisticated cyber attacks.  
 2: Somewhat. The government has the resources to combat moderately sophisticated cyber attacks.

3: Mostly. The government has the resources to combat most sophisticated cyber attacks.

4: Yes. The government has the resources to combat sophisticated cyber attacks, even those launched by highly skilled actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.3.45 Digital Society Survey - State Internet Regulation Capacity and Approach

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual’s use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization’s digital presence, such

as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### 2.3.45.1 Internet legal regulation content (v2smregcon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smregcon

*Original tag:* v2smregcon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What type of content is covered in the legal framework to regulate Internet?

RESPONSES:

0: The state can remove any content at will.

1: The state can remove most content, and the law protects speech in only specific, and politically uncontroversial contexts.

2: The legal framework is ambiguous. The state can remove some politically sensitive content, while other is protected by law.

3: The law protects most political speech, but the state can remove especially politically controversial content.

4: The law protects political speech, and the state can only remove content if it violates well-established legal criteria.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.3.45.2 Privacy protection by law exists (v2smprivex)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smprivex

*Original tag:* v2smprivex

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does a legal framework to protect Internet users' privacy and their data exist?

RESPONSES:

0: No. (Skip to v2smregcap)

1: Yes

ORDERING: if 0 no, Skip to v2smregcap

SCALE: yes/no

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.3.45.3 Privacy protection by law content (v2smprivcon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smprivcon

*Original tag:* v2smprivcon

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What does the legal framework to protect Internet users' privacy and their data stipulate?

RESPONSES:

0: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access any type of personal data on the Internet.

1: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access most types of personal data on the Internet.

2: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access many types of personal data on the Internet.

3: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access only a few types of personal information on the Internet.

4: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access personal information on the Internet only in extraordinary circumstances.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.3.45.4 Government capacity to regulate online content (v2smregcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smregcap

*Original tag:* v2smregcap

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government have sufficient staff and resources to regulate Internet content in accordance with existing law?

RESPONSES:

0: No, almost all online activity happens outside of reach of the state, where it lacks the capacity to remove illegal content.

1: Not really. The state has extremely limited resources to regulate online content.

2: Somewhat. The state has the capacity to regulate only some online content or some portions of the law.

3: Mostly. The state has robust capacity to regulate online content, though not enough to regulate all content and all portions of the law.

4: Yes, the government has sufficient capacity to regulate all online content.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein

*et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 2.3.45.5 Government online content regulation approach (v2smregapp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smregapp

*Original tag:* v2smregapp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government use its own resources and institutions to monitor and regulate online content or does it distribute this regulatory burden to private actors such as Internet service providers?

RESPONSES:

0: All online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state.

1: Most online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state, though the state involves private actors in a limited way.

2: Some online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state, but the state also involves private actors in monitoring and regulation in various ways.

3: The state does little online content monitoring and regulation, and entrusts most of the monitoring and regulation to private actors.

4: The state off-loads all online content monitoring and regulation to private actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.3.45.6 Defamation protection (v2smlawpr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smlawpr

*Original tag:* v2smlawpr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the legal framework provide protection against defamatory online content, or hate speech?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The law provides no protection against Internet defamation and hate speech.

1: Not really. The law provides a weak protection and to very limited range of circumstances.

2: Somewhat. The law provides some protection against Internet defamation and hate speech but in limited circumstances, or only to particular groups of people.

3: Mostly. The law provides protection against Internet defamation and hate speech under many circumstances, and to most groups of people.

4: Yes. The law provides comprehensive protection against Internet defamation and hate speech.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein

*et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.3.45.7 Abuse of defamation and copyright law by elites (v2smdefabu)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smdefabu

*Original tag:* v2smdefabu

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do elites abuse the legal system (e.g., defamation and copyright law) to censor political speech online?

RESPONSES:

0: Regularly. Elites abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet as regular practice.

1: Often. Elites commonly abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.

2: Sometimes. Elites abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet about half the time.

3: Rarely. Elites occasionally abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.

4: Never, or almost never. Elites do not abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.3.46 Digital Society Survey - Online Media Polarization

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

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Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual's use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization's digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss "censorship" or "censoring" content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

### 2.3.46.1 Online media existence (v2smonex)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smonex

*Original tag:* v2smonex

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do people consume domestic online media?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. No one consumes domestic online media. Skip next question if this answer is selected.

1: Limited. Domestic online media consumption is limited.

2: Relatively extensive. Domestic online media consumption is common.

3: Extensive. Almost everyone consumes domestic online media.

ORDERING: if 0, skip v2smonper

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.3.46.2 Online media perspectives (v2smonper)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smonper

*Original tag:* v2smonper

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major domestic online media outlets represent a wide range of political perspectives?

RESPONSES:

0: The major domestic online media outlets represent only the government's perspective.

1: The major domestic online media outlets represent only the perspectives of the government and a government approved, semi-official opposition party.

2: The major domestic online media outlets represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.

3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major domestic online media outlets.

4: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in many major domestic online media outlets.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.3.46.3 Online media fractionalization (v2smmefra)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smmefra

*Original tag:* v2smmefra

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major (political) news?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The major domestic online media outlets give opposing presentation of major events.

1: Not really. The major domestic online media outlets differ greatly in the presentation of major events.

2: Sometimes. The major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major events about half the time.

3: Mostly. The major domestic online media outlets mostly give a similar presentation of major events.

4: Yes. Although there are small differences in representation, the major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 2.3.47 Digital Society Survey - Social Cleavages

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#### 2.3.47.1 Use of social media to organize offline violence (v2smorgviol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smorgviol

*Original tag:* v2smorgviol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do people use social media to organize offline violence?

RESPONSES:

0: Frequently. There are numerous cases in which people have used social media to organize offline violence.

1: Sometimes. There are a few cases in which people have used social media to organize offline violence.

2: Never. People have never used social media to organize offline violence.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.3.47.2 Average people's use of social media to organize offline action (v2smorgavgact)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smorgavgact

*Original tag:* v2smorgavgact

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do average people use social media to organize offline political action of any kind?

RESPONSES:

0: Never or almost never. Average people have almost never used social media to organize offline political action.

1: Rarely. Average people do not typically use social media to organize offline political action.

2: Sometimes. There are a few cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

3: Often. There have been several cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

4: Regularly. There are numerous cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.3.47.3 Elites' use of social media to organize offline action (v2smorgelitact)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smorgelitact

*Original tag:* v2smorgelitact

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do domestic elites use social media to organize offline political action of any kind?

RESPONSES:

0: Never or almost never. Elites have almost never used social media to organize offline political action.

1: Rarely. Elites do not typically use social media to organize offline political action.

2: Sometimes. There are a few cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.

3: Often. There have been several cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.

4: Regularly. There are numerous cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.3.47.4 Party/candidate use of social media in campaigns (v2smcamp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smcamp

*Original tag:* v2smcamp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do major political parties and candidates use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents?

RESPONSES:

0: None. Major political parties and candidates do not use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

1: A little. Major political parties and candidates rarely use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

2: Somewhat. Major political parties and candidates sometimes use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

3: Substantial. Major political parties and candidates frequently use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

#### 2.3.47.5 Arrests for political content (v2smarrest)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smarrest

*Original tag:* v2smarrest

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If a citizen posts political content online that would run counter to the government and its policies, what is the likelihood that citizen is arrested?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely likely.

1: Likely.

2: Unlikely.

3: Extremely unlikely.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.3.47.6 Polarization of society (v2smpolsoc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smpolsoc

*Original tag:* v2smpolsoc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you characterize the differences of opinions on major political issues in this society?

CLARIFICATION: While plurality of views exists in all societies, we are interested in knowing the extent to which these differences in opinions result in major clashes of views and polarization or, alternatively, whether there is general agreement on the general direction this society should develop.

RESPONSES:

0: Serious polarization. There are serious differences in opinions in society on almost all key political issues, which result in major clashes of views.

1: Moderate polarization. There are differences in opinions in society on many key political issues, which result in moderate clashes of views.

2: Medium polarization. Differences in opinions are noticeable on about half of the key political issues, resulting in some clashes of views.

3: Limited polarization. There are differences in opinions on only a few key political issues, resulting in few clashes of views.

4: No polarization. There are differences in opinions but there is a general agreement on the direction for key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.3.47.7 Political parties hate speech (v2smpolhate)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smpolhate

*Original tag:* v2smpolhate

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do major political parties use hate speech as part of their rhetoric?

CLARIFICATION: Hate speech is any speech that is intended to insult, offend, or intimidate members of specific groups, defined by race, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, disability, or similar trait.

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often.

1: Often.

2: Sometimes.

3: Rarely.

4: Never, or almost never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 2.3.47.8 Online harassment groups (v2smhargr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smhargr

*Original tag:* v2smhargr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which groups are targets of hate speech or harassment in online media?

CLARIFICATION: Multiple selection. Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Women [v2smhargr\_0]

1: LGBTQ groups and individuals [v2smhargr\_1]

2: Specific religious groups [v2smhargr\_2]

3: Specific ethnic groups [v2smhargr\_3]

4: Specific caste [v2smhargr\_4]

5: Specific language groups [v2smhargr\_5]

6: Specific race [v2smhargr\_6]

7: People with physical or cognitive disabilities [v2smhargr\_7]

8: People from specific regions [v2smhargr\_8]

9: Other (specify in the next question) [v2smhargr\_9]

10: No group is a specific target [v2smhargr\_10]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.3.47.9 Types of organization through social media (v2smorgtypes)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smorgtypes

*Original tag:* v2smorgtypes

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: What types of offline political action are most commonly mobilized on social media?

CLARIFICATION: Multiple selection. Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Petition signing [v2smorgtypes\_0]

1: Voter turnout [v2smorgtypes\_1]

2: Street protests [v2smorgtypes\_2]

3: Strikes/labor actions [v2smorgtypes\_3]  
 4: Riots [v2smorgtypes\_4]  
 5: Organized rebellion [v2smorgtypes\_5]  
 6: Vigilante Justice (e.g., mob lynching, stalking harassment) [v2smorgtypes\_6]  
 7: Terrorism [v2smorgtypes\_7]  
 8: Ethnic cleansing/genocide [v2smorgtypes\_8]  
 9: Other (specify in the next question) [v2smorgtypes\_9]  
 SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.  
 DATA RELEASE: 9-12.  
 CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.  
 CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
 YEARS: 2000-2021

### 2.3.48 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Ordinal Versions of Indices

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

#### 2.3.48.1 Additive polyarchy index ordinal (e\_v2x\_api\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_api\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_api\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem Additive polyarchy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

For the \_3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the \_4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the \_5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_api

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION:

3 CATEGORIES

0.0: if v2x\_api >= 0 and v2x\_api <= 0.25

0.0: if v2x\_api > 0.25 and v2x\_api <= 0.5

and v2elmulpar\_osp >= 0 and v2elmulpar\_osp <= 2.5

0.0: if v2x\_api > 0.25 and v2x\_api <= 0.5

and v2elfrfair\_osp >= 0 and v2elfrfair\_osp <= 2

0.5: if v2x\_api > 0.25 and v2x\_api <= 0.5

and v2elmulpar\_osp > 2.5 and v2elmulpar\_osp <= 4

0.5: if v2x\_api > 0.25 and v2x\_api <= 0.5

and v2elfrfair\_osp > 2 and v2elfrfair\_osp <= 4

0.5: if v2x\_api > 0.5 and v2x\_api <= 1

and v2elfrfair\_osp >= 0 and v2elfrfair\_osp < 3

1.0: if v2x\_api > 0.5 and v2x\_api <= 1

and v2elfrfair\_osp >= 3 and v2elfrfair\_osp <= 4

4 CATEGORIES

0.00: if v2x\_api >= 0 and v2x\_api <= 0.25

0.00: if v2x\_api>0.25 and v2x\_api<=0.5  
 and v2elmulpar\_osp>=0 and v2elmulpar\_osp<=2  
 0.00: if v2x\_api>0.25 and v2x\_api<=0.5  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp>=0 and v2elfrfair\_osp<=2  
 0.33: if v2x\_api>=0.250001 and v2x\_api<=0.5  
 and v2elmulpar\_osp>2 and v2elmulpar\_osp<=4  
 0.33: if v2x\_api>0.25 and v2x\_api<=0.5  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp>2 and v2elfrfair\_osp<=4  
 0.67: if v2x\_api>0.5 and v2x\_api<=1  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp>2 and v2elfrfair\_osp<3 and v2elmulpar\_osp>2  
 1.00: if v2x\_api>0.5 and v2x\_api<=1  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp>3 and v2elmulpar\_osp>3

#### 5 CATEGORIES

0.00: if I >=0 and I <=0.2  
 0.25: if I >0.2 and I <=0.4  
 0.50: if I >0.4 and I <=0.6  
 0.75: if I >0.6 and I <=0.8  
 1.00: if I >0.8 and I <=1  
 CITATION: Lindberg (2016).  
 YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.2 Civil liberties index ordinal (e\_v2x\_civlib\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_civlib\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_civlib\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is civil liberty respected?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem civil liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three \_3C, four \_4C, and five \_5C levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_civlib

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.3 Physical violence index ordinal (e\_v2x\_clphy\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_clphy\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_clphy\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is physical integrity respected?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem physical violence index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three \_3C, four \_4C, and five \_5C levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_clphy

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.48.4 Political civil liberties index ordinal (e\_v2x\_clpol\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_clpol\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_clpol\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent are political liberties respected?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem political liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three \_3C, four \_4C, and five \_5C levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_clpol

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.48.5 Private liberties index ordinal (e\_v2x\_clpriv\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_clpriv\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_clpriv\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent are private liberties respected?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem private civil liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three \_3C, four \_4C, and five \_5C levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_clpriv

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.48.6 Political corruption index ordinal (e\_v2x\_corr\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_corr\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_corr\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: How pervasive is political corruption?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem political corruption index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_corr

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.48.7 Civil society participation index ordinal (e\_v2x\_cspart\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_cspart\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_cspart\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymaker; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem civil society participation index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2cspptept v2csgender

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.48.8 Deliberative democracy index ordinal (e\_v2x\_delibdem\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_delibdem\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_delibdem\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of deliberative democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem deliberative democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

For the \_3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the \_4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the \_5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2xdl\_delib v2x\_polyarchy

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.48.9 Electoral component index ordinal (e\_v2x\_edcomp\_thick\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_edcomp\_thick\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_EDcomp\_thick\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem electoral component index. There are three versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) categories respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_EDcomp\_thick

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for v2x\_polyarchy\_3C / \_4C / \_5C.



CITATION: Lindberg (2016).  
YEARS: 1789-2021

#### 2.3.48.10 Egalitarian component index ordinal (e\_v2x\_egal\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_egal\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_egal\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is the egalitarian principle achieved?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem egalitarian component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2xeg\_eqprotec v2xeg\_eqdr

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.48.11 Egalitarian democracy index ordinal (e\_v2x\_egaldem\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_egaldem\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_egaldem\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem egalitarian democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

For the \_3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the \_4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the \_5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_egal v2x\_polyarchy

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.48.12 Elected officials index (*de jure*) ordinal (e\_v2x\_elecoff\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_elecoff\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_elecoff\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: Is the chief executive appointed through popular elections (either directly or indirectly)?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem elected executive index (*de jure*). The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lgdomchm v2exaphos v2expathhs v2exaphogp v2expathhg  
v2exdfcbhs v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg v2exhoshog

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.13 Executive corruption index ordinal (e\_v2x\_execorr\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_execorr\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_execorr\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem executive corruption index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_execorr

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.14 Division of power index ordinal (e\_v2x\_feduni\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_feduni\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_feduni\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: Are there elected local and regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem division of power index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three \_3C, four \_4C, and five \_5C levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_feduni

DATA RELEASE: 6-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.15 Freedom of association (thick) index ordinal (e\_v2x\_frassoc\_thick\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_frassoc\_thick\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_frassoc\_thick\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem freedom of association (thick)

index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (`_3C`), four (`_4C`), and five (`_5C`) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): `v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csrepress`

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "`v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C`".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.16 Freedom of expression index ordinal (`e_v2x_freexp_3c`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_cy_e_v2x_freexp_3c`

*Original tag:* `e_v2x_freexp_3C`

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: `*_3C, *_4C, *_5C`

QUESTION: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem freedom of expression index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (`_3C`), four (`_4C`), and five (`_5C`) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): `v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree`

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "`v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C`".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.17 Expanded freedom of expression index ordinal (`e_v2x_freexp_altinf_3c`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_cy_e_v2x_freexp_altinf_3c`

*Original tag:* `e_v2x_freexp_altinf_3C`

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: `*_3C, *_4C, *_5C`

QUESTION: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem expanded freedom of expression index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (`_3C`), four (`_4C`), and five (`_5C`) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): `v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree`

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "`v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C`".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.18 Women civil liberties index ordinal (`e_v2x_gencl_3c`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_cy_e_v2x_gencl_3c`

*Original tag:* `e_v2x_gencl_3C`

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: `*_3C, *_4C, *_5C`

QUESTION: Do women have the ability to make meaningful decisions in key areas of their

lives?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women civil liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2cldmovew v2cls slavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.19 Women civil society participation index ordinal (e\_v2x\_gengcs\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_gengcs\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_gengcs\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: Do women have the ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women civil society participation index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2cldiscw v2csgender v2mefemjrn

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.20 Women political empowerment index ordinal (e\_v2x\_gender\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_gender\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_gender\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: How politically empowered are women?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women political empowerment index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_gencl v2x\_gengcs v2x\_genpp

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.21 Women political participation index ordinal (e\_v2x\_genpp\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_genpp\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_genpp\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: Are women descriptively represented in formal political positions?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women political participation index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal

versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2lgfemleg v2pepwrngen

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.22 Judicial constraints on the executive index ordinal (e\_v2x\_jucon\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_jucon\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_jucon\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem judicial constraints on the executive index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2exrescon v2jucomp v2juhccomp v2juhcind v2juncind

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.23 Liberal democracy index ordinal (e\_v2x\_libdem\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_libdem\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_libdem\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem liberal democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

For the \_3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the \_4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the \_5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_libdem

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION:

3 CATEGORIES

0.0: if I >=0 and I <=0.25

0.5: if I >0.25 and I <=0.5

1.0: if I >0.5 and I <=1

4 CATEGORIES

0.00: if I >=0 and I <=0.25

0.33: if I >0.25 and I <=0.5

0.67: if I >0.5 and I <=0.75

1.00: if I >0.75 and I <=1

## 5 CATEGORIES

0.00: if I &gt;=0 and I &lt;=0.2

0.25: if I &gt;0.2 and I &lt;=0.4

0.50: if I &gt;0.4 and I &lt;=0.6

0.75: if I &gt;0.6 and I &lt;=0.8

1.00: if I &gt;0.8 and I &lt;=1

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.48.24 Liberal component index ordinal (e\_v2x\_liberal\_3c)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_liberal\_3c*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_liberal\_3C*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem liberal component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2xcl\_rol v2x\_jucon v2xlg\_legcon

DATA RELEASE: 1-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.48.25 Multiplicative polyarchy index ordinal (e\_v2x\_mpi\_3c)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_mpi\_3c*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_mpi\_3C*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem Multiplicative polyarchy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

For the \_3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the \_4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the \_5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_mpi

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION:

3 CATEGORIES

0.0: if v2x\_mpi&gt;=0 and v2x\_mpi&lt;=0.25

0.0: if v2x\_mpi&gt;0.25 and v2x\_mpi&lt;=0.5

and v2elmulpar\_osp&gt;=0 and v2elmulpar\_osp&lt;=2.5

0.0: if v2x\_mpi&gt;0.25 and v2x\_mpi&lt;=0.5

and v2elfrfair\_osp&gt;=0 and v2elfrfair\_osp&lt;=2

0.5: if v2x\_mpi&gt;0.25 and v2x\_mpi&lt;=0.5

and v2elmulpar\_osp&gt;2.5 and v2elmulpar\_osp&lt;=4

0.5: if v2x\_mpi&gt;0.25 and v2x\_mpi&lt;=0.5

and v2elfrfair\_osp>2 and v2elfrfair\_osp<=4  
 0.5: if v2x\_mpi>0.5 and v2x\_mpi<=1  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp>=0 and v2elfrfair\_osp<3  
 1.0: if v2x\_mpi>0.5 and v2x\_mpi<=1  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp>=3 and v2elfrfair\_osp<=4

#### 4 CATEGORIES

0.00: if v2x\_mpi>=0 and v2x\_mpi<=0.25  
 0.00: if v2x\_mpi>0.25 and v2x\_mpi<=0.5  
 and v2elmulpar\_osp>=0 and v2elmulpar\_osp<=2  
 0.00: if v2x\_mpi>0.25 and v2x\_mpi<=0.5  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp>=0 and v2elfrfair\_osp<=2  
 0.33: if v2x\_mpi>=0.250001 and v2x\_mpi<=0.5  
 and v2elmulpar\_osp>2 and v2elmulpar\_osp<=4  
 0.33: if v2x\_mpi>0.25 and v2x\_mpi<=0.5  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp>2 and v2elfrfair\_osp<=4  
 0.67: if v2x\_mpi>0.5 and v2x\_mpi<=1  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp>2 and v2elfrfair\_osp<3 and v2elmulpar\_osp>2  
 1.00: if v2x\_mpi>0.5 and v2x\_mpi<=1  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp>3 and v2elmulpar\_osp>3

#### 5 CATEGORIES

0.00: if I >=0 and I <=0.2  
 0.25: if I >0.2 and I <=0.4  
 0.50: if I >0.4 and I <=0.6  
 0.75: if I >0.6 and I <=0.8  
 1.00: if I >0.8 and I <=1  
 CITATION: Lindberg (2016).  
 YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.26 Participatory component index ordinal (e\_v2x\_partip\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_partip\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_partip\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is the participatory principle achieved?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem participatory component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_cspart v2xdd\_dd v2xel\_locelec v2xel\_regelec

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.27 Participatory democracy index ordinal (e\_v2x\_partipdem\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_partipdem\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_partipdem\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem participatory democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different

ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

For the \_3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the \_4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the \_5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_partidem

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.28 Electoral democracy index ordinal (e\_v2x\_polyarchy\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_polyarchy\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_polyarchy\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem electoral democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

For the \_3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the \_4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the \_5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_polyarchy

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION:

3 CATEGORIES

0.0: if v2x\_polyarchy>=0 and v2x\_polyarchy<=0.25

0.0: if v2x\_polyarchy>0.25 and v2x\_polyarchy<=0.5

and v2elmulpar\_osp>=0 and v2elmulpar\_osp<=2.5

0.0: if v2x\_polyarchy>0.25 and v2x\_polyarchy<=0.5

and v2elfrfair\_osp>=0 and v2elfrfair\_osp<=2

0.5: if v2x\_polyarchy>0.25 and v2x\_polyarchy<=0.5

and v2elmulpar\_osp>2.5 and v2elmulpar\_osp<=4

0.5: if v2x\_polyarchy>0.25 and v2x\_polyarchy<=0.5

and v2elfrfair\_osp>2 and v2elfrfair\_osp<=4

0.5: if v2x\_polyarchy>0.5 and v2x\_polyarchy<=1

and v2elfrfair\_osp>=0 and v2elfrfair\_osp<3

1.0: if v2x\_polyarchy>0.5 and v2x\_polyarchy<=1

and v2elfrfair\_osp>=3 and v2elfrfair\_osp<=4

4 CATEGORIES

0.00: if v2x\_polyarchy>=0 and v2x\_polyarchy<=0.25

0.00: if v2x\_polyarchy>0.25 and v2x\_polyarchy<=0.5

and v2elmulpar\_osp>=0 and v2elmulpar\_osp<=2

0.00: if v2x\_polyarchy>0.25 and v2x\_polyarchy<=0.5

and v2elfrfair\_osp>=0 and v2elfrfair\_osp<=2

0.33: if v2x\_polyarchy>=0.250001 and v2x\_polyarchy<=0.5

and v2elmulpar\_osp>2 and v2elmulpar\_osp<=4



0.33: if v2x\_polyarchy>0.25 and v2x\_polyarchy<=0.5  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp>2 and v2elfrfair\_osp<=4  
 0.67: if v2x\_polyarchy>0.5 and v2x\_polyarchy<=1  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp>2 and v2elfrfair\_osp<3 and v2elmulpar\_osp>2  
 1.00: if v2x\_polyarchy>0.5 and v2x\_polyarchy<=1  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp>3 and v2elmulpar\_osp>3

#### 5 CATEGORIES

0.00: if I >=0 and I <=0.2  
 0.25: if I >0.2 and I <=0.4  
 0.50: if I >0.4 and I <=0.6  
 0.75: if I >0.6 and I <=0.8  
 1.00: if I >0.8 and I <=1  
 CITATION: Lindberg (2016).  
 YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.29 Public sector corruption index ordinal (e\_v2x\_pubcorr\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_pubcorr\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_pubcorr\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem public sector corruption index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_pubcorr

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.30 Share of population with suffrage ordinal (e\_v2x\_suffr\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_suffr\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_suffr\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem share of population with suffrage. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2elsuffrage

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.48.31 Equality before the law and individual liberty index ordinal (e\_v2xcl\_rol\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2xcl\_rol\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2xcl\_rol\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem equality before the law and individual liberty index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2cltort v2clkill v2clslavem v2clslavf v2clreleg v2clfmov v2cldmovem v2cldmovew

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### **2.3.48.32 Core civil society index ordinal (e\_v2xcs\_ccsi\_3c)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2xcs\_ccsi\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2xcs\_ccsi\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: How robust is civil society?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem core civil society index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2csprcpt

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### **2.3.48.33 Direct popular vote index ordinal (e\_v2xdd\_dd\_3c)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2xdd\_dd\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2xdd\_dd\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is the direct popular vote utilized?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem direct popular vote index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2ddlexci v2ddsigpci v2ddsiglci v2ddsigdci v2ddpartci v2ddapprci v2ddspmci v2ddadmci v2ddyrci v2ddlexrf v2ddsigprf v2ddsigdrf v2ddpartrf v2ddapprrf v2ddspmrf v2ddadmrf v2ddyrrf v2ddpartpl v2ddapprpl v2ddspmpl v2ddadmpl v2ddlexpl v2ddyrrpl v2ddlexor v2ddpartor v2ddappor v2ddspmor v2ddadmor v2ddyror, v2ddthreor, v2ddthrerf, v2ddthrepl

DATA RELEASE: 5-12. Release 7 (new aggregation formula).

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.48.34 Deliberative component index ordinal (e\_v2xdl\_delib\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2xdl\_delib\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2xdl\_delib\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem deliberative component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2dlreason v2dlcommon v2dlcountr v2dlconslt v2dlengage

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.48.35 Equal distribution of resources index ordinal (e\_v2xeg\_eqdr\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2xeg\_eqdr\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2xeg\_eqdr\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: How equal is the distribution of resources?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem equal distribution of resources index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2dlencmps v2dlunivl v2peedueq v2pehealth v2pepwrses v2pepwrsoc v2pepwrgen

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1900-2021

#### 2.3.48.36 Equal protection index ordinal (e\_v2xeg\_eqprotec\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2xeg\_eqprotec\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2xeg\_eqprotec\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: How equal is the protection of rights and freedoms across social groups by the state?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem equal protection index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2xcl\_acjst v2clacjust v2clsocgrp v2clsnlpct

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.48.37 Clean elections index ordinal (e\_v2xel\_frefair\_3c)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2xel\_frefair\_3c*Original tag:* e\_v2xel\_frefair\_3C*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent are elections free and fair?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem clean elections index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2el\_frefair

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_polyarchy\_3C/\_4C/\_5C" above.

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.48.38 Local government index ordinal (e\_v2xel\_locelec\_3c)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2xel\_locelec\_3c*Original tag:* e\_v2xel\_locelec\_3C*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: Are there elected local governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem local government index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2ellocelc v2ellocpwr

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.48.39 Regional government index ordinal (e\_v2xel\_regelec\_3c)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2xel\_regelec\_3c*Original tag:* e\_v2xel\_regelec\_3C*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: Are there elected regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem regional government index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2elsrgel v2elrgpwr

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

**2.3.48.40 Legislative constraints on the executive index ordinal (e\_v2xlg\_legcon\_3c)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2xlg\_legcon\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2xlg\_legcon\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is the legislature and government agencies (*e.g.*, comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem legislative constraints on the executive index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2lgqstexp v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgoppart

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.3.48.41 Alternative sources of information index ordinal (e\_v2xme\_altinf\_3c)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2xme\_altinf\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2xme\_altinf\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage (or lack of coverage) of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem alternative sources of information index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

#### **2.3.48.42 Party institutionalization index ordinal (e\_v2xps\_party\_3c)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2xps\_party\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2xps\_party\_3C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent are political parties institutionalized?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem party institutionalization index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2psorgs v2psprbrch v2psprlnks v2psplats v2pscohesv v2lgello

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.49 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Political Regimes

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

#### 2.3.49.1 Democracy (BMR) (e\_boix\_regime)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_boix\_regime

*Original tag:* e\_boix\_regime

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Is a country democratic?

CLARIFICATION: Dichotomous democracy measure based on contestation and participation. Countries coded democratic have (1) political leaders that are chosen through free and fair elections and (2) a minimal level of suffrage.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

SOURCE(S): Boix *et al.* (2013), Boix *et al.* (2018)

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Boix *et al.* (2013).

YEARS: 1800-2015

#### 2.3.49.2 Democratic breakdowns (Boix et al.) (e\_democracy\_breakdowns)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_democracy\_breakdowns

*Original tag:* e\_democracy\_breakdowns

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: How many previous democratic breakdowns occurred?

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SOURCE(S): Boix *et al.* (2013), Boix *et al.* (2018)

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Boix *et al.* (2013).

YEARS: 1800-2015

#### 2.3.49.3 Omitted data (e\_democracy\_omitteddata)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_democracy\_omitteddata

*Original tag:* e\_democracy\_omitteddata

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Is the country a democracy?

CLARIFICATION: This is the same measure as democracy, except it records an "NA" for countries occupied during an international war (*e.g.*, the Netherlands 1940-44) or experiencing state collapse during a civil war (*e.g.*, Lebanon 1976-89). The democracy variable instead fills in these years as continuations of the same regime type.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

2: NA

SOURCE(S): Boix *et al.* (2013), Boix *et al.* (2018)

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Boix *et al.* (2013).

YEARS: 1800-2015

#### 2.3.49.4 Democratic transition (e\_democracy\_trans)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_democracy\_trans

*Original tag:* e\_democracy\_trans

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Was there a democratic transition?

RESPONSES:

-1: Democratic breakdown

0: No change

1: Democratic transition

SOURCE(S): Boix *et al.* (2013), Boix *et al.* (2018)

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Boix *et al.* (2013).

YEARS: 1800-2015

#### 2.3.50 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Freedom House

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

##### 2.3.50.1 Freedom House: Civil Liberties (e\_fh\_cl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_fh\_cl

*Original tag:* e\_fh\_cl

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. The more specific list of rights considered vary over the years.

RESPONSES:

Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

SOURCE(S): Freedom House (2021).

NOTES: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Freedom House (2021)

YEARS: 1972-2020

##### 2.3.50.2 Freedom House: Political Rights (e\_fh\_pr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_fh\_pr

*Original tag:* e\_fh\_pr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. The specific list of rights considered varies over the years.

RESPONSES:

Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

SOURCE(S): Freedom House (2021).

NOTES: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Freedom House (2021)

YEARS: 1972-2020

**2.3.50.3 Freedom House: Rule of Law (e\_fh\_rol)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_fh\_rol*Original tag:* e\_fh\_rol*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: The variable measures the independence of the judiciary; the extent to which rule of law prevails in civil and criminal matters; the existence of direct civil control over the police; the protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile and torture; absence of war and insurgencies; and the extent to which laws, policies and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population.

RESPONSES:

Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

SOURCE(S): Freedom House (2021). Taken from Teorell et al (2018).

NOTES: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Freedom House (2021).

YEARS: 2005-2018

**2.3.50.4 Freedom House: Status (e\_fh\_status)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_fh\_status*Original tag:* e\_fh\_status*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

RESPONSES:

1: Free.

2: Partly Free.

3: Not Free.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Freedom House (2021).

NOTES: Until 2003, countries whose combined average ratings for Political Rights and Civil Liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated "Free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 "Partly Free", and between 5.5 and 7.0 "Not Free". Since then, countries whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered "Free", 3.0 to 5.0 "Partly Free", and 5.5 to 7.0 "Not Free". This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Freedom House (2021)

YEARS: 1972-2020

**2.3.51 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - World Bank Governance Indicators**

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

**2.3.51.1 Control of corruption — estimate (e\_wbgi\_cce)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_wbgi\_cce*Original tag:* e\_wbgi\_cce*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: "Control of Corruption" measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of "additional payments to get things done", to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to



measuring "grand corruption" in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in "state capture".

SOURCE(S): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

YEARS: 1996-2020

### 2.3.51.2 Government effectiveness (e\_wbgi\_gee)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_wbgi\_gee

*Original tag:* e\_wbgi\_gee

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: "Government Effectiveness" combines into a single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on "inputs" required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods.

SOURCE(S): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

YEARS: 1996-2020

### 2.3.51.3 Political stability — estimate (e\_wbgi\_pve)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_wbgi\_pve

*Original tag:* e\_wbgi\_pve

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: "Political Stability" combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.

SOURCE(S): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

YEARS: 1996-2020

### 2.3.51.4 Rule of law — estimate (e\_wbgi\_rle)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_wbgi\_rle

*Original tag:* e\_wbgi\_rle

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: "Rule of Law" includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected.

SOURCE(S): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

YEARS: 1996-2020

### 2.3.51.5 Regulatory quality — estimate (e\_wbgi\_rqe)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_wbgi\_rqe

*Original tag:* e\_wbgi\_rqe

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: "Regulatory Quality" includes measures of the incidence of marketunfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development.

SOURCE(S): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

YEARS: 1996-2020

**2.3.51.6 Voice and accountability — estimate (e\_wbgi\_vae)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_wbgi\_vae

*Original tag:* e\_wbgi\_vae

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: "Voice and Accountability" includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions.

SOURCE(S): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

YEARS: 1996-2020

**2.3.52 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy**

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

**2.3.52.1 Lexical index (e\_lexical\_index)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_lexical\_index

*Original tag:* e\_lexical\_index

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the lexical index of democracy in the country?

RESPONSES:

0: No elections

1: No party or one-party elections

2: Multi-party elections for legislature

3: Multi-party elections for legislature and executive

4: Minimally competitive elections

5: Male or female suffrage

6: Universal suffrage

SOURCE(S): Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

YEARS: 1789-2019

**2.3.53 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Unified Democracy Score**

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections

based on source.

### 2.3.53.1 Unified democracy score posterior (median) (e\_uds\_median)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_uds\_median

*Original tag:* e\_uds\_median

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_mean, \*\_pct025, \*\_pct975

CLARIFICATION: Unified democracy score posterior median.

SOURCE(S): Pemstein *et al.* (2010).

NOTES: The dataset also contains posterior mean as well as 2,5 and 97,5 posterior percentile.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2010).

YEARS: 1946-2012

## 2.3.54 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Political Institutions and Political Events

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

### 2.3.54.1 Coups (Przeworski et al.) (e\_coups)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_coups

*Original tag:* e\_coups

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: Number of successful coups d'état during a given year. A coup is any event resulting in an irregular removal or resignation of the chief executive that involves a violent action or an explicit threat of resorting to it, by an armed organization. Assassinations of the chief executive are not considered coups unless the group responsible for the action takes over the office. Whenever the rules about the replacement of the chief executive are either not codified or unclear, the force criterion prevails. The definition excludes resignations under pressure of popular mobilization if no armed group (legal or not) is involved (resignation of Carlos Mesa in Bolivia). Similarly, irregular transfers of power among civilians that do not entail force (such as changes of communist leaders) are not considered coups. We place no restriction on whether the armed group causing the replacement is domestic or foreign, nor on the identity of the incoming ruler. In particular, any military intervention of foreign powers producing a replacement of the chief executive is coded as a coup, even if they restore a previously elected ruler (French troops overthrowing Bokassa in Central African Republic). As a general rule, any replacement of a military chief executive by another military man is considered a coup, unless the succession occurred according to pre-established rules (Figueirido replacing Geisel in Brazil). Specifically, resignations of the military chief executive caused by votes of non-confidence of irregular military bodies are considered coups (Galtieri replacing Viola in Argentina). The variable is compatible to other conventional sources such as Powell and Thyne (2011), Marshall and Marshall (2009), and Svobik and Akcinaroglu (2010) for the period 1950–2008, with some difference in the interpretation of specific events. Information for the pre-1950 era is more scarce and therefore the coding may be less reliable.

SOURCE(S): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

NOTES: Where there is more than one observation per country-year, the maximum of the variable for this period is taken.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

YEARS: 1789-2008

### 2.3.54.2 Parties in legislature (e\_legparty)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_legparty

*Original tag:* e\_legparty

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: Number of parties in the legislature. By "party" we take here any recognizable, named grouping, regardless whether and how they appeared in elections. This variable is coded regardless whether the legislature was elected or appointed.

RESPONSES:

-1: if no legislature.

0: if none (including cases where parties are officially banned).

1: if one (including cases where other parties are officially banned).

2: if more.

SCALE: Nominal.

SOURCE(S): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

NOTES: During the early period candidates typically competed in elections on an individual basis, without any kind of centralized party organizations or shared programs. Within legislatures, however, they often coalesced into groups, currents, factions, "sentiments," etc. Hence, subjective judgments are inevitable in coding this variable. Our rule of thumb was to code as parties any kind of groups that bare a label that survived over two consecutive legislatures. This was true in several countries of "Liberals" and "Conservatives." In other countries, notably France between 1815 and 1848, however, the divisive issues, the parliamentary groups, and their labels changed frequently, and such cases are coded as "none." A legislature consisting of one party and independents is coded as one party. When there is more than one observation per country-year, the one which has higher value is taken.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

YEARS: 1789-2008

### 2.3.55 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Polity5

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

#### 2.3.55.1 Institutionalized autocracy (e\_autoc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_autoc

*Original tag:* e\_autoc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Is the polity an institutionalized autocracy?

CLARIFICATION: Autocracy is defined operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SOURCE(S): Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

NOTES: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

YEARS: 1800-2018

#### 2.3.55.2 Institutionalized democracy (e\_democ)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_democ

*Original tag:* e\_democ

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Is the polity an institutionalized democracy?

CLARIFICATION: Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.

The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (PARCOMP), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (XROPEN and XRCOMP), and constraints on the chief executive (XCONST).

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SOURCE(S): Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

NOTES: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

YEARS: 1800-2018

### 2.3.55.3 Polity combined score (e\_p\_polity)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_p\_polity

*Original tag:* e\_p\_polity

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the Polity score?

CLARIFICATION: The Polity score is computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score. The resulting unified POLITY scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SOURCE(S): Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

YEARS: 1800-2018

### 2.3.55.4 Political competition (e\_polcomp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_polcomp

*Original tag:* e\_polcomp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Is there any (institutionalized) political competition?

CLARIFICATION: This variable combines information presented in two component variables: the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, of political competition (e\_parreg) and the extent of government restriction on political competition (e\_parcomp).

RESPONSES:

1: Repressed Competition: While no significant political activity is permitted outside the ranks of the hegemonic regime, nevertheless, some organized political participation occurs within the regime through highly circumscribed institutional channels.

2: Restricted Competition: Some organized political activity occurs outside the ranks of the hegemonic regime, but the regime systematically limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups from participating in the political arena and/or suppresses the contestation of rival political interests.

3: Authoritarian-guided liberalization of repressed or restricted competition or the deepening

of hegemonic control: Used to indicate either the concerted effort on the part of hegemonic regimes to open up their political systems to limited (and typically factional) political competition or the transformation of factional-based "quasi-democracies" or "weak authoritarian regimes" into more repressive hegemonic systems in which political competition is increasingly institutionalized and restricted.

4: Uninstitutionalized Competition: Political participation is decentralized and fluid in character — revolving around personalities, regional interests, and religious/ethnic/clan groups. There are no enduring national political organizations and systematic regime control of political activity is limited, that is, a situation characterized by a coincidence of weak state and weak society. In the contemporary context, uninstitutionalized competition is most likely to occur in resource poor countries and/or following the collapse of central authority under a (former) repressive, authoritarian state.

5: Gradual transition from uninstitutionalized (unregulated) competition to more regulated forms of political competition (the increasing regulation of competition may be centrally-guided or decentralized through the gradual development of political parties and interest groups).

6: Factional/Restricted Competition: Polities that oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and faction-based restrictions: that is, when one faction secures power it uses that power to promote its exclusive interests and favor group members while restricting the political access and activities of other, excluded groups, until it is displaced in turn.

7: Factional Competition: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level — parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups — but particularistic/parochial agendas tend to be exclusive and uncompromising with limited social integration or accommodation across identity boundaries. Factional competition is distinguished by a relative balance of group capabilities that prevents any one of the groups from capturing state power and imposing restrictions on other groups.

8: Political liberalization or democratic retrenchment: persistent over coercion: relatively coercive/restrictive transitions either from factional/restricted competition to institutionalized competitive participation or from institutionalized competitive participation to factional/restricted competition. In either case, this code reflects the unconsolidated nature of liberal political participation in otherwise procedurally democratic polities.

9: Political liberalization or democratic retrenchment: limited and/or decreasing overt coercion: This code is used to indicate relatively peaceful transitions either to or from institutionalized competitive participation. In either case, this code reflects the unconsolidated nature of liberal political participation in otherwise procedurally open electoral polities.

10: Institutionalized open electoral participation: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence with little use of coercion. No significant or substantial groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

SOURCE(S): Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

YEARS: 1800-2018

#### 2.3.55.5 Polity revised combined score (e\_polity2)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_polity2

*Original tag:* e\_polity2

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the Revised Polity score?

CLARIFICATION: This variable is a modified version of the Polity variable added in order to facilitate the use of the Polity regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual Polity score by applying a simple treatment, or "fix," to convert instances of "standardized authority scores" (*i.e.*, -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (*i.e.*, within the range, -10 to +10). The values have been converted according to the following rule set

-66: Cases of foreign "interruption" are treated as "system missing."

-77: Cases of "interregnum," or anarchy, are converted to a "neutral" Polity score of "0."

-88: Cases of "transition" are prorated across the span of the transition. For example, country X has a POLITY score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years at a rate of per year, so that the converted scores would be as follows: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5.

SOURCE(S): Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

NOTES: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

YEARS: 1800-2018

### 2.3.56 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Others

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

#### 2.3.56.1 Democratic breakdown (Bernhard et al.) (e\_bnr\_dem)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_bnr\_dem

*Original tag:* e\_bnr\_dem

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: Countries that meet the minimum conditions for democracy (see below) enter the dataset and are coded "0." When countries cease to meet those minimum criteria they are coded "1" and exit from the dataset.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): Bernhard *et al.* (2001). Taken from Teorell *et al.* (2021).

NOTES: If, after a democratic breakdown, a country again meets our minimum criteria it re-enters the data as a new democratic episode. The time frame onset in 1913 is a function of when the first country (Norway) meets the minimum conditions. All series terminate in either in a breakdown in various years or right censorship in 2005. The minimal conditions are based on Dahl's notion of polyarchy (competitiveness, inclusiveness) combined with Linz and Stepan's stateness criteria. Competitiveness: Like Przeworski *et al.* we include countries that hold elections for both the executive and legislature, and in which more than one party contests the elections. However, we exclude cases in which we detected outcome changing vote fraud, in which there was either extensive or extreme violence that inhibited voters' preference expression, or in which political parties representing a substantial portion of the population were banned. Inclusiveness: We only include competitive polities in which at least fifty percent of all adult citizens are enfranchised to vote in our set of democracies. Stateness: We also considered questions of sovereignty, not including colonial states, where founding elections were held prior to the granting of independence, and countries experiencing internal wars in which twenty percent or greater of the population or territory was out of control of the state.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2001), Teorell *et al.* (2021).

YEARS: 1946-2005

#### 2.3.56.2 Democracy (e\_chga\_demo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_chga\_demo

*Original tag:* e\_chga\_demo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: A regime is considered a democracy if the executive and the legislature is directly or indirectly elected by popular vote, multiple parties are allowed, there is *de facto*

existence of multiple parties outside of regime front, there are multiple parties within the legislature, and there has been no consolidation of incumbent advantage (*e.g.* unconstitutional closing of the lower house or extension of incumbent's term by postponing of subsequent elections). Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges in that year.

RESPONSES:

1: Democracy.

0: Otherwise.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): Cheibub *et al.* (2010).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Cheibub *et al.* (2010).

YEARS: 1946-2008

### 2.3.56.3 Corruption perception index (e\_ti\_cpi)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_ti\_cpi

*Original tag:* e\_ti\_cpi

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 100 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

SOURCE(S): Transparency International (2021).

NOTES: The data spans 2012–present due to the methodological incomparability with the data prior 2012.

DATA RELEASE: 7-12.

CITATION: Transparency International (2021).

YEARS: 2012-2021

### 2.3.57 Background Factors (E) - Education

This section lists variables gathered from other sources that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy. The variables are divided into sections based on theme.

#### 2.3.57.1 Education 15+ (e\_peaveduc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_peaveduc

*Original tag:* e\_peaveduc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the average years of education among citizens older than 15?

CLARIFICATION: The Average years of education in the total population aged 15 years and older.

SOURCE(S): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Mitchell (1998a, 1998b, 1998c), United States Census Bureau (2021), UNESCO, Földvári and van Leeuwen (2014), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2011), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2012a), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2012b), Didenko, Foldvari, van Leeuwen (2012).

NOTES: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation for each country. In addition to this, from the last recorded data point to nowadays the data is extrapolated.

DATA RELEASE: 2-12.

CITATION: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), along with other sources listed above.

YEARS: 1820-2021



### 2.3.57.2 Educational inequality, Gini (e\_\_peedgini)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_\_peedgini

*Original tag:* e\_\_peedgini

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: How unequal is the level of education achieved by the population aged 15 years and older?

CLARIFICATION: Gini coefficient of educational inequality estimated from average education data using the method as suggested by Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2000), Checchi (2004) and Castelló and Doménech (2002: 4). Van Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, and Foldvari (N.d.) provide a more detailed explanation in the Clio-Infra codebook.

SOURCE(S): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Mitchell (1998a, 1998b, 1998c), United States Census Bureau (2021), UNESCO, Földvári and van Leeuwen (2010a), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2011), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2012a), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2012b), Didenko, Foldvari, van Leeuwen (2012).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), along with other sources listed above.

YEARS: 1850-2010

### 2.3.58 Background Factors (E) - Geography

This section lists variables gathered from other sources that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy. The variables are divided into sections based on theme.

#### 2.3.58.1 Land area (e\_\_area)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_\_area

*Original tag:* e\_\_area

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the land area of a country?

CLARIFICATION: Country land area in square kilometers.

SOURCE(S): Haber and Menaldo (2011); Schvitz et al. (2021).

NOTES: Uses v2.0 of R package cshapes; Where several values were available per country-year, the latest one was chosen for the dataset.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Schvitz *et al.* (2021).

YEARS: 1886-2019

#### 2.3.58.2 Region (geographic) (e\_\_regiongeo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_\_regiongeo

*Original tag:* e\_\_regiongeo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: In which geographic region is this country located?

CLARIFICATION: Regions are described based on geographic location.

RESPONSES:

- 1: Western Europe
- 2: Northern Europe
- 3: Southern Europe
- 4: Eastern Europe
- 5: Northern Africa
- 6: Western Africa
- 7: Middle Africa
- 8: Eastern Africa
- 9: Southern Africa

- 10: Western Asia
- 11: Central Asia
- 12: Eastern Asia
- 13: South-Eastern Asia
- 14: Southern Asia
- 15: Oceania (including Australia and the Pacific)
- 16: North America
- 17: Central America
- 18: South America
- 19: Caribbean (including Belize, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Guyana)

SOURCE(S): United Nations Statistics Division (2013).

NOTES: For the countries coded only in the historical project or for which the UN does not have the code, the region is coded by V-Dem Data Manager in accordance with the position of the neighboring countries.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: United Nations Statistics Division (2013).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.58.3 Region (politico-geographic) (e\_regionpol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_regionpol

*Original tag:* e\_regionpol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: In which politico-geographic region is this country located?

CLARIFICATION: This is a tenfold politico-geographic classification of world regions, based on a mixture of two considerations: geographical proximity (with Cyprus, German Democratic Republic, and Mongolia being recoded from original coding) and demarcation by area specialists having contributed to a regional understanding of democratization. The categories are as follow:

RESPONSES:

- 1: Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central Asia, Mongolia, and German Democratic Republic)
- 2: Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic)
- 3: North Africa and the Middle East (including Israel and Turkey, but excluding Cyprus)
- 4: Sub-Saharan Africa
- 5: Western Europe and North America (including Australia, New Zealand, and Cyprus, but excluding German Democratic Republic)
- 6: Eastern Asia (including Japan, excluding Mongolia)
- 7: South-Eastern Asia
- 8: Southern Asia
- 9: The Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand)
- 10: The Caribbean (including Guyana and Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic)

SOURCE(S): Quality of Government Standard Dataset version Jan21 (Teorell et al., 2021).

NOTES: The values are filled backwards to the first year of coding.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Teorell *et al.* (2018).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.58.4 Region (politico-geographic 6-category) (e\_regionpol\_6c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_regionpol\_6c

*Original tag:* e\_regionpol\_6C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: In which politico-geographic region is this country located?

CLARIFICATION: Regions are described as politico-geographic in the sense that they are

based on geographical proximity as well as characteristics that contribute to regional understanding as identified by scholars in studies of democratization (e.g. post-Communist). This is a modification of *e\_regionpol* above.

RESPONSES:

- 1: Eastern Europe and Central Asia (including Mongolia and German Democratic Republic)
- 2: Latin America and the Caribbean
- 3: The Middle East and North Africa (including Israel and Turkey, excluding Cyprus)
- 4: Sub-Saharan Africa
- 5: Western Europe and North America (including Cyprus, Australia and New Zealand, but excluding German Democratic Republic)
- 6: Asia and Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand; see 5)

SOURCE(S): Quality of Government Standard Dataset (2019).

NOTES: The values are filled backwards to the first year of coding.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document); Teorell *et al.* (2018).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 2.3.59 Background Factors (E) - Economics

This section lists variables gathered from other sources that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy. The variables are divided into sections based on theme.

#### 2.3.59.1 Exports (e\_cow\_exports)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_cow\_exports

*Original tag:* e\_cow\_exports

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the total value of a country's exports?

CLARIFICATION: Total exports in 2014 US millions of dollars.

SOURCE(S): Barbieri *et al.* (2009), Barbieri and Keshk (2016)

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Barbieri *et al.* (2009), Barbieri and Keshk (2016)

YEARS: 1870-2014

#### 2.3.59.2 Imports (e\_cow\_imports)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_cow\_imports

*Original tag:* e\_cow\_imports

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the total value of a country's imports?

CLARIFICATION: Total imports in 2014 US millions of dollars.

SOURCE(S): Barbieri *et al.* (2009), Barbieri and Keshk (2016)

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Barbieri *et al.* (2009), Barbieri and Keshk (2016)

YEARS: 1870-2014

#### 2.3.59.3 GDP (e\_gdp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_gdp

*Original tag:* e\_gdp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_sd

CLARIFICATION: Point estimate from latent variable model of Gross Domestic Product based on a number of sources. For details, see the citation.

DATA RELEASE: 12.

CITATION: Fariss *et al.* (2021)

YEARS: 1789-2019

#### 2.3.59.4 GDP per capita (e\_gdppc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_gdppc

*Original tag:* e\_gdppc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_sd

CLARIFICATION: Point estimate from latent variable model of Gross Domestic Product Per Capita based on a number of sources. For details, see the citation.

DATA RELEASE: 12.

CITATION: Fariss *et al.* (2021)

YEARS: 1789-2019

#### 2.3.59.5 Inflation (e\_miinflat)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_miinflat

*Original tag:* e\_miinflat

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the annual inflation rate?

SOURCE(S): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), based on Abad, Davies and van Zanden (2012), Montevideo-Oxford Latin America Economic History Database (<https://www.lac.ox.ac.uk/research-projects/moxlad-database>), De Zwart (2011), De Zwart (2012), Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), Santing (N.d.), World Bank (2021).

NOTES: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 2.3.59.6 Population (Fariss et al.) (e\_pop)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_pop

*Original tag:* e\_pop

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_sd

CLARIFICATION: Point estimate from latent variable model of Population based on a number of sources. For details, see the citation.

DATA RELEASE: 12.

CITATION: Fariss *et al.* (2021)

YEARS: 1789-2019

### 2.3.60 Background Factors (E) - Natural Resource Wealth

This section lists variables gathered from other sources that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy. The variables are divided into sections based on theme.

#### 2.3.60.1 Petroleum, coal, and natural gas production per capita (e\_total\_fuel\_income\_pc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_total\_fuel\_income\_pc

*Original tag:* e\_total\_fuel\_income\_pc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the real value of a country's petroleum, coal, and natural gas production?

CLARIFICATION: Real value of petroleum, coal, and natural gas produced per capita.

SOURCE(S): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

YEARS: 1900-2006

### **2.3.60.2 Petroleum production per capita (e\_total\_oil\_income\_pc)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_total\_oil\_income\_pc

*Original tag:* e\_total\_oil\_income\_pc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the real value of a country's petroleum production?

CLARIFICATION: Real value of petroleum produced per capita.

SOURCE(S): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

YEARS: 1800-2006

### **2.3.60.3 Petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals production per capita (e\_total\_resources\_income\_pc)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_total\_resources\_income\_pc

*Original tag:* e\_total\_resources\_income\_pc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the real value of a country's petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals production?

CLARIFICATION: Real value of petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals produced per capita.

SOURCE(S): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

YEARS: 1900-2006

## **2.3.61 Background Factors (E) - Infrastructure**

This section lists variables gathered from other sources that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy. The variables are divided into sections based on theme.

### **2.3.61.1 Radios (e\_radio\_n)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_radio\_n

*Original tag:* e\_radio\_n

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the number of radio sets?

CLARIFICATION: Original source doesn't specify if the indicators considers total number of radio sets or only radio sets in use.

SOURCE(S): Comin and Hobijn (2009).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Comin and Hobijn (2009).

YEARS: 1815-2000

## **2.3.62 Background Factors (E) - Demography**

This section lists variables gathered from other sources that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy. The variables are divided into sections based on theme.

**2.3.62.1 Fertility rate (e\_miferrat)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_miferrat*Original tag:* e\_miferrat*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the fertility rate?

CLARIFICATION: The fertility rate (*i.e.* total fertility rate, period total fertility rate, total period fertility rate) of a population is the mean number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if (a) she were to experience the current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime, and (b) she were to survive through the end of her reproductive life. It is obtained by adding single-year age-specific rates at a given time.

SOURCE(S): Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawn from various sources (unspecified).

DATA RELEASE: 2-12.

CITATION: Gapminder (gapminder.org).

YEARS: 1960-2019

**2.3.62.2 Population total (Clio Infra, in thousands) (e\_mipopula)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_mipopula*Original tag:* e\_mipopula*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the total population (in thousands)?

SOURCE(S): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Goldewijk, Beusen, Janssen (2010), History Database of Global Environment (www.pbl.nl/hyde).

NOTES: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

DATA RELEASE: 2-12.

CITATION: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).

YEARS: 1800-2000

**2.3.62.3 Urbanization (e\_miurbani)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_miurbani*Original tag:* e\_miurbani*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the urbanization rate?

CLARIFICATION: Ratio of Urban Population to Population.

SOURCE(S): See Population and Urban population.

DATA RELEASE: 2-12.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1800-2000

**2.3.62.4 Urban population (e\_miurbpop)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_miurbpop*Original tag:* e\_miurbpop*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the total urban population?

CLARIFICATION: The population living in areas classified as urban according to the criteria of each area or country (United Nations, with reference to 1950-present).

SOURCE(S): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu) based on Bairoch, Batou, Chevre (1988), Chandler (1987), de Vries (1984), History Database of Global Environment (www.pbl.nl/hyde), Etter, McAlpine, Possingham (2008), Grigg (1980), Goldewijk, Beusen, Janssen (2010), Maddison (2001), Rozman (1973), United Nations (2009a), United Nations (2009b), Urquhart and Buckley (1965), Van Zanden (2012).

NOTES: No definition is provided by sources used by Clio-Infra for years prior to 1950.

Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).

YEARS: 1800-2000

#### **2.3.62.5 Life expectancy, female (e\_\_pefeliex)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_\_pefeliex

*Original tag:* e\_\_pefeliex

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the life expectancy at birth among women?

CLARIFICATION: Life expectancy refers to expected longevity at birth based on current age-specific mortality rates.

SOURCE(S): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Human Mortality Database (2008), Human Life Table Database (2007), World Bank (2021), Gapminder (gapminder.org), Montevideo-Oxford Latin America Economic History Database (<https://www.lac.ox.ac.uk/research-projects/moxlad-database>).

NOTES: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).

YEARS: 1800-2000

#### **2.3.62.6 Infant mortality rate (e\_\_peinfmor)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_\_peinfmor

*Original tag:* e\_\_peinfmor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the infant mortality rate?

CLARIFICATION: Deaths of children during first year of life (per 1000 live births).

SOURCE(S): Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawing on various sources.

NOTES: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

DATA RELEASE: 2-12.

CITATION: Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawing on various sources.

YEARS: 1800-2015

#### **2.3.62.7 Life expectancy (e\_\_pelifeex)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_\_pelifeex

*Original tag:* e\_\_pelifeex

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the life expectancy?

CLARIFICATION: The average number of years a newborn child would live if current mortality patterns were to stay the same.

SOURCE(S): Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawing on Human Mortality Database (2008), Riley (2005a, 2005b), Human Life Table Database (2007), United Nations Population Division (2010). Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), Human Life Table Database (2017), World Bank (2021), Montevideo-Oxford Latin America Economic History Database (<https://www.lac.ox.ac.uk/research-projects/moxlad-database>).

NOTES: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

DATA RELEASE: 2-3, 7-12.

CITATION: Gapminder (gapminder.org).

YEARS: 1800-2021

#### **2.3.62.8 Maternal mortality rate (e\_\_pematmor)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_\_pematmor

*Original tag:* e\_pematmor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the maternal mortality rate?

CLARIFICATION: The number of maternal deaths divided by the number of live births in a given year, multiplied by 100000. Maternal death is defined as the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days after the termination of that pregnancy, regardless of the length and site of the pregnancy, from a cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy.

SOURCE(S): Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawing from various sources (unspecified).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Gapminder (gapminder.org).

YEARS: 1800-2013

### **2.3.62.9 Population (World Bank, 1960s-onward) (e\_wb\_pop)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_wb\_pop

*Original tag:* e\_wb\_pop

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the total population?

CLARIFICATION: Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. The values shown are midyear estimates.

SCALE: Continuous

SOURCE(S): (1) United Nations Population Division. World Population Prospects: 2019 Revision. (2) Census reports and other statistical publications from national statistical offices, (3) Eurostat: Demographic Statistics, (4) United Nations Statistical Division. Population and Vital Statistics Reprot (various years), (5) U.S. Census Bureau: International Database, and (6) Secretariat of the Pacific Community: Statistics and Demography Programme.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CITATION: World Bank (2021)

YEARS: 1960-2020

### **2.3.63 Background Factors (E) - Conflict**

This section lists variables gathered from other sources that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy. The variables are divided into sections based on theme.

#### **2.3.63.1 Civil war (e\_civil\_war)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_civil\_war

*Original tag:* e\_civil\_war

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Was there a civil war?

CLARIFICATION: Civil war — at least one intra-state war with at least 1,000 battle deaths for each country-year.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

SOURCE(S): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

YEARS: 1816-2006

#### **2.3.63.2 Armed conflict, international (e\_miinteco)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_miinteco



*Original tag:* e\_miinteco

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Did the country participate in an international armed conflict?

CLARIFICATION: Coded 1 if the country participated in an international armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data contains only 1's along with missing data (no 0's). Following the authors' instructions (personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1.

SOURCE(S): Clío Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Brecke (2001).

YEARS: 1789-2000

### **2.3.63.3 Armed conflict, internal (e\_miinterc)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_miinterc

*Original tag:* e\_miinterc

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Did the country experience an internal armed conflict?

CLARIFICATION: Coded 1 if the country suffered in an internal armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data contains only 1's along with missing data (no 0's). Following the authors' instructions (personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1.

SOURCE(S): Clío Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001).

DATA RELEASE: 5-12.

CITATION: Brecke (2001).

YEARS: 1789-2000

### **2.3.63.4 Coups d'état (Powell and Thyne) (e\_pt\_coup)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_pt\_coup

*Original tag:* e\_pt\_coup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Did a coup d'état occur?

CLARIFICATION: Coups d'état are defined as "overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of state using unconstitutional means(...)there is no minimal death threshold for defining a coup. A coup attempt is defined as successful if the coup perpetrators seize and hold power for at least seven days" (Powell Thyne 2011:252).

RESPONSES:

0: No coup attempt occurred

1: Unsuccessful coup attempt occurred

2: Successful coup attempt occurred

SCALE: Categorical

SOURCE(S): Powell and Thyne (2011)

NOTES: Where the number of observations per country-year is more than one, the maximum value was taken to indicate whether there was a coup or not.

DATA RELEASE: 9-12.

CITATION: Powell and Thyne (2011)

YEARS: 1950-2021

## 2.4 V-Dem Episodes of Regime Transformation Dataset

**Dataset tag:** `vdem_ert`

**Description:** The ERT dataset identifies episodes of democratization (liberalizing autocracy, democratic deepening) and autocratization (democratic regression, autocratic regression) in the most recent V-Dem dataset.

**Dataset citation:** Edgell, Amanda B., Seraphine F. Maerz, Laura Maxwell, Richard Morgan, Juraj Medzihorsky, Matthew C. Wilson, Vanessa Boese, Sebastian Hellmeier, Jean Lachapelle, Patrik Lindenfors, Anna Luhrmann, and Staffan I. Lindberg. (2020). Episodes of Regime Transformation Dataset (v2.0) Codebook.

Maerz, Seraphine F., Amanda B. Edgell, Joshua Krusell, Laura Maxwell, and Sebastian Hellmeier. (2020). ERT - an R package to load, explore and work with the Episodes of Regime Transformation dataset. Available at: [www.github.com/vdeminstitute/ert](https://www.github.com/vdeminstitute/ert)

Luhrmann, Anna and Staffan I. Lindberg. (2019). A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it? *Democratization*, 26:7, pp. 1095-1113.

Wilson, Matthew C., Richard Morgan, Juraj Medzihorsky, Laura Maxwell, Seraphine F. Maerz, Anna Luhrmann, Patrik Lindenfors, Amanda B. Edgell, Vanessa Boese, and Staffan I. Lindberg. (2020). Successful and Failed Episodes of Democratization: Conceptualization, Identification, and Description. V-Dem Working Paper, 2020:97.

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More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page:  
<https://www.v-dem.net/ertds.html>

### 2.4.1 Regime Type Variables

This section includes variables related to regime type, country, and year.

#### 2.4.1.1 Country identifier (`country_id`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_ert_country_id`

*Original tag:* `country_id`

*Description:*

What is the V-Dem unique country identifier for this case?

Format: integer, [3,236]

#### 2.4.1.2 Country text identifier (`country_text_id`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_ert_country_text_id`

*Original tag:* `country_text_id`

*Description:*

What is the V-Dem country text identifier for this case?

Format: string

#### 2.4.1.3 Country name (`country_name`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_ert_country_name`

*Original tag:* `country_name`

*Description:*

What is the V-Dem country name for this case?

Format: string

#### 2.4.1.4 Year (`year`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_ert_year`

*Original tag:* year

*Description:*

What is the year of this observation?

Clarification: Based on 31 December or the average of historical date from V-Dem.

Format: integer, [1900,2019]

#### 2.4.1.5 Regimes of the World (v2x\_regime)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_v2x\_regime

*Original tag:* v2x\_regime

*Description:*

What is the regime value for this country-year according to the Regimes of the World?

0– Closed autocracy

1– Electoral Autocracy

2– Electoral Democracy

3– Liberal Democracy

Format: integer, [0,3]

#### 2.4.1.6 Electoral democracy index (v2x\_polyarchy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_v2x\_polyarchy

*Original tag:* v2x\_polyarchy

*Description:*

What is the country's current score on the V-Dem electoral democracy index (EDI)?

Format: interval, [0,1]

Other versions: v2x polyarchy codelow; v2x polyarchy codehigh

#### 2.4.1.7 Regime founding (reg\_start\_year)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_reg\_start\_year

*Original tag:* reg\_start\_year

*Description:*

When was the current regime founded?

Clarification: This variable is coded as the year the regime was founded and is coded for the entire duration of the regime.

For democratic regimes, this is coded as the year after the country moves from autocracy to democracy on the RoW measure, provided that direct national-level elections for the parliament, executive, or a constituent assembly are subsequently held under conditions of democracy (on the RoW measure) and the elected officials are able to assume office.

For autocratic regimes, this is generally defined as the year the country moved from democracy to autocracy on the RoW measure. To guard against noise in the data, we require that cases moving from democracy to electoral autocracy stay autocratic for the tolerance period (e.g. 5 years) or hold an autocratic founding election. Autocratic founding elections are defined as the first direct national-level election for the parliament, executive, or a constituent assembly having been held under conditions of autocracy on the RoW measure.

To deal with left censoring, we code the first regime after the coding starts or a gap in the case based solely on the RoW value, and set its founding year as the first observation year after the coding starts or a gap ends in the data.

We deal with right censoring conservatively, by assuming the regime persists until we receive information to the contrary. Because democratic regime founding (i.e. transition) is not completed until the founding democratic election occurs, those cases where a change in RoW results in democracy without holding an election before the end of coding or a gap in coding are treated as remaining autocratic. Likewise, for changes from democracy to electoral autocracy that occur within the tolerance (e.g. 5 years) of the coding end or gap in the dataset and do not hold a founding autocratic election, we also treat as remaining democratic until the coding end or gap. For changes from democracy to closed autocracy, censoring is not an issue as we take the year the case becomes closed as the transition or founding of the new autocratic regime.

Required variables: v2x regime; v2eltype 0; v2eltype 4; v2eltype 6; v2elasmoff ord  
Format: year, [1900,2019]

#### 2.4.1.8 Regime termination (reg\_end\_year)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_reg\_end\_year

*Original tag:* reg\_end\_year

*Description:*

When will the current regime end?

Clarification: This variable is coded as the year the regime ends and is coded for the entire duration of the regime.

For democratic regimes, this is generally coded as the year the country moved from democracy to autocracy on the RoW measure, provided that it resulted in a democratic breakdown. To guard against noise in the data, we require that cases moving from democracy to electoral autocracy stay autocratic for the tolerance period or hold an autocratic founding election. Autocratic founding elections are defined as the first direct national-level election for either the parliament, executive, or a constituent assembly having been held under conditions of autocracy on the RoW measure, after a transition from democracy to autocracy on the RoW measure.

For autocratic regimes, this is coded as the year the country moves from autocracy to democracy on the RoW measure, provided that direct national-level elections for the parliament, executive, or a constituent assembly are subsequently held under conditions of democracy (on the RoW measure) and the elected officials are able to assume office.

Right censoring is not an issue for changes between autocracy and democracy, because the regime ending (i.e. transition) is not completed until after the founding democratic election occurs. Thus, we assume the previous autocratic regime persists until we receive information to the contrary. A change in RoW resulting in democracy that stays there to the end of the coding or a gap in coding without holding an election is treated as remaining autocratic.

For changes from democracy to closed autocracy (i.e. breakdown), censoring is also not an issue as we take the year prior to when the case becomes closed as the end of the regime.

For changes from democracy to electoral autocracy that occur within the tolerance (e.g. 5 years) of the coding end or gap in the dataset and do not hold a founding autocratic election, we treat these as remaining democratic until the coding end or gap.

Required variables: v2x regime; v2eltype 0; v2eltype 4; v2eltype 6; v2elasmoff ord  
Format: year, [1900,2019]

#### 2.4.1.9 Regime identifier (reg\_id)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_reg\_id

*Original tag:* reg\_id

*Description:*

What is the unique regime identifier?

Clarification: This is a combination of the country text id, start, and end year of the regime.

Required variables: country text id, reg start year, reg end year.

Format: string

#### 2.4.1.10 Regime type (reg\_type)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_reg\_type

*Original tag:* reg\_type

*Description:*

What is the current regime type?

Clarification: This variable denotes whether the current regime can be classified as a democracy or autocracy.

0– Autocracy. A country-year coded as autocracy on the RoW measure that has had an autocratic transition, i.e. (a) closed autocracy; or (b) electoral autocracy that has held an autocratic founding election and/or stayed autocratic for the tolerance period (e.g. 5 years).

1– Democracy. A country-year coded as democracy on the RoW measure that has held a

democratic founding election. The year of the founding election is included.

To deal with left censoring, we code the first regime after the coding starts or a gap in the case purely based on the RoW value, and set its founding year as the first observation year after the coding starts or a gap ends in the data.

Right censoring is not an issue for changes between autocracy and democracy, because the regime founding (i.e. transition) is not completed until the founding democratic election occurs. Thus, we assume the previous autocratic regime persists until we receive information to the contrary. A change in RoW resulting in democracy that stays there to the end of the coding or a gap in coding without holding an election is treated as remaining autocratic.

For changes from democracy to closed autocracy, censoring is also not an issue as we take the year the case becomes closed as the transition or founding of the new autocratic regime.

For changes from democracy to electoral autocracy that occur within the tolerance (e.g. 5 years) of the coding end or gap in the dataset and do not hold a founding autocratic election, we treat these as remaining democratic until the coding end or gap.

Required variables: v2x regime, reg founding Format: categorical, [0,1]

#### 2.4.1.11 Regime transition (reg\_trans)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_reg\_trans

*Original tag:* reg\_trans

*Description:*

Was there a regime transition in the country-year? If so, what type?

Clarification: This variable is coded based on a transition between democracy and autocracy based on the regime founding criteria. It is coded as the final year of a regime.

-1– Democratic breakdown.

0– No regime transition

1– Democratic transition.

Required variables: reg type Format: categorical, [-1,1]

#### 2.4.1.12 Founding election (dem\_founding\_elec)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_dem\_founding\_elec

*Original tag:* dem\_founding\_elec

*Description:*

When was the founding democratic election for this regime?

Clarification: This variable is only coded for democratic regime years and reflects the first election held under democracy within the democratic regime that allowed officials to assume office in either the legislature, executive, or a constituent assembly. It is coded for all years of the regime and missing for all non-democratic country-years.

Required variables: v2eltype 0, v2eltype 4, v2eltype 6, v2elasmoff ord, v2x regime Format: year, [1903,2019]

NA: V-Dem data required to construct the variable is missing.

#### 2.4.1.13 Founding autocratic election (aut\_founding\_elec)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_aut\_founding\_elec

*Original tag:* aut\_founding\_elec

*Description:*

When was the founding autocratic election for this regime?

Clarification: This variable is only coded for autocratic regime years and reflects the first election held under autocracy in either the legislature, executive, or a constituent assembly. It is coded for all years of the regime and missing for all democratic country-years.

Required variables: v2eltype 0, v2eltype 4, v2eltype 6, v2x regime Format: year, [1903,2019]

NA: V-Dem data required to construct the variable is missing.

#### 2.4.1.14 RoW regime change event (row\_regch\_event)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_row\_regch\_event

*Original tag:* row\_regch\_event

*Description:*

Was there a regime change according to the RoW measure during this country-year?

Clarification: This variable is coded based on a change between democracy and autocracy on the RoW measure.

-1- Change from democracy to autocracy on RoW

0- No regime change on RoW

1- Change from autocracy to democracy on RoW

Required variables: v2x regime Format: categorical, [-1,1]

#### 2.4.1.15 RoW regime change censored (row\_regch\_censored)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_row\_regch\_censored

*Original tag:* row\_regch\_censored

*Description:*

Is this particular regime change censored?

Clarification: If the regime change on RoW between democracy and autocracy occurs within tolerance period (e.g. 5 years) of the end of coding or a gap in coding, it is considered censored unless we know there was a breakdown or democratic transition based on above criteria.

Required variables: row regch event, codingend, gapstart1, gapstart2, gapstart3

Format: dummy, [0,1]

### 2.4.2 Democratization Episodes

This section includes variables related to democratization.

#### 2.4.2.1 Democratization episode (dem\_ep)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_dem\_ep

*Original tag:* dem\_ep

*Description:*

Was there an ongoing democratization episode during the country-year?

Clarification: A period of substantial and sustained increases on V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (EDI). The default parameters require that such a period begin with an initial 0.01 increase on the EDI and a total increase of at least 0.10 throughout the episode. A democratization episode ends the final year of a positive change greater than or equal to the initial increase (e.g. 0.01), prior to experiencing an annual drop, cumulative drop, or stasis period. These are defined in the defaults as -0.03, -0.10, and 5 years, respectively.

Required variables: v2x polyarchy

Format: dummy, [0,1]

#### 2.4.2.2 Democratization episode identifier (dem\_ep\_id)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_dem\_ep\_id

*Original tag:* dem\_ep\_id

*Description:*

What is the unique identifier for current the democratization episode?

Clarification: This is a combination of the country text id, start, and end year of the episode. This is coded for all episode years and the pre-episode year.

Required variables: country text id, dem ep start year, dem ep end year.

Format: string

#### 2.4.2.3 Democratization episode start year (dem\_ep\_start\_year)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_dem\_ep\_start\_year

*Original tag:* dem\_ep\_start\_year

*Description:*

When did the current episode of democratization begin?

Clarification: The first year of the democratization episode, defined as the first year of a positive change equal or greater than the start inclusion (e.g. +0.01) on the EDI, followed by a period of sustained positive changes on the EDI. This is coded for all years within the episode and the pre-episode year.

Format: year, [1901,2018]

#### 2.4.2.4 Democratization episode end year (dem\_ep\_end\_year)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_dem\_ep\_end\_year

*Original tag:* dem\_ep\_end\_year

*Description:*

When will the current episode of democratization end?

Clarification: The final year of the democratization episode, defined as the last positive change equal to or greater than the start inclusion (e.g. +0.01) on the EDI before experiencing an annual drop (e.g. -0.03), gradual drop over the tolerance (e.g. -0.10 over 5 years), or a period of no positive changes on the EDI equal to the start inclusion (e.g. +0.01) for the tolerance (e.g. 5 years). This is coded for all years within the episode and the pre-episode year.

Format: year, [1902,2019]

#### 2.4.2.5 Pre-democratization episode year (dem\_pre\_ep\_year)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_dem\_pre\_ep\_year

*Original tag:* dem\_pre\_ep\_year

*Description:*

Will a democratization episode begin in the following year?

Clarification: Coded as the year before a democratization episode begins.

Format: dummy, [0,1]

#### 2.4.2.6 Democratization episode termination type (dem\_ep\_termination)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_dem\_ep\_termination

*Original tag:* dem\_ep\_termination

*Description:*

Why did the current democratization episode terminate the year it did?

Clarification: Democratization episodes generally end the final year of a positive change greater than or equal to the start incl parameter (e.g. 0.01). This is coded for the entire episode. The reasons for termination include:

0– Censored. This occurs when the episode has not experienced any of the below conditions and experienced its last positive change greater than or equal to the start incl parameter (e.g. 0.01) within the tolerance period of coding end or a gap in coding (e.g. 5 years).

1– Stasis. The episode terminated because the political unit did not experience any subsequent increases greater than or equal to the start incl parameter (e.g. +0.01) for a period of time longer than the tolerance period (e.g. 5 years).

2– Year drop. The episode terminated because the political unit experienced an annual drop of less than or equal to the year turn parameter (e.g. -0.03) within the tolerance window (e.g. 5 years) of its last positive change greater than or equal to start incl (e.g. +0.01).

3– Cumulative drop. The episode terminated because the political unit experienced a cumulative drop less than or equal to the cum turn parameter (e.g. -0.10) within the tolerance window (e.g. 5 years) of the last positive change greater than or equal to start incl (e.g. +0.01). Note: Using our default parameters with v10 produces no cases of this. All are absorbed by category 2, “year drop”. However, we maintain it here and in the script for those who might encounter this independent of a year drop depending on how the parameters are set.

4– Closed or breakdown. The episode terminated because the country reverted to closed authoritarianism on the RoW measure or experienced a democratic breakdown according to reg trans.

Required variables: v2x polyarchy, v2x regime, codingend, gapstart1, gapstart2, gapstart3

Format: categorical, [0,4]

#### 2.4.2.7 Episode with potential democratic transition (dem\_ep\_prch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_dem\_ep\_prch

*Original tag:* dem\_ep\_prch

*Description:*

Is there an ongoing democratization episode within the political unit that has/had the potential for a regime change?

Clarification: By regime change, we mean a reclassification from autocracy to democracy (“democratic transition”). To count as a “democratic transition”, the country must move from autocracy (<2) to democracy (2) on the RoW within the episode period and experience a “founding” democratic election (i.e. elections for the legislature, executive, or constituent assembly) for which the elected officials were able to assume office. Here we are not interested in movements between intermediate types of autocracy (i.e. electoral or closed) or democracy (i.e. electoral or liberal). Instead, this variable captures whether an episode originates in an authoritarian regime and has the potential to produce a democratic transition. This variable is coded for the entire episode, even if the transition has already occurred.

0– Not in an episode with the potential for democratic transition.

1– In an episode with the potential for democratic transition.

Notes: This variable supersedes “sub dem ep” (ERT v1.2). It will be useful for researchers interested in studying a subset of democratization episodes where autocracies had the potential to become democratic (i.e. liberalizing autocracies).

Required variables: dem ep, reg type Format: dummy, [0,1]

#### 2.4.2.8 Post-democratic transition episode year (dem\_ep\_ptr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_dem\_ep\_ptr

*Original tag:* dem\_ep\_ptr

*Description:*

Has the political unit experienced a democratic transition within the current episode?

Clarification: This variable captures whether, during the current episode of democratization, the political unit experienced a democratic transition. In other words, it captures those years of democratic deepening that occur in an episode after a democratic transition occurred.

0– No democratic transition has occurred 1– A democratic transition has occurred

Notes: This variable supersedes “sub dem ep” (ERT v1.2). This variable may be useful for those who wish to limit their analysis to the authoritarian years of an episode prior to a democratic transition.

Required variables: dem ep, reg trans, dem ep prch

Format: dummy, [0,1]

#### 2.4.2.9 Democratic transition and democratic deepening (dem\_ep\_subdep)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_dem\_ep\_subdep

*Original tag:* dem\_ep\_subdep

*Description:*

Did the current episode experience a democratic transition and subsequently democratic deepening?

Clarification: This variable is coded for episodes that experienced a democratic transition followed by democratic deepening. It is coded for the entire episode. It provides a further refinement of the outcome (dem ep outcome) for those who are interested in exploring which episodes culminated in transition versus those that continued deepening after the transition.

0– This episode does not experience a democratic transition and democratic deepening

1– This episode experiences a democratic transition and subsequently democratic deepening

Required variables: dem\_ep, reg \_rans, dem\_ep\_prch, dem\_ep\_ptr

Format: dummy, [0,1]

#### 2.4.2.10 Democratization outcome (dem\_ep\_outcome)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_dem\_ep\_outcome

*Original tag:* dem\_ep\_outcome



*Description:*

What was the outcome of the current democratization episode?

Clarification: This variable captures detailed outcomes of the episodes. Episodes experiencing a democratic transition are coded accordingly, even if the episode endures a subsequent period of democratic deepening. Separate variables (dem ep subdep, dem ep ptr) account for this variation.

0—There is no democratization episode during this year.

1 - Democratic transition. The episode resulted in a change from autocracy to democracy on the RoW measure followed by a democratic founding election. Applies to entire episode, even if subsequent democratic deepening occurred.

2— Preempted democratic transition. The episode resulted in a change from autocracy to democracy on the RoW measure but the political unit did not hold a democratic founding election before reverting to autocracy.

3— Stabilized electoral autocracy. The episode did not result in a change from autocracy to democracy on the RoW measure, and the political unit stabilized as an electoral autocracy for the tolerance period (e.g. 5 years) without subsequent improvements equal to the start inclusion (e.g. +0.01).

4— Reverted liberalization. The episode (a) never resulted in change from closed autocracy on the RoW measure, (b) resulted in an electoral autocracy on the RoW measure but the political unit reverted back to closed autocracy, (c) resulted in an electoral autocracy on the RoW measure but the political unit experienced a subsequent annual decline less than or equal to the year turn parameter (e.g. -0.03) or a decline less than the cum turn parameter (e.g. -0.10) on the EDI over the course of the tolerance period (e.g. 5 years).

5— Deepened democracy. The episode resulted in further liberalization or democratization of a political unit that was already classified as democracy in the pre-episode year.

6— Uncertain. The outcome of the episode is uncertain because it has the potential for a regime change (dem ep prch==1) but is ongoing in the final observation year of the dataset or before a gap in coding is encountered.

Note: This variable supersedes the older version (ERT v1.2) and has been recoded at the entire episode level. There may be a small number of observations (or none, depending on parameters) within each of these outcome types. Users should be aware and consider the more aggregate outcome types for statistical analysis.

Required variables: dem ep, row regch event, reg type, dem ep termination  
Format: categorical, [0,6]

#### 2.4.2.11 Aggregate democratization outcome (dem\_ep\_outcome\_agg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_dem\_ep\_outcome\_agg

*Original tag:* dem\_ep\_outcome\_agg

*Description:*

What was the aggregate outcome of the current democratization episode?

Clarification: This variable captures aggregate outcomes of the episodes. Episodes experiencing a democratic transition are coded accordingly, even if the episode endures a subsequent period of democratic deepening or autocratic regression. Separate variables (dem ep subdep, dem ep ptr) account for this variation.

0—There is no democratization episode during this year.

1- Democratic transition. The episode resulted in a change from autocracy to democracy on the RoW measure followed by a democratic founding election. Applies to entire episode, even if subsequent democratic deepening occurred.

2— No democratic transition. The episode did not result in a change from autocracy to democracy on the RoW measure; or it did result in a change between democracy and autocracy on the RoW measure, but the political unit did not hold a democratic founding election before reverting to autocracy.

3— Deepened democracy. The episode resulted in further liberalization or democratization of a political unit that was already classified as democracy in the pre-episode year.

4— Uncertain. The outcome of the episode is uncertain because it has the potential for a regime change (dem ep prch==1) but is ongoing in the final observation year of the dataset or before a gap in coding is encountered.

Note: This variable provides an aggregate alternative to dem ep outcome that may be more useful for those engaging in statistical modeling.

Required variables: dem ep, row regch event, reg type, dem ep termination Format: categorical, [0,4]

#### 2.4.2.12 Democratization episode censored (dem\_ep\_censored)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_dem\_ep\_censored

*Original tag:* dem\_ep\_censored

*Description:*

Is the current democratization episode censored?

Clarification: A democratization episode may be censored if its end date corresponds with the date the coding for the case ends (i.e. codingend) or the year before a gap starts in the coding (i.e. gapstart1, gapstart2, gapstart3).

Required variables: dem\_ep\_end\_year, codingend, gapstart1, gapstart2, gapstart3 Format: dummy, [0,1]

### 2.4.3 Autocratization Episodes

This section includes variables related to autocratization.

#### 2.4.3.1 Autocratization episode (aut\_ep)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_aut\_ep

*Original tag:* aut\_ep

*Description:*

QUESTION: Was there an ongoing autocratization episode during the country-year?

CLARIFICATION: A period of substantial and sustained decreases on V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (EDI). The default parameters require that such a period begin with an initial -0.01 decrease on the EDI and a total decrease of at least -0.10 throughout the episode. An autocratization episode ends the final year of a negative change less than or equal to the initial decrease (e.g. -0.01), prior to experiencing an annual increase, cumulative increase, or stasis period. These are defined in the defaults as +0.03, +0.10, and 5 years respectively.

REQUIRED VARIABLES: v2x\_polyarchy

FORMAT: dummy, [0,1]

#### 2.4.3.2 Autocratization episode identifier (aut\_ep\_id)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_aut\_ep\_id

*Original tag:* aut\_ep\_id

*Description:*

QUESTION: What is the unique identifier for current the autocratization episode? This is coded for all episode years and the pre-episode year.

CLARIFICATION: This is a combination of the country text id, start, and end year of the episode.

REQUIRED VARIABLES: country\_text\_id, aut\_ep\_start year, aut\_ep\_end\_year.

FORMAT: string

#### 2.4.3.3 Autocratization episode start year (aut\_ep\_start\_year)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_aut\_ep\_start\_year

*Original tag:* aut\_ep\_start\_year

*Description:*

QUESTION: When did the current episode of autocratization begin?

CLARIFICATION: The first year of the autocratization episode, defined as the first year of a negative change equal or less than the start inclusion (e.g. -0.01) on the EDI, followed by a period of sustained negative changes on the EDI. This is coded for all episode years and the

pre-episode year.  
FORMAT: year, [1905,2017]

#### 2.4.3.4 Autocratization episode end year (aut\_ep\_end\_year)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_aut\_ep\_end\_year

*Original tag:* aut\_ep\_end\_year

*Description:*

QUESTION: When will the current episode of autocratization end?

CLARIFICATION: The final year of the autocratization episode, defined as the last negative change equal to or less than the start inclusion (e.g. -0.01) on the EDI before experiencing an annual increase (e.g. +0.03), gradual increase over the tolerance (e.g. +0.10 over 5 years), or a period of no negative changes less than or equal to the start inclusion (e.g. -0.01) on the EDI for the tolerance (e.g. 5 years). This is coded for all years of the episode and the pre-episode year.

FORMAT: year, [1906,2019]

#### 2.4.3.5 Pre-autocratization episode year (aut\_pre\_ep\_year)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_aut\_pre\_ep\_year

*Original tag:* aut\_pre\_ep\_year

*Description:*

CLARIFICATION: Coded as the year before an autocratization episode begins.

FORMAT: dummy, [0,1]

#### 2.4.3.6 Autocratization episode termination type (aut\_ep\_termination)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_aut\_ep\_termination

*Original tag:* aut\_ep\_termination

*Description:*

QUESTION: Why did the current autocratization episode terminate in the year it did?

CLARIFICATION: Autocratization episodes generally end the final year of a negative change less than or equal to the start incl parameter (e.g. -0.01). This variable is coded for all episode years. The reasons for termination include:

0– Censored. This occurs when the episode has not experienced any of the below conditions and experienced its last negative change less than or equal to the start incl parameter (e.g. -0.01) within the tolerance period of coding end or a gap in coding (e.g. 5 years).

1– Stasis. The episode terminated because the political unit did not experience any subsequent decreases less than or equal to the start incl parameter (e.g. -0.01) for a period of time longer than the tolerance period (e.g. 5 years).

2– Year increase. The episode terminated because it experienced an annual increase greater than or equal to the year turn parameter (e.g. +0.03) within the tolerance window (e.g. 5 years) of its last negative change.

3– Cumulative increase. The episode terminated because it experienced a cumulative increase greater than or equal to the cum turn parameter (e.g. +0.10) within the tolerance window (e.g. 5 years) of the last negative change. Note: Using our default parameters with v10 produces no cases of this. All are absorbed by category 2, “year increase”. However, we maintain it here and in the script for those who might encounter this independent of a year increase depending on how the parameters are set.

4– Democratic transition. The episode terminated because the country experienced a democratic transition according to reg trans.

REQUIRED VARIABLES: v2x\_polyarchy, v2x\_regime

Format: categorical, [0,3]

#### 2.4.3.7 Episode with potential democratic breakdown (aut\_ep\_prch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_aut\_ep\_prch

*Original tag:* aut\_ep\_prch

*Description:*

QUESTION: Is there an ongoing autocratization episode within the political unit that has/had the potential for a regime change?

CLARIFICATION: By regime change, we mean a reclassification from democracy to autocracy (“democratic breakdown”). To count as a “democratic breakdown”, the country must move from democracy (2) to autocracy (<2) on the RoW within the episode period and experience either a “founding” autocratic election (i.e. elections for the legislature, executive, or constituent assembly) or remain classified as autocratic for the tolerance period (e.g. 5 years). Here we are not interested in movements between intermediate types of autocracy (i.e. electoral or closed) or democracy (i.e. electoral or liberal). Instead, this variable captures whether an episode originates in an democratic regime and has the potential to produce a democratic breakdown. This variable is coded for the entire episode, even if the transition has already occurred.

0– Not in an episode with the potential for democratic breakdown.

1– In an episode with the potential for democratic breakdown.

Notes: This variable supersedes “sub aut ep” (ERT v1.2). It will be useful for researchers interested in studying a subset of autocratization episodes where democracies had the potential to become autocratic (i.e. democratic regression).

Required variables: aut ep, reg type

FORMAT: dummy, [0,1]

#### 2.4.3.8 Post-democratic breakdown episode year (aut\_ep\_pbr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_aut\_ep\_pbr

*Original tag:* aut\_ep\_pbr

*Description:*

QUESTION: Has the political unit experienced a democratic breakdown within the current episode?

CLARIFICATION: This variable captures whether, during the current episode of autocratization, the political unit experienced a democratic breakdown. In other words, it captures those years of autocratic regression that occur in an episode after a democratic breakdown occurred.

0– No democratic breakdown has occurred

1– A democratic breakdown has occurred

NOTES: This variable supersedes “sub aut ep” (ERT v1.2). This variable may be useful for those who wish to limit their analysis to the democratic years of an episode prior to a democratic breakdown.

REQUIRED VARIABLES: aut\_ep, reg\_trans, aut\_ep\_prch

FORMAT: dummy, [0,1]

#### 2.4.3.9 Democratic breakdown and autocratic regression (aut\_ep\_subreg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_aut\_ep\_subreg

*Original tag:* aut\_ep\_subreg

*Description:*

QUESTION: Did the current episode experience a democratic breakdown and subsequently autocratic regression?

CLARIFICATION: This variable is coded for episodes that experienced a democratic breakdown followed by autocratic regression. It is coded for the entire episode. It provides a further refinement of the outcome (aut ep outcome) for those who are interested in exploring which episodes culminated in breakdown versus those that continued autocratizing after the breakdown.

0– This episode does not experience a democratic breakdown and autocratic regression

1– This episode experiences a democratic breakdown and subsequently autocratic regression

REQUIRED VARIABLES: aut\_ep, reg\_trans, aut\_ep\_prch, aut\_ep\_pbr

FORMAT: dummy, [0,1]

#### 2.4.3.10 Autocratization outcome (aut\_ep\_outcome)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_aut\_ep\_outcome

*Original tag:* aut\_ep\_outcome

*Description:*

QUESTION: What was the outcome of the current autocratization episode?

CLARIFICATION: This variable captures detailed outcomes of the episodes. Episodes experiencing democratic breakdown are coded accordingly, even if the episode endures a subsequent period of autocratic regression. Separate variables (aut ep subreg, aut ep pbr) account for this variation.

0– There is no autocratization episode during this year.

1– Democratic breakdown. The episode resulted in the political unit (a) becoming a closed autocracy on RoW, (b) becoming an electoral autocracy and staying there for at least one election, or (c) becoming an electoral autocracy and staying there for at least the tolerance period (e.g. 5 years). Applies to entire episode, even if subsequent autocratic regression occurred.

2– Preempted democratic breakdown. The episode resulted the political unit becoming an electoral autocracy, but it reclaimed its democratic status without holding an autocratic founding election and within the tolerance period (e.g. 5 years).

3– Diminished democracy. While the democracy retained its democratic status, the episode resulted in depreciated levels of electoral democracy or a transition to electoral democracy from liberal democracy, that was sustained for the tolerance period (e.g. 5 years). Note - with the default parameters we do not observe this outcome.

4– Averted regression. The episode (a) never resulted in a change from liberal democracy, (b) resulted in an electoral democracy on the RoW measure but the political unit reverted back to liberal democracy, (c) resulted in an electoral democracy on the RoW measure but the political unit experienced a subsequent increase greater than or equal to the year turn parameter (e.g. 0.03) or a decline greater than or equal to the cum turn parameter (e.g. 0.10) on the EDI over the course of the tolerance period (e.g. 5 years).

5– Regressed autocracy. The episode resulted in further autocratization of a political unit that was already classified as autocratic in the pre-episode year.

6– Uncertain. The outcome of the episode is uncertain because it has the potential for a regime change (aut ep prch==1) but is ongoing in the final observation year of the dataset or before a gap in coding is encountered.

NOTE: This variable supersedes the older version (ERT v1.2) and has been recoded at the entire episode level. There may be a small number of observations (or none, depending on parameters) within each of these outcome types. Users should be aware and consider the more aggregate outcome types for statistical analysis.

REQUIRED VARIABLES: aut\_ep, row\_regch event, reg\_type, aut\_ep\_termination

FORMAT: categorical, [0,6]

#### 2.4.3.11 Aggregate Autocratization outcome (aut\_ep\_outcome\_agg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_aut\_ep\_outcome\_agg

*Original tag:* aut\_ep\_outcome\_agg

*Description:*

QUESTION: What was the aggregate outcome of the current autocratization episode?

CLARIFICATION: This variable captures aggregate outcomes of the episodes. Episodes experiencing democratic breakdown are coded accordingly, even if the episode endures a subsequent period of autocratic regression. Separate variables (aut ep subreg, aut ep pbr) account for this variation.

0– There is no autocratization episode during this year.

1– Democratic breakdown. The episode resulted in the political unit (a) becoming a closed autocracy on RoW, (b) becoming an electoral autocracy and staying there for at least one election, or (c) becoming an electoral autocracy and staying there for at least the tolerance period (e.g. 5 years). Applies to entire episode, even if subsequent autocratic regression occurred.

2– No democratic breakdown. The episode did not result in a change from democracy to autocracy on the RoW measure or it did result in a change between democracy and autocracy on the RoW measure, but the political unit did not hold an autocratic founding election or remain autocratic for the tolerance period (e.g. 5 years) before restoring democracy.

3– Regressed autocracy. The episode resulted in further autocratization of a political unit that was already classified as autocratic in the pre-episode year.

4– Uncertain. The outcome of the episode is uncertain because it has the potential for a regime change (aut ep prch==1) but is ongoing in the final observation year of the dataset or before a gap in coding is encountered.

NOTE: This variable provides an aggregate alternative to aut ep outcome that may be more useful for those engaging in statistical modeling.

REQUIRED VARIABLES: aut\_ep, row\_regch\_event, reg\_type, aut\_ep\_termination

FORMAT: categorical, [0,4]

#### 2.4.3.12 Autocratization episode censored (aut\_ep\_censored)

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_aut\_ep\_censored

*Original tag:* aut\_ep\_censored

*Description:*

QUESTION: Is the current autocratization episode censored?

CLARIFICATION: An autocratization episode may be censored if its end date corresponds with the date the coding for the case ends (i.e. codingend) or the year before a gap starts in the coding (i.e. gapstart1, gapstart2, gapstart3).

NOTE: This is coded for the entire episode. Thus, episodes where a period of democratic regression results in a breakdown may still be censored overall if the resulting period of autocratic regression is censored.

REQUIRED VARIABLES: aut\_ep\_end\_year, codingend, gapstart1, gapstart2, gapstart3

FORMAT: dummy, [0,1]

## 2.5 V-Dem V-Party Coder Level

**Dataset tag:** vdem\_vp\_coder\_level

**Description:** Includes global data on Political Parties at the coder level.

**Dataset citation:** Staffan I. Lindberg, Nils Düpont, Masaaki Higashijima, Yaman Berker Kavasoglu, Kyle L. Marquardt, Michael Bernhard, Holger Döring, Allen Hicken, Melis Laebens, Juraj Medzihorsky, Anja Neundorf, Ora John Reuter, Saskia Ruth-Lovell, Keith R. Weghorst, Nina Wiesehomeier, Joseph Wright, Nazifa Alizada, Paul Bederke, Lisa Gastaldi, Sandra Grahn, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Johannes von Römer, Steven Wilson, Daniel Pemstein, and Brigitte Seim. 2022. “Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party) Dataset V2”. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vpartydsv2>

and:

Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tselgov, Yi-ting Wang, Juraj Medzihorsky, Joshua Krusell, Farhad Miri, and Johannes von Römer. 2020. “The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data”. V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 5th edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute

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More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page:  
<https://www.v-dem.net/vpartyds.html>

### 2.5.1 Identifier Variables

This section lists the identifier variables in the V-Dem V-Party Dataset

#### 2.5.1.1 Country name abbreviation (A\*) (country\_text\_id)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_country\_text\_id

*Original tag:* country\_text\_id

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Abbreviated country names.

RESPONSES: Text

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: V-Dem Codebook

#### **2.5.1.2 Numeric party identifier (v2paid)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2paid

*Original tag:* v2paid

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Unique identifier for each party.

CLARIFICATION: Unique, numeric identifier for each party as recorded in Party Facts' core parties dataset (Döring and Regel 2019). In case a party changed names of scholars, sources, etc. used (slightly) different names when referring to this entity.)

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SOURCE(S): Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke 2021). For a full list of names used by a wide range of academic sources for the party in question see <https://partyfacts.herokuapp.com/data/partycodes/>.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

#### **2.5.1.3 Historical Date (A) (historical\_date)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_historical\_date

*Original tag:* historical\_date

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Variable designating the date for which observation is given.

CLARIFICATION: The date is coded in YYYY-MM-DD format. December 31st observation always refers to the situation at the end of the year. There can be observations on other dates signifying other events, i.e. elections or executive appointments.

RESPONSES: Numeric

NOTES: This variable is included in the V-Dem Country Year as well as Country Date datasets.

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: V-Dem Codebook

#### **2.5.1.4 Coder ID (coder\_id)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_coder\_id

*Original tag:* coder\_id

*Description:*

Coder ID

#### **2.5.1.5 V-Dem country ID (A) (country\_id)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_country\_id

*Original tag:* country\_id

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Unique country ID designated for each country.

RESPONSES: Numeric

NOTES: For more details on country units consult the V-Dem Country Coding Units document.

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.  
CITATION: V-Dem Codebook

## 2.5.2 Party Organisation

This section lists variables related to how parties operate and are organised internally.

### 2.5.2.1 Local Organizational Strength (v2paactcom)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2paactcom

*Original tag:* v2paactcom

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what degree are party activists and personnel permanently active in local communities?

CLARIFICATION: Please consider the degree to which party activists and personnel are active both during election and non-election periods. Party personnel refers to paid staff.

RESPONSES:

0: There is negligible permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

1: There is minor permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

2: There is noticeable permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

3: There is significant permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

4: There is widespread permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 2.5.2.2 Internal Cohesion (v2padisa)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2padisa

*Original tag:* v2padisa

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do the elites in this party display disagreement over party strategies?

CLARIFICATION: Party strategies include election campaign strategy, policy stance, distribution of party financial resources, cooperation with other parties (i.e. coalition formation), and the selection of legislative and presidential candidates as well as the party leader. Party elites are prominent and influential party members such as current and former ministers, members of parliament or the party leadership, regional and municipal leaders, and opinion leaders. They do not necessarily have to be the part of the official party leadership.

RESPONSES:

0: Party elites display almost complete disagreement over party strategies and many party elites have left the party.

1: Party elites display a high level of visible disagreement over party strategies and some of them have left the party.

2: Party elites display some visible disagreement over party strategies, but none of them have left the party.

3: Party elites display negligible visible disagreement over party strategies.

4: Party elites display virtually no visible disagreement over party strategies.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.



CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 2.5.2.3 Party resources (C) (v2pafunds)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2pafunds

*Original tag:* v2pafunds

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: What were the major sources of party funds for this election campaign?

CLARIFICATION: Choose up to three most important ones. If a main source of funding for this campaign

comes from the party's assets such as properties and stocks, please code where these assets originally came from.

RESPONSES:

0: Formal state subsidies for political parties. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_0]

1: Large-scale donations from individuals. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_1]

2: Large-scale donations from companies. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_2]

3: Large-scale donations from civil society organizations (including trade unions). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_3]

4: Membership fees and small-scale supporters' donations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_4] 5:

Informal use of state resources as incumbent party. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_5]

6: Funds of the party leader. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_6]

7: Funds of candidates. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_7]

SOURCE(S): Quality of Government Standard Dataset (2019).

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 2.5.2.4 Party support group (C) (v2pagroup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2pagroup

*Original tag:* v2pagroup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: To which particular group in society does the core membership and supporters of this party belong?

CLARIFICATION: Choose only the key groups. Though you may choose up to three groups, if only one

group is most relevant, please only choose that group.

RESPONSES: 0: No specific, clearly identifiable group. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_0]

1: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_1]

2: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_2]

3: Business elites. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_4]

5: An ethnic or racial group(s). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_5]

6: A religious group(s). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_6]

7: Local elites, including customary chiefs. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_7]

8: Urban working classes, including labor unions. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_8]

9: Urban middle classes. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_9]

10: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_10]

11: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_11]

12: Regional groups or separatists. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_12]

13: Women. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_13]  
 14: Other specific groups. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_14]  
 DATA RELEASE: 1-2.  
 CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean  
 DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.5.2.5 Personalization of Party (v2paid)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2paid

*Original tag:* v2paid

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent is this party a vehicle for the personal will and priorities of one individual leader?

RESPONSES:

0: The party is not focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual leader.

1: The party is occasionally focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party leader.

2: The party is somewhat focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party leader.

3: The party is mainly focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party leader.

4: The party is solely focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party leader.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.5.2.6 Local Party Office (v2palocoff)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2palocoff

*Original tag:* v2palocoff

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does this party maintain permanent offices that operate outside of election campaigns at the local or municipal-level?

CLARIFICATION: By “local or municipal” we mean low level administrative divisions that are ranked below regions, provinces, or states. We refer to offices that ensure professional personal and continued interaction of the party with citizens. Permanent offices operate outside of election campaigns.

RESPONSES:

0: The party does not have permanent local offices.

1: The party has permanent local offices in few municipalities.

2: The party has permanent local offices in some municipalities.

3: The party has permanent local offices in most municipalities.

4: The party has permanent local offices in all or almost all municipalities.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.5.2.7 Candidate Nomination (v2panom)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2panom

*Original tag:* v2panom

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Which of the following options best describes the process by which the party decides on candidates for the national legislative elections?

CLARIFICATION: If nomination procedures vary across constituencies consider the most common practice.

RESPONSES:

0: The party leader unilaterally decides on which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections.

1: The national party leadership (i.e. an executive committee) collectively decides which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections.

2: Delegates of local/regional organizations decide which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections.

3: All party members decide on which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections in primaries/caucuses.

4: All registered voters decide on which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections in primaries/caucuses.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 2.5.2.8 Affiliate Organizations (v2pasoctie)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2pasoctie

*Original tag:* v2pasoctie

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does this party maintain ties to prominent social organizations?

CLARIFICATION: When evaluating the strength of ties between the party and social organizations please consider the degree to which social organizations contribute to party operations by providing material and personnel resources, propagating the party's message to its members and beyond, as well as by directly participating in the party's electoral campaign and/or mobilization efforts. Social organizations include: Religious organizations (e.g. churches, sects, charities), trade unions/syndical organizations or cooperatives, cultural and social associations (e.g. sports clubs, neighborhood associations), political associations (e.g. environmental protection) and professional and business associations. Social organizations do not include paramilitary units or militias.

RESPONSES:

0: The party does not maintain ties to any prominent social organization.

1: The party maintains weak ties to prominent social organizations.

2: The party maintains moderate ties to prominent social organizations.

3: The party maintains strong ties to prominent social organizations.

4: The party controls prominent social organizations.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 2.5.3 Party Identity

This section lists variables related to party identity and ideology.

#### 2.5.3.1 Anti-elitism (v2paanteli)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2paanteli

*Original tag:* v2paanteli

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How important is anti-elite rhetoric for this party?

CLARIFICATION: Elites are relatively small groups that have a greater say in society than others, for instance due to their political power, wealth or societal standing. The specific groups considered to be the elite may vary by country and even from party to party within the same country as do the terms used to describe them. In some cases, “elites” can also refer to an international elite.

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all important. The leadership of this party never makes statements against the elite.

1: Not important. The leadership of this party rarely makes statements against the elite.

2: Somewhat important. The leadership of this party sometimes makes statements against the elite.

3: Important. The leadership of this party often makes statements against the elite.

4: Very important. The leadership of this party makes statements against the elite whenever possible.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 2.5.3.2 Clientelism (v2paclient)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2paclient

*Original tag:* v2paclient

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do the party and its candidates provide targeted and excludable (clientelistic) goods and benefits - such as consumer goods, cash or preferential access to government services - in an effort to keep and gain votes?

CLARIFICATION: In some cases, parties and their candidates deliver targeted and excludable goods and benefits directly to individual voters with the explicit intention to keep or gain votes. In other cases, they rely on brokers or companies as intermediaries. In some countries, candidates promise procurement contracts or favorable regulatory decisions to companies in exchange for ensuring their workers vote for the party/candidate. Such efforts count as an instance of clientelism, if they are clearly targeted at one specific company and excludable. On the other hand, handing out of small gifts can be common in some contexts without the intention to “buy votes” but rather as courtesy or part of what all candidates do (“entry ticket”). Such activities do not count as attempts to “keep or gain votes”.

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. The party and its candidates do not provide targeted goods and benefits in order to keep and gain votes.

1: A minor extent. The party and its candidates provide targeted goods and benefits to a minor extent in order to keep and gain votes.

2: A moderate extent. The party and its candidates provide targeted goods and benefits to a moderate extent in order to keep and gain votes.

3: A large extent. The party and its candidates provide targeted goods and benefits to a sizeable extent in order to keep and gain votes.

4: As its main effort. The party and its candidates provide targeted goods and benefits to the extent that it constitutes the party’s main effort in order to keep and gain votes.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 2.5.3.3 Cultural Superiority (v2paculsup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2paculsup

*Original tag:* v2paculsup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the party leadership promote the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole?

CLARIFICATION: This question refers to key non-economic cleavages in society, which could, for example, be based on caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. This question further refers to cultural issues related to the national history and identity of a country. This question does not pertain to social groups based on gender or sexual orientation.

RESPONSES:

0: Strongly promotes. The party strongly promotes the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole.

1: Promotes. The party promotes the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole.

2: Ambiguous. The party does not take a specific position on the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole.

3: Opposes. The party opposes the promotion of the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole.

4: Strongly opposes. The party strongly opposes the promotion of the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.5.3.4 Gender Equality (v2pagender)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2pagender

*Original tag:* v2pagender

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What is the share of women in national-level leadership positions of this political party?

CLARIFICATION: This question does NOT concern the share of women in the legislature.

RESPONSES:

0: None.

1: Small minority (about 1-15percent).

2: Medium minority (about 16-25percent).

3: Large minority (about 26-39percent).

4: Balanced (about 40percent or more).

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.5.3.5 Immigration (v2paimmig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2paimmig

*Original tag:* v2paimmig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What is the party's position regarding immigration into the country?

CLARIFICATION: Immigration refers to individuals entering the country for an indefinite, long-term or permanent period of time.

RESPONSES:

0: Strongly opposes. This party strongly opposes all or almost all forms of immigration into the country.

1: Opposes. This party opposes most forms of immigration into the country.

2: Ambiguous/No position. This party has no clear policy with regard to immigration into the country.

3: Supports. This party supports most forms of immigration into the country.

4: Strongly supports. This party strongly supports all or almost all forms of immigration into the country.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 2.5.3.6 LGBT Social Equality (v2palgbt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2palgbt

*Original tag:* v2palgbt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What is this party's position toward social equality for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community?

RESPONSES:

0: Strongly opposes. This party is strongly opposed to LGBT social equality.

1: Opposes. This party is opposed to LGBT social equality.

2: Ambiguous/No position. This party has no clear policy with regard to LGBT social equality.

3: Supports. This party supports LGBT social equality.

4: Strongly supports. This party strongly supports LGBT social equality.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 2.5.3.7 Minority Rights (v2paminor)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2paminor

*Original tag:* v2paminor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: According to the leadership of this party, how often should the will of the majority be implemented even if doing so would violate the rights of minorities?

CLARIFICATION: This concerns the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which apply to everyone "without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." The declaration protects - among others - freedom of speech, property, religion, peaceful assembly and association.

RESPONSES:

0: Always. The leadership of this party argues that the will of the majority should always determine policy even if such policy violates minority rights.

1: Usually. The leadership of this party argues that the will of the majority should usually determine policy even if such policy violates minority rights.

2: Half of the time. The leadership of this party argues that the will of the majority should about half of the time determine policy even if such policy violate minority rights.

3: Usually not. The leadership of this party argues that the will of the majority should usually not determine policy if such policy violates minority rights.

4: Never. The leadership of this party argues that the will of the majority should never

determine policy if such policy violates minority rights.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.5.3.8 Political Opponents (v2paopresp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2paopresp

*Original tag:* v2paopresp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Prior to this election, have leaders of this party used severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents?

CLARIFICATION: Severe personal attacks and demonization includes dehumanizing opponents or describing them as an existential threat or as subversive, criminal or foreign agents.

RESPONSES:

0: Always. Party leaders always used severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents

1: Usually. Party leaders usually used severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents

2: About half of the time. Party leaders sometimes used severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents.

3: Usually not. Party leaders usually did not use severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents.

4: Never. Party leaders never used severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

CLEANING: Set to missing when there are more than two answers per coder for this question for a particular date, country, and party.

#### 2.5.3.9 People-centrism (v2papeople)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2papeople

*Original tag:* v2papeople

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do leaders of this party glorify the ordinary people and identify themselves as part of them?

CLARIFICATION: Many parties and leaders make reference to the “people”, but only some party leaders describe the ordinary people specifically as a homogenous group and emphasize/claim that they are part of this group and represent it. This means that they do not acknowledge the existence of divergent interests and values in society, but rather suggest that the “people” have a unified political will which should guide all political action. Often this group is glorified and romanticized, describing an ideal-typical ordinary person/commoner, who embodies the national ideal.

RESPONSES:

0: Never. The party leadership never glorifies and identifies with the ordinary people.

1: Usually not. The party leadership generally does not glorify and identify with the ordinary people.

2: About half of the time. The party leadership sometimes glorifies and identifies with the ordinary people.

3: Usually. The party leadership generally glorifies and identifies with the ordinary people, which they claim to represent.

4: Always. The party leadership always glorifies and identifies with the ordinary people, which they claim to represent.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 2.5.3.10 Political Pluralism (v2paplur)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2paplur

*Original tag:* v2paplur

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Prior to this election, to what extent was the leadership of this political party clearly committed to free and fair elections with multiple parties, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association?

CLARIFICATION: Party leaders show no commitment to such principles if they openly support an autocratic form of government without elections or freedom of speech, assembly and association (e.g. theocracy; single-party rule; revolutionary regime). Party leaders show a full commitment to key democratic principles if they unambiguously support freedom of speech, media, assembly and association and pledge to accept defeat in free and fair elections.

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all committed. The party leadership was not at all committed to free and fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.

1: Not committed. The party leadership was not committed to free and fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.

2: Weakly committed. The party leadership was weakly committed to free and fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.

3: Committed. The party leadership was committed to free and fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.

4: Fully committed. The party leadership was fully committed to free and fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 2.5.3.11 Religious Principles (v2parelig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2parelig

*Original tag:* v2parelig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does this party invoke God, religion, or sacred/religious texts to justify its positions?

RESPONSES:

0: Always, or almost always. The party almost always invokes God, religion, or sacred/religious texts to justify its positions.

1: Often, but not always. The party often, but not always, invokes God, religion, or religious texts to justify its positions.

2: About half of the time. The party about half of the time invokes God, religion, or religious texts to justify its positions.

3: Rarely. The party rarely invokes God, religion, or religious texts to justify its positions.

4: Never. The party never invokes God, religion, or religious texts to justify its positions.



DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 2.5.3.12 Economic Left-Right Scale (v2pariglef)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2pariglef

*Original tag:* v2pariglef

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Please locate the party in terms of its overall ideological stance on economic issues.

CLARIFICATION: Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. This includes higher taxes, more regulation and government spending and a more generous welfare state. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state.

RESPONSES:

0: Far-left.

1: Left.

2: Center-left.

3: Center.

4: Center-right.

5: Right.

6: Far-right.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 2.5.3.13 Salience and mobilization (C) (v2pasalie)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2pasalie

*Original tag:* v2pasalie

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following issues are most relevant for the party's effort to gain and keep voters?

CLARIFICATION: Choose only the key issue(s). Though you may choose up to three issues, if only one issue is most relevant, choose only that issue. Most of these issues have been covered in this survey; if you need additional clarification as to what a category represents, you can return to the relevant question.

RESPONSES: 0: Anti-elitism. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_0]

1: People-centrism. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_1]

2: Political pluralism (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_2]

3: Minority rights (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_3]

4: Immigration (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_4]

5: LGBT social equality (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_5]

6: Cultural superiority (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_6]

7: Religious principles (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_7]

8: Gender equality (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_8]

9: Welfare. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_9]

10: Economic issues (including infrastructure and taxes). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_10]

11: Clientelism in order to keep or gain votes (the distribution of targeted and excludable benefits towards supporters). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_11]

12: Environmental protection. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_12]  
13: Farmers' issues. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_13]  
14: The leader. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_14]  
15: Anti-corruption. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_15]  
16: Intimidation/violence. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_16]  
17: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_17]  
DATA RELEASE: 1-2.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates

#### 2.5.3.14 Rejection of Political Violence (v2paviol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2paviol

*Original tag:* v2paviol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the leadership of this party explicitly discourage the use of violence against domestic political opponents?

CLARIFICATION: "Domestic political opponents" refers to all political opponents, with the exception of those who are engaged in an armed conflict with the state. They may be other political parties or other political groups and movements.

RESPONSES:

0: Encourages. Leaders of this party often encourage the use of violence against domestic political opponents.

1: Sometimes encourages. Leaders of this party sometimes encourage the use of violence against domestic political opponents and generally refrain from discouraging it.

2: Discourages about half of the time. Leaders of this party occasionally discourage the use of violence against domestic political opponents, and do not encourage it.

3: Generally discourages. Leaders of this party often discourage the use of violence against its domestic political opponents.

4: Consistently discourages. Leaders of this party consistently reject the use of violence against its domestic political opponents.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.5.3.15 Welfare (v2pawelf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2pawelf

*Original tag:* v2pawelf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the party promote means-tested or universalistic welfare policies?

RESPONSES:

0: The party does not support either type of policies and opposes any public welfare policy.

1: The party solely promotes means-tested welfare policies.

2: The party mainly promotes means-tested policies, but a significant portion (e.g. 1/4 or 1/3) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population.

3: The party roughly equally supports means-tested and universalistic welfare policies.

4: The party mainly promotes universalistic policies, but a significant portion (e.g. 1/4 or 1/3) of its policies are means-tested.

5: The party solely promotes universalistic welfare policies for all groups of the society.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

*V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.5.3.16 Working Women (v2pawomlab)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2pawomlab

*Original tag:* v2pawomlab

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does this party support the equal participation of women in the labor market?

CLARIFICATION: Measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market include - but are not limited to - legal provisions on equal treatment and pay, parental leave and financial support for child care.

RESPONSES:

0: Strongly opposes. This party strongly opposes all or almost all types of measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.

1: Opposes. This party opposes most types of measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.

2: Ambiguous/No position. This party has no clear policy with regard to measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.

3: Supports. This party supports most types of measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.

4: Strongly supports. This party strongly supports all or almost all types of measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 2.5.4 Party Basics

This section lists variables related to basic party information.

#### 2.5.4.1 Party continuation (v2paelcont)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2paelcont

*Original tag:* v2paelcont

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Did the party participate in the previous election under its current name?

CLARIFICATION: This question concerns the election prior to the one you are coding. If you choose option 2, please provide the previous party name in the comments field.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, party participated in the previous election under the same name.

1: No, party did not participate in the previous election.

2: No, but the party participated in the previous election under a different name.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.5.4.2 Pariah Party (v2papariah)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vp\_coder\_level\_v2papariah

*Original tag:* v2papariah

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In the years before this election, to what extent have other parties distanced themselves from this party?

RESPONSES:

0: Entirely. All other parties are unwilling to accept formal or informal parliamentary support from this party (e.g. joint legislative initiative; toleration).

1: To a great extent. One or more parties has accepted informal parliamentary support from this party (e.g. joint legislative initiative; toleration) or has signaled that it would be willing to do so. No party is willing to accept formal support from this party.

2: To some extent. One or more parties has accepted formal parliamentary support from this party (e.g. formed a coalition) or has signaled that it would be willing to do so. Most other parties are not willing to accept informal support from this party (e.g. joint legislative initiative; toleration).

3: Not at all. One or more parties has accepted formal parliamentary support from this party (e.g. coalition) or has signaled that it would be willing to do so. Most other parties are willing to accept informal support from this party (e.g. joint legislative initiative; toleration).

NOTES: We show the following question for coding only for election years during which more than two parties won a substantial seat share (more than 5percent) in the election.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

## 2.6 V-Dem V-Party

**Dataset tag:** vdem\_vparty

**Description:** The V-Party dataset includes global data on Political Parties.

**Dataset citation:** Staffan I. Lindberg, Nils Düpont, Masaaki Higashijima, Yaman Berker Kavasoglu, Kyle L. Marquardt, Michael Bernhard, Holger Döring, Allen Hicken, Melis Laebens, Juraj Medzihorsky, Anja Neundorf, Ora John Reuter, Saskia Ruth-Lovell, Keith R. Weghorst, Nina Wiesehomeier, Joseph Wright, Nazifa Alizada, Paul Bederke, Lisa Gastaldi, Sandra Grahn, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Johannes von Römer, Steven Wilson, Daniel Pemstein, and Brigitte Seim. 2022. "Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party) Dataset V2". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vpartydsv2>

and:

Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tselgov, Yi-ting Wang, Juraj Medzihorsky, Joshua Krusell, Farhad Miri, and Johannes von Römer. 2020. "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data". V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 5th edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute

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More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page: <https://www.v-dem.net/vpartyds.html>

### 2.6.1 Identifier Variables

This section lists the identifier variables in the V-Dem V-Party Dataset

#### 2.6.1.1 Party name, English (v2paenname)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paenname

*Original tag:* v2paenname

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Harmonized English name.

CLARIFICATION: The most common English name for this party in political science datasets as recorded in Party Facts' core parties (Döring and Regel 2019).

RESPONSES:

Text

SOURCE(S): Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke 2021). For a full list of names used by a wide range of academic sources for the party in question see <https://partyfacts.herokuapp.com/data/partycodes/>.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

#### **2.6.1.2 Party name, Original (v2paorname)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paorname

*Original tag:* v2paorname

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Harmonized original party name

CLARIFICATION: The most common original name for this party in political science datasets as recorded in Party Facts' core parties (Döring and Regel 2019).

RESPONSES:

Text

SOURCE(S): Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke 2021). For a full list of names used by a wide range of academic sources for the party in question see <https://partyfacts.herokuapp.com/data/partycodes/>.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

#### **2.6.1.3 Party short name (v2pashname)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pashname

*Original tag:* v2pashname

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Harmonized short name

CLARIFICATION: Harmonized short name.

RESPONSES:

Text

SOURCE(S): Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke 2021). For a full list of names used by a wide range of academic sources for the party in question see <https://partyfacts.herokuapp.com/data/partycodes/>.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

#### **2.6.1.4 Numeric party identifier (v2paid)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paid

*Original tag:* v2paid

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Unique identifier for each party.

CLARIFICATION: Unique, numeric identifier for each party as recorded in Party Facts' core parties dataset (Döring and Regel 2019). In case a party changed names of scholars, sources, etc. used (slightly) different names when referring to this entity.)

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SOURCE(S): Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke 2021). For a full list of names

used by a wide range of academic sources for the party in question see <https://partyfacts.herokuapp.com/data/partycodes/>.  
DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

#### **2.6.1.5 Party Facts ID (A) (pf\_party\_id)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_pf\_party\_id

*Original tag:* pf\_party\_id

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Party Facts ID

SCALE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke 2021).

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

#### **2.6.1.6 Start and end year of gap in party coding (A) (party\_gaps)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_party\_gaps

*Original tag:* party\_gaps

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: The starting and ending year in which the party was out of national legislature.

CLARIFICATION: The default format is YYYY-YYYY. Several time spans can be listed in this manner and are separated by comma. The starting year indicates the first year after the available election year for a party. The ending gap year is specified as the last year before available election for the party in question.

RESPONSES:

Text

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

#### **2.6.1.7 Party Facts URL (A) (pf\_url)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_pf\_url

*Original tag:* pf\_url

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: URL to party's webpage at Party Facts website

SCALE: Text

SOURCE(S): Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke 2021).

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

#### **2.6.1.8 Country name (country\_name)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_country\_name

*Original tag:* country\_name

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Name of coded country.

CLARIFICATION: A V-Dem country is a political unit enjoying at least some degree of functional and/or formal sovereignty.

RESPONSES: Text

NOTES: For more details on country units consult the V-Dem Country Coding Units document.

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: V-Dem Codebook

#### **2.6.1.9 Time-Specific Country Name (histname)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_histname

*Original tag:* histname

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Name of coded country at different dates.

RESPONSES: Text

ANSWER-TYPE: Text

NOTES: For more details on country units consult the V-Dem Country Coding Units document.

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: V-Dem Codebook

#### **2.6.1.10 V-Dem country ID (A) (country\_id)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_country\_id

*Original tag:* country\_id

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Unique country ID designated for each country.

RESPONSES: Numeric

NOTES: For more details on country units consult the V-Dem Country Coding Units document.

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: V-Dem Codebook

#### **2.6.1.11 Country name abbreviation (A\*) (country\_text\_id)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_country\_text\_id

*Original tag:* country\_text\_id

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Abbreviated country names.

RESPONSES: Text

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: V-Dem Codebook

#### **2.6.1.12 Year (A) (year)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_year

*Original tag:* year

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Four-digit designation of the year for which an observation is given that ranges from the start to the end of the coding period.

RESPONSES: Numeric

NOTES: For more details on country units consult the V-Dem Country Coding Units document.

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: V-Dem Codebook

#### **2.6.1.13 Historical Date (A) (historical\_date)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_historical\_date

*Original tag:* historical\_date

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Variable designating the date for which observation is given.

CLARIFICATION: The date is coded in YYYY-MM-DD format. December 31st observation

always refers to the situation at the end of the year. There can be observations on other dates signifying other events, i.e. elections or executive appointments.

RESPONSES: Numeric

NOTES: This variable is included in the V-Dem Country Year as well as Country Date datasets.

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: V-Dem Codebook

#### **2.6.1.14 Start of coding period (A) (codingstart)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_codingstart

*Original tag:* codingstart

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Year in which coding of the country in question starts.

CLARIFICATION: V-Dem country coding starts in 1789, or from when a country first enjoyed at least

some degree of functional and/or formal sovereignty.

RESPONSES: Numeric

NOTES: For detailed information, please see the V-Dem Country Coding Units document.

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: V-Dem Codebook

#### **2.6.1.15 Gap in coding period starts (A) (gapstart)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_gapstart

*Original tag:* gapstart

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: The starting year in which country in question does not conform to V-Dem definition of an independent state in between the starting and ending year of coding.

CLARIFICATION: Year that indicates the gap start is the last date coded before the gap.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

NOTES: For more details about V-Dem country coding periods, please see the V-Dem Country Coding

Units document.

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: V-Dem Codebook

#### **2.6.1.16 Gap in coding period ends (A) (gapend)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_gapend

*Original tag:* gapend

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: The ending year in which country in question does not conform to V-Dem definition of an independent state in between the starting and ending year of coding.

CLARIFICATION: Year that indicates the gap end is the last date coded after the gap.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

NOTES: For more details about V-Dem country coding periods, please see the V-Dem Country Coding

Units document.

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: V-Dem Codebook

#### **2.6.1.17 End of coding period (A) (codingend)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_codingend



*Original tag:* codingend

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Either a maximum year of country coding period or the year when the country ceased to exist because it lost functional or formal sovereignty.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

NOTES: For more details about V-Dem country coding periods, please see the V-Dem Country Coding

Units document.

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: V-Dem Codebook

#### **2.6.1.18 V-Dem Project (project)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_project

*Original tag:* project

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Indication what project team has coded country in respective year.

RESPONSES:

0: Contemporary.

1: Historical.

2: Both (overlap).

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: V-Dem Codebook

#### **2.6.1.19 COW Country Code (E) (cowcode)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_cowcode

*Original tag:* COWcode

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Correlates of War (COW) project country codes.

RESPONSES: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Correlates of War Project (2017)

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: Correlates of War Project (2017)

YEARS: 1789-2020

#### **2.6.1.20 Gap index (A) (gap\_index)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_gap\_index

*Original tag:* gap\_index

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

CLARIFICATION: Indication that party was not present in national legislature.

RESPONSES: Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 2.

#### **2.6.1.21 CHES Party Code (E) (ches\_id)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ches\_id

*Original tag:* CHES\_ID

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Unique identifier for each party from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES).

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SOURCE(S): Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

#### **2.6.1.22 Region (geographic) (E) (e\_regiongeo)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_e\_regiongeo

*Original tag:* e\_regiongeo

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: In which geographic region is this country located?

CLARIFICATION: Regions are described based on geographic location.

RESPONSES:

- 1: Western Europe
- 2: Northern Europe
- 3: Southern Europe
- 4: Eastern Europe
- 5: Northern Africa
- 6: Western Africa
- 7: Middle Africa
- 8: Eastern Africa
- 9: Southern Africa
- 10: Western Asia
- 11: Central Asia
- 12: Eastern Asia
- 13: South-Eastern Asia
- 14: Southern Asia
- 15: Oceania (including Australia and the Pacific)
- 16: North America
- 17: Central America
- 18: South America
- 19: Caribbean (including Belize, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Guyana)

SOURCE(S): United Nations Statistics Division (2013).

NOTES: For the countries coded only in the historical project or for which the UN does not have the code, the region is coded by V-Dem Data Manager in accordance with the position of the neighboring countries.

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

YEARS: 1789-2020

#### **2.6.1.23 Region (politico-geographic) (E) (e\_regionpol)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_e\_regionpol

*Original tag:* e\_regionpol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: WIn which politico-geographic region is this country located?

RESPONSES:

- 1: Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central Asia, Mongolia, and German Democratic Republic)
- 2: Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic)
- 3: North Africa and the Middle East (including Israel and Turkey, but excluding Cyprus)
- 4: Sub-Saharan Africa
- 5: Western Europe and North America (including Australia, New Zealand, and Cyprus, but excluding German Democratic Republic)
- 6: Eastern Asia (including Japan, excluding Mongolia)
- 7: South-Eastern Asia
- 8: Southern Asia

9: The Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand)  
10: The Caribbean (including Guyana and Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic)  
SOURCE(S): Quality of Government Standard Dataset (2019).  
DATA RELEASE: 1-2.  
CITATION: Teorell et al. (2018).  
YEARS: 1789-2020

#### **2.6.1.24 Region (politico-geographic 6-category) (E) (e\_regionpol\_6c)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_e\_regionpol\_6c

*Original tag:* e\_regionpol\_6C

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: In which politico-geographic region is this country located?

CLARIFICATION: This is a tenfold politico-geographic classification of world regions, based on a mixture

of two considerations: geographical proximity (with Cyprus, German Democratic Republic, and Mongolia being recoded from original coding) and demarcation by area specialists having contributed to a regional understanding of democratization. The categories are as follow:

RESPONSES: 1: Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central Asia, Mongolia, and German Democratic Republic)

2: Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic)

3: North Africa and the Middle East (including Israel and Turkey, but excluding Cyprus)

4: Sub-Saharan Africa

5: Western Europe and North America (including Australia, New Zealand, and Cyprus, but excluding German Democratic Republic)

6: Eastern Asia (including Japan, excluding Mongolia)

7: South-Eastern Asia

8: Southern Asia

9: The Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand)

10: The Caribbean (including Guyana and Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic)

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: Teorell et al. (2018).

YEARS: 1789-2020

#### **2.6.1.25 GPS Party Code (E) (gps\_id)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_gps\_id

*Original tag:* GPS\_ID

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Unique numeric code for each party in the Global Party Survey (GPS) dataset.

RESPONSES: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Norris (2020).

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: Norris (2020).

### **2.6.2 Indices**

This section lists variables related to indices.

#### **2.6.2.1 Anti-Pluralism Index (D) (v2xpa\_antiplural)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2xpa\_antiplural

*Original tag:* v2xpa\_antiplural

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

QUESTION: To what extent does the party show a lacking commitment to democratic norms prior to elections?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

SOURCE(S): v2paopresp v2paplur v2paminor v2paviol

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is computed as a transformed weighted average of the input variables using the following formula:

$$v2xpa\_antiplural_i = 1 - \Phi \left( \frac{0.5 * v2paopresp_i + 2 * v2paplur_i + v2paminor_i + v2paviol_i}{4.5} \right),$$

where  $i$  indexes observations and  $\Phi$  is the standard normal cumulative density function.

For each observation, the posterior distribution of the index is obtained by computing the value of the index for each draw from the posterior distributions of v2paopresp<sub>*i*</sub>, v2paplur<sub>*i*</sub>, v2paminor<sub>*i*</sub> and v2paviol<sub>*i*</sub>, and then summarized.

### 2.6.2.2 Populism Index (D) (v2xpa\_popul)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2xpa\_popul

*Original tag:* v2xpa\_popul

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

QUESTION: To what extent do representatives of the party use populist rhetoric (narrowly defined)?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

SOURCE(S): v2paanteli v2papeople

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is computed as the harmonic mean of rescaled v2paanteli\_osp and v2papeople\_osp posterior distributions, using the following formula:

$$v2xpa\_popul_i = \frac{2}{\frac{1}{x_i} + \frac{1}{y_i}},$$

where  $i$  indexes each observation,

$$x_i = \frac{1}{4}v2paanteli\_osp_i,$$

and

$$y_i = \frac{1}{4}v2papeople\_osp_i.$$

For each observation, the posterior distribution of the index is obtained by computing the value of the index for each draw from the posterior distributions of v2paanteli\_osp<sub>*i*</sub> and v2papeople\_osp<sub>*i*</sub>, and then summarized.

## 2.6.3 Party Basics

This section lists variables related to basic party information.

### 2.6.3.1 Seat share (v2paseatshare)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paseatshare

*Original tag:* v2paseatshare

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

QUESTION: Seat share the party gained in the election to the lower chamber.

RESPONSES:  
Numeric  
SOURCE(S): Döring and Düpont (2020).  
DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### **2.6.3.2 Seat number (v2panumbseat)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2panumbseat

*Original tag:* v2panumbseat

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
QUESTION: Number of seats the party gained in the election to the lower chamber.  
RESPONSES:  
Numeric  
SOURCE(S): Döring and Düpont (2020).  
DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### **2.6.3.3 Seats total (v2patotalseat)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2patotalseat

*Original tag:* v2patotalseat

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
QUESTION: Total number of seats in the lower chamber.  
RESPONSES:  
Numeric  
SOURCE(S): Döring and Düpont (2020).  
DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### **2.6.3.4 Vote share (v2pavote)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pavote

*Original tag:* v2pavote

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
QUESTION: Vote share the party gained in the election to the lower chamber.  
RESPONSES:  
Numeric  
SOURCE(S): Döring and Düpont (2020).  
DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### **2.6.3.5 Temporary pre-electoral alliance (v2paallian)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paallian

*Original tag:* v2paallian

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A  
QUESTION: Was the party part of a temporary pre-electoral alliance in this national election or is the entity actually an alliance?  
RESPONSES:  
0: No.  
1: Yes, party was part of an alliance.  
2: Yes, entity is an alliance of two or more parties.  
SOURCE(S): Döring and Düpont (2020).

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### **2.6.3.6 Name of temporary pre-electoral alliance (v2panaallian)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2panaallian

*Original tag:* v2panaallian

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

QUESTION: If the party was part of a temporary pre-electoral temporary alliance, what was the name of that alliance?

RESPONSES:

Text

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2paallian is 0.

#### **2.6.3.7 Vote share of temporary pre-electoral alliance (v2pavallian)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pavallian

*Original tag:* v2pavallian

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

QUESTION: If the party was part of a temporary pre-electoral temporary alliance, what was the vote share of the alliance?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2paallian is 0.

#### **2.6.3.8 Seats of temporary pre-electoral alliance (v2panoallian)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2panoallian

*Original tag:* v2panoallian

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

QUESTION: If the party was part of a temporary pre-electoral temporary alliance, how many seats did the alliance gain?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2paallian is 0.

#### **2.6.3.9 Party continuation (v2paelcont)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paelcont

*Original tag:* v2paelcont

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Did the party participate in the previous election under its current name?

CLARIFICATION: This question concerns the election prior to the one you are coding. If you choose option 2, please provide the previous party name in the comments field.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, party participated in the previous election under the same name.

1: No, party did not participate in the previous election.

2: No, but the party participated in the previous election under a different name.  
DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### **2.6.3.10 Party continuation (C) (v2paelcont\_\_nr)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paelcont\_nr

*Original tag:* v2paelcont\_nr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_\_nr

QUESTION: Did the party participate in the previous election under its current name?

RESPONSES: 0: Yes, party participated in the previous election under the same name.

1: No, party did not participate in the previous election.

2: No, but the party participated in the previous election under a different name.

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### **2.6.3.11 Government support (v2pagovsup)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pagovsup

*Original tag:* v2pagovsup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A,C

QUESTION: Does this party support the government formed immediately after this election?

CLARIFICATION: This question refers to the initial support, by the party, of the first government formed based on this election. It does not include caretaker cabinets that are in office until the first cabinet forms.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, as senior partner. The Head of Government belongs to this party.

1: Yes, as junior partner. The Head of Government does not belong to this party, but one or more cabinet ministers do.

2: Yes, but the party is not officially represented in government.

3: No, party is in opposition to the government.

4: Not applicable. No government took office based on this election (yet).

NOTES: The data collected using expert survey and aggregated by mode was cross-checked by a research assistant.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### **2.6.3.12 Pariah Party (v2papariah)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2papariah

*Original tag:* v2papariah

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_\_osp, \*\_\_ord, \*\_\_codelow, \*\_\_codehigh, \*\_\_sd, \*\_\_mean, \*\_\_nr

QUESTION: In the years before this election, to what extent have other parties distanced themselves from this party?

RESPONSES:

0: Entirely. All other parties are unwilling to accept formal or informal parliamentary support from this party (e.g. joint legislative initiative; toleration).

1: To a great extent. One or more parties has accepted informal parliamentary support from this party (e.g. joint legislative initiative; toleration) or has signaled that it would be willing to do so. No party is willing to accept formal support from this party.

2: To some extent. One or more parties has accepted formal parliamentary support from this party (e.g. formed a coalition) or has signaled that it would be willing to do so. Most other parties are not willing to accept informal support from this party (e.g. joint legislative initiative; toleration).

3: Not at all. One or more parties has accepted formal parliamentary support from this party (e.g. coalition) or has signaled that it would be willing to do so. Most other parties are willing to accept informal support from this party (e.g. joint legislative initiative; toleration).

NOTES: We show the following question for coding only for election years during which more than two parties won a substantial seat share (more than 5percent) in the election.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

## 2.6.4 Party Identity

This section lists variables related to party identity and ideology.

### 2.6.4.1 Anti-elitism (v2paanteli)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paanteli

*Original tag:* v2paanteli

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How important is anti-elite rhetoric for this party?

CLARIFICATION: Elites are relatively small groups that have a greater say in society than others, for instance due to their political power, wealth or societal standing. The specific groups considered to be the elite may vary by country and even from party to party within the same country as do the terms used to describe them. In some cases, “elites” can also refer to an international elite.

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all important. The leadership of this party never makes statements against the elite.

1: Not important. The leadership of this party rarely makes statements against the elite.

2: Somewhat important. The leadership of this party sometimes makes statements against the elite.

3: Important. The leadership of this party often makes statements against the elite.

4: Very important. The leadership of this party makes statements against the elite whenever possible.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 2.6.4.2 People-centrism (v2papeople)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2papeople

*Original tag:* v2papeople

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do leaders of this party glorify the ordinary people and identify themselves as part of them?

CLARIFICATION: Many parties and leaders make reference to the “people”, but only some party leaders describe the ordinary people specifically as a homogenous group and emphasize/claim that they are part of this group and represent it. This means that they do not acknowledge the existence of divergent interests and values in society, but rather suggest that the “people” have a unified political will which should guide all political action. Often



this group is glorified and romanticized, describing an ideal-typical ordinary person/commoner, who embodies the national ideal.

RESPONSES:

0: Never. The party leadership never glorifies and identifies with the ordinary people.

1: Usually not. The party leadership generally does not glorify and identify with the ordinary people.

2: About half of the time. The party leadership sometimes glorifies and identifies with the ordinary people.

3: Usually. The party leadership generally glorifies and identifies with the ordinary people, which they claim to represent.

4: Always. The party leadership always glorifies and identifies with the ordinary people, which they claim to represent.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.4.3 Political Opponents (v2paopresp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paopresp

*Original tag:* v2paopresp

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Prior to this election, have leaders of this party used severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents?

CLARIFICATION: Severe personal attacks and demonization includes dehumanizing opponents or describing them as an existential threat or as subversive, criminal or foreign agents.

RESPONSES:

0: Always. Party leaders always used severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents

1: Usually. Party leaders usually used severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents

2: About half of the time. Party leaders sometimes used severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents.

3: Usually not. Party leaders usually did not use severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents.

4: Never. Party leaders never used severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

CLEANING: Set to missing when there are more than two answers per coder for this question for a particular date, country, and party.

#### 2.6.4.4 Political Pluralism (v2paplur)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paplur

*Original tag:* v2paplur

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Prior to this election, to what extent was the leadership of this political party clearly committed to free and fair elections with multiple parties, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association?

CLARIFICATION: Party leaders show no commitment to such principles if they openly

support an autocratic form of government without elections or freedom of speech, assembly and association (e.g. theocracy; single-party rule; revolutionary regime). Party leaders show a full commitment to key democratic principles if they unambiguously support freedom of speech, media, assembly and association and pledge to accept defeat in free and fair elections.  
RESPONSES:

0: Not at all committed. The party leadership was not at all committed to free and fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.

1: Not committed. The party leadership was not committed to free and fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.

2: Weakly committed. The party leadership was weakly committed to free and fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.

3: Committed. The party leadership was committed to free and fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.

4: Fully committed. The party leadership was fully committed to free and fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.4.5 Minority Rights (v2paminor)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paminor

*Original tag:* v2paminor

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: According to the leadership of this party, how often should the will of the majority be implemented even if doing so would violate the rights of minorities?

CLARIFICATION: This concerns the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which apply to everyone “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” The declaration protects - among others - freedom of speech, property, religion, peaceful assembly and association.

RESPONSES:

0: Always. The leadership of this party argues that the will of the majority should always determine policy even if such policy violates minority rights.

1: Usually. The leadership of this party argues that the will of the majority should usually determine policy even if such policy violates minority rights.

2: Half of the time. The leadership of this party argues that the will of the majority should about half of the time determine policy even if such policy violate minority rights.

3: Usually not. The leadership of this party argues that the will of the majority should usually not determine policy if such policy violates minority rights.

4: Never. The leadership of this party argues that the will of the majority should never determine policy if such policy violates minority rights.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.4.6 Rejection of Political Violence (v2paviol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paviol

*Original tag:* v2paviol

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the leadership of this party explicitly discourage the use of

violence against domestic political opponents?

CLARIFICATION: “Domestic political opponents” refers to all political opponents, with the exception of those who are engaged in an armed conflict with the state. They may be other political parties or other political groups and movements.

RESPONSES:

0: Encourages. Leaders of this party often encourage the use of violence against domestic political opponents.

1: Sometimes encourages. Leaders of this party sometimes encourage the use of violence against domestic political opponents and generally refrain from discouraging it.

2: Discourages about half of the time. Leaders of this party occasionally discourage the use of violence against domestic political opponents, and do not encourage it.

3: Generally discourages. Leaders of this party often discourage the use of violence against its domestic political opponents.

4: Consistently discourages. Leaders of this party consistently reject the use of violence against its domestic political opponents.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.4.7 Immigration (v2paimmig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paimmig

*Original tag:* v2paimmig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What is the party’s position regarding immigration into the country?

CLARIFICATION: Immigration refers to individuals entering the country for an indefinite, long-term or permanent period of time.

RESPONSES:

0: Strongly opposes. This party strongly opposes all or almost all forms of immigration into the country.

1: Opposes. This party opposes most forms of immigration into the country.

2: Ambiguous/No position. This party has no clear policy with regard to immigration into the country.

3: Supports. This party supports most forms of immigration into the country.

4: Strongly supports. This party strongly supports all or almost all forms of immigration into the country.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.4.8 LGBT Social Equality (v2palgbt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2palgbt

*Original tag:* v2palgbt

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What is this party’s position toward social equality for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community?

RESPONSES:

0: Strongly opposes. This party is strongly opposed to LGBT social equality.

1: Opposes. This party is opposed to LGBT social equality.

2: Ambiguous/No position. This party has no clear policy with regard to LGBT social equality.

3: Supports. This party supports LGBT social equality.

4: Strongly supports. This party strongly supports LGBT social equality.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.4.9 Cultural Superiority (v2paculsup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paculsup

*Original tag:* v2paculsup

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the party leadership promote the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole?

CLARIFICATION: This question refers to key non-economic cleavages in society, which could, for example, be based on caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. This question further refers to cultural issues related to the national history and identity of a country. This question does not pertain to social groups based on gender or sexual orientation.

RESPONSES:

0: Strongly promotes. The party strongly promotes the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole.

1: Promotes. The party promotes the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole.

2: Ambiguous. The party does not take a specific position on the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole.

3: Opposes. The party opposes the promotion of the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole.

4: Strongly opposes. The party strongly opposes the promotion of the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.4.10 Religious Principles (v2parelig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2parelig

*Original tag:* v2parelig

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does this party invoke God, religion, or sacred/religious texts to justify its positions?

RESPONSES:

0: Always, or almost always. The party almost always invokes God, religion, or sacred/religious texts to justify its positions.

1: Often, but not always. The party often, but not always, invokes God, religion, or religious texts to justify its positions.

2: About half of the time. The party about half of the time invokes God, religion, or religious texts to justify its positions.

3: Rarely. The party rarely invokes God, religion, or religious texts to justify its positions.

4: Never. The party never invokes God, religion, or religious texts to justify its positions.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.4.11 Gender Equality (v2pagender)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pagender

*Original tag:* v2pagender

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What is the share of women in national-level leadership positions of this political party?

CLARIFICATION: This question does NOT concern the share of women in the legislature.

RESPONSES:

0: None.

1: Small minority (about 1-15percent).

2: Medium minority (about 16-25percent).

3: Large minority (about 26-39percent).

4: Balanced (about 40percent or more).

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.4.12 Working Women (v2pawomlab)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pawomlab

*Original tag:* v2pawomlab

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does this party support the equal participation of women in the labor market?

CLARIFICATION: Measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market include - but are not limited to - legal provisions on equal treatment and pay, parental leave and financial support for child care.

RESPONSES:

0: Strongly opposes. This party strongly opposes all or almost all types of measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.

1: Opposes. This party opposes most types of measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.

2: Ambiguous/No position. This party has no clear policy with regard to measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.

3: Supports. This party supports most types of measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.

4: Strongly supports. This party strongly supports all or almost all types of measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.4.13 Economic Left-Right Scale (v2pariglef)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pariglef

*Original tag:* v2pariglef

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Please locate the party in terms of its overall ideological stance on economic issues.

CLARIFICATION: Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the

economy. This includes higher taxes, more regulation and government spending and a more generous welfare state. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state.

RESPONSES:

- 0: Far-left.
- 1: Left.
- 2: Center-left.
- 3: Center.
- 4: Center-right.
- 5: Right.
- 6: Far-right.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.4.14 Welfare (v2pawelf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pawelf

*Original tag:* v2pawelf

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the party promote means-tested or universalistic welfare policies?

RESPONSES:

- 0: The party does not support either type of policies and opposes any public welfare policy.
- 1: The party solely promotes means-tested welfare policies.
- 2: The party mainly promotes means-tested policies, but a significant portion (e.g. 1/4 or 1/3) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population.
- 3: The party roughly equally supports means-tested and universalistic welfare policies.
- 4: The party mainly promotes universalistic policies, but a significant portion (e.g. 1/4 or 1/3) of its policies are means-tested.
- 5: The party solely promotes universalistic welfare policies for all groups of the society.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.4.15 Clientelism (v2paclient)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paclient

*Original tag:* v2paclient

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do the party and its candidates provide targeted and excludable (clientelistic) goods and benefits - such as consumer goods, cash or preferential access to government services - in an effort to keep and gain votes?

CLARIFICATION: In some cases, parties and their candidates deliver targeted and excludable goods and benefits directly to individual voters with the explicit intention to keep or gain votes. In other cases, they rely on brokers or companies as intermediaries. In some countries, candidates promise procurement contracts or favorable regulatory decisions to companies in exchange for ensuring their workers vote for the party/candidate. Such efforts count as an instance of clientelism, if they are clearly targeted at one specific company and excludable. On the other hand, handing out of small gifts can be common in some contexts without the intention to “buy votes” but rather as courtesy or part of what all candidates do

(“entry ticket”). Such activities do not count as attempts to “keep or gain votes”.

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. The party and its candidates do not provide targeted goods and benefits in order to keep and gain votes.

1: A minor extent. The party and its candidates provide targeted goods and benefits to a minor extent in order to keep and gain votes.

2: A moderate extent. The party and its candidates provide targeted goods and benefits to a moderate extent in order to keep and gain votes.

3: A large extent. The party and its candidates provide targeted goods and benefits to a sizeable extent in order to keep and gain votes.

4: As its main effort. The party and its candidates provide targeted goods and benefits to the extent that it constitutes the party’s main effort in order to keep and gain votes.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.4.16 Salience and Mobilization (v2pasalie\_nr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pasalie\_nr

*Original tag:* v2pasalie\_nr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following issues are most relevant for the party’s effort to gain and keep voters?

CLARIFICATION: Choose only the key issue(s). Though you may choose up to three issues, if only one issue is most relevant, choose only that issue. Most of these issues have been covered in this survey; if you need additional clarification as to what a category represents, you can return to the relevant question.

RESPONSES: 0: Anti-elitism. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_0]

1: People-centrism. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_1]

2: Political pluralism (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_2]

3: Minority rights (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_3]

4: Immigration (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_4]

5: LGBT social equality (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_5]

6: Cultural superiority (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_6]

7: Religious principles (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_7]

8: Gender equality (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_8]

9: Welfare. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_9]

10: Economic issues (including infrastructure and taxes). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_10]

11: Clientelism in order to keep or gain votes (the distribution of targeted and excludable benefits towards supporters). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_11]

12: Environmental protection. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_12]

13: Farmers’ issues. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_13]

14: The leader. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_14]

15: Anti-corruption. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_15]

16: Intimidation/violence. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_16]

17: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_17]

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates

#### 2.6.5 Party Organisation

This section lists variables related to how parties operate and are organised internally.

##### 2.6.5.1 Local Party Office (v2palocoff)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2palocoff

*Original tag:* v2palocoff

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does this party maintain permanent offices that operate outside of election campaigns at the local or municipal-level?

CLARIFICATION: By “local or municipal” we mean low level administrative divisions that are ranked below regions, provinces, or states. We refer to offices that ensure professional personal and continued interaction of the party with citizens. Permanent offices operate outside of election campaigns.

RESPONSES:

0: The party does not have permanent local offices.

1: The party has permanent local offices in few municipalities.

2: The party has permanent local offices in some municipalities.

3: The party has permanent local offices in most municipalities.

4: The party has permanent local offices in all or almost all municipalities.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.5.2 Local Organizational Strength (v2paactcom)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paactcom

*Original tag:* v2paactcom

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what degree are party activists and personnel permanently active in local communities?

CLARIFICATION: Please consider the degree to which party activists and personnel are active both during election and non-election periods. Party personnel refers to paid staff.

RESPONSES:

0: There is negligible permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

1: There is minor permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

2: There is noticeable permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

3: There is significant permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

4: There is widespread permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.5.3 Affiliate Organizations (v2pasoctie)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pasoctie

*Original tag:* v2pasoctie

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does this party maintain ties to prominent social organizations?

CLARIFICATION: When evaluating the strength of ties between the party and social organizations please consider the degree to which social organizations contribute to party



operations by providing material and personnel resources, propagating the party's message to its members and beyond, as well as by directly participating in the party's electoral campaign and/or mobilization efforts. Social organizations include: Religious organizations (e.g. churches, sects, charities), trade unions/syndical organizations or cooperatives, cultural and social associations (e.g. sports clubs, neighborhood associations), political associations (e.g. environmental protection) and professional and business associations. Social organizations do not include paramilitary units or militias.

RESPONSES:

0: The party does not maintain ties to any prominent social organization.

1: The party maintains weak ties to prominent social organizations.

2: The party maintains moderate ties to prominent social organizations.

3: The party maintains strong ties to prominent social organizations.

4: The party controls prominent social organizations.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.5.4 Candidate Nomination (v2panom)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2panom

*Original tag:* v2panom

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following options best describes the process by which the party decides on candidates for the national legislative elections?

CLARIFICATION: If nomination procedures vary across constituencies consider the most common practice.

RESPONSES:

0: The party leader unilaterally decides on which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections.

1: The national party leadership (i.e. an executive committee) collectively decides which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections.

2: Delegates of local/regional organizations decide which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections.

3: All party members decide on which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections in primaries/caucuses.

4: All registered voters decide on which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections in primaries/caucuses.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.5.5 Internal Cohesion (v2padisa)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2padisa

*Original tag:* v2padisa

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do the elites in this party display disagreement over party strategies?

CLARIFICATION: Party strategies include election campaign strategy, policy stance, distribution of party financial resources, cooperation with other parties (i.e. coalition formation), and the selection of legislative and presidential candidates as well as the party leader. Party elites are prominent and influential party members such as current and former

ministers, members of parliament or the party leadership, regional and municipal leaders, and opinion leaders. They do not necessarily have to be the part of the official party leadership.

RESPONSES:

0: Party elites display almost complete disagreement over party strategies and many party elites have left the party.

1: Party elites display a high level of visible disagreement over party strategies and some of them have left the party.

2: Party elites display some visible disagreement over party strategies, but none of them have left the party.

3: Party elites display negligible visible disagreement over party strategies.

4: Party elites display virtually no visible disagreement over party strategies.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.5.6 Personalization of Party (v2paid)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paid

*Original tag:* v2paid

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent is this party a vehicle for the personal will and priorities of one individual leader?

RESPONSES:

0: The party is not focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual leader.

1: The party is occasionally focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party leader.

2: The party is somewhat focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party leader.

3: The party is mainly focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party leader.

4: The party is solely focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party leader.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.5.7 Party Resources (v2pafunds\_nr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pafunds\_nr

*Original tag:* v2pafunds\_nr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: What were the major sources of party funds for this election campaign?

CLARIFICATION: Choose up to three most important ones. If a main source of funding for this campaign

comes from the party's assets such as properties and stocks, please code where these assets originally came from.

RESPONSES:

0: Formal state subsidies for political parties. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_0]

1: Large-scale donations from individuals. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_1]

2: Large-scale donations from companies. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_2]

3: Large-scale donations from civil society organizations (including trade unions). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_3]

4: Membership fees and small-scale supporters' donations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_4]

5: Informal use of state resources as incumbent party. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_5]

6: Funds of the party leader. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_6]  
 7: Funds of candidates. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_7]  
 SOURCE(S): Quality of Government Standard Dataset (2019).  
 DATA RELEASE: 1-2.  
 CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean  
 DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.5.8 Party Support Group (v2pagroup\_nr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pagroup\_nr

*Original tag:* v2pagroup\_nr

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: To which particular group in society does the core membership and supporters of this party belong?

CLARIFICATION: Choose only the key groups. Though you may choose up to three groups, if only one

group is most relevant, please only choose that group.

RESPONSES: 0: No specific, clearly identifiable group. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_0]

1: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_1]

2: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_2]

3: Business elites. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_4]

5: An ethnic or racial group(s). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_5]

6: A religious group(s). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_6]

7: Local elites, including customary chiefs. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_7]

8: Urban working classes, including labor unions. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_8]

9: Urban middle classes. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_9]

10: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_10]

11: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_11]

12: Regional groups or separatists. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_12]

13: Women. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_13]

14: Other specific groups. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_14]

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 2.6.6 Populism

This section lists variables measuring populist features of parties.

##### 2.6.6.1 Salience of anti-establishment rhetoric (E) (ep\_antielite\_salience)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_antielite\_salience

*Original tag:* ep\_antielite\_salience

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “Not important at all” to “Extremely important” (0–10)

SOURCE(S): Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

#### 2.6.6.2 Saliency of reducing political corruption (E) (ep\_corrupt\_salience)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_corrupt\_salience

*Original tag:* ep\_corrupt\_salience

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the saliency of reducing political corruption?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “Not important at all” to “Extremely important” (0–10)

SOURCE(S): Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

#### 2.6.6.3 Members vs. leadership party policy choices (E) (ep\_members\_vs\_leadership)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_members\_vs\_leadership

*Original tag:* ep\_members\_vs\_leadership

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the position on whether members/activists or leadership has control over party policy choices?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “Members/activists have complete control over party policy choices” to “Leadership had complete control over party policy choices” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

#### 2.6.6.4 Position on direct vs. representative democracy (E) (ep\_people\_vs\_elite)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_people\_vs\_elite

*Original tag:* ep\_people\_vs\_elite

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the position on direct vs. representative democracy?

CLARIFICATION: Some political parties take the position that “the people” should have the final say on the most important issues, for example, by voting directly in referendums. At the opposite pole are political parties that believe that elected representatives should make the most important political decisions.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “Elected office holders should make the most important decisions” to “«The people», not politicians, should make the most important decisions” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

NOTES: In CHES 2019 survey words “direct” and “representative democracy” are changed to “people” and “elected representatives” accordingly. For this codebook, the entry in CHES 2017 survey was used.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

#### 2.6.6.5 Populism type (E) (ep\_type\_populism)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_type\_populism

*Original tag:* ep\_type\_populism

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: The Party Populism typology categorizes whether parties favor the use of pluralism or populist rhetoric categorized into four groups (V8\_Ord).

RESPONSES:

- 1: Strongly Pluralist.
- 2: Moderately Pluralist.
- 3: Moderately Populist.
- 4: Strongly Populist.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Norris (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Norris (2020)

#### 2.6.6.6 Populist values type (E) (ep\_type\_populist\_values)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_type\_populist\_values

*Original tag:* ep\_type\_populist\_values

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: The Populist Values typology combines the categories of rhetoric (V8\_Bin) and the social values (B6\_Bin) for each party.

RESPONSES:

- 1: Pluralist–Liberal.
- 2: Pluralist–Conservative.
- 3: Populist–Liberal.
- 4: Populist–Conservative.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Norris (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Norris (2020)

#### 2.6.6.7 Populist rhetoric (E) (ep\_v8\_popul\_rhetoric)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_v8\_popul\_rhetoric

*Original tag:* ep\_v8\_popul\_rhetoric

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Where would you place each party on the following scale?

CLARIFICATION: Parties can also be classified by their current use of *populist* or *pluralist* rhetoric. *Populist* language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people should prevail. By contrast, *pluralist* rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining and compromise, as well as checks and balances on executive power.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “Strongly favors pluralist rhetoric” to “Strongly favors populist rhetoric” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Norris (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Norris (2020)

#### 2.6.6.8 Populist saliency (E) (ep\_v9\_popul\_saliency)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_v9\_popul\_saliency

*Original tag:* ep\_v9\_popul\_saliency

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: And how *important* is populist rhetoric currently for each of the following parties?

Where would you place each party on the following scale?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “No importance” to “Great importance” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Norris (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Norris (2020)

### 2.6.7 Liberal-Traditional Scaling

This section measures whether parties lean towards liberal values or traditional values.

#### 2.6.7.1 Position on democratic freedoms and rights (E) (ep\_galtan)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_galtan

*Original tag:* ep\_galtan

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the position of the party in a particular year in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights?

CLARIFICATION: “Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “Libertarian/Postmaterialist” to “Traditional/Authoritarian” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

NOTES: In CHES 2019 survey words “democratic freedoms” and “rights” in the wording of the question are changed to “social” and “cultural values” accordingly. The formulation of the clarification section is also nonsignificantly different in comparison with CHES 1999-2017, which is used in this codebook.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

#### 2.6.7.2 Salience of libertarian or traditional issues (E) (ep\_galtan\_salience)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_galtan\_salience

*Original tag:* ep\_galtan\_salience

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the relative salience of libertarian/traditional issues in the party’s public stance in a particular year?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “No importance” to “Great importance” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

#### 2.6.7.3 Social Liberalism-Conservatism (E) (ep\_v6\_lib\_cons)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_v6\_lib\_cons

*Original tag:* ep\_v6\_lib\_cons

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Where would you place each party on the following scale?

CLARIFICATION: Parties can also be classified by their current social values. Those with *liberal* values favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with *conservative* values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “Very liberal” to “Very conservative” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Norris (2020)

NOTES: Only original score is included.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Norris (2020)

#### 2.6.7.4 Social values saliency (E) (ep\_v7\_lib\_cons\_saliency)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_v7\_lib\_cons\_saliency

*Original tag:* ep\_v7\_lib\_cons\_saliency

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: And how *important* are liberal/conservative social values for each of the following parties? Where would you place each party on the following scale?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “No importance” to “Great importance” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Norris (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Norris (2020)

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