

# Codebook

## Political Parties and Elections



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Based on Demscore  
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# 1 Explanatory Notes

## 1.1 Release Notes v3

Demscore provides worldwide free access to harmonized data on Democracy, Environment, Migration, Social Policy, Conflict and Representation from several of the world's most prominent social science research institutes. The interdisciplinary nature of Demscore data facilitates large-scale comparative analyses. This is essential to advance adequate policy responses to complex societal challenges associated with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and beyond, facing Sweden, Europe, and the world today.

With a firm commitment to transparency and openness, Demscore v3 enables users to gain comprehensive insights into various topics across the social sciences. The joint infrastructure ensures data integrity and quality at the highest international standards and maximizes usability in the measurement of contextual data with 25.000 variables across nearly all countries in the world, from 1750 to the present.

This creates critical time- and cost saving advantages in data collection, management, distribution, and not the least for end-users in the scientific community. Demscore's unique approach to translating and merging data scales up to a total of 378.876 variable versions available in the infrastructure, storing more than 10 billion non-missing observations.

This collaborative effort between leading Swedish universities pushes the scale of social science data to a new level and offers unprecedented possibilities for interdisciplinary research and knowledge advancement.

These are the key features of Demscore:

1. **Customized Download:** A fully normalized, joint PostgreSQL database, sophisticated programming, and a user-friendly web-based interface for users to generate custom-designed datasets and codebooks for download.
2. **Translations and Data Merges:** Demscore currently offers more than 1000 merge options between datasets.
3. **Metadata:** Demscore takes information on and organization of metadata to new heights with the inclusion of customized codebooks, a detailed methodology document, and a comprehensive handbook.
4. **Handling of Missing Data:** Demscore pioneers in developing an innovative approach to tackle missing data. Researchers can now account for missing values with increased precision, leading to more robust and reliable analyses.
5. **Merge Scores:** Demscore introduces a unique merge mechanism. This powerful tool enables researchers to combine datasets effortlessly, uncovering connections and patterns that were previously hidden in isolated data silos.
6. **Thematic Datasets:** Demscore provides researchers with curated thematic datasets, each focused on a specific topic. These datasets bring together relevant variables from across the Demscore partners, facilitating in-depth investigations and comprehensive analyses of specific domains.
7. **Interactive Web Portal:** In addition to all the above, Demscore's web portal offers interactive visualization tools, user support and additional information on all partners and data sources.

For more information, please visit <https://www.demscore.se/> or contact [contact@demscore.se](mailto:contact@demscore.se).

## 1.2 New in Demscore version 3

A detailed description of changes and additions made for version 3 compared to version 2 can be found in the Methodology Document.

## 1.3 The Demscore Codebook

The autogenerated Demscore Codebook lists variable entries for those variables chosen by the user along with citation guidelines and licenses per variable.

The meta data is extracted from the codebooks per dataset stored in a table in the Demscore PostgreSQL database with one row per variable for all datasets. This table includes codebook entries, variable tags, labels, and other variable information in LaTeX format used to generate an automated codebook.

Demscore maintains a single set of standard entries for metadata across all datasets, to which all project members contribute their information. Additionally, variables within different datasets may have varying sets of additional information requirements specific to each dataset. These dataset-specific entries are also included, but they are presented as variable-specific metadata beneath the standard entries.

At the outset of the harmonization process, Demscore underwent a thorough variable name cleanup. This involved tasks such as replacing spaces or dots in variable names with underscores and converting all letters to lowercase. Notably, the original tags remain preserved and stored in the PostgreSQL table. Each variable in Demscore is accessible in both short and long forms. The short form comprises the cleaned version of the original variable tag, while the long form starts with the dataset name from which it originates, followed by the cleaned variable name.

For instance, the original name of the variable *MinisterPersonalID* from the H-DATA Foreign Minister Dataset is included as *ministerpersonalid* (short form) and *hdata\_fomin\_ministerpersonalid* (long form) in Demscore.

In addition, each dataset includes Demscore unit-identifier variables which are named according to the following naming scheme: Beginning with *u\_*, followed by the name of the primary unit and finally the variable tag. The *year-* variable from the COMPLAB SPIN The Out-of-Work Benefits Dataset (OUTWB), which is part of the primary unit *u\_complab\_country\_year* has the Demscore unit identifier name *u\_complab\_country\_year\_year*.

## 1.4 Methodology

For details on our methodology please see the Demscore Methodology document available for download on the Demscore website.

## 1.5 Citations

The Demscore project does not have a formal citation of its own. Hence, when using Demscore, we suggest that you cite the respective projects and datasets. We indicate how every dataset is to be cited in the autogenerated codebook you retrieve with your data download, both in the dataset description and the codebook entry for each variable. Most often it is sufficient to cite the dataset a variable originates from, but sometimes there is a variable specific citation listed in the codebook entry in addition to that. For these cases, please also add the variable specific citation to the reference list of your publication. Full references are linked in the codebook entries of the variables and listed in the codebook's bibliography. We suggest you to also cite the Demscore Methodology Document when using data retrieved through Demscore.

## 1.6 Missing Data

Demscore indicates different types of missingness for observations in the customized datasets:  
**Missing in original data** = Whenever an observation in the original variable is a missing (NA, missing code such as 7777, blank cell), we preserve this missing value. When the original source has special codes for various types of missing, those are preserved.

**Missing code: -11111** = Demscore code for observation is missing due to the translation/merge, i.e., missing data due to no data being included for this combination of identifiers in the end Output Unit.

**Missing code: -22222** = No observation is merged/translated, but the original data contains information for these identifier combinations elsewhere. For these cases, we use a different code. The

user needs to consult the reference documents (Methodology Document Section 5.1. or the Demscore Handbook) to clarify why the translation to the identifier combinations in the end Output Unit was not possible.

Please note that an observation that is missing in its original output unit does not take the value -11111, but appears as NA/blank cell in the customized dataset.

## 1.7 Download ID

The download ID allows the user to share the ID with other users for replication purposes. A user can type the download ID into the Demscore website and retrieve the same download selection and files as the original user. This ID is autogenerated for each download from the Demscore website and will always retrieve the same data, even if the Demscore version was updated in the meantime.

Download ID:

## 1.8 Unit Identifier Variables

An Output Unit is defined as an output format in which variables can be retrieved from one or more datasets through a strictly defined output grid. A unit table defining this output grid contains unit identifier columns with `u_` prefixes and the table is sorted based on these unit identifier columns and has a fixed number of rows. Unit columns are based on the columns that constitute the unit of analysis in a dataset. They are added to the original dataset and marked by a unit prefix (consisting of a `u_` and the dataset unit name) before the original variable name. Unit columns can contain slightly modified data, e.g., missing values are replaced by a default value. Sometimes we add additional columns to the unit table, for instance if a dataset includes both a `country_id` column with a numeric country code, we add the variable storing the full country name to the unit table as well for better readability.

## 1.9 Thematic Dataset

All variables on political parties and elections

### 1.10 Output Unit Identifier Variables in the Chosen Unit

`u_vdem_party_country_year_country_name`: The column is a duplicate of `country_name` in the V-Dem V-Party dataset.

`u_vdem_party_country_year_country_text_id`: The column is a duplicate of `country_text_id` in the V-Dem V-Party dataset.

`u_vdem_party_country_year_v2paenname`: The column is a duplicate of `v2paenname` in the V-Dem V-Party dataset.

`u_vdem_party_country_year_v2paid`: The column is a duplicate of the party identifier `v2paid` in the V-Dem V-Party dataset.

`u_vdem_party_country_year_year`: The column is a duplicate of `year` in the V-Dem V-Party dataset.

## 2 H-DATA

**The Historical Data Archive (H-DATA)** is a hub of historical country-level data running as far back as the French revolution (1789) and offers unparalleled depth of data and temporality, enabling researchers to answer critical questions about the past but to also understand the origins of, and find historical parallels to, present-day problems. H-DATA works to collect, integrate, and curate historical data from Demscore's other modules. By adding this long-term historical dimension, H-DATA makes it possible for researchers to study the path dependency of political institutions where changes are incremental or rare thus making long time-series essential to understanding their causes and consequences. By extending data back into time, H-DATA helps deepen and further our understanding of the conditions of the complex global challenges that we face today. More information is available on the project's website: <https://www.su.se/english/research/research-projects/h-data>

### 2.1 H-DATA Foreign Minister Dataset

**Dataset tag:** hdata\_fomin

**Output Unit:** H-DATA Minister-Year, i.e., data is collected per foreign minister and the date they got into office.

**Description:** For their article "War, Performance, and the Survival of Foreign Ministers", Hanna Bäck, Jan Teorell, Alexander Von Hagen-Jamar and Alejandro Quiroz Flores created The Foreign Minister Dataset. The Foreign Minister Dataset consists of comparative historical data on foreign ministers' background and reasons for leaving office in the world's 13 former and current great powers from 1789 to the present. The data covers 1155 regular (non-acting) foreign ministers, as well as partial information on 173 acting foreign ministers, for the following 13 great powers: Austria (the Habsburg Empire/Austria-Hungary), Britain, China (Qing Empire/Republic/People's Republic of China), France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Prussia/Germany, the Ottoman Empire/Turkey, Russia, Spain, Sweden and the United States.

**Dataset citation:** When using this dataset, please cite the following paper:

Hanna Bäck, Jan Teorell, Alexander Von Hagen-Jamar, Alejandro Quiroz Flores, War, Performance, and the Survival of Foreign Ministers, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Volume 17, Issue 2, April 2021, oraa024, <https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/oraa024>

**License:** CC-BY-SA 4.0 International  
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode>

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page:  
<https://www.su.se/english/research/research-projects/h-data/datasets-1.610144>

#### 2.1.1 Political Background

Variables providing information on the political background of the foreign minister.

##### 2.1.1.1 Politics: Party (party)

*Long tag:* hdata\_fomin\_party

*Original tag:* party

*Dataset citation:* Bäck et al. (2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1627, Percent: 13.67

*Description:*

Was the FM acting as member of a party?

1. No
2. Yes

#### 2.1.1.2 Politics: Party Name (`party_name`)

*Long tag:* `hdata_fomin_party_name`

*Original tag:* `party_name`

*Dataset citation:* Bäck et al. (2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1643, Percent: 13.81

*Description:*

Free text the name of the political party. In English where available, otherwise in original language. If `party=1`, enter 9999.

#### 2.1.1.3 Politics: Party Lead (`party_lead`)

*Long tag:* `hdata_fomin_party_lead`

*Original tag:* `party_lead`

*Dataset citation:* Bäck et al. (2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1627, Percent: 13.67

*Description:*

Did the FM hold a leading position or special mandate on a national level within a political party?

1. No
2. Yes

#### 2.1.1.4 Politics: Interest organizations (`org_connections`)

*Long tag:* `hdata_fomin_org_connections`

*Original tag:* `org_connections`

*Dataset citation:* Bäck et al. (2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1627, Percent: 13.67

*Description:*

Did the FM hold office within any interest organisations other than political parties (such as trade unions or business organisations) prior to appointment?

1. No
2. Yes

### 2.1.2 Position

These variables give information on the position of the foreign minister.

#### 2.1.2.1 Reason out (`reason_out`)

*Long tag:* `hdata_fomin_reason_out`

*Original tag:* `Reason_out`

*Dataset citation:* Bäck et al. (2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1627, Percent: 13.67

*Description:*

When exiting by regular procedures (when manner\_out is coded 1, otherwise this variable should be coded 9999), why did the FM leave the post as FM?

**1. End of government/party leaves government:**

11. End of constitutionally mandated term/elections
12. Other reason for end of government (e.g. new PM/change in party composition)
13. Party of minister leaves government

**2. Forced resignation (removed by head of government or similar) primarily due to:**

21. Political scandal
22. Policy disagreement between minister and premier/PM
23. Policy disagreement between minister and monarch/president
24. Policy disagreement between minister and own party/other minister
25. Personal/departmental error or low personal performance
26. Move to other post within cabinet (individual move of the FM to another post)
27. Move to another post within cabinet in the general context of a reshuffle
28. Loss of eligibility for the post
29. Other reason

**3. Unforced resignation primarily due to:**

31. Move to alternative (high) position outside of cabinet
32. Other reason (e.g. voluntary retirement, not due to ill health)

### 3 QOG

The **Quality of Government (QoG)** Institute was founded in 2004 by Professor Bo Rothstein and Professor Sören Holmberg. It is an independent research institute within the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. QoG is comprised of about 30 researchers who conduct and promote research on the causes, consequences and nature of Good Governance and the Quality of Government (QoG) - that is, trustworthy, reliable, impartial, uncorrupted and competent government institutions. QoG's award-winning datasets focus on concepts related to quality of government, transparency, and public administration. The main objective of QoG's research is to address the theoretical and empirical problem of how political institutions of high quality can be created and maintained. A second objective is to study the effects of Quality of Government on a number of policy areas, such as health, the environment, social policy, and poverty. The QoG datasets draw on a number of freely available datasources. More information on how the variables are compiled for different QoG datasets can be found in the respective QoG codebooks available on their website. More information is available on the project's website: <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government>

#### 3.1 QoG Environmental Indicators Dataset

**Dataset tag:** qog\_ei

**Output Unit:** QoG Country-Year, i.e., data is collected per country and year.

**Description:** The Quality of Government Environmental Indicators Dataset (QoG-EI) is a compilation of major freely available indicators measuring environmental performance of countries over time.

**Dataset citation:** Povitkina, Marina, Natalia Alvarado Pachon Cem Mert Dalli. 2021. The Quality of Government Environmental Indicators Dataset, version Sep21. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government>

**Link to original codebook**

[https://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/codebook\\_ei\\_sept21\\_august2023.pdf](https://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/codebook_ei_sept21_august2023.pdf)

**License:** The QoG datasets are open and available, free of charge and without a need to register your data. You can use them for your analysis, graphs, teaching, and other academic-related and non-commercial purposes. We ask our users to cite always the original source(s) of the data and our datasets.

We do not allow other uses of these data including but not limited to redistribution, commercialization and other for-profit usage. If a user is interested in such use or has doubts about the license, they will have to refer to the original source and check with them if this is allowed and what requirements they need to fulfill.

Be mindful that the original data sources are the only owners of their data and they can adjust their license without previous warning.

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page: <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government/qog-data/data-downloads/environmental-indicators-dataset>

##### 3.1.1 V-Party Dataset

Dataset by: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project V-Party provides expert-coded assessments of party organization and identity for most parties in most countries over 1970-2019. Using V-Dem methodology (Coppedge et al., 2020), in January 2020, 665 experts rated the policy positions and organizational capacity of political parties across elections in a given country. Specifically, as a general rule, experts coded data for all parties that reached more than 5Link to the original source: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data/v-party-dataset/>

### 3.1.1.1 Environmental parties: share of seats (vparty\_envseat)

*Long tag:* qog\_ei\_vparty\_envseat

*Original tag:* vparty\_envseat

*Dataset citation:* Povitkina et al. (2021)

*Variable citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022a), (n.d.)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1015, Percent: 8.53

*Description:*

The variable measures the share of seats in the lower chamber taken by the parties, for which environmental protection is relevant to gain and keep voters, as agreed on by at least half of the coders in the V-Party dataset.

The original variable from V-Party dataset - v2pasalie - measures the share of coders who answered “12: Environmental protection” to the multiple-choice question “Which of the following issues are most relevant for the party’s effort to gain and keep voters?”. We only keep parties that score 0.5 or higher on variable v2pasalie\_12 and then calculate their share of seats in a given country-year using v2paseatshare variable - Seat share the party gained in the election to the lower chamber.

### 3.1.1.2 Environmental parties: share of votes (vparty\_envvote)

*Long tag:* qog\_ei\_vparty\_envvote

*Original tag:* vparty\_envvote

*Dataset citation:* Povitkina et al. (2021)

*Variable citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022a), (n.d.)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1015, Percent: 8.53

*Description:*

The variable measures the share of votes to the lower chamber received by the parties, for which environmental protection is relevant to gain and keep voters, as agreed on by at least half of the coders in the V-Party dataset.

The original variable from V-Party dataset - v2pasalie - reports the share of coders who answered “12: Environmental protection” to the multiple-choice question “Which of the following issues are most relevant for the party’s effort to gain and keep voters?”. We only keep parties that score 0.5 or higher on variable v2pasalie\_12 and then calculate their share of votes in a given country-year using v2pavote variable - Vote share the party gained in the election to the lower chamber.

## 3.2 QoG Standard Dataset Time-Series

**Dataset tag:** qog\_std\_ts

**Output Unit:** QoG Country-Year, i.e., data is collected per country and year.

**Description:** The QoG Standard dataset is our largest dataset. It consists of approximately 2100 variables from more than 100 data sources related to Quality of Government. In the QoG Standard TS dataset, data from 1946 to 2023 is included and the unit of analysis is country-year (e.g., Sweden-1946, Sweden-1947, etc.).

**Dataset citation:** Teorell, Jan, Aksel Sundström, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Natalia Alvarado Pachon, Cem Mert Dalli, Rafael Lopez Valverde Paula Nilsson. 2024. The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan24. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of



Government Institute, <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government> doi:10.18157/qogstdjan24

***Link to original codebook***

[https://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/codebook\\_std\\_jan24.pdf](https://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/codebook_std_jan24.pdf)

***License:*** The QoG datasets are open and available, free of charge and without a need to register your data. You can use them for your analysis, graphs, teaching, and other academic-related and non-commercial purposes. We ask our users to cite always the original source(s) of the data and our datasets.

We do not allow other uses of these data including but not limited to redistribution, commercialization and other for-profit usage. If a user is interested in such use or has doubts about the license, they will have to refer to the original source and check with them if this is allowed and what requirements they need to fulfill.

Be mindful that the original data sources are the only owners of their data and they can adjust their license without previous warning.

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page:  
<https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government/qog-data/data-downloads/standard-dataset>

### **3.2.1 Media**

This category includes indicators on the freedom of the media in a given country (freedom of the press, regulation of the media) as well as the public access and confidence in the media.

#### **3.2.1.1 Practice: candidates/pol. parties have fair access to state-owned media outlets (aai\_q23)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_aai\_q23

*Original tag:* aai\_q23

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 285, Percent: 2.4

*Description:*

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 23. In practice, candidates/political parties have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.

A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:

- 1) candidates/political parties have equal access to and receive fair treatment in state-owned media outlets,
- 2) access is equal in both news reports and editorial commentary, and
- 3) candidates/political parties are offered the same rates for campaign advertising.

A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:

- 1) some candidates/political parties occasionally have more access to and receive better treatment in state-owned media outlets,
- 2) access is occasionally unequal in either news reports or editorial commentary, or
- 3) occasionally a candidate/political party is offered better rates for campaign advertising.

A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:

- 1) some candidates/political parties usually have more access to and/or receive better treatment in state-owned media outlets,
- 2) access is usually unequal in both news reports or editorial commentary, or
- 3) some candidates/political parties are usually offered better rates for campaign advertising.

### 3.2.2 Political Parties and Elections

This category includes variables describing various aspects of the legislature and political parties in the legislature (number of seats) as well as variables related to the election for the executive and variables on the outcomes of elections.

#### 3.2.2.1 Law: political parties are required to disclose public donations (Gov. funds) (aii\_q48)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_aii\_q48

*Original tag:* aii\_q48

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 201, Percent: 1.69

*Description:*

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 48. In law, political parties are required to regularly disclose public donations (funds sourced from the government).

A 100 score is earned where a law requires political parties to publish all public contributions.

A 0 score is earned where no such law exists.

#### 3.2.2.2 Practice: pol. parties disclose public donations and these are available to the public (aii\_q49)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_aii\_q49

*Original tag:* aii\_q49

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 285, Percent: 2.4

*Description:*

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 49. In practice, political parties regularly disclose public donations (funds that are sourced from the government) and the disclosures are easily available to the public.

A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:

- 1) political parties disclose public donations within a month of received, and
- 2) they are easily available online or at the cost of photocopy.

A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:

- 1) political parties don't always disclose public donations or disclose them more than a month of received, or
- 2) disclosures are not available online or the cost of paper versions is higher than photocopying.

A 0 score is earned where political parties rarely disclose public donations.

### 3.2.2.3 Law: political parties are required to disclose private donations (aai\_q50)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_aai\_q50

*Original tag:* aai\_q50

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 201, Percent: 1.69

*Description:*

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 50. In law, political parties are required to regularly disclose private donations.

A 100 score is earned where the law requires political parties to publish all private contributions.

A 0 score is earned where no such law exists.

### 3.2.2.4 Practice: pol. parties disclose private donations and it is available to the public (aai\_q51)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_aai\_q51

*Original tag:* aai\_q51

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 285, Percent: 2.4

*Description:*

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 51. In practice, political parties regularly disclose private donations and the disclosures are easily available to the public.

A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:

- 1) political parties disclose private donations within a one month of received, and
- 2) they are easily available online or at the cost of photocopy.

A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:

- 1) political parties don't always disclose private donations or disclose them more than a month of received, or
- 2) disclosures are not available online or the cost of paper versions is higher than photocopying.

A 0 score is earned where political parties rarely disclose private donations.

### 3.2.2.5 Whether an election was postponed (br\_elecpst)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_br\_elecpst

*Original tag:* br\_elecpst

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bjørnskov & Rode (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8386, Percent: 70.48

*Description:*

Whether an election at the Parliament held that year was postponed from an earlier date (0: No, 1: Yes)

### 3.2.2.6 Whether an election was held during the year (br\_elecyar)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_br\_elecyar

*Original tag:* br\_elecyar

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bjørnskov & Rode (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8386, Percent: 70.48

*Description:*

Whether an election at the Parliament was held that year (0: No, 1: Yes)

### 3.2.2.7 Does the country have proportional voting (br\_pvot)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_br\_pvot

*Original tag:* br\_pvot

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bjørnskov & Rode (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8012, Percent: 67.34

*Description:*

Is the electoral system characterized by including proportional representation? (0: No 1: Yes)

### 3.2.2.8 Full suffrage (br\_suff)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_br\_suff

*Original tag:* br\_suff

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bjørnskov & Rode (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8381, Percent: 70.44

*Description:*

Whether the electoral system attributes full suffrage (0: No 1: Yes)

### 3.2.2.9 Free and Fair Elections (bti\_ffe)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_bti\_ffe

*Original tag:* bti\_ffe

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Donner et al. (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1055, Percent: 8.87

*Description:*

To what extent are political representatives determined by general, free and fair elections?  
From 1 to 10.

1. There are no elections on free and fair elections.
4. General, multi-party elections are held, conducted properly and accepted as the means of filling political posts. However, there are some constraints on the fairness of the elections with regard to registration, campaigning or media access.
7. General elections are held, but serious irregularities during the voting process and ballot count occur. The rights to vote, campaign, and run for office are restricted, and elections have de facto only limited influence over who governs.
10. National elections, if held at all, are entirely unfree and unfair.

#### **3.2.2.10 Contestation (standardized version) (cam\_contest)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cam\_contest

*Original tag:* cam\_contest

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Coppedge et al. (2008)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4828, Percent: 40.58

*Description:*

Contestation standardized to be comparable across years.

#### **3.2.2.11 Inclusiveness (standardized version) (cam\_inclusive)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cam\_inclusive

*Original tag:* cam\_inclusive

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Coppedge et al. (2008)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4828, Percent: 40.58

*Description:*

Inclusiveness standardized to be comparable across years.

#### **3.2.2.12 Electoral Self-Determination (ciri\_elecsd)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ciri\_elecsd

*Original tag:* ciri\_elecsd

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Mark et al. (2023), Cingranelli et al. (2014)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4413, Percent: 37.09

*Description:*

The right of citizens to freely determine their own political system and leadership is known as the right to self-determination. Enjoyment of this right means that citizens have both the legal right and the ability in practice to change the laws and officials that govern them through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal adult suffrage. To what extent do citizens have freedom of political choice and have the legal right and ability in practice to change the laws and officials that govern them?

Scoring Scheme:

The right of citizens to change their government through free and fair elections is:

(0) Not respected (neither free nor fair elections)

(1) Limited (moderately free and fair elections)

(2) Generally respected (very free and fair elections)

### **3.2.2.13 Number of changes in government per year (cpds\_chg)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_chg

*Original tag:* cpds\_chg

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023<sup>a,b</sup>)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2591, Percent: 21.78

*Description:*

Number of changes in government per year [termination of government due to (a) elections, (b) voluntary resignation of the Prime Minister, (c) resignation of Prime Minister due to health reasons, (d) dissension within government (break up of the coalition), (e) lack of parliamentary support, (f) intervention by the head of state, or (g) broadening of the coalition (inclusion of new parties)].

### **3.2.2.14 Effective number of parties on the seats level (cpds\_enps)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_enps

*Original tag:* cpds\_enps

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023<sup>a,b</sup>)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Effective number of parties on the seats level according to the formula proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979).

### **3.2.2.15 Effective number of parties on the votes level (cpds\_enpv)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_enpv

*Original tag:* cpds\_enpv

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Effective number of parties on the votes level according to the formula proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979).

### 3.2.2.16 Electoral fractionalization of the party system (Rae index) (cpds\_frel)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_frel

*Original tag:* cpds\_frel

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Index of electoral fractionalization of the party system according to the formula proposed by Rae (1968). The index can take values between 1 (maximal fractionalization) and 0 (minimal fractionalization).

### 3.2.2.17 Legislative fractionalization of the party system (Rae index) (cpds\_frleg)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_frleg

*Original tag:* cpds\_frleg

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Index of legislative fractionalization of the party system according to the formula proposed by Rae (1968). The index can take values between 1 (maximal fractionalization) and 0 (minimal fractionalization).

### 3.2.2.18 Cabinet composition (Schmidt index) (cpds\_govlr)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_govlr

*Original tag:* cpds\_govlr

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2572, Percent: 21.62

*Description:*

Cabinet composition (Schmidt-Index):

1. Hegemony of right-wing (and centre) parties.
2. Dominance of right-wing (and centre) parties.
3. Balance of power between left and right.
4. Dominance of social-democratic and other left parties.
5. Hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties.

### 3.2.2.19 Government support (seat share of all parties in government) (cpds\_govsup)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_govsup

*Original tag:* cpds\_govsup

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2591, Percent: 21.78

*Description:*

Total government support: seat share of all parties in government. Weighted by the numbers of days in office in a given year.

### 3.2.2.20 Share of seats in parliament: agrarian (cpds\_la)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_la

*Original tag:* cpds\_la

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as agrarian.

### 3.2.2.21 Share of seats in parliament: electoral alliance (cpds\_lall)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lall

*Original tag:* cpds\_lall

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as electoral alliance.

### 3.2.2.22 Share of seats in parliament: communist (cpds\_lcom)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lcom

*Original tag:* cpds\_lcom

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as communist.

### 3.2.2.23 Share of seats in parliament: conservative (cpds\_lcon)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lcon

*Original tag:* cpds\_lcon



*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as conservative.

### **3.2.2.24 Share of seats in parliament: ethnic (cpds\_le)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_le

*Original tag:* cpds\_le

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as ethnic.

### **3.2.2.25 Share of seats in parliament: feminist (cpds\_lfe)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lfe

*Original tag:* cpds\_lfe

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as feminist.

### **3.2.2.26 Share of seats in parliament: green (cpds\_lg)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lg

*Original tag:* cpds\_lg

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as green.

### **3.2.2.27 Share of seats in parliament: liberal (cpds\_ll)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_ll

*Original tag:* cpds\_ll

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as liberal.

**3.2.2.28 Share of seats in parliament: left-socialist (cpds\_lls)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lls

*Original tag:* cpds\_lls

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as left-socialist.

**3.2.2.29 Share of seats in parliament: monarchist (cpds\_lmo)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lmo

*Original tag:* cpds\_lmo

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as monarchist.

**3.2.2.30 Share of seats in parliament: non-labelled (cpds\_lnl)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lnl

*Original tag:* cpds\_lnl

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as non-labelled.

**3.2.2.31 Share of seats in parliament: other (cpds\_lo)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lo

*Original tag:* cpds\_lo

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as other.

**3.2.2.32 Share of seats in parliament: protest (cpds\_lp)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lp

*Original tag:* cpds\_lp

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as protest.

### **3.2.2.33 Share of seats in parliament: post-communist (cpds\_lpc)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lpc

*Original tag:* cpds\_lpc

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as post-communist.

### **3.2.2.34 Share of seats in parliament: pensioners (cpds\_lpen)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lpen

*Original tag:* cpds\_lpen

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as pensioners.

### **3.2.2.35 Share of seats in parliament: personalist (cpds\_lper)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lper

*Original tag:* cpds\_lper

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as personalist.

### **3.2.2.36 Share of seats in parliament: right (cpds\_lr)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lr

*Original tag:* cpds\_lr

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as right.

### **3.2.2.37 Share of seats in parliament: regionalist (cpds\_lreg)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lreg

*Original tag:* cpds\_lreg

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as regionalist.

### **3.2.2.38 Share of seats in parliament: religious (cpds\_lrel)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_lrel

*Original tag:* cpds\_lrel

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as religious.

### **3.2.2.39 Share of seats in parliament: social democratic (cpds\_ls)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_ls

*Original tag:* cpds\_ls

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of seats in parliament for the political parties classified as social democratic.

### **3.2.2.40 Type of Government (cpds\_tg)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_tg

*Original tag:* cpds\_tg

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2591, Percent: 21.78

*Description:*

Type of government based on the following classification:

1. Single-party majority government: One party takes all government seats and has a parliamentary majority.
2. Minimal winning coalition: All participating parties are necessary to form a majority government [gt;50.0percent].
3. Surplus coalition: Coalition governments that exceed the minimal-winning criterion [gt;50.0percent].
4. Single-party minority government: The party in government does not possess a majority in Parliament [lt;50.0percent].
5. Multi-party minority government: The parties in government do not possess a majority in Parliament [lt;50.0percent].
6. Caretaker government: Governments that should simply maintain the status quo.
7. Technocratic government: Led by a technocratic prime minister, consists of a majority of technocratic ministers and is in possession of a mandate to change the status quo.

#### 3.2.2.41 Share of votes: agrarian (cpds\_va)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_va

*Original tag:* cpds\_va

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as agrarian.

#### 3.2.2.42 Share of votes: electoral alliance (cpds\_vall)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vall

*Original tag:* cpds\_vall

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as electoral alliance.

#### 3.2.2.43 Share of votes: communist (cpds\_vcom)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vcom

*Original tag:* cpds\_vcom

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as communist.

**3.2.2.44 Share of votes: conservative (cpds\_vcon)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vcon

*Original tag:* cpds\_vcon

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as conservative.

**3.2.2.45 Share of votes: ethnic (cpds\_ve)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_ve

*Original tag:* cpds\_ve

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as ethnic.

**3.2.2.46 Share of votes: feminist (cpds\_vfe)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vfe

*Original tag:* cpds\_vfe

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as feminist.

**3.2.2.47 Share of votes: green (cpds\_vg)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vg

*Original tag:* cpds\_vg

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as green.

**3.2.2.48 Share of votes: liberal (cpds\_vl)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vl

*Original tag:* cpds\_vl

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as liberal.

#### **3.2.2.49 Share of votes: left-socialist (cpds\_vls)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vls

*Original tag:* cpds\_vls

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as left-socialist.

#### **3.2.2.50 Share of votes: monarchist (cpds\_vmo)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vmo

*Original tag:* cpds\_vmo

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as monarchist.

#### **3.2.2.51 Share of votes: non-labelled (cpds\_vnl)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vnl

*Original tag:* cpds\_vnl

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as non-labelled.

#### **3.2.2.52 Share of votes: other (cpds\_vo)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vo

*Original tag:* cpds\_vo

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as other.

**3.2.2.53 Share of votes: protest (cpds\_vp)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vp

*Original tag:* cpds\_vp

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as protest.

**3.2.2.54 Share of votes: post-communist (cpds\_vpcom)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vpcom

*Original tag:* cpds\_vpcom

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as post-communist.

**3.2.2.55 Share of votes: pensioners (cpds\_vpen)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vpen

*Original tag:* cpds\_vpen

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as pensioners.

**3.2.2.56 Share of votes: personalist (cpds\_vper)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vper

*Original tag:* cpds\_vper

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as personalist.

**3.2.2.57 Share of votes: right (cpds\_vr)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vr

*Original tag:* cpds\_vr

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)



*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as right.

### **3.2.2.58 Share of votes: regionalist (cpds\_vreg)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vreg

*Original tag:* cpds\_vreg

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as regionalist.

### **3.2.2.59 Share of votes: religious (cpds\_vrel)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vrel

*Original tag:* cpds\_vrel

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as religious.

### **3.2.2.60 Share of votes: social democratic (cpds\_vs)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vs

*Original tag:* cpds\_vs

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Share of votes of the political parties classified as social democratic.

### **3.2.2.61 Voter turnout in election (cpds\_vt)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_cpds\_vt

*Original tag:* cpds\_vt

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Armingeon et al. (2023a,b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2606, Percent: 21.9

*Description:*

Voter turnout in election.

### 3.2.2.62 Electoral Volatility - Parties above 1percent (dev\_altv1)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_dev\_altv1

*Original tag:* dev\_altv1

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Williams (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1782, Percent: 14.98

*Description:*

Electoral volatility caused by vote switching between existing parties, namely parties receiving at least 1percent of the national share in both elections under scrutiny.

### 3.2.2.63 Electoral Volatility - Parties below 1percent (dev\_othv1)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_dev\_othv1

*Original tag:* dev\_othv1

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Williams (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1782, Percent: 14.98

*Description:*

Electoral volatility caused by vote switching between parties falling below 1percent of the national share in both the elections at time t and t+1. It is important to clarify that this category is not computed by aggregating the scores of each party falling below 1percent and then comparing the overall sum at time t and t+1. Conversely, each party's volatility is counted separately - up to a specification of 0.1percent - and then added to the calculation of dev\_othv. This choice has been made to avoid underestimation of Total Volatility but at the same time to maintain a distinction between parties above 1percent and parties below 1percent for the calculation of the two components of dev\_regv and dev\_altv.

### 3.2.2.64 Electoral Volatility - Parties entering/exiting party system (dev\_regv1)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_dev\_regv1

*Original tag:* dev\_regv1

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Williams (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1782, Percent: 14.98

*Description:*

Electoral volatility caused by vote switching between parties that enter or exit from the party system. A party is considered as entering the party system where it receives at least 1percent of the national share in election at time t+1 (while it received less than 1percent in election at time t). Conversely, a party is considered as exiting the party system where it receives less than 1percent in election at time t+1 (while it received at least 1percent in election at time t).

### 3.2.2.65 Electoral Volatility - Total (dev\_tv1)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_dev\_tv1

*Original tag:* dev\_tv1

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Williams (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1782, Percent: 14.98

*Description:*

Total electoral volatility in the party system, given by the sum of the previous measures:  
 $dev\_regv + dev\_altv + dev\_othv = dev\_tv$ .

### 3.2.2.66 Trust in Parliament (ess\_trparl)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ess\_trparl

*Original tag:* ess\_trparl

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 297, Percent: 2.5

*Description:*

Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. The Parliament.

### 3.2.2.67 Trust in Political Parties (ess\_trpart)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ess\_trpart

*Original tag:* ess\_trpart

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 249, Percent: 2.09

*Description:*

Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. The Political Parties.

### 3.2.2.68 Trust in Politicians (ess\_trpolit)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ess\_trpolit

*Original tag:* ess\_trpolit

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 297, Percent: 2.5

*Description:*

Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. The Politicians.

### 3.2.2.69 Electoral Volatility in the EP - Parties above 1percent (evep\_altv)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_evep\_altv

*Original tag:* evep\_altv

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele et al. (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 259, Percent: 2.18

*Description:*

Electoral volatility in the European Parliament, caused by vote switching between parties that enter or exit from the party system caused by vote switching between existing parties, namely parties receiving at least 1percent of the national share in both elections under scrutiny.

### **3.2.2.70 Net change in the agg. vote share for all parties in Class Bloc (EP) (evep\_classbloc)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_evep\_classbloc

*Original tag:* evep\_classbloc

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele et al. (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 259, Percent: 2.18

*Description:*

Net change in the aggregate vote share for all parties included in the Class Bloc. For the definition of the class bloc and the identification of parties included in such bloc, the author relies on Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Bartolini (1983; 2000). This includes 'those parties which are the historical product of the structuring of the working-class movement' (Bartolini and Mair 1990 [2007], 46). Full list of parties in the class bloc can be found in the original codebook.

### **3.2.2.71 Net change in the agg. vote share for all parties in Demarcation Bloc (EP) (evep\_dembloc)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_evep\_dembloc

*Original tag:* evep\_dembloc

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele et al. (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 207, Percent: 1.74

*Description:*

Net change in the aggregate vote share for all parties included in the Demarcation Bloc. Those political parties that defend anti-EU, anti-immigration and economically protectionist policies are included in the demarcation bloc. Full list of parties in the demarcation bloc can be found in the original codebook.

### **3.2.2.72 Electoral Volatility in the EP - Parties below 1percent (evep\_othv)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_evep\_othv

*Original tag:* evep\_othv

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele et al. (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 259, Percent: 2.18

*Description:*

Electoral volatility in the European Parliament, caused by vote switching between parties falling below 1percent of the national share in both the elections at time t and t+1. It is

important to clarify that this category is not computed by aggregating the scores of each party falling below 1percent and then comparing the overall sum at time t and t+1. Conversely, each party's volatility is counted separately - up to a specification of 0.1percent - and then added to the calculation of `evep_othv`. This choice has been made to avoid underestimation of Total Volatility but at the same time to maintain a distinction between parties above 1percent and parties below 1percent for the calculation of the two components of `evep_regv` and `evep_altv`.

### 3.2.2.73 Electoral Volatility in the EP - Parties entering/exiting party system (`evep_regv`)

*Long tag:* `qog_std_ts_evep_regv`

*Original tag:* `evep_regv`

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele et al. (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 259, Percent: 2.18

*Description:*

Electoral volatility in the European Parliament, caused by vote switching between parties that enter or exit from the party system. A party is considered as entering the party system where it receives at least 1percent of the national share in election at time t+1 (while it received less than 1percent in election at time t). Conversely, a party is considered as exiting the party system where it receives less than 1percent in election at time t+1 (while it received at least 1percent in election at time t).

### 3.2.2.74 Electoral Volatility in the EP - Total (`evep_tv`)

*Long tag:* `qog_std_ts_evep_tv`

*Original tag:* `evep_tv`

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele et al. (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 259, Percent: 2.18

*Description:*

Total electoral volatility in the party system, given by the sum of the previous measures:  $evep\_regv + evep\_altv + evep\_othv = evep\_tv$ .

### 3.2.2.75 Electoral Process (`fh_ep`)

*Long tag:* `qog_std_ts_fh_ep`

*Original tag:* `fh_ep`

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2022b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2956, Percent: 24.84

*Description:*

Electoral Process - The variable measures to what extent the national legislative representatives and the national chief authority are elected through free and fair elections. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 12 (best).

### 3.2.2.76 Average District Magnitude (`gol_adm`)

*Long tag:* `qog_std_ts_gol_adm`

*Original tag:* gol\_adm

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5839, Percent: 49.08

*Description:*

Average district magnitude in an electoral tier. This is calculated as the total number of seats allocated in an electoral tier divided by the total number of districts in that tier.

### **3.2.2.77 Districts (gol\_dist)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_dist

*Original tag:* gol\_dist

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5874, Percent: 49.37

*Description:*

This is the number of electoral districts or constituencies in an electoral tier.

### **3.2.2.78 Effective Number of Electoral Parties (gol\_enep)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_enep

*Original tag:* gol\_enep

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5533, Percent: 46.5

*Description:*

Effective number of electoral parties.

### **3.2.2.79 Effective Number of Electoral Parties 1 (gol\_enep1)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_enep1

*Original tag:* gol\_enep1

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5542, Percent: 46.58

*Description:*

The effective number of electoral parties once the "other" category has been "corrected" by using the least component method of bounds.

### **3.2.2.80 Effective Number of Electoral Parties (Others) (gol\_enepo)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_enepo

*Original tag:* gol\_enepo

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5510, Percent: 46.31

*Description:*

The percentage of the vote going to parties that are collectively known as "others" in official election results.

### **3.2.2.81 Effective Number of Parliamentary or Legislative Parties (gol\_enpp)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_enpp

*Original tag:* gol\_enpp

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5851, Percent: 49.18

*Description:*

The effective number of parliamentary (legislative) parties.

### **3.2.2.82 Effective Number of Parliamentary or Legislative Parties, other corrected (gol\_enpp1)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_enpp1

*Original tag:* gol\_enpp1

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5790, Percent: 48.66

*Description:*

This is the effective number of parliamentary (legislative) parties once the "other" category has been "corrected" by using the least component method of bounds.

### **3.2.2.83 Effective Number of Parliamentary or Legislative Parties (Others) (gol\_enppo)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_enppo

*Original tag:* gol\_enppo

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5793, Percent: 48.69

*Description:*

The percentage of seats won by parties that are collectively known as "others" in official election results.

### **3.2.2.84 Effective Number of Presidential Candidates (gol\_enpres)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_enpres

*Original tag:* gol\_enpres

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2936, Percent: 24.68

*Description:*

The effective number of presidential candidates.

### **3.2.2.85 Electoral System Type-3 classes (gol\_est)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_est

*Original tag:* gol\_est

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5910, Percent: 49.67

*Description:*

This is a categorical variable that takes on one of three values indicating the basic type of electoral system used in the elections.

1. Majoritarian
2. Proportional
3. Mixed

### **3.2.2.86 Electoral System Type-12 classes (gol\_est\_spec)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_est\_spec

*Original tag:* gol\_est\_spec

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5914, Percent: 49.71

*Description:*

This is a categorical variable that provides a more detailed indication of the type of electoral system used in the election.

1. Single-Member-District-Plurality (SMDP)
2. Two-Round System (TRS)
3. Alternative Vote (AV)
4. Borda Count (BC)
5. Block Vote (BV)
6. Party Block Vote (PBV)
7. Limited Vote (LV)
8. Single Nontransferable Vote (SNTV)
9. List Proportional Representation (List PR)
10. Single Transferable Vote (STV)



11. Mixed Dependent (or Mixed Member Proportional)

12. Mixed Independent (or Mixed Parallel)

### 3.2.2.87 Institution (gol\_inst)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_inst

*Original tag:* gol\_inst

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5915, Percent: 49.71

*Description:*

This is a categorical variable indicating a country's regime type at the end of a given year. The data for this variable come from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), which we updated through 2011.

0. Parliamentary democracy
1. Semi-presidential democracy
2. Presidential democracy
3. Civilian dictatorship
4. Military dictatorship
5. Royal dictatorship

Not all elections that occur when a regime is classified as a dictatorship (regime = 4-6) are dictatorial. This apparent anomaly has to do with the fact that a country's regime type is coded based on its status at the end of a given year. Elections like those in Argentina 1962, Nicaragua 1983, Philippines 1965, and Thailand 1976 all preceded a democratic collapse in the same year. Although these countries are considered dictatorial at the end of these years, we code these particular elections as democratic and therefore include them in our data set. We should note that we code the 1997 elections in Kenya, the 1999 elections in Guinea Bissau, the 2005 elections in Liberia, the 2006 elections in Mauritania, and the 2008 elections in Bangladesh as democratic even though Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) do not code these countries as democratic until the following year. The reason for this is that these elections are the primary reason cited by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) for their eventual recoding of these countries as democratic. As an example, Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) do not code Liberia as democratic until 2006 despite the fact that presidential elections took place in October 2005, because the winner of these elections, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, did not officially take office until January 2006. The bottom line is that there are a few observations in our data set of democratic elections where regime indicates that the country was a dictatorship by the end of the year.

### 3.2.2.88 Mixed Type (gol\_mix)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_mix

*Original tag:* gol\_mix

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 820, Percent: 6.89

*Description:*

This is a categorical variable that indicates the precise type of mixed electoral system that is being used.

1. Coexistence
2. Superposition
3. Fusion
4. Correction
5. Conditional

### 3.2.2.89 Multi-Tier Type (gol\_mt)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_mt

*Original tag:* gol\_mt

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5908, Percent: 49.66

*Description:*

This is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether different electoral tiers are linked (1) or not (0). Electoral tiers are linked if the unused votes from one electoral tier are used to allocate seats in another electoral tier, or if the allocation of seats in one electoral tier is conditional on the seats received in a different electoral tier.

### 3.2.2.90 Number of Seats (gol\_nos)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_nos

*Original tag:* gol\_nos

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5897, Percent: 49.56

*Description:*

This indicates the total number of seats in the lower house of the national legislature.

### 3.2.2.91 Presidential Electoral System Type (gol\_pest)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_pest

*Original tag:* gol\_pest

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2928, Percent: 24.61

*Description:*

This is a categorical variable that indicates the electoral formula used in the presidential election.

1. Plurality
2. Absolute Majority
3. Qualified Majority
4. Electoral College
5. Alternative Vote

### 3.2.2.92 Electoral Formula used in an Electoral Tier (gol\_pr)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_pr

*Original tag:* gol\_pr

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5838, Percent: 49.07

*Description:*

This is a categorical variable that indicates the precise electoral formula used in an electoral tier.

1. Single-Member-District-Plurality (SMDP)
2. Two Round Majority-Plurality
3. Two Round Qualified Majority
4. Two Round Majority Runoff
5. Alternative Vote (AV)
6. Borda Count (BC)
7. Modified Borda Count (mBC)
8. Block Vote (BV)
9. Party Block Vote (PBV)
10. Limited Vote (LV)
11. Single Nontransferable Vote (SNTV)
12. Hare quota
13. Hare quota with largest remainders
14. Hare quota with highest average remainders
15. Hagenbach-Bischoff quota
16. Hagenbach-Bischoff quota with largest remainders
17. Hagenbach-Bischoff quota with highest average remainders
18. Droop quota
19. Droop quota with largest remainders
20. Droop quota with highest average remainders
21. Imperiali quota
22. Imperiali quota with largest remainders
23. Imperiali quota with highest average remainders

24. Reinforced Imperiali quota
25. D'Hondt
26. Sainte-Laguë
27. Modified Sainte-Laguë
28. Single Transferable Vote.

Note: Users can find a detailed description of the difference between types in the original codebook.

### 3.2.2.93 Presidential Election (gol\_preel)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_preel

*Original tag:* gol\_preel

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5915, Percent: 49.71

*Description:*

This is a dichotomous variable that takes on the value 1 if the election is presidential and 0 if the election is legislative.

### 3.2.2.94 Upper Seats (gol\_upseat)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_upseat

*Original tag:* gol\_upseat

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5537, Percent: 46.54

*Description:*

This indicates the number of legislative seats allocated in electoral districts above the lowest electoral tier.

### 3.2.2.95 Upper Tier (gol\_uptier)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gol\_uptier

*Original tag:* gol\_uptier

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bormann & Golder (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4912, Percent: 41.28

*Description:*

This indicates the percentage of all legislative seats allocated in electoral districts above the lowest electoral tier.

### 3.2.2.96 Proportional Representation (gtm\_pr)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gtm\_pr

*Original tag:* gtm\_pr

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU),  
Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4464, Percent: 37.52

*Description:*

The centripetal theory of democratic governance emphasizes the following three features of an electoral system: (a) district magnitude (M), (b) seat allocation rules (majoritarian or proportional), and (c) candidate selection rules. The centripetal ideal type is defined by Mgt;1, proportional seat allocation rules, and party-controlled candidate selection. This is the closed-list-PR electoral system. Other systems are ranked lower in this coding according to their deviation from this ideal type. Thus, the coding for the list-PR variable is as follows:

0. Majoritarian or Preferential-vote.

1. Mixed-member majority or Block vote.

2. Closed-list-PR.

### **3.2.2.97 Alignment Executive/Legislative Chamber (lower) (h\_alignl1)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_h\_alignl1

*Original tag:* h\_alignl1

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Henisz (2017, 2002a)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 6604, Percent: 55.51

*Description:*

Dummy variable indicating alignment between the executive and the lower legislative chamber, coded 1 when the party controlling the executive branch is either the largest party in the lower legislative chamber or is a member of a ruling coalition in that chamber.

### **3.2.2.98 Alignment Lower/Upper Legislative Chamber (h\_alignl12)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_h\_alignl12

*Original tag:* h\_alignl12

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Henisz (2017, 2002a)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2053, Percent: 17.26

*Description:*

Dummy variable indicating alignment between the legislative chambers, coded 1 when the same party or a coalition of parties (when available) control a majority in both legislative chambers.

### **3.2.2.99 Alignment Executive/Legislative Chamber (upper) (h\_alignl2)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_h\_alignl2

*Original tag:* h\_alignl2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Henisz (2017, 2002a)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2053, Percent: 17.26

*Description:*

Dummy variable indicating alignment between the executive and the upper legislative chamber, coded 1 when the party controlling the executive branch is either the largest party in the upper legislative chamber or is a member of a ruling coalition in that chamber.

### **3.2.2.100 Legislative Fractionalization (lower) (h\_lflo)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_h\_lflo

*Original tag:* h\_lflo

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Henisz (2017, 2002a)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7306, Percent: 61.41

*Description:*

Legislative fractionalization is approximately the probability that two random draws from the lower legislative chamber will be from different parties.

### **3.2.2.101 Legislative Fractionalization (upper) (h\_lfup)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_h\_lfup

*Original tag:* h\_lfup

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Henisz (2017, 2002a)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2176, Percent: 18.29

*Description:*

Legislative fractionalization is approximately the probability that two random draws from the upper legislative chamber will be from different parties.

### **3.2.2.102 Size of Largest Party in Legislature (in Fractions) (ht\_partsz)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ht\_partsz

*Original tag:* ht\_partsz

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Teorell & Wahman (2018)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5209, Percent: 43.78

*Description:*

Counts the largest parties' number of seats divided by the legislative assemblies' total number of seats expressed in fractions. In countries with a two-chamber parliament, the lower house is counted.

### **3.2.2.103 Banning of Anti-System Parties (iaep\_basp)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_basp

*Original tag:* iaep\_basp

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5825, Percent: 48.96

*Description:*

Does an anti-system platform determine the banning of parties?

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### 3.2.2.104 Banned Parties (iaep\_bp)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_bp

*Original tag:* iaep\_bp

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5856, Percent: 49.22

*Description:*

Are there banned parties?

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### 3.2.2.105 Some other executive have the power to call elections (iaep\_callo)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_callo

*Original tag:* iaep\_callo

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5961, Percent: 50.1

*Description:*

Does some other executive have the power to call elections?

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### 3.2.2.106 Ethnicity Based Banning of Parties (iaep\_ebbp)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_ebbp

*Original tag:* iaep\_ebbp

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5825, Percent: 48.96

*Description:*

Does ethnic makeup determine the banning of parties?

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### 3.2.2.107 Election of the Executive (iaep\_ee)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_ee

*Original tag:* iaep\_ee

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4666, Percent: 39.22

*Description:*

Is the executive elected by:

1. Directly elected by public vote
2. Elected through legislative action by members of the legislature
3. Chosen through party process strictly by a party
4. Indirect public vote
5. Appointed

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### 3.2.2.108 Executive Nomination of Legislature Candidates (iaep\_enlc)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_enlc



*Original tag:* iaep\_enlc

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5731, Percent: 48.17

*Description:*

Does executive nomination establish how the field of candidates who stand for legislative elections is determined?

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### **3.2.2.109 Electoral System (iaep\_es)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_es

*Original tag:* iaep\_es

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5602, Percent: 47.08

*Description:*

What is the type of electoral system for legislative elections?

1. Plurality (First past the post)

2. Majority

3. Proportional representation

4. Mixed systems (combination of PR and either plurality or majority). This option includes situations in which a single chamber contains seats selected by different methods, or situations in which all of the seats in a chamber are chosen with the same method, but each chamber is selected through different methods.

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### **3.2.2.110 Electoral System for the Executive (iaep\_ese)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_ese

*Original tag:* iaep\_ese

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2881, Percent: 24.21

*Description:*

Election rules governing the determination of electoral outcomes for the executive: we record data on the electoral requirements for winning executive elections, specifically, the sorts of vote thresholds required for winners. If the executive is appointed or otherwise comes to power via non-electoral processes, we code this as missing.

1. Majority rule (50percent + 1). Where run-offs are held, "majority rule" is selected, as the intention of a run-off election is to have one candidate receive a majority of the votes.
2. Plurality
3. No official, explicit, rule governing the outcome
4. Party leader of majority party/coalition in legislature is automatically selected without additional process

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### **3.2.2.111 Independence of Selection of Executive (iaep\_ise)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_ise

*Original tag:* iaep\_ise

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5811, Percent: 48.84

*Description:*

Is there an executive chosen independently of the legislature (like a president, for example)? If these processes that select the executive are distinct from that which selects the legislature, then the authors consider the two to be independent. The selection processes, moreover, can involve different - albeit competing or complimentary - forms of selection.

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### **3.2.2.112 National Elections for an Executive (iaep\_nee)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_nee

*Original tag:* iaep\_nee

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5937, Percent: 49.9

*Description:*

Does the country hold national elections for an executive? We consider national elections to involve subjecting the executive to some form of popular plebiscite. This electoral process may or may not bear any relationship to the ultimate appointment of the executive. Executive council elections that select an executive are not considered national elections.

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### **3.2.2.113 National Elections for the Legislature (iaep\_nel)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_nel

*Original tag:* iaep\_nel

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5815, Percent: 48.87

*Description:*

Does the country hold national elections for the legislature We consider national elections to involve subjecting the members of the legislature to some form of popular plebiscite. While seats may be divided into districts, we consider national elections to occur when district-wide elections are organized at the national level.

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### **3.2.2.114 No Parties Allowed (iaep\_npa)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_npa

*Original tag:* iaep\_npa

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5825, Percent: 48.96

*Description:*

Are no parties allowed?

- 0. No
- 1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### 3.2.2.115 National Referendums (iaep\_nr)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_nr

*Original tag:* iaep\_nr

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5737, Percent: 48.22

*Description:*

Does the country hold national elections on referendum items?

- 0. No
- 1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### 3.2.2.116 Parties with More than 5 Percent (iaep\_pm5p)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_pm5p

*Original tag:* iaep\_pm5p

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5413, Percent: 45.5

*Description:*

How many parties hold at least 5percent of seats in the legislature?

- 1. One
- 2. Two
- 3. More than two

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### 3.2.2.117 Party Nomination of Executive Candidates (iaep\_pnec)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_pnec

*Original tag:* iaep\_pnec

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3026, Percent: 25.43

*Description:*

Does party nomination (party list, convention, etc.) establish how the field of candidates who stand for executive elections is determined?

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### **3.2.2.118 Party Nomination of Legislature Candidates (iaep\_pnlc)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_pnlc

*Original tag:* iaep\_pnlc

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5731, Percent: 48.17

*Description:*

Does party nomination (party list, convention, etc.) establish how the field of candidates who stand for legislative elections is determined?

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### **3.2.2.119 Petition Signatures Establish Executive Candidates (iaep\_pseec)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_pseec

*Original tag:* iaep\_pseec

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3026, Percent: 25.43

*Description:*

Do petition signatures establish how the field of candidates who stand for executive elections

is determined?

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### 3.2.2.120 Petition Signatures Establish Legislature Candidates (iaep\_pselc)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_pselc

*Original tag:* iaep\_pselc

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5731, Percent: 48.17

*Description:*

Do petition signatures establish how the field of candidates who stand for legislative elections is determined?

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### 3.2.2.121 Party Vote Establish Executive Candidates (iaep\_pveec)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_pveec

*Original tag:* iaep\_pveec

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3026, Percent: 25.43

*Description:*

Do members of party vote (primary) establish how the field of candidates who stand for executive elections is determined?

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### 3.2.2.122 Party Vote Establish Legislature Candidates (iaep\_pvelc)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_pvelc

*Original tag:* iaep\_pvelc

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5731, Percent: 48.17

*Description:*

Do members of party vote (primary) establish how the field of candidates who stand for legislative elections is determined?

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### 3.2.2.123 Self-Nomination of Executive Candidates (iaep\_snec)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_snec

*Original tag:* iaep\_snec

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3026, Percent: 25.43

*Description:*

Does self-nomination establish how the field of candidates who stand for executive elections is determined?

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### 3.2.2.124 Self-Nomination of Legislature Candidates (iaep\_snlc)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_snlc

*Original tag:* iaep\_snlc

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5731, Percent: 48.17

*Description:*

Does self-nomination establish how the field of candidates who stand for legislative elections is determined?

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### **3.2.2.125 Electoral System Family (ideaesd\_esf)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideaesd\_esf

*Original tag:* ideaesd\_esf

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023a)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5072, Percent: 42.63

*Description:*

Electoral System Family

1. Proportional Representation
2. Plurality/Majority
3. Plurality/Majority and Proportional Representation
4. Mixed
5. Transition
6. Other
7. Not Applicable

### **3.2.2.126 Electoral System for the National Legislature (ideaesd\_esnl)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideaesd\_esnl

*Original tag:* ideaesd\_esnl

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023a)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5072, Percent: 42.63

*Description:*

Electoral System for National Legislature:

1. List Proportional Representation (List PR)

Under a List Proportional Representation (List PR) system each party or grouping presents a list of candidates for a multi-member electoral district, the voters vote for a party, and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote. In some (closed list) systems the winning candidates are taken from the lists in order of their position on the lists. If the lists are 'open' or 'free' the voters can influence the order of the candidates by marking



individual preferences.

## 2. Block Vote (BV)

Block Vote is a plurality/majority system used in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are candidates to be elected. The candidates with the highest vote totals win the seats. Usually voters vote for candidates rather than parties and in most systems may use as many, or as few, of their votes as they wish.

## 3. First Past the Post (FPTP)

First Past The Post is the simplest form of plurality/majority electoral system. The winning candidate is the one who gains more votes than any other candidate, even if this is not an absolute majority of valid votes. The system uses single-member districts and the voters vote for candidates rather than political parties.

## 4. Two-Round System (TRS)

The Two-Round System is a plurality/majority system in which a second election is held if no candidate or party achieves a given level of votes, most commonly an absolute majority (50 per cent plus one), in the first election round. A Two-Round System may take a majority-plurality form-more than two candidates contest the second round and the one wins the highest number of votes in the second round is elected, regardless of whether they have won an absolute majority-or a majority run-off form-only the top two candidates in the first round contest the second round.

## 5. Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)

Mixed Member Proportional is a mixed system in which the choices expressed by the voters are used to elect representatives through two different systems-one List PR system and (usually) one plurality/majority system-where the List PR system compensates for the disproportionality in the results from the plurality/majority system.

## 6. Single Transferable Vote (STV)

The Single Transferable Vote is a preferential system in which the voter has one vote in a multi-member district and the candidates that surpass a specified quota of first preference votes are immediately elected. In successive counts, votes are redistributed from least successful candidates, who are eliminated, and votes surplus to the quota are redistributed from successful candidates, until sufficient candidates are declared elected. Voters normally vote for candidates rather than political parties, although a party-list option is possible.

## 7. Alternative Vote (AV)

The Alternative Vote is a preferential plurality/majority system used in single-member districts. Voters use numbers to mark their preferences on the ballot paper. A candidate who

receives an absolute majority (50 per cent plus 1) of valid first preference votes is declared elected. If no candidate achieves an absolute majority of first preferences, the least successful candidates are eliminated and their votes reallocated according to their second preferences until one candidate has an absolute majority. Voters vote for candidates rather than political parties.

#### 8. Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV)

Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote system voters cast a single vote in a multi-member district. The candidates with the highest vote totals are declared elected. Voters vote for candidates rather than political parties.

#### 9. Two-Round System, Party Block Vote (TRS PBV)

Party Block Vote (PBV) is a plurality/majority system using multi-member districts in which voters cast a single party-centered vote for a party of choice, and do not choose between candidates. The party with the most votes will win every seat in the electoral district.

#### 10. Limited Vote (LV)

Limited Vote is a candidate-centred electoral system used in multi-member districts in which electors have more than one vote, but fewer votes than there are candidates to be elected. The candidates with the highest vote totals win the seats.

#### 11. First Past The Post, Party Block Vote (FPTP PBV)

#### 12. First Past the Post, List Proportional Representation (FPTP List PR)

#### 13. First Past the Post, Block Vote (FPTP BV)

#### 14. First Past the Post, Party Block Vote, List Proportional Representation (FPTP PBV List PR)

#### 15. Parallel

A Parallel System is a mixed system in which the choices expressed by the voters are used to elect representatives through two different systems—one List PR system and (usually) one plurality/majority system—but where no account is taken of the seats allocated under the first system in calculating the results in the second system.

16. In transition

17. Modified Borda Count (Modified BC)

Borda Count (BC) - A candidate-centred preferential system used in either single- or multimember districts in which voters use numbers to mark their preferences on the ballot paper and each preference marked is then assigned a value using equal steps. These are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are declared elected.

18. Two-Round System, Party Block Vote, List Proportional Representation (TRS PBV List PR)

19. No direct elections.

### 3.2.2.127 Electoral System for the President (*ideaesd\_esp*)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideaesd\_esp

*Original tag:* ideaesd\_esp

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023a)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5050, Percent: 42.44

*Description:*

Electoral System for the President:

1. Two-Round System (TRS)

The Two-Round System is a plurality/majority system in which a second election is held if no candidate or party achieves a given level of votes, most commonly an absolute majority (50 per cent plus one), in the first election round. A Two-Round System may take a majority-plurality form-more than two candidates contest the second round and the one who wins the highest number of votes in the second round is elected, regardless of whether they have won an absolute majority-or a majority run-off form-only the top two candidates in the first round contest the second round.

2. First Past the Post (FPTP)

First Past The Post is the simplest form of plurality/majority electoral system. The winning candidate is the one who gains more votes than any other candidate, even if this is not an absolute majority of valid votes. The system uses single-member districts and the voters vote for candidates rather than political parties.

3. Supplementary Vote (SV)

Supplementary vote: Voters can rank up to three candidates, and if no candidate wins a majority in the first round of voting, second and third preferences from ballots whose first preference candidate has been eliminated are used to determine the winner.

#### 4. Single Transferable Vote (STV)

The Single Transferable Vote is a preferential system in which the voter has one vote in a multi-member district and the candidates that surpass a specified quota of first preference votes are immediately elected. In successive counts, votes are redistributed from least successful candidates, who are eliminated, and votes surplus to the quota are redistributed from successful candidates, until sufficient candidates are declared elected. Voters normally vote for candidates rather than political parties, although a party-list option is possible.

#### 5. In Transition

#### 6. Other

#### 7. Not applicable

### 3.2.2.128 Legislative Size (Directly Elected) (ideaesd\_lsde)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideaesd\_lsde

*Original tag:* ideaesd\_lsde

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023a)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5067, Percent: 42.59

*Description:*

Legislative size, directly elected. Total number of directly elected representatives, excluding those appointed or indirectly elected.

### 3.2.2.129 Legislative Size (Voting Members) (ideaesd\_lsvm)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideaesd\_lsvm

*Original tag:* ideaesd\_lsvm

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023a)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5026, Percent: 42.24

*Description:*

Legislative size, voting members. Total number of directly elected representatives, including those appointed or indirectly elected.

### 3.2.2.130 Number of Tiers (ideaesd\_tiers)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideaesd\_tiers

*Original tag:* ideaesd\_tiers

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023a)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5067, Percent: 42.59

*Description:*

Number of tiers. The tiers of an electoral system can be understood as the sets of representatives that are elected to the same chamber by the entire electorate of a country. 99 indicates a hybrid system, where one part of the country elects representatives using one electoral system, while another distinct part of the country elects representatives using a different system.

### **3.2.2.131 EU Parliamentary Election: Compulsory Voting (ideavt\_eucv)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideavt\_eucv

*Original tag:* ideavt\_eucv

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 297, Percent: 2.5

*Description:*

EU Parliamentary Election: Compulsory Voting

### **3.2.2.132 EU Parliamentary Election: Voter Turnout (ideavt\_euvt)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideavt\_euvt

*Original tag:* ideavt\_euvt

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 297, Percent: 2.5

*Description:*

EU Parliamentary Election: Voter Turnout

### **3.2.2.133 Parliamentary Election: Compulsory Voting (ideavt\_legcv)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideavt\_legcv

*Original tag:* ideavt\_legcv

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7699, Percent: 64.71

*Description:*

Parliamentary Election: Compulsory Voting

### **3.2.2.134 Parliamentary Election: Voter Turnout (ideavt\_legvt)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideavt\_legvt

*Original tag:* ideavt\_legvt

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7505, Percent: 63.08

*Description:*

Parliamentary Election: Voter Turnout

### **3.2.2.135 Presidential Election: Compulsory Voting (ideavt\_prescv)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideavt\_prescv

*Original tag:* ideavt\_prescv

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1873, Percent: 15.74

*Description:*

Presidential Election: Compulsory Voting

### **3.2.2.136 Presidential Election: Voter Turnout (ideavt\_presvt)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideavt\_presvt

*Original tag:* ideavt\_presvt

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1817, Percent: 15.27

*Description:*

Presidential Election: Voter Turnout

### **3.2.2.137 Number of Seats (Lower and Single Houses) (ipu\_l\_s)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ipu\_l\_s

*Original tag:* ipu\_l\_s

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Inter-Parliamentary Union (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4218, Percent: 35.45

*Description:*

Number of Seats (Lower and Single Houses).

### **3.2.2.138 Number of Seats (Upper House) (ipu\_u\_s)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ipu\_u\_s

*Original tag:* ipu\_u\_s

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Inter-Parliamentary Union (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1710, Percent: 14.37

*Description:*

Number of Seats (Upper House).

**3.2.2.139 Party Control over Ballot (lower/only house) (jw\_avgballot)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_avgballot

*Original tag:* jw\_avgballot

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2581, Percent: 21.69

*Description:*

Country-level weighted averages of Party Control over Ballot - SMD (lower/only house) (jw\_smdballot) and Party Control over Ballot - MMD (lower/only house) (jw\_mmdballot), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of ballots for the average member sitting in the lower house. The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order); (1) where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list); (2) where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates).

**3.2.2.140 Party Control over Ballot (upper house) (jw\_avgballot2)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_avgballot2

*Original tag:* jw\_avgballot2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 675, Percent: 5.67

*Description:*

Country-level weighted averages of Party Control over Ballot - SMD (upper house) (jw\_smdballot2) and Party Control over Ballot - MMD (upper house) (jw\_mmdballot2), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of ballots for the average member sitting in the upper house. The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order); (1) where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list); (2) where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates).

**3.2.2.141 Sharing of Votes among Candidates (lower/only house) (jw\_avgpool)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_avgpool

*Original tag:* jw\_avgpool

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2625, Percent: 22.06

*Description:*

Country-level weighted averages of Sharing of Votes among Candidates - SMD (lower/only house) (jw\_smdpool) and Sharing of Votes among Candidates - MMD (lower/only house) (jw\_mmdpool), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of the pooling of votes for the average member sitting in the lower house. The Pool variables measure the extent to which votes among candidates from the same party are shared. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where pooling of votes occurs across all candidates in a party in a district; (1) where pooling of votes occurs across some, but not all, candidates in a party in a district, or, where there is vote pooling across all candidates in a party in a district, but where the average district accounts for 5percent or less of a legislature's membership; (2) where no pooling of votes occurs across candidates in a party (including single-member districts).

### **3.2.2.142 Sharing of Votes among Candidates (upper house) (jw\_avgpool2)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_avgpool2

*Original tag:* jw\_avgpool2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 675, Percent: 5.67

*Description:*

Country-level weighted averages of Sharing of Votes among Candidates - SMD (upper house) (jw\_smdpool2) and Sharing of Votes among Candidates - MMD (upper house) (jw\_mmdpool2), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of the pooling of votes for the average member sitting in the upper house. The Pool variables measure the extent to which votes among candidates from the same party are shared. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where pooling of votes occurs across all candidates in a party in a district; (1) where pooling of votes occurs across some, but not all, candidates in a party in a district, or, where there is vote pooling across all candidates in a party in a district, but where the average district accounts for 5percent or less of a legislature's membership; (2) where no pooling of votes occurs across candidates in a party (including single-member districts).

### **3.2.2.143 Candidate or Party-specific Voting (lower/only house) (jw\_avgvote)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_avgvote

*Original tag:* jw\_avgvote

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2575, Percent: 21.64

*Description:*

Country-level weighted averages of Candidate- or Party-specific Voting - SMD (lower/only house) (jw\_smdvote) and Candidate- or Party-specific Voting - MMD (lower/only house)



(*jw\_mmdvote*), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of votes for the average member sitting in the lower house. The Vote variables focus attention on the distinction between casting votes for either parties or individual candidates. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where voters have only one vote for a party; (1) where voters can vote for a party or a candidate (as in open lists), where voters have multiple votes for multiple candidates (as in runoff or single-transferable vote systems), or where votes for a party or candidate are observationally equivalent (as in single-member districts); (2) where voters have one vote for an individual candidate.

### 3.2.2.144 Candidate or Party-specific Voting (upper house) (*jw\_avgvote2*)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_avgvote2

*Original tag:* jw\_avgvote2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 675, Percent: 5.67

*Description:*

Country-level weighted averages of Candidate- or Party-specific Voting - SMD (upper house) (*jw\_smdvote2*) and Candidate- or Party-specific Voting - MMD (upper house) (*jw\_mmdvote2*), where the weights are the percentage of members that originate from each tier. This variable thus reflects the value of votes for the average member sitting in the upper house. The Vote variables focus attention on the distinction between casting votes for either parties or individual candidates. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where voters have only one vote for a party; (1) where voters can vote for a party or a candidate (as in open lists), where voters have multiple votes for multiple candidates (as in runoff or single-transferable vote systems), or where votes for a party or candidate are observationally equivalent (as in single-member districts); (2) where voters have one vote for an individual candidate.

### 3.2.2.145 Dominant or Populous Tier (*jw\_domr*)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_domr

*Original tag:* jw\_domr

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2521, Percent: 21.19

*Description:*

This variable ranks countries in increasing order of incentives to cultivate a personal vote according to their most dominant or populous tier (or tier with the greater number of legislators). The variable varies from 1 to 13, corresponding to the thirteen positions in Carey & Shugart's (1995) ranking. For example, a country with a ranking of 1 would have a tier with the lowest possible rank of personal vote incentives, and that tier would account for the majority of the members in the assembly.

### 3.2.2.146 Year of Election (lower/only house) (*jw\_election*)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_election

*Original tag:* jw\_election

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2645, Percent: 22.23

*Description:*

Dummy variable, 1 if year of election to lower house.

### **3.2.2.147 Year of Election (upper house) (jw\_election2)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_election2

*Original tag:* jw\_election2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 624, Percent: 5.24

*Description:*

Dummy variable, 1 if year of election to upper house.

### **3.2.2.148 Ballot Access for Independent Candidates (lower/only house) (jw\_indy)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_indy

*Original tag:* jw\_indy

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2340, Percent: 19.67

*Description:*

Equals 1 wherever independent candidates are legally allowed (even where the legal requirements are strict), and 0 otherwise. This complements the cases where the ballot variables above equal 1 or 2, since they are adjusted to capture de facto practice. `jw_indy` instead captures the de jure rules. A user could adjust the ballot variables above to be de jure if (s)he replaced values of 2 with values of 1 when `jw_indy = 0`. Refers to lower house elections. The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order); (1) where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list); (2) where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates).

### **3.2.2.149 Ballot Access for Independent Candidates (upper house) (jw\_indy2)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_indy2

*Original tag:* jw\_indy2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 623, Percent: 5.24

*Description:*

Same as `jw_indy`, but for upper house elections. The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order); (1) where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list); (2) where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates).

**3.2.2.150 Number of Coded Legislators (lower/only house) (`jw_legsize`)**

*Long tag:* `qog_std_ts_jw_legsize`

*Original tag:* `jw_legsize`

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2917, Percent: 24.52

*Description:*

The number of legislators coded in the dataset. These may not account for the total number of legislators if there are appointed legislators that have no electoral rules to code.

**3.2.2.151 Number of Coded Legislators (upper house) (`jw_legsize2`)**

*Long tag:* `qog_std_ts_jw_legsize2`

*Original tag:* `jw_legsize2`

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 807, Percent: 6.78

*Description:*

The number of legislators coded in the dataset. These may not account for the total number of legislators if there are appointed legislators that have no electoral rules to code.

**3.2.2.152 District Magnitude of Average Legislator (lower/only house) (`jw_mcand`)**

*Long tag:* `qog_std_ts_jw_mcand`

*Original tag:* `jw_mcand`

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1976, Percent: 16.61

*Description:*

In keeping with the emphasis on the incentives faced by individual legislators, this variable measures the district magnitude considering the viewpoint of the average legislator in the lower house. It is scored as a weighted average of the various district sizes, where weights are computed as the number of legislators running in the district of each magnitude divided by the total number of seats. For example: A country with 300 seats divided among one national district with 200 members and 100 single-member districts has a magnitude for the average

legislator of  $[(200*200) + (100*1)]/300$ , which yields a figure of 133.67.

### 3.2.2.153 District Magnitude of Average Legislator (upper house) (jw\_mcand2)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_mcand2

*Original tag:* jw\_mcand2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 785, Percent: 6.6

*Description:*

This is the district magnitude of the average legislator in the upper house.

### 3.2.2.154 Average District Magnitude (lower/only house) (jw\_mdists)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_mdists

*Original tag:* jw\_mdists

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3056, Percent: 25.68

*Description:*

This is the standard magnitude of the average district in the lower house. For example: A country with 300 seats divided among one national district with 200 members and 100 single-member districts would have an average district magnitude (jw\_mdists) of 2.97 (i.e.,  $300/101$ ).

### 3.2.2.155 Average District Magnitude (upper house) (jw\_mdists2)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_mdists2

*Original tag:* jw\_mdists2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 828, Percent: 6.96

*Description:*

This is the average district magnitude in the upper house.

### 3.2.2.156 Party Control over Ballot - MMD (lower/only house) (jw\_mmdballot)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_mmdballot

*Original tag:* jw\_mmdballot

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2049, Percent: 17.22

*Description:*

Ballot (coded as above) for multi-member district tiers in elections to the lower house. The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the

seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order); (1) where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list); (2) where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates).

### 3.2.2.157 Party Control over Ballot - MMD (upper house) (jw\_mmdballot2)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_mmdballot2

*Original tag:* jw\_mmdballot2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 475, Percent: 3.99

*Description:*

Ballot for multi-member district tiers in elections to the upper house. The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order); (1) where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list); (2) where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates).

### 3.2.2.158 Sharing of Votes among Candidates - MMD (lower/only house) (jw\_mmdpool)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_mmdpool

*Original tag:* jw\_mmdpool

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2082, Percent: 17.5

*Description:*

Pool for multi-member district tiers in elections to the lower house. The Pool variables measure the extent to which votes among candidates from the same party are shared. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where pooling of votes occurs across all candidates in a party in a district; (1) where pooling of votes occurs across some, but not all, candidates in a party in a district, or, where there is vote pooling across all candidates in a party in a district, but where the average district accounts for 5percent or less of a legislature's membership; (2) where no pooling of votes occurs across candidates in a party (including single-member districts).

### 3.2.2.159 Sharing of Votes among Candidates - MMD (upper house) (jw\_mmdpool2)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_mmdpool2

*Original tag:* jw\_mmdpool2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 480, Percent: 4.03

*Description:*

Pool for multi-member district tiers in elections to the upper house. The Pool variables measure the extent to which votes among candidates from the same party are shared. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where pooling of votes occurs across all candidates in a party in a district; (1) where pooling of votes occurs across some, but not all, candidates in a party in a district, or, where there is vote pooling across all candidates in a party in a district, but where the average district accounts for 5percent or less of a legislature's membership; (2) where no pooling of votes occurs across candidates in a party (including single-member districts).

### **3.2.2.160 Candidate or Party-specific Voting - MMD (lower/only house) (jw\_mmdvote)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_mmdvote

*Original tag:* jw\_mmdvote

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2032, Percent: 17.08

*Description:*

Vote for multi-member district tiers in elections to the lower house. The Vote variables focus attention on the distinction between casting votes for either parties or individual candidates. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where voters have only one vote for a party; (1) where voters can vote for a party or a candidate (as in open lists), where voters have multiple votes for multiple candidates (as in runoff or single-transferable vote systems), or where votes for a party or candidate are observationally equivalent (as in single-member districts); (2) where voters have one vote for an individual candidate.

### **3.2.2.161 Candidate or Party-specific Voting - MMD (upper house) (jw\_mmdvote2)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_mmdvote2

*Original tag:* jw\_mmdvote2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 475, Percent: 3.99

*Description:*

Vote for multi-member district tiers in elections to the upper house. The Vote variables focus attention on the distinction between casting votes for either parties or individual candidates. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where voters have only one vote for a party; (1) where voters can vote for a party or a candidate (as in open lists), where voters have multiple votes for multiple candidates (as in runoff or single-transferable vote systems), or where votes for a party or candidate are observationally equivalent (as in single-member districts); (2) where voters have one vote for an individual candidate.

### **3.2.2.162 Runoff Elections (jw\_multiround)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_multiround

*Original tag:* jw\_multiround

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2371, Percent: 19.93

*Description:*

The variable indicates whether there are run-off elections. These are usually for SMDs with absolute majority requirements. Where jw\_multiround is equal to 1, voters have more than a single vote to cast, albeit votes occur on separate election days.

### **3.2.2.163 Multi Tier (lower/only house) (jw\_multitier)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_multitier

*Original tag:* jw\_multitier

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2663, Percent: 22.38

*Description:*

Indicates whether there are two or more tiers to the legislature.

### **3.2.2.164 Multi Tier (upper house) (jw\_multitier2)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_multitier2

*Original tag:* jw\_multitier2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 737, Percent: 6.19

*Description:*

Equals 1 wherever there are multiple allocation tiers, regardless of whether they are the result of mixed member systems that incorporate different members under different rules, or systems that have upper tiers within a single electoral system to compensate for disproportionality in lower tiers.

### **3.2.2.165 Tiers allocated in Parallel (jw\_parallel)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_parallel

*Original tag:* jw\_parallel

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 413, Percent: 3.47

*Description:*

Coded 1 if multiple tiers are elected in parallel fashion, 0 when they are elected in (at least some-what) compensatory fashion. Is coded only when jw\_multitier = 1.

### **3.2.2.166 Personalistic Tier (jw\_persr)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_persr

*Original tag:* jw\_persr

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2532, Percent: 21.28

*Description:*

This variable ranks countries in increasing order of incentives to cultivate a personal vote according to their more personalistic tier (or tier with the greater incentives to cultivate a personal vote). The variable varies from 1 to 13, corresponding to the thirteen positions in Carey \amp; Shugart's (1995) ranking. For example, a country with a ranking of 13 would have a tier with the highest possible rank of incentives to cultivate a personal vote, although that tier may only account for a minority or small fraction of its members.

### **3.2.2.167 Proportion Coded Legislators (lower/only house) (jw\_propcoded)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_propcoded

*Original tag:* jw\_propcoded

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3340, Percent: 28.07

*Description:*

Shows the proportion of total legislators (elected and non-elected) that are included in the database (i.e. those that are elected).

### **3.2.2.168 Proportion Coded Legislators (upper house) (jw\_propcoded2)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_propcoded2

*Original tag:* jw\_propcoded2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1079, Percent: 9.07

*Description:*

This is the proportion of the total number of legislators (elected and non-elected) that are coded.

### **3.2.2.169 Seats from Multi-Member Districts (lower/only house) (jw\_propmmd)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_propmmd

*Original tag:* jw\_propmmd

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2915, Percent: 24.5

*Description:*

Proportion of seats from Multi-Member District (lower/only house).

### **3.2.2.170 Seats from Multi-Member Districts (upper house) (jw\_propmmd2)**



*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_propmmd2

*Original tag:* jw\_propmmd2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 705, Percent: 5.93

*Description:*

This is the proportion of coded legislators elected in multi-member districts.

### **3.2.2.171 Seats from a National District (lower/only house) (jw\_propn)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_propn

*Original tag:* jw\_propn

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3288, Percent: 27.63

*Description:*

The proportion of legislators that are elected via a national tier.

### **3.2.2.172 Seats from a National District (upper house) (jw\_propn2)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_propn2

*Original tag:* jw\_propn2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1385, Percent: 11.64

*Description:*

This is the proportion of coded legislators that are elected via a national tier. This is often (but not always) similar to the proportion elected via multi-member districts (jw\_propmmd): some electoral systems have proportional representation based on regional multimember districts as well as national tiers (e.g. Hungary).

### **3.2.2.173 Seats from Single-Member Districts (lower/only house) (jw\_propsm)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_propsm

*Original tag:* jw\_propsm

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2906, Percent: 24.42

*Description:*

Proportion of seats from Single-Member Districts.

### **3.2.2.174 Seats from Single-Member Districts (upper house) (jw\_propsm2)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_propsm2

*Original tag:* jw\_propsm2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 601, Percent: 5.05

*Description:*

This is the proportion of coded legislators elected in single-member districts (Note: In the original data for Kyrgyzstan `propcmd2=60` in 1997-1999 and `propcmd2=45` 2000-2004. We have replaced these figures with missing values).

### 3.2.2.175 Rank Vote (lower/only house) (`jw_rank`)

*Long tag:* `qog_std_ts_jw_rank`

*Original tag:* `jw_rank`

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2139, Percent: 17.98

*Description:*

Equals 1 in two circumstances: where voters may rank order candidates according to preference, or where citizens have multiple preference votes for multiple candidates, even if they may not specifically rank the candidates. Otherwise, `jw_rank` is equal to zero. Refers to lower house elections.

### 3.2.2.176 Rank Vote (upper house) (`jw_rank2`)

*Long tag:* `qog_std_ts_jw_rank2`

*Original tag:* `jw_rank2`

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 623, Percent: 5.24

*Description:*

Same as `jw_rank`, but for upper house elections.

### 3.2.2.177 Party Control over Ballot - SMD (lower/only house) (`jw_smdballot`)

*Long tag:* `qog_std_ts_jw_smdballot`

*Original tag:* `jw_smdballot`

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1005, Percent: 8.45

*Description:*

Ballot for single-member district tiers in elections to the lower house. The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order); (1) where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts

where parties control access to the list); (2) where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates).

### 3.2.2.178 Sharing of Votes among Candidates - SMD (lower/only house) (jw\_smdpool)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_smdpool

*Original tag:* jw\_smdpool

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1016, Percent: 8.54

*Description:*

Pool for single-member district tiers in elections to the lower house. The Pool variables measure the extent to which votes among candidates from the same party are shared. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where pooling of votes occurs across all candidates in a party in a district; (1) where pooling of votes occurs across some, but not all, candidates in a party in a district, or, where there is vote pooling across all candidates in a party in a district, but where the average district accounts for 5percent or less of a legislature's membership; (2) where no pooling of votes occurs across candidates in a party (including single-member districts).

### 3.2.2.179 Candidate or Party-specific Voting - SMD (lower/only house) (jw\_smdvote)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_smdvote

*Original tag:* jw\_smdvote

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1016, Percent: 8.54

*Description:*

Vote for single-member district tiers in elections to the lower house. The Vote variables focus attention on the distinction between casting votes for either parties or individual candidates. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where voters have only one vote for a party; (1) where voters can vote for a party or a candidate (as in open lists), where voters have multiple votes for multiple candidates (as in runoff or single-transferable vote systems), or where votes for a party or candidate are observationally equivalent (as in single-member districts); (2) where voters have one vote for an individual candidate.

### 3.2.2.180 Tiervote (lower/only house) (jw\_tiervote)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_tiervote

*Original tag:* jw\_tiervote

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2428, Percent: 20.41

*Description:*

Equals 1 when citizens are given a separate vote for deputies in each legislative tier.

### 3.2.2.181 Tiervote (upper house) (jw\_tiervote2)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_tiervote2

*Original tag:* jw\_tiervote2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 517, Percent: 4.35

*Description:*

Equals 1 when citizens are given a separate vote for deputies in each legislative tier.

### 3.2.2.182 First Multiparty Election (nelda\_fme)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_nelda\_fme

*Original tag:* nelda\_fme

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Hyde & Marinov (2012a, 2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8478, Percent: 71.26

*Description:*

This indicates when a newly independent country is having its first elections, when a country holds the first multiparty elections after a significant period of non-democratic rule, or when a country transitions from single-party elections to multiparty elections. Multiparty means that more than one party is allowed to contest the election, and that at least some of the parties are both nominally and effectively independent of the ruling actors.

Values:

0. No

1. Yes

### 3.2.2.183 Media Bias before Election (nelda\_mbbe)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_nelda\_mbbe

*Original tag:* nelda\_mbbe

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Hyde & Marinov (2012a, 2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8381, Percent: 70.44

*Description:*

If there were reports by either domestic or outside actors of media bias in favor of the incumbent or ruling party, it is coded as a 'Yes'. In cases where the media is totally controlled by the government, and/or no opposition is allowed, the answer is 'Yes'. It is possible that the answer is 'No' even if the political system is tightly controlled.

Values:

0. No

1. Yes
3. Unclear

**3.2.2.184 Was More Than One Party Legal (nelda\_mtop)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_nelda\_mtop

*Original tag:* nelda\_mtop

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Hyde & Marinov (2012a, 2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8478, Percent: 71.26

*Description:*

This variable indicates whether multiple political parties were technically legal. The legalization of multiple parties need not necessarily mean the existence of a functioning opposition party, as there may be other non-legal barriers to the development of an opposition party. Similarly, a well organized opposition party may exist but may not be legal.

Values:

0. No
1. Yes
3. Unclear

**3.2.2.185 Number of Elections, Total (nelda\_noe)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_nelda\_noe

*Original tag:* nelda\_noe

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Hyde & Marinov (2012a, 2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8478, Percent: 71.26

*Description:*

The number of elections during the year (counting legislative, executive and constituent assembly elections).

**3.2.2.186 Number of Elections, Constituent Assembly (nelda\_noea)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_nelda\_noea

*Original tag:* nelda\_noea

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Hyde & Marinov (2012a, 2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8478, Percent: 71.26

*Description:*

Number of constituent assembly elections during the year.

**3.2.2.187 Number of Elections, Executive (nelda\_noee)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_nelda\_noee

*Original tag:* nelda\_noee

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Hyde & Marinov (2012a, 2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8478, Percent: 71.26

*Description:*

Number of executive elections during the year.

### **3.2.2.188 Number of Elections, Legislative (nelda\_noel)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_nelda\_noel

*Original tag:* nelda\_noel

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Hyde & Marinov (2012a, 2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8478, Percent: 71.26

*Description:*

Number of legislative elections during the year.

### **3.2.2.189 Was Opposition Allowed (nelda\_oa)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_nelda\_oa

*Original tag:* nelda\_oa

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Hyde & Marinov (2012a, 2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8478, Percent: 71.26

*Description:*

This variable indicates whether at least one opposition political party existed to contest the election. Some countries have multiple government parties but no opposition political party. An opposition party is one that is not in the government, meaning it is not affiliated with the incumbent party in power.

Values:

0. No

1. Yes

3. Unclear

### **3.2.2.190 Riots and Protests after Election (nelda\_rpae)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_nelda\_rpae

*Original tag:* nelda\_rpae

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Hyde & Marinov (2012a, 2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8448, Percent: 71

*Description:*

If there are protests and riots after elections, a 'Yes' is coded. The riots and protests should at least somewhat be related to the handling or outcome of the election.

Values:

0. No

1. Yes

3. Unclear

**3.2.2.191 Violence and Civilian Deaths before Election (nelda\_vcdbe)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_nelda\_vcdbe

*Original tag:* nelda\_vcdbe

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Hyde & Marinov (2012a, 2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8433, Percent: 70.88

*Description:*

If there was any significant violence relating to the elections that resulted in civilian deaths, a 'Yes' is coded. These deaths should be at least plausibly related to the election, though sometimes it is difficult to be certain. Deaths related to civil war that are not intended to influence the election, and are not caused by the election, should not be counted.

Values:

0. No

1. Yes

3. Unclear

**3.2.2.192 Cumulative Party System Innovation (psi\_cpsil)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_psi\_cpsil

*Original tag:* psi\_cpsil

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele (2016)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1701, Percent: 14.3

*Description:*

Cumulative Party System Innovation: sum of the vote share received by non-founder parties in each election. A party is considered as a founder if it has received at least 1percent of the national vote share in at least one of the first two post-WWII elections (or, in the case of Greece, Portugal and Spain, the first two democratic elections). Otherwise, the party is counted as a non-founder. The rationale behind this choice is that we look at the first two post-WWII or post-authoritarian elections and make a dichotomous distinction between relevant parties that formed the system (those who received more than 1percent of the votes) and parties that emerged later or were only marginal actors (those below 1percent) at that time.

**3.2.2.193 Cumulative Party System Innovation of a second election in a year (psi\_cpsi2)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_psi\_cpsi2

*Original tag:* psi\_cpsi2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele (2016)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 37, Percent: 0.31

*Description:*

Cumulative Party System Innovation: sum of the vote share received by non-founder parties in each election. A party is considered as a founder if it has received at least 1percent of the national vote share in at least one of the first two post-WWII elections (or, in the case of Greece, Portugal and Spain, the first two democratic elections). Otherwise, the party is counted as a non-founder. The rationale behind this choice is that we look at the first two post-WWII or post-authoritarian elections and make a dichotomous distinction between relevant parties that formed the system (those who received more than 1percent of the votes) and parties that emerged later or were only marginal actors (those below 1percent) at that time. This variable (psi\_cpsi2) refers to a second election held on the same year as an election reported on psi\_cpsi1.

**3.2.2.194 Exact date of the election (psi\_edate1)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_psi\_edate1

*Original tag:* psi\_edate1

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele (2016)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8716, Percent: 73.26

*Description:*

Exact date of the election

**3.2.2.195 Exact date of the second election in a year (psi\_edate2)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_psi\_edate2

*Original tag:* psi\_edate2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele (2016)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8716, Percent: 73.26

*Description:*

Exact date of a second election in a same year

**3.2.2.196 Party System Innovation (overall vote share of new parties in given election) (psi\_psi1)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_psi\_psi1

*Original tag:* psi\_psi1

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele (2016)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0



*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1701, Percent: 14.3

*Description:*

Party System Innovation: overall vote share of new parties in a given election. It is calculated at time t with respect to time t-1 (namely, PSInn is calculated with respect to the status quo established at the previous election) and therefore each observation in each country is completely independent from the previous ones. In order to exclude marginal parties, the author has set a threshold at 1percent of the national share for a given party to be considered as part of the party system in a given election and has collected data starting from the third post-World War II or democratic election of each country, for a total of 209 new parties (see the complete list of new parties below) in 327 elections. The underlying assumption is that the party system innovation they are interested in is that occurring after the initial institutionalization of the party system. According to PSInn, a party is considered 'new' only in the first election when it enters the party system by receiving at least 1percent of the national share. Then, in the subsequent elections, it becomes 'old'.

**3.2.2.197 Party System Innovation of a second election in a year (psi\_psi2)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_psi\_psi2

*Original tag:* psi\_psi2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele (2016)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 37, Percent: 0.31

*Description:*

Party System Innovation: overall vote share of new parties in a given election. It is calculated at time t with respect to time t-1 (namely, PSInn is calculated with respect to the status quo established at the previous election) and therefore each observation in each country is completely independent from the previous ones. In order to exclude marginal parties, the author has set a threshold at 1percent of the national share for a given party to be considered as part of the party system in a given election and has collected data starting from the third post-World War II or democratic election of each country, for a total of 209 new parties (see the complete list of new parties below) in 327 elections. The underlying assumption is that the party system innovation they are interested in is that occurring after the initial institutionalization of the party system. According to PSInn, a party is considered 'new' only in the first election when it enters the party system by receiving at least 1percent of the national share. Then, in the subsequent elections, it becomes 'old'. This variable (psi\_psi2) refers to a second election held on the same year as an election reported on psi\_psi1.

**3.2.2.198 Robust Democracy: Electoral Process (sgi\_qdep)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_sgi\_qdep

*Original tag:* sgi\_qdep

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Schiller & Hellmann (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 529, Percent: 4.45

*Description:*

Robust Democracy: Electoral Process (Candidacy Procedures, Media Access, Voting and Registration Rights, Party Financing, Popular Decision-making).

**3.2.2.199 Competition (van\_comp)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_van\_comp

*Original tag:* van\_comp

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Vanhanen (2019)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8406, Percent: 70.65

*Description:*

The competition variable portrays the electoral success of smaller parties, that is, the percentage of votes gained by the smaller parties in parliamentary and/or presidential elections. The variable is calculated by subtracting from 100 the percentage of votes won by the largest party (the party which wins most votes) in parliamentary elections or by the party of the successful candidate in presidential elections. Depending on their importance, either parliamentary or presidential elections are used in the calculation of the variable, or both elections are used, with weights. If information on the distribution of votes is not available, or if the distribution does not portray the reality accurately, the distribution of parliamentary seats is used instead. If parliament members are elected but political parties are not allowed to take part in elections, it is assumed that one party has taken all votes or seats. In countries where parties are not banned but yet only independent candidates participate in elections, it is assumed that the share of the largest party is not over 30 percent.

### 3.2.2.200 Participation (van\_part)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_van\_part

*Original tag:* van\_part

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Vanhanen (2019)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8406, Percent: 70.65

*Description:*

The political participation variable portrays the voting turnout in each election, and is calculated as the percentage of the total population who actually voted in the election. In the case of indirect elections, only votes cast in the final election are taken into account. If electors have not been elected by citizens, only the number of actual electors is taken into account, which means that the degree of participation drops to the value 0. If an election to choose electors has been held, the participation variable is calculated from the number and distribution of votes in that election. National referendums raise the variable value by five percent and state (regional) referendums by one percent for the year they are held. Referendums can add the degree of participation at maximum by 30 percent a year. The value of the combined degree of participation cannot be higher than 70 percent, even in cases where the sum of participation and referendums would be higher than 70.

### 3.2.2.201 Number of years the leader in office continuously (wgov\_leadexp)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wgov\_leadexp

*Original tag:* wgov\_leadexp

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Nyrup & Bramwell (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7214, Percent: 60.63

*Description:*

The number of years the person has been leader of the country in a row, continuous. Thus, it starts over if the leader is removed. The count starts at 1, when the leader first appear as leader in the dataset. Therefore, the measure is imprecise for leaders, who came to power before 1966.

### 3.2.2.202 Number of cabinet ministers (wgov\_min)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wgov\_min

*Original tag:* wgov\_min

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Nyrup & Bramwell (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7214, Percent: 60.63

*Description:*

Number of cabinet ministers. This number only include cabinet ministers.

### 3.2.2.203 Average age in cabinet ministers (wgov\_minage)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wgov\_minage

*Original tag:* wgov\_minage

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Nyrup & Bramwell (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5331, Percent: 44.81

*Description:*

Average age for cabinet ministers (people included for wgov\_min).

### 3.2.2.204 Average tenure for cabinet ministers (wgov\_minten)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wgov\_minten

*Original tag:* wgov\_minten

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Nyrup & Bramwell (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7181, Percent: 60.35

*Description:*

The average tenure for cabinet ministers (people included for wgov\_min).

### 3.2.2.205 Adjusted retention rate for cabinet ministers (wgov\_mret)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wgov\_mret

*Original tag:* wgov\_mret

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Nyrup & Bramwell (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7205, Percent: 60.56

*Description:*

The share of cabinet ministers (people included for wgov\_min), who were in office the previous year. This measure is adjusted for an expansion of the size of wgov\_min, so wgov\_min stays constant and the retention rate is therefore not influenced by an expansion of the cabinet.

### 3.2.2.206 Total number of government positions (inc. unoccupied and multiple positions) (wgov\_tot)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wgov\_tot

*Original tag:* wgov\_tot

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Nyrup & Bramwell (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7214, Percent: 60.63

*Description:*

Number of entries for the country in the dataset. This number includes unoccupied positions and multiple positions held by the same persons.

### **3.2.2.207 Average age in government positions (wgov\_totage)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wgov\_totage

*Original tag:* wgov\_totage

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Nyrup & Bramwell (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5531, Percent: 46.49

*Description:*

Average age for people in government positions, who were counted for wgov\_tot.

### **3.2.2.208 Average tenure for people in government positions (wgov\_totten)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wgov\_totten

*Original tag:* wgov\_totten

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Nyrup & Bramwell (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7194, Percent: 60.46

*Description:*

The average tenure for people in government positions, who were counted for wgov\_tot.

### **3.2.2.209 Adjusted retention rate for people in government positions (wgov\_tret)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wgov\_tret

*Original tag:* wgov\_tret

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Nyrup & Bramwell (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7116, Percent: 59.81

*Description:*

The share of people in government positions, who were also in office in the previous year. This measure is adjusted for an expansion of the size of wgov\_tot, so n\_total stays constant and the retention rate is therefore not influenced by an expansion of the cabinet.

### **3.2.2.210 Confidence: The Political Parties (wvs\_confpp)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wvs\_confpp

*Original tag:* wvs\_confpp

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* EVS (2021, 2020), Haerpfer et al. (2021, 2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 506, Percent: 4.25

*Description:*

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: The Political Parties

1. None at all
2. Not very much
3. Quite a lot
4. A great deal

### **3.2.2.211 Age Representation Index (30 or under) (yri\_agi30)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_agi30

*Original tag:* yri\_agi30

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The percentage of MPs aged 30 or under relative to the percent of citizens aged 30 or under in the population.

### **3.2.2.212 Age Representation Index (35 or under) (yri\_agi35)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_agi35

*Original tag:* yri\_agi35

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The percentage of MPs aged 35 or under relative to the percent of citizens aged 35 or under in the population.

### **3.2.2.213 Age Representation Index (40 or under) (yri\_agi40)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_agi40

*Original tag:* yri\_agi40

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The percentage of MPs aged 40 or under relative to the percent of citizens aged 40 or under in the population.

### **3.2.2.214 Age Representation Index (41 to 60) (yri\_agi4160)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_agi4160

*Original tag:* yri\_agi4160

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The percentage of MPs aged 41 to 60 relative to the percent of citizens aged 41 to 60 in the population.

### **3.2.2.215 Age Representation Index (61 or over) (yri\_agi61)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_agi61

*Original tag:* yri\_agi61

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The percentage of MPs aged 61 or over relative to the percent of citizens aged 61 or over in the population.

### **3.2.2.216 Female Representation in Parliament (under 30 years) (yri\_fem30)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_fem30

*Original tag:* yri\_fem30

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The percentage of female MPs aged 30 or under of all female MPs.

### **3.2.2.217 Female Representation in Parliament (under 35 years) (yri\_fem35)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_fem35

*Original tag:* yri\_fem35

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The percentage of female MPs aged 35 or under of all female MPs.

### **3.2.2.218 Female Representation in Parliament (under 40 years) (yri\_fem40)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_fem40

*Original tag:* yri\_fem40

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The percentage of female MPs aged 40 or under of all female MPs.

### **3.2.2.219 Female Representation in Parliament (41 to 60 years) (yri\_fem4160)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_fem4160

*Original tag:* yri\_fem4160

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The percentage of female MPs aged 41 to 60 of all female MPs.

### **3.2.2.220 Female Representation in Parliament (over 61 years) (yri\_fem61)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_fem61

*Original tag:* yri\_fem61

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The percentage of female MPs aged 61 or over of all female MPs.

### **3.2.2.221 Mean age of MPs (yri\_meanage)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_meanage

*Original tag:* yri\_meanage

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The mean age of MPs in the respective country.

### **3.2.2.222 Median age of MPs (yri\_medianage)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_medianage

*Original tag:* yri\_medianage

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The median age of MPs in the respective country.

### **3.2.2.223 Percent MPs aged 30 or under (yri\_mp30)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_mp30

*Original tag:* yri\_mp30

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The percentage of MPs aged 30 or under.

### **3.2.2.224 Percent MPs aged 35 or under (yri\_mp35)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_mp35

*Original tag:* yri\_mp35

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The percentage of MPs aged 35 or under.

### **3.2.2.225 Percent MPs aged 40 or under (yri\_mp40)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_mp40

*Original tag:* yri\_mp40

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The percentage of female MPs aged 40 or under of all female MPs.

### **3.2.2.226 Percent MPs aged 41 to 60 (yri\_mp4160)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_mp4160

*Original tag:* yri\_mp4160

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The percentage of MPs aged 41 to 60.

### **3.2.2.227 Percent MPs aged 61 or over (yri\_mp61)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_yri\_mp61

*Original tag:* yri\_mp61

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Stockemer & Sundström (2022)

*Merge scores:*



*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2615, Percent: 21.98

*Description:*

The percentage of MPs aged 61 or over.

### **3.2.2.228 Parliamentary Election Second Round: Compulsory Voting (ideavt\_legcvsnd)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideavt\_legcvsnd

*Original tag:* ideavt\_legcvsnd

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023b)

*Description:*

1 represents compulsory voting

0 represents non compulsory voting

### **3.2.2.229 Parliamentary Election Second Round: Voter Turnout (ideavt\_legvtsnd)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideavt\_legvtsnd

*Original tag:* ideavt\_legvtsnd

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023b)

*Description:*

Voter turnout in election.

### **3.2.2.230 Presidential Election Second Round: Compulsory Voting (ideavt\_prescvsnd)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideavt\_prescvsnd

*Original tag:* ideavt\_prescvsnd

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023b)

*Description:*

1 represents compulsory voting

0 represents non compulsory voting

### **3.2.2.231 Presidential Election Second Round: Voter Turnout (ideavt\_presvtsnd)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ideavt\_presvtsnd

*Original tag:* ideavt\_presvtsnd

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2023b)

*Description:*

Voter turnout in election.

### **3.2.2.232 Polarization score in terms of seats (ipwe\_pseats1)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ipwe\_pseats1

*Original tag:* ipwe\_pseats1

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele, Vincenzo and Marino, Bruno (2023)

*Description:*

The polarization score of the legislature calculated from parties' left-right placement according to expert survey data and using Dalton's polarization index (2008). The score

ranges from 0 to 10, where higher values mean higher polarization.

For more information on the methodology and some information for individual countries, please consult the methodology available at <https://cise.luiss.it/cise/dataset-of-ideological-polarization-in-western-europe/>

### 3.2.2.233 Polarization score in terms of votes (2nd election in year) (ipwe\_pseats2)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ipwe\_pseats2

*Original tag:* ipwe\_pseats2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele, Vincenzo and Marino, Bruno (2023)

*Description:*

This variable has information if the country held a second election during the year of reference; otherwise it is empty. The polarization score of the legislature calculated from parties' left-right placement according to expert survey data and using Dalton's polarization index (2008). The score ranges from 0 to 10, where higher values mean higher polarization.

For more information on the methodology and some information for individual countries, please consult the methodology available at <https://cise.luiss.it/cise/dataset-of-ideological-polarization-in-western-europe/>

### 3.2.2.234 Polarization score in terms of votes (ipwe\_pvotes1)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ipwe\_pvotes1

*Original tag:* ipwe\_pvotes1

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele, Vincenzo and Marino, Bruno (2023)

*Description:*

The polarization score of the election calculated from parties' left-right placement according to expert survey data and using Dalton's polarization index (2008). The score ranges from 0 to 10, where higher values mean higher polarization.

For more information on the methodology and some information for individual countries, please consult the methodology available at <https://cise.luiss.it/cise/dataset-of-ideological-polarization-in-western-europe/>

### 3.2.2.235 Polarization score in terms of votes (second election in year) (ipwe\_pvotes2)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ipwe\_pvotes2

*Original tag:* ipwe\_pvotes2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Emanuele, Vincenzo and Marino, Bruno (2023)

*Description:*

This variable has information if the country held a second election during the year of reference; otherwise it is empty. The polarization score of the election calculated from parties' left-right placement according to expert survey data and using Dalton's polarization index (2008). The score ranges from 0 to 10, where higher values mean higher polarization.

For more information on the methodology and some information for individual countries, please consult the methodology available at <https://cise.luiss.it/cise/dataset-of-ideological-polarization-in-western-europe/>

### 3.2.2.236 Party Control over Ballot - SMD (upper house) (jw\_smdballot2)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_smdballot2

*Original tag:* jw\_smdballot2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Description:*

Ballot for single-member district tiers in elections to the upper house. The ballot variables focus on the amount of party control over candidates' access to a competitive position on the ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order); (1) where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member districts where parties control access to the list); (2) where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select candidates).

### 3.2.2.237 Sharing of Votes among Candidates - SMD (upper house) (jw\_smdpool2)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_smdpool2

*Original tag:* jw\_smdpool2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Description:*

Pool for single-member district tiers in elections to the upper house. The Pool variables measure the extent to which votes among candidates from the same party are shared. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where pooling of votes occurs across all candidates in a party in a district; (1) where pooling of votes occurs across some, but not all, candidates in a party in a district, or, where there is vote pooling across all candidates in a party in a district, but where the average district accounts for 5percent or less of a legislature's membership; (2) where no pooling of votes occurs across candidates in a party (including single-member districts).

### 3.2.2.238 Candidate or Party-specific Voting - SMD (upper house) (jw\_smdvote2)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_smdvote2

*Original tag:* jw\_smdvote2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Description:*

Vote (coded as above) for single-member district tiers in elections to the upper house. The Vote variables focus attention on the distinction between casting votes for either parties or individual candidates. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): (0) where voters have only one vote for a party; (1) where voters can vote for a party or a candidate (as in open lists), where voters have multiple votes for multiple candidates (as in runoff or single-transferable vote systems), or where votes for a party or candidate are observationally equivalent (as in single-member districts); (2) where voters have one vote for an individual candidate.

## 3.2.3 Political System

This category includes variables describing the rules of the political system (presidential or parliamentary system), the chief executive (years in office), regime type, stability (age of present regime), and checks and balances as well as aspects of federalism.

### 3.2.3.1 Typology of political institutions (br\_elect)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_br\_elect

*Original tag:* br\_elect

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Bjørnskov & Rode (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8386, Percent: 70.48

*Description:*

Alternative democracy indicator capturing degree of multi-party competition. (0: No elections  
1: Single-party elections 2: Non-democratic multi-party elections 3: Democratic elections.)

### 3.2.3.2 Party System (bti\_ps)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_bti\_ps

*Original tag:* bti\_ps

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Donner et al. (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1055, Percent: 8.87

*Description:*

To what extent is there a stable and socially rooted party system able to articulate and aggregate societal interests? From 1 to 10.

1. There is no party system to articulate and aggregate societal interests.
4. The party system is unstable with shallow roots in society: high fragmentation, high voter volatility, and high polarization.
7. The party system is fairly stable and socially rooted: moderate fragmentation, moderate voter volatility, and moderate polarization.
10. The party system is stable and socially rooted: it is able to articulate and aggregate societal interest with low fragmentation, low voter volatility and low polarization.

### 3.2.3.3 Democracy (chga\_demo)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_chga\_demo

*Original tag:* chga\_demo

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Cheibub et al. (2010)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 6471, Percent: 54.39

*Description:*

A regime is considered a democracy if the executive and the legislature is directly or indirectly elected by popular vote, multiple parties are allowed, there is de facto existence of multiple parties outside of regime front, there are multiple parties within the legislature, and there has been no consolidation of incumbent advantage (e.g. unconstitutional closing of the lower house or extension of incumbent's term by postponing of subsequent elections). Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges in that year.

0. No Democracy

1. Democracy

#### 3.2.3.4 Political Pluralism and Participation (fh\_ppp)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fh\_ppp

*Original tag:* fh\_ppp

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2022b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2956, Percent: 24.84

*Description:*

Political Pluralism and Participation - This variable encompasses an examination of the right of the people to freely organize in political parties; the existence of an opposition with a realistic possibility to increase its support; the ability of the people to make political choices free from domination by the military, totalitarian parties or other powerful groups; and the existence of full political rights for all minorities. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

#### 3.2.3.5 Political Rights (fh\_pr)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fh\_pr

*Original tag:* fh\_pr

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2022b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 6867, Percent: 57.72

*Description:*

Political Rights Rating - Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. The specific list of rights considered varies over the years. Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

#### 3.2.3.6 Political Constraints Index III (h\_polcon3)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_h\_polcon3

*Original tag:* h\_polcon3

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Henisz (2017, 2002a)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7996, Percent: 67.2

*Description:*

This index measures the feasibility of policy change, i.e. the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one political actor may lead to a change in government policy. The index is composed from the following information: the number of independent branches of government with veto power over policy change, counting the executive and the presence of an effective lower and upper house in the legislature (more branches leading to more constraint); the extent of

party alignment across branches of government, measured as the extent to which the same party or coalition of parties control each branch (decreasing the level of constraint); and the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch, measured as legislative fractionalization in the relevant house (increasing constraint for aligned executives, decreasing it for opposed executives). The index scores are derived from a simple spatial model and theoretically ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating more political constraint and thus less feasibility of policy change. Note that the coding reflects information as of January 1 in any given year. Henisz (2002) uses this index to demonstrate that political environments that limit the feasibility of policy change are an important determinant of investment in infrastructure.

### 3.2.3.7 Official State Party (iaep\_osp)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_osp

*Original tag:* iaep\_osp

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5796, Percent: 48.71

*Description:*

Is there an official state party?

0. No

1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### 3.2.3.8 Single Party System (jw\_oneparty)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_jw\_oneparty

*Original tag:* jw\_oneparty

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Johnson & Wallack (2012)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3282, Percent: 27.58

*Description:*

Dummy variable, 1 if single-party system.

## 3.2.4 Religion

This category includes variables regarding numbers of followers of specific religions and the status of religion in the constitution.

### 3.2.4.1 Government Restrictions on Religious Practices (ciri\_relfre)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ciri\_relfre

*Original tag:* ciri\_relfre

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Mark et al. (2023), Cingranelli et al. (2014)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4580, Percent: 38.49

*Description:*

This variable indicates the extent to which the freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their religious beliefs is subject to actual government restrictions. Citizens of whatever religious belief should be able to worship free from government interference. Additionally, citizens should be able to hold no religion at all.

Citizens should be able to freely practice their religion and proselytize (attempt to convert) other citizens to their religion as long as such attempts are done in a non-coercive, peaceful manner.

Members of the clergy should be able to advocate partisan political views freely, oppose government laws, support political candidates, and otherwise freely participate in politics without fear of government prosecution.

Some important questions to consider include: Does the government respect rights to religious expression, including the freedom to publish religious documents in foreign languages? Does religious belief affect membership in a ruling party or a career in government? Does the government prohibit promotion of one religion over another, or discriminate on the grounds of religion or belief? Does the government restrict the teaching or practice of any faith? Does the government discriminate against minority religious groups?

Scoring Scheme:

Government restrictions on religious practices are:

- (0) Severe and Widespread
- (1) Moderate
- (2) Practically Absent

### 3.2.4.2 Religion Based Banning of Parties (iaep\_rbbp)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_iaep\_rbbp

*Original tag:* iaep\_rbbp

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Wig et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5825, Percent: 48.96

*Description:*

Does religious affiliation determine the banning of parties?

- 0. No
- 1. Yes

Source: IAEP (Wig et al., 2015)

### 3.2.5 Quality of Government

This category includes variables that are the core features of QoG (impartiality, bureaucratic quality and corruption) as well as measures that are broader (rule of law and transparency).

#### 3.2.5.1 Corruption Perception: Political Parties (gcb\_ppa)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_gcb\_ppa

*Original tag:* gcb\_ppa

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Transparency International (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 677, Percent: 5.69

*Description:*

To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? Political parties. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).

#### 3.2.5.2 Election vote buying (vdem\_elvotbuy)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_vdem\_elvotbuy

*Original tag:* vdem\_elvotbuy

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Coppedge, Gerring, Henrik Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Good God, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Krusell, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Natsika, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig, Wilson & Ziblatt (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023a), Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig & Ziblatt (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8560, Percent: 71.94

*Description:*

Election vote buying

Question: In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?

Clarification: Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, i.e., "porkbarrel" legislation.

Responses:

0: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only



in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties.

2: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these

offerings were more about meeting an ‘entry-ticket’ expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded.

3: Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.

4: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.

### 3.2.6 Gender Equality

This category includes variables related to the differences of access and opportunities between women and men by country, such as access to education, overall employment and employment by specific sectors, and indexes that shine a light on the general differences in treatment between men and women.

#### 3.2.6.1 Strength of Placement Mandates for Gender Quota (qar\_plstr)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_qar\_plstr

*Original tag:* qar\_plstr

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 514, Percent: 4.32

*Description:*

Placement mandates as coded “strong” if they specify an order that meets or exceeds the threshold set by the quota. For example, if a quota with a 30percent threshold requires that women are on every third position on a party list (33percent), the placement mandate would be coded strong. Alternatively, placement mandates are coded “weak” if they are not specific (e.g., “place in winnable positions”) or require a lower share of women than the legislated threshold (e.g., every 10 candidates for a 15percent quota). Coded only for country-years where a quota with placement mandates was present.

#### 3.2.6.2 Strength of Sanctions for Gender Quota (qar\_sstr)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_qar\_sstr

*Original tag:* qar\_sstr

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 708, Percent: 5.95

*Description:*

Sanctions are coded “strong” only if parties are stopped from participating in the election if they do not comply with the quota rules. If parties are fined or lose state funding, sanctions are coded as “weak.” Coded only for country-years where a quota with sanctions for noncompliance was present.

#### 3.2.6.3 Type of Gender Quota (qar\_typ)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_qar\_typ

*Original tag:* qar\_typ

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1196, Percent: 10.05

*Description:*

Type of gender quota. ‘seats’ denotes a national quota that reserves a certain percentage of seats in the legislature for women. ‘candidate’ denotes a national gender quota that requires all parties to field a certain percentage of female candidates or nominees. ‘both’ denotes hybrid quotas that use a mix of both types.

Coded only for country-years where a quota was present.

### 3.2.7 Conflict and Military Service

This category includes variables concerning armed conflict, including civil war and terrorism, government revenue and spending related to violent conflict (military expenditure, arms imports, military personnel).

#### 3.2.7.1 Battle-related deaths (number of people) (wdi\_brdeath)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_brdeath

*Original tag:* wdi\_brdeath

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 810, Percent: 6.81

*Description:*

Battle-related deaths are deaths in battle-related conflicts between warring parties in the conflict dyad (two conflict units that are parties to a conflict). Typically, battle-related deaths occur in warfare involving the armed forces of the warring parties. This includes traditional battlefield fighting, guerrilla activities, and all kinds of bombardments of military units, cities, and villages, etc. The targets are usually the military itself and its installations or state institutions and state representatives, but there is often substantial collateral damage in the form of civilians being killed in crossfire, in indiscriminate bombings, etc. All deaths--military as well as civilian--incurred in such situations, are counted as battle-related deaths.

## 4 REPDEM

The **Representative Democracy Data Archive (REPDEM)** presents the comparative data collection efforts undertaken by various research and data infrastructure projects on political institutions, political parties, cabinets and governments in Europe. As a world-leading database for research on the competition for government in Europe, the archive contains unique data on governments, parliaments, political parties, length of government formation periods, bargain rounds, as well as procedures and mechanism for intra-coalition governance, etc. The latest updates were made in the research infrastructure project Party Government in Europe Database (PAGED). PAGED builds on REPDEM's previous international and comparative projects on European parliamentary democracy. More information is available on the project's website: <http://repdem.org>

### 4.1 REPDEM PAGED Basic

**Dataset tag:** repdem\_basic

**Output Unit:** Repdem Cabinet-Date, i.e., data is collected per cabinet and date.

**Description:** Party Government in Europe Database (PAGED) – Basic dataset, is a research infrastructure project that aims to build a state-of-the-art database for comparative coalition research on political institutions, political parties, parliaments and governments.

This comparative dataset builds on previous datasets (Andersson et al 2020, Bergman et al 2019, Bergman et al 2021, Hellström et al 2021, Strøm et al 2008), and has been updated in-house to mid-2023. Some additional variables have also been added. However, the data does not contain the so-called governance variables (e.g., conflict management mechanisms), and other variables that require country experts on coalition politics.

The dataset provides detailed information on important aspects of government formation and government termination in 28 European countries from 1945 (or their democratic transitions) up to June 1st, 2023.

**Dataset citation:**

Hellström, Johan, Torbjörn Bergman, Jonas Lindahl, and Maciej Sychowiec (2023). Party Government in Europe Database (PAGED) – Basic dataset, Version 2023.12. Available on <https://repdem.org>.

**Comments:**

For party abbreviations see party codebooks:

Western Europe: [https://repdem.org/index.php/download/44/combined-dataset-europe/3737/party\\_codebook\\_we.pdf](https://repdem.org/index.php/download/44/combined-dataset-europe/3737/party_codebook_we.pdf)

Central and Eastern Europe: [https://repdem.org/index.php/download/44/combined-dataset-europe/3736/party\\_codebook\\_cee.pdf](https://repdem.org/index.php/download/44/combined-dataset-europe/3736/party_codebook_cee.pdf)

**Link to original codebook**

<https://repdem.org/index.php/download/91/basic-data-europe/4214/v1-paged-basic-dataset-codebook-2.pdf>

**License:** REPDEM presents the comparative data collection efforts undertaken by various research and data infrastructure projects on political institutions, political parties, cabinets and governments in Europe.

Repdem offers a range of datasets available for free (without even a demand for registration).

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page: <https://repdem.org/index.php/current-dataset/>

#### 4.1.1 Cabinet Information

These variables provide information on the Cabinet.

##### 4.1.1.1 Bargaining power (Banzhaf index) fractionalization: lower chamber (bp\_fract)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_bp\_fract

*Original tag:* bp\_fract

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Same calculation as enpp, but using Banzhaf index values instead of party seat shares as weights.

##### 4.1.1.2 Coalition (cab\_coalition)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_coalition

*Original tag:* cab\_coalition

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Coalition government

0: no

1: yes

##### 4.1.1.3 Cabinet composition (cab\_composition1)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_composition1

*Original tag:* cab\_composition1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party abbreviations (see party codebook). List of cabinet parties, beginning with the party of the PM.

##### 4.1.1.4 Cabinet composition (cab\_composition2)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_composition2

*Original tag:* cab\_composition2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party Ids (see party codebook). List of cabinet parties, beginning with the party of the PM.

##### 4.1.1.5 Ideologically connected cabinet (cab\_connected)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_connected

*Original tag:* cab\_connected

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Ideologically “connected cabinet” (i.e., the parties are next to one another) on economic left-right placement of political parties.

0: no

1: yes

##### 4.1.1.6 Cabinet duration (cab\_duration\_days)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_duration\_days

*Original tag:* cab\_duration\_days

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Measured in days. Defined as the time period between cabinet's first and last day in office.

**4.1.1.7 Maximum possible cabinet duration (cab\_duration\_max)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_duration\_max

*Original tag:* cab\_duration\_max

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Measured in days. Defined as: remainder of the parliamentary term when cabinet assumes office until

(a) next constitutionally mandated parliamentary elections

(b) next constitutionally mandated presidential elections if it is required or customary for governments to resign at that time

**4.1.1.8 Relative cabinet duration (cab\_duration\_relative)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_duration\_relative

*Original tag:* cab\_duration\_relative

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Defined as the share (proportion) of potential duration the cabinet was in office.

**4.1.1.9 Effective number of cabinet parties: lower chamber (cab\_enpp)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_enpp

*Original tag:* cab\_enpp

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Effective number of cabinet parties(lower chamber)

**4.1.1.10 Formal minority cabinet (cab\_formal\_minority)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_formal\_minority

*Original tag:* cab\_formal\_minority

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Formal minority

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.11 Cabinet centre of gravity, RILE (cab\_gravity)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_gravity

*Original tag:* cab\_gravity

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

The Manifesto Project's RILE scale has been used to estimate party positions. For the calculation of the measure, consult the notes on coding principles.

**4.1.1.12 Cabinet centre of gravity, RILE, logit scaled (cab\_gravity\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_gravity\_logit

*Original tag:* cab\_gravity\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Same as cab\_gravity, but with logit-scaled (Lowe et al. 2011) party positions.

**4.1.1.13 Cabinet centre of gravity, Prosser (2014) left-right scale, logit scaled (cab\_gravity\_logit\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_gravity\_logit\_prosser

*Original tag:* cab\_gravity\_logit\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Same as cab\_gravity\_prosser, but with logit-scaled (Lowe et al. 2011) party positions.

**4.1.1.14 Cabinet centre of gravity, Prosser (2014) left-right scale (cab\_gravity\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_gravity\_prosser

*Original tag:* cab\_gravity\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Prosser's (2014) suggested categories for estimating party positions from the Manifesto Project data has been used.

**4.1.1.15 Cabinet ID (cab\_id)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_id

*Original tag:* cab\_id

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Cabinet code. First two digits: country Second two digits: cabinet number.

**4.1.1.16 Cabinet majority (50percent + 1) seat) (cab\_majority)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_majority

*Original tag:* cab\_majority

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Majority government

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.17 Minimal winning coalition (cab\_mwc)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_mwc

*Original tag:* cab\_mwc

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

MWC

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.18 Minimal Winning Connected Cabinet (cab\_mwcc)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_mwcc

*Original tag:* cab\_mwcc

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Minimal Winning Connected Cabinet (MWCC).

0: no

1: yes

A cabinet is a MWCC if (i) it is connected, and (ii) it cannot remain winning AND connected by dropping a party.

**4.1.1.19 MWCC including single-party cabinets (cab\_mwccs)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_mwccs

*Original tag:* cab\_mwccs

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

MWCC including single-party cabinets

0: no

1: yes

Minimal Winning Connected Cabinet including single-party majority governments.

**4.1.1.20 Cabinet (cab\_name)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_name

*Original tag:* cab\_name

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Cabinet name (name of the PM consecutively numbered with Roman figures).

**4.1.1.21 Number of cabinet parties (cab\_num\_parties)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_num\_parties

*Original tag:* cab\_num\_parties

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of cabinet parties

**4.1.1.22 Cabinet party 1 (cab\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_party1

*Original tag:* cab\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party-IDs see party codebook

**4.1.1.23 Cabinet party 2 (cab\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_party2

*Original tag:* cab\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party-IDs see party codebook

**4.1.1.24 Cabinet party 3 (cab\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_party3

*Original tag:* cab\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party-IDs see party codebook

**4.1.1.25 Cabinet party 4 (cab\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_party4

*Original tag:* cab\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party-IDs see party codebook

**4.1.1.26 Cabinet party 5 (cab\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_party5

*Original tag:* cab\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party-IDs see party codebook

**4.1.1.27 Cabinet party 6 (cab\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_party6

*Original tag:* cab\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party-IDs see party codebook

**4.1.1.28 Cabinet party 7 (cab\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_party7

*Original tag:* cab\_party7

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party-IDs see party codebook

**4.1.1.29 Cabinet party 8 (cab\_party8)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_party8

*Original tag:* cab\_party8

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party-IDs see party codebook

**4.1.1.30 Cabinet polarization, RILE (cab\_polar)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_polar

*Original tag:* cab\_polar

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the mean position in cabinet, based on the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale

**4.1.1.31 Cabinet polarization, RILE, logit scaled (cab\_polar\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_polar\_logit

*Original tag:* cab\_polar\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the mean position in cabinet, based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) of the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale

**4.1.1.32 Cabinet polarization, Prosser (2014) left-right scale (cab\_polar\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_polar\_prosser

*Original tag:* cab\_polar\_prosser



*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the mean position in cabinet, based on Prosser's (2014) suggested categories in the Manifesto Project data for the general left-right dimension

#### **4.1.1.33 Cabinet polarization, Prosser (2014) left-right scale, logit scaled (cab\_polar\_prosser\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_polar\_prosser\_logit

*Original tag:* cab\_polar\_prosser\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the mean position in cabinet, based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) on Prosser's (2014) suggested categories in the Manifesto Project data for the general left-right dimension

#### **4.1.1.34 Cabinet preference range, RILE (cab\_prefrange)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_prefrange

*Original tag:* cab\_prefrange

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

The distance between the left-most and right-most parties in the cabinet on the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale.

#### **4.1.1.35 Cabinet preference range, RILE, logit scaled (cab\_prefrange\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_prefrange\_logit

*Original tag:* cab\_prefrange\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

The distance between the left-most and right-most parties in the cabinet based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) of the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale.

#### **4.1.1.36 Cabinet preference range, Prosser (2014) left-right scale, logit scaled (cab\_prefrange\_logit\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_prefrange\_logit\_prosser

*Original tag:* cab\_prefrange\_logit\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

As cab\_prefrange\_logit, but using the categories suggested by Prosser (2014) for constructing the left-right scale

#### **4.1.1.37 Cabinet preference range, Prosser (2014) left-right scale (cab\_prefrange\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_prefrange\_prosser

*Original tag:* cab\_prefrange\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

As cab\_prefrange, but using the categories suggested by Prosser (2014) for constructing the left-right scale

#### **4.1.1.38 Cabinet seat share (cab\_seatshare)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_seatshare

*Original tag:* cab\_seatshare

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Cabinet seat share (0-1)

**4.1.1.39 Cabinet strength: lower chamber (cab\_strength\_lower)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_strength\_lower

*Original tag:* cab\_strength\_lower

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Cabinet strength, i.e., total seat share of all cabinet parties combined.

**4.1.1.40 Cabinet strength including formal support parties: lower chamber (cab\_strength\_lower\_supported)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_strength\_lower\_supported

*Original tag:* cab\_strength\_lower\_supported

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Cabinet strength, i.e., total seat share of all cabinet parties and all formal support parties.

**4.1.1.41 Cabinet strength at date out: lower chamber (cab\_strength\_out)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_strength\_out

*Original tag:* cab\_strength\_out

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Cabinet strength, i.e., total seat share of all cabinet parties at termination of the cabinet.

**4.1.1.42 Cabinet strength: upper chamber (cab\_strength\_upper)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_strength\_upper

*Original tag:* cab\_strength\_upper

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Cabinet strength (upper chamber)

**4.1.1.43 Cabinet strength at date out: upper chamber (cab\_strength\_upper\_out)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_strength\_upper\_out

*Original tag:* cab\_strength\_upper\_out

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Cabinet strength, i.e., total seat share (upper chamber) of all cabinet parties at termination of the cabinet.

**4.1.1.44 Surplus majority cabinet (cab\_surplus)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_surplus

*Original tag:* cab\_surplus

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Surplus government

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.45 Cabinet polarization, RILE, weighted SD (cab\_wpolar)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_wpolar

*Original tag:* cab\_wpolar

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

As cab\_polar, but standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position.

**4.1.1.46 Cabinet polarization, RILE, weighted SD, logit scaled (cab\_wpolar\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_wpolar\_logit

*Original tag:* cab\_wpolar\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

As cab\_wpolar, but standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position.

**4.1.1.47 Cabinet polarization, RILE, weighted SD (cab\_wpolar\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_wpolar\_prosser

*Original tag:* cab\_wpolar\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

As cab\_polar\_prosser, but standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position.

**4.1.1.48 Cabinet polarization, RILE, weighted SD, logit scaled (cab\_wpolar\_prosser\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_cab\_wpolar\_prosser\_logit

*Original tag:* cab\_wpolar\_prosser\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

As cab\_wpolar\_prosser, but standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position.

**4.1.1.49 Seat share of conservative parties: lower chamber, alternative operationalization (con\_alt\_share)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_con\_alt\_share

*Original tag:* con\_alt\_share

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Includes parties that are coded as belonging to the Christian democratic (50) or conservative (60) party families in the Manifesto Project data.

**4.1.1.50 Seat share of conservative parties: lower chamber (con\_share)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_con\_share

*Original tag:* con\_share

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Includes parties that are coded as belonging to the liberal (40) or conservative (60) party families in the Manifesto Project data.

**4.1.1.51 Date in (date\_in)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_date\_in

*Original tag:* date\_in

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

First day in cabinet life according to official criteria defined as:  
(a) date that PM/cabinet was appointed by head of state  
(b) date of investiture vote in parliament  
(c) date of general election

**4.1.1.52 Date in (String) (date\_in\_str)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_date\_in\_str

*Original tag:* date\_in\_str

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

In date as character string

**4.1.1.53 Date out (date\_out)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_date\_out

*Original tag:* date\_out

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Last day in cabinet life defined as:  
(a) day of cabinet resignation  
(b) day of general election

**4.1.1.54 Date out (string) (date\_out\_str)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_date\_out\_str

*Original tag:* date\_out\_str

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Out date as character string

**4.1.1.55 First policy dimension (label) (dim\_first\_label)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_dim\_first\_label

*Original tag:* dim\_first\_label

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

First policy dimension (label)

**4.1.1.56 Party of the median legislator: first policy dimension, lower chamber (dim\_first\_median)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_dim\_first\_median

*Original tag:* dim\_first\_median

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party IDs, see party codebooks. Excluding legislators subsumed under ‘others’

**4.1.1.57 Party of the median legislator: first policy dimension, lower chamber, 2nd party (dim\_first\_median\_2nd)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_dim\_first\_median\_2nd

*Original tag:* dim\_first\_median\_2nd

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party IDs, see party codebooks. Excluding legislators subsumed under ‘others’, only coded if

a second median party exists

**4.1.1.58 Bargaining power (Banzhaf index) of the party of the median legislator: first policy dimension, lower chamber (dim\_first\_median\_bp)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_dim\_first\_median\_bp

*Original tag:* dim\_first\_median\_bp

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party IDs, see party codebooks. Excluding legislators subsumed under ‘others’

**4.1.1.59 Second policy dimension (label) (dim\_second\_label)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_dim\_second\_label

*Original tag:* dim\_second\_label

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Second policy dimension (label)

**4.1.1.60 Party of the median legislator: second policy dimension, lower chamber (dim\_second\_median)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_dim\_second\_median

*Original tag:* dim\_second\_median

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party IDs, see party codebooks. Excluding legislators subsumed under ‘others’

**4.1.1.61 Party of the median legislator: second policy dimension, lower chamber, 2nd party (dim\_second\_median\_2nd)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_dim\_second\_median\_2nd

*Original tag:* dim\_second\_median\_2nd

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party IDs, see party codebooks. Excluding legislators subsumed under ‘others’, only coded if a second median party exists

**4.1.1.62 Third policy dimension (label) (dim\_third\_label)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_dim\_third\_label

*Original tag:* dim\_third\_label

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Third policy dimension (label)

**4.1.1.63 Party of the median legislator: third policy dimension, lower chamber (dim\_third\_median)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_dim\_third\_median

*Original tag:* dim\_third\_median

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party IDs, see party codebooks. Excluding legislators subsumed under ‘others’

**4.1.1.64 Election date (elecdate)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_elecdate

*Original tag:* elecdate

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Date of most recent parliamentary election:

(a) two-round elections: date of second round

(b) elections held over several days: date of last day

#### **4.1.1.65 Effective number of parliamentary parties: lower chamber (enpp)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_enpp

*Original tag:* enpp

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

All legislators subsumed under ‘others’ treated as one single party (minimum fragmentation)

#### **4.1.1.66 Effective number of parliamentary parties: lower chamber (Other minor parties and independents excluded) (enpp\_no\_others)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_enpp\_no\_others

*Original tag:* enpp\_no\_others

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

All legislators subsumed under ‘others’ have been excluded from the calculation of the measure.

#### **4.1.1.67 Decade by date of formation (form\_decade)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_form\_decade

*Original tag:* form\_decade

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

90: 1990s

100: 2000s

110: 2010s

120: 2020s

#### **4.1.1.68 Number of days required for cabinet formation (form\_duration)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_form\_duration

*Original tag:* form\_duration

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Measured in days. Time period between ‘Date out’ of previous cabinet and ‘Date in’ of current cabinet.

#### **4.1.1.69 Number of days required for cabinet formation (form\_duration\_alt)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_form\_duration\_alt

*Original tag:* form\_duration\_alt

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Measured in days. Number of days since the election OR the ‘Date out’ of previous cabinet if it is terminated between elections. Thus, this alternative measurement ignores/doesn’t count the time between ‘Date out’ of previous cabinet and the election date.

#### **4.1.1.70 Final vote of investiture: abstentions (form\_invest\_abs)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_form\_invest\_abs

*Original tag:* form\_invest\_abs

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Final vote of investiture. Number of abstentions.

#### **4.1.1.71 Final vote of investiture: contra (form\_invest\_con)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_form\_invest\_con

*Original tag:* form\_invest\_con

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Final vote of investiture. Number of contra votes.

#### **4.1.1.72 Final vote of investiture: pro (form\_invest\_pro)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_form\_invest\_pro

*Original tag:* form\_invest\_pro

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Final vote of investiture. Number of pro votes.

#### **4.1.1.73 Government type (govtype)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_govtype

*Original tag:* govtype

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

- 1: Min Minority cabinet: Holds less than 50 percent plus one seat in parliament. Single-party minority cabinets are likewise coded as 'Min'.
- 2: Maj Single-party majority cabinet: Holds 50percent plus one seat in parliament. Is not a coalition.
- 3: Mwc Minimal winning coalition: Is turned into a losing coalition by the subtraction of any of the coalition parties, i.e., if it loses a coalition party it holds less than 50 percent plus one seat.
- 4: Sur Surplus majority coalition: Can lose a coalition party and still be winning, i.e. control 50 percent plus one seat or more in the parliament
- 5: Non A non-partisan cabinet, e.g. appointed by a president to hold an election

#### **4.1.1.74 Bicameralism (inst\_bicam)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_inst\_bicam

*Original tag:* inst\_bicam

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

- Bicameralism:
- 0: no
  - 1: yes

#### **4.1.1.75 Comments on institutional features (inst\_comment)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_inst\_comment

*Original tag:* inst\_comment

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

No codebook entry

**4.1.1.76 Constructive vote of no-confidence (inst\_convote)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_inst\_convote

*Original tag:* inst\_convote

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Constructive vote of no-confidence:

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.77 PM powers (inst\_pmpower)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_inst\_pmpower

*Original tag:* inst\_pmpower

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

PM powers. Ranges from 1 to 8, with an increasing number indicating an increasingly more powerful PM.

**4.1.1.78 Positive parliamentarism (inst\_posparl)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_inst\_posparl

*Original tag:* inst\_posparl

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Positive parliamentarism:

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.79 Semi-presidentialism (inst\_semipres)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_inst\_semipres

*Original tag:* inst\_semipres

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Semi-presidentialism:

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.80 Approval required for investiture vote in bicameral systems (invest\_bicameral)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_invest\_bicameral

*Original tag:* invest\_bicameral

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Approval required for investiture vote in bicameral systems:

1: Only in first/lower chamber

2: In both chambers

**4.1.1.81 Comments on investiture vote (invest\_comment)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_invest\_comment

*Original tag:* invest\_comment

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Comments



#### 4.1.1.82 Existence of investiture vote (invest\_exist)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_invest\_exist

*Original tag:* invest\_exist

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Existence of investiture vote:

0: no

1: yes

#### 4.1.1.83 Government in office after investiture object (invest\_inoffice)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_invest\_inoffice

*Original tag:* invest\_inoffice

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Government in office after investiture object. In the case of multiple objects of investiture, indicates after which object the government can effectively act (e.g., has control over armed forces):

1: Only PM

2: Whole cabinet

3: Single ministers

4: Government and its programme

#### 4.1.1.84 Object of investiture vote (invest\_object)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_invest\_object

*Original tag:* invest\_object

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Object of investiture vote. Lists all objects that need to pass an investiture vote, separated by commas:

1: Only PM

2: Whole cabinet

3: Single ministers

4: Government and its programme

#### 4.1.1.85 Object of investiture vote: first object (invest\_object1)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_invest\_object1

*Original tag:* invest\_object1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Object of investiture vote: first object:

1: Only PM

2: Whole cabinet

3: Single ministers

4: Government and its programme

#### 4.1.1.86 Object of investiture vote: second object (invest\_object2)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_invest\_object2

*Original tag:* invest\_object2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Object of investiture vote: second object:

1: Only PM

2: Whole cabinet

- 3: Single ministers
- 4: Government and its programme

**4.1.1.87 Allowed number of investiture votes/rounds (invest\_rounds\_max)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_invest\_rounds\_max

*Original tag:* invest\_rounds\_max

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Only relevant if there is a maximum number of votes/rounds.

**4.1.1.88 Decision rule for first investiture vote (invest\_rule1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_invest\_rule1

*Original tag:* invest\_rule1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Decision rule for first investiture vote/round:

- 1: Majority support (50percent+1 votes)
- 2: Plurality support
- 3: Plurality support among different options
- 4: No majority against
- 5: No investiture vote

**4.1.1.89 Decision rule for first investiture vote (invest\_rule2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_invest\_rule2

*Original tag:* invest\_rule2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Decision rule for second investiture vote/round:

- 1: Majority support (50percent+1 votes)
- 2: Plurality support
- 3: Plurality support among different options
- 4: No majority against
- 5: No investiture vote

**4.1.1.90 Decision rule for first investiture vote (invest\_rule3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_invest\_rule3

*Original tag:* invest\_rule3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Decision rule for third investiture vote/round:

- 1: Majority support (50percent+1 votes)
- 2: Plurality support
- 3: Plurality support among different options
- 4: No majority against
- 5: No investiture vote

**4.1.1.91 Decision rule for first investiture vote (invest\_rule4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_invest\_rule4

*Original tag:* invest\_rule4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Decision rule for fourth investiture vote/round

- 1: Majority support (50percent+1 votes)
- 2: Plurality support
- 3: Plurality support among different options
- 4: No majority against
- 5: No investiture vote

#### 4.1.1.92 Timing of investiture vote (`invest_timing`)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_invest\_timing

*Original tag:* invest\_timing

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Timing of investiture vote:

- 1: Before taking office
- 2: After taking office
- 3: Both before and after taking office When investiture votes must be held with respect to the government taking office.

#### 4.1.1.93 Largest party in parliament (`largest_party`)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_largest\_party

*Original tag:* largest\_party

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party IDs, See party codebooks. Largest party in term of seats.

#### 4.1.1.94 Bargaining power (Banzhaf index) of largest party in parliament: lower chamber (`largest_party_bp`)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_largest\_party\_bp

*Original tag:* largest\_party\_bp

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Bargaining power (Banzhaf index) of largest party in parliament (lower chamber)

#### 4.1.1.95 Largest party in parliament in cabinet (`largest_party_incab`)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_largest\_party\_incab

*Original tag:* largest\_party\_incab

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Largest party in parliament in cabinet

0: No

1: Yes

#### 4.1.1.96 Seat share of largest party in parliament: lower chamber (`largest_party_share`)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_largest\_party\_share

*Original tag:* largest\_party\_share

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Seat share of largest party in parliament (lower chamber)

#### 4.1.1.97 Minority situation in parliament (`minority_sit`)

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_minority\_sit

*Original tag:* minority\_sit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Minority situation in parliament i.e., no single party holds 50percent plus one seat or more of the parliamentary seats.

0: no

1: yes

#### **4.1.1.98 Type of new government (newgov\_type)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_newgov\_type

*Original tag:* newgov\_type

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Records if a new cabinet is the result of an election, replacement of one or several cabinet parties without a preceding election, of if there has only been a change of PM without a preceding election. This variable does not apply to non-partisan cabinets.

1: Election

2: Replacement

3: PM change, but same party composition as previous cabinet

4: other

5: non-partisan

#### **4.1.1.99 Number of cabinet members (num\_ministers)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_num\_ministers

*Original tag:* num\_ministers

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of Ministers

#### **4.1.1.100 Number of ministries (num\_ministries)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_num\_ministries

*Original tag:* num\_ministries

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of Ministries

#### **4.1.1.101 Number of parties in parliament (num\_parties)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_num\_parties

*Original tag:* num\_parties

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of parties in parliament. All parties, excluding 'others'.

#### **4.1.1.102 Parliamentary polarization, Prosser (2014) left-right scale (parl\_polar\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_parl\_polar\_prosser

*Original tag:* parl\_polar\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in cabinet, based on Prosser's (2014) suggested categories in the Manifesto Project data for the general left-right dimension

**4.1.1.103 Parliamentary polarization, Prosser (2014) left-right scale, logit scaled (parl\_polar\_prosser\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_parl\_polar\_prosser\_logit

*Original tag:* parl\_polar\_prosser\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in cabinet, based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) on Prosser's (2014) suggested categories in the Manifesto Project data for the general left-right dimension

**4.1.1.104 Parliamentary polarization, RILE, logit scaled (parl\_polar\_rile)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_parl\_polar\_rile

*Original tag:* parl\_polar\_rile

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in cabinet, based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) of the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale

**4.1.1.105 Parliamentary polarization, Prosser (2014) left-right scale (parl\_polar\_rile\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_parl\_polar\_rile\_logit

*Original tag:* parl\_polar\_rile\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in cabinet, based on Prosser's (2014) suggested categories in the Manifesto Project data for the general left-right dimension

**4.1.1.106 Parliamentary preference range: lower chamber, RILE (parl\_prefrange)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_parl\_prefrange

*Original tag:* parl\_prefrange

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

The distance between the left-most and right-most parties in parliament on the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale.

**4.1.1.107 Parliamentary preference range: lower chamber, RILE, logit scaled (parl\_prefrange\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_parl\_prefrange\_logit

*Original tag:* parl\_prefrange\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Same as parl\_prefrange, but using logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011).

**4.1.1.108 Parliamentary preference range: lower chamber, Prosser (2014) scale, logit scaled (parl\_prefrange\_logit\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_parl\_prefrange\_logit\_prosser

*Original tag:* parl\_prefrange\_logit\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Same as parl\_prefrange\_prosser, but using logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011).

**4.1.1.109 Parliamentary preference range: lower chamber, Prosser (2014) scale (parl\_prefrange\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_parl\_prefrange\_prosser

*Original tag:* parl\_prefrange\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

The distance between the left-most and right-most parties in parliament on the general-left right dimension in the Manifesto Project data based on the categories suggested by Prosser (2014)

**4.1.1.110 Formal cabinet decision rule (pmpower\_formcab)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_formcab

*Original tag:* pmpower\_formcab

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Formal cabinet decision rule:

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.111 Type of actual decision rule 1 (pmpower\_formcab\_rule1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_formcab\_rule1

*Original tag:* pmpower\_formcab\_rule1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Type of actual decision rule 1:

1: unanimity

2: majority

3: consensus defined by PM (by way of summarizing cabinet debate)

4: consensus defined by head of state (by way of summarizing cabinet debate)

**4.1.1.112 Type of actual decision rule 2 (pmpower\_formcab\_rule2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_formcab\_rule2

*Original tag:* pmpower\_formcab\_rule2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Type of actual decision rule 2:

1: unanimity

2: majority

3: consensus defined by PM (by way of summarizing cabinet debate)

4: consensus defined by head of state (by way of summarizing cabinet debate)

**4.1.1.113 Ministers' parliamentary accountability (pmpower\_minaccount)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_minaccount

*Original tag:* pmpower\_minaccount

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Ministers' parliamentary accountability:

0: direct

1: via PM only

2: via vote of no confidence against full cabinet only

**4.1.1.114 PM right to appoint ministers (pmpower\_minappoint)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_minappoint

*Original tag:* pmpower\_minappoint

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

PM right to appoint ministers:

0: no

1: yes

#### **4.1.1.115 Type of actual appointment right (pmpower\_minappoint\_rule)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_minappoint\_rule

*Original tag:* pmpower\_minappoint\_rule

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Type of actual appointment right:

1: yes, PM alone

2: yes, through formal act carried out by head of state

3: no, head of state has discretionary powers

4: other

#### **4.1.1.116 PM right to dismiss ministers (pmpower\_mindismiss)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_mindismiss

*Original tag:* pmpower\_mindismiss

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

PM right to dismiss ministers:

0: no

1: yes

#### **4.1.1.117 Type of actual dismissal right (pmpower\_mindismiss\_rule)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_mindismiss\_rule

*Original tag:* pmpower\_mindismiss\_rule

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Type of actual dismissal right:

1: yes, PM alone

2: yes, through formal act carried out by head of state

3: no, head of state has discretionary powers

4: other

#### **4.1.1.118 PM full control over agenda for cabinet meeting (pmpower\_pmagenda)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_pmagenda

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmagenda

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

PM full control over agenda for cabinet meeting:

0: no

1: yes

#### **4.1.1.119 PM formal right to determine jurisdiction of ministries (pmpower\_pmjurisdiction)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_pmjurisdiction

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmjurisdiction

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

PM formal right to determine jurisdiction of ministries:  
0: no  
1: yes

**4.1.1.120 Regular bureaucratic structure in PM's office designed to monitor departmental affairs (pmpower\_pmoffice)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_pmoffice

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmoffice

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Regular bureaucratic structure in PM's office designed to monitor departmental affairs:  
0: no  
1: yes

**4.1.1.121 Description of structure 1 (pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule1

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Description of structure 1:  
1: personal staff (political appointees)  
2: civil service staff  
3: PM occupies specific (PM) portfolio  
4: other

**4.1.1.122 Description of structure 2 (pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule2

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Description of structure 2:  
1: personal staff (political appointees)  
2: civil service staff  
3: PM occupies specific (PM) portfolio  
4: other

**4.1.1.123 Description of structure 3 (pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule3

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Description of structure 3:  
1: personal staff (political appointees)  
2: civil service staff  
3: PM occupies specific (PM) portfolio  
4: other

**4.1.1.124 Description of structure 4 (pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule4

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule4



*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

- Description of structure 4:
- 1: personal staff (political appointees)
  - 2: civil service staff
  - 3: PM occupies specific (PM) portfolio
  - 4: other

#### **4.1.1.125 PM steering or coordination rights vis-à-vis cabinet ministers (pmpower\_pmsteering)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pmpower\_pmsteering

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmsteering

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

- PM steering or coordination rights vis-à-vis cabinet ministers:
- 0: no
  - 1: yes

#### **4.1.1.126 Post-electoral cabinet (post\_election\_cab)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_post\_election\_cab

*Original tag:* post\_election\_cab

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

- Post-electoral cabinet
- 0: No
  - 1: Yes

#### **4.1.1.127 Presidential power to appoint PM (pres\_appoint\_pm)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_appoint\_pm

*Original tag:* pres\_appoint\_pm

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

- Presidential power to appoint PM:
- 0: No appointment power
  - 1: Free choice
  - 2: Constitution gives open room for interpretation
  - 3: Constitution gives clear instruction

#### **4.1.1.128 Restrictions on presidential power to appoint PM (pres\_appoint\_pm\_restr)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_appoint\_pm\_restr

*Original tag:* pres\_appoint\_pm\_restr

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

- Clarification on what constitutional restrictions apply if a president has limited appointment power.

#### **4.1.1.129 Comments on presidential powers (pres\_comment)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_comment

*Original tag:* pres\_comment

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Comments on presidential powers

**4.1.1.130 Presidential decree powers (pres\_decree)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_decree

*Original tag:* pres\_decree

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Presidential decree powers:

0: No decree power

1: Decree power

2: Decrees need to be countersigned by PM

**4.1.1.131 Presidential decree powers: explanation (pres\_decree\_expl)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_decree\_expl

*Original tag:* pres\_decree\_expl

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Provides further detail on any decree powers held by the president, if any.

**4.1.1.132 Presidential power to dismiss PM/cabinet at own initiative (pres\_dismiss)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_dismiss

*Original tag:* pres\_dismiss

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Presidential power to dismiss PM/cabinet at own initiative:

0: No dissolution at own initiative

1: Free choice (at own initiative)

2: In case of parliamentary (in)activity

**4.1.1.133 No name (pres\_dissolve\_parl)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_dissolve\_parl

*Original tag:* pres\_dissolve\_parl

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

No codebook entry

**4.1.1.134 Presidential right of initiative (legislation) (pres\_init)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_init

*Original tag:* pres\_init

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Presidential right of initiative (legislation):

0: No (President cannot initiate legislation)

1: Yes (President can initiate legislation)

**4.1.1.135 Popularly elected president (pres\_pop)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_pop

*Original tag:* pres\_pop

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Popularly elected president:

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.136 Presidential power of referenda (pres\_refer)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_refer

*Original tag:* pres\_refer

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Presidential power of referenda. All relevant referenda powers are listed, separated by commas:

0: No right to initiate referenda

1: Right to initiate referenda

2: Right to initiate referenda in assent with parliament/government

3: Right to initiate referenda on initiative of the people

4: Right to initiate referenda on special issues

**4.1.1.137 Presidential power of referenda: first right (pres\_refer\_rule1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_refer\_rule1

*Original tag:* pres\_refer\_rule1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Presidential power of referenda, first right:

0: No right to initiate referenda

1: Right to initiate referenda

2: Right to initiate referenda in assent with parliament/government

3: Right to initiate referenda on initiative of the people

4: Right to initiate referenda on special issues

**4.1.1.138 Presidential power of referenda: first right (pres\_refer\_rule2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_refer\_rule2

*Original tag:* pres\_refer\_rule2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Presidential power of referenda, second right

0: No right to initiate referenda

1: Right to initiate referenda

2: Right to initiate referenda in assent with parliament/government

3: Right to initiate referenda on initiative of the people

4: Right to initiate referenda on special issues

**4.1.1.139 Presidential power of referenda: first right (pres\_refer\_rule3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_refer\_rule3

*Original tag:* pres\_refer\_rule3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Presidential power of referenda, third right:

0: No right to initiate referenda

1: Right to initiate referenda

2: Right to initiate referenda in assent with parliament/government

3: Right to initiate referenda on initiative of the people

4: Right to initiate referenda on special issues

**4.1.1.140 Presidential power to select the PM (pres\_select\_pm)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_select\_pm

*Original tag:* pres\_select\_pm

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Presidential power to select the PM:

0: No power or only formal powers

1: Selecting power

**4.1.1.141 Presidential veto powers (pres\_veto)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_veto

*Original tag:* pres\_veto

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Presidential veto powers:

0: No veto power

1: Veto can be overruled by supermajority

2: Veto can be overruled by majority of the new parliament after new elections

3: Veto can be overruled by absolute majority

4: Veto can be overruled by simple majority

5: Veto of president leads to a referendum

**4.1.1.142 Presidential veto powers: explanation (pres\_veto\_expl)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_pres\_veto\_expl

*Original tag:* pres\_veto\_expl

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Provides further detail on any veto powers held by the president, if any.

**4.1.1.143 Proximity to election: lower chamber (prox\_election)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_prox\_election

*Original tag:* prox\_election

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Proximity to election: lower chamber

1 (FE): Cabinets formed immediately following an election and ended by the next election.

2 (F): Cabinets formed immediately following an election.

3 (N): Cabinets neither formed immediately following an election nor ended by the next election.

4 (E): Cabinets ended by an election.

**4.1.1.144 Proximity to election: upper chamber (prox\_election\_upper)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_prox\_election\_upper

*Original tag:* prox\_election\_upper

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Proximity to election: upper chamber

1 (FE): Cabinets immediately following an election and ended by the next election.

2 (F): Cabinets immediately following an election.

3 (N): Cabinets neither immediately following an election nor ended by the next election.

4 (E): Cabinets ended by an election.

**4.1.1.145 Seat share of radical left/right parties: lower chamber (rad\_share)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_rad\_share

*Original tag:* rad\_share

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Includes parties that are coded as belonging to the socialist or other left parties (20) or nationalist and radical right parties (70) party families in the Manifesto Project data.

#### **4.1.1.146 Total number of seats: lower chamber (seats)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats

*Original tag:* seats

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Total number of seats (lower chamber)

#### **4.1.1.147 Party seats lower chamber: Party 1 (seats\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party1

*Original tag:* seats\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 1

#### **4.1.1.148 Party seats lower chamber: Party 10 (seats\_party10)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party10

*Original tag:* seats\_party10

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 10

#### **4.1.1.149 Party seats lower chamber: Party 11 (seats\_party11)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party11

*Original tag:* seats\_party11

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 11

#### **4.1.1.150 Party seats lower chamber: Party 12 (seats\_party12)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party12

*Original tag:* seats\_party12

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 12

#### **4.1.1.151 Party seats lower chamber: Party 13 (seats\_party13)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party13

*Original tag:* seats\_party13

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 13

**4.1.1.152 Party seats lower chamber: Party 14 (seats\_\_party14)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party14

*Original tag:* seats\_party14

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 14

**4.1.1.153 Party seats lower chamber: Party 15 (seats\_\_party15)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party15

*Original tag:* seats\_party15

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 15

**4.1.1.154 Party seats lower chamber: Party 16 (seats\_\_party16)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party16

*Original tag:* seats\_party16

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 16

**4.1.1.155 Party seats lower chamber: Party 17 (seats\_\_party17)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party17

*Original tag:* seats\_party17

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 17

**4.1.1.156 Party seats lower chamber: Party 18 (seats\_\_party18)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party18

*Original tag:* seats\_party18

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 18

**4.1.1.157 Party seats lower chamber: Party 19 (seats\_\_party19)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party19

*Original tag:* seats\_party19

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 19

**4.1.1.158 Party seats lower chamber: Party 2 (seats\_\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party2

*Original tag:* seats\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 2

**4.1.1.159 Party seats lower chamber: Party 20 (seats\_party20)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party20

*Original tag:* seats\_party20

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 20

**4.1.1.160 Party seats lower chamber: Party 21 (seats\_party21)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party21

*Original tag:* seats\_party21

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 21

**4.1.1.161 Party seats lower chamber: Party 22 (seats\_party22)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party22

*Original tag:* seats\_party22

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 22

**4.1.1.162 Party seats lower chamber: Party 23 (seats\_party23)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party23

*Original tag:* seats\_party23

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 23

**4.1.1.163 Party seats lower chamber: Party 24 (seats\_party24)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party24

*Original tag:* seats\_party24

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 24

**4.1.1.164 Party seats lower chamber: Party 25 (seats\_party25)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party25

*Original tag:* seats\_party25

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 25

**4.1.1.165 Party seats lower chamber: Party 26 (seats\_party26)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party26

*Original tag:* seats\_party26

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 26

**4.1.1.166 Party seats lower chamber: Party 27 (seats\_party27)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party27

*Original tag:* seats\_party27

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 27

**4.1.1.167 Party seats lower chamber: Party 28 (seats\_party28)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party28

*Original tag:* seats\_party28

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 28

**4.1.1.168 Party seats lower chamber: Party 29 (seats\_party29)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party29

*Original tag:* seats\_party29

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 29

**4.1.1.169 Party seats lower chamber: Party 3 (seats\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party3

*Original tag:* seats\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 3

**4.1.1.170 Party seats lower chamber: Party 30 (seats\_party30)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party30

*Original tag:* seats\_party30

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 30

**4.1.1.171 Party seats lower chamber: Party 31 (seats\_party31)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party31

*Original tag:* seats\_party31

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 31

**4.1.1.172 Party seats lower chamber: Party 32 (seats\_party32)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party32

*Original tag:* seats\_party32

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 32



**4.1.1.173 Party seats lower chamber: Party 33 (seats\_party33)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party33

*Original tag:* seats\_party33

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 33

**4.1.1.174 Party seats lower chamber: Party 34 (seats\_party34)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party34

*Original tag:* seats\_party34

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 34

**4.1.1.175 Party seats lower chamber: Party 35 (seats\_party35)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party35

*Original tag:* seats\_party35

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 35

**4.1.1.176 Party seats lower chamber: Party 36 (seats\_party36)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party36

*Original tag:* seats\_party36

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 36

**4.1.1.177 Party seats lower chamber: Party 37 (seats\_party37)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party37

*Original tag:* seats\_party37

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 37

**4.1.1.178 Party seats lower chamber: Party 38 (seats\_party38)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party38

*Original tag:* seats\_party38

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 38

**4.1.1.179 Party seats lower chamber: Party 39 (seats\_party39)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party39

*Original tag:* seats\_party39

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 39

**4.1.1.180 Party seats lower chamber: Party 4 (seats\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party4

*Original tag:* seats\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 4

**4.1.1.181 Party seats lower chamber: Party 40 (seats\_party40)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party40

*Original tag:* seats\_party40

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 40

**4.1.1.182 Party seats lower chamber: Party 41 (seats\_party41)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party41

*Original tag:* seats\_party41

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 41

**4.1.1.183 Party seats lower chamber: Party 42 (seats\_party42)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party42

*Original tag:* seats\_party42

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 42

**4.1.1.184 Party seats lower chamber: Party 43 (seats\_party43)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party43

*Original tag:* seats\_party43

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 43

**4.1.1.185 Party seats lower chamber: Party 44 (seats\_party44)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party44

*Original tag:* seats\_party44

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 44

**4.1.1.186 Party seats lower chamber: Party 45 (seats\_party45)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party45

*Original tag:* seats\_party45

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 45

**4.1.1.187 Party seats lower chamber: Party 46 (seats\_\_party46)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party46

*Original tag:* seats\_party46

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 46

**4.1.1.188 Party seats lower chamber: Party 47 (seats\_\_party47)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party47

*Original tag:* seats\_party47

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 47

**4.1.1.189 Party seats lower chamber: Party 48 (seats\_\_party48)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party48

*Original tag:* seats\_party48

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 48

**4.1.1.190 Party seats lower chamber: Party 49 (seats\_\_party49)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party49

*Original tag:* seats\_party49

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 49

**4.1.1.191 Party seats lower chamber: Party 5 (seats\_\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party5

*Original tag:* seats\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 5

**4.1.1.192 Party seats lower chamber: Party 50 (seats\_\_party50)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party50

*Original tag:* seats\_party50

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 50

**4.1.1.193 Party seats lower chamber: Party 51 (seats\_\_party51)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party51

*Original tag:* seats\_party51

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 51

**4.1.1.194 Party seats lower chamber: Party 52 (seats\_party52)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party52

*Original tag:* seats\_party52

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 52

**4.1.1.195 Party seats lower chamber: Party 53 (seats\_party53)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party53

*Original tag:* seats\_party53

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 53

**4.1.1.196 Party seats lower chamber: Party 54 (seats\_party54)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party54

*Original tag:* seats\_party54

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 54

**4.1.1.197 Party seats lower chamber: Party 55 (seats\_party55)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party55

*Original tag:* seats\_party55

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 55

**4.1.1.198 Party seats lower chamber: Party 56 (seats\_party56)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party56

*Original tag:* seats\_party56

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 56

**4.1.1.199 Party seats lower chamber: Party 57 (seats\_party57)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party57

*Original tag:* seats\_party57

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 57

**4.1.1.200 Party seats lower chamber: Party 58 (seats\_party58)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party58

*Original tag:* seats\_party58

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 58

**4.1.1.201 Party seats lower chamber: Party 59 (seats\_\_party59)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party59

*Original tag:* seats\_party59

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 59

**4.1.1.202 Party seats lower chamber: Party 6 (seats\_\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party6

*Original tag:* seats\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 6

**4.1.1.203 Party seats lower chamber: Party 60 (seats\_\_party60)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party60

*Original tag:* seats\_party60

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 60

**4.1.1.204 Party seats lower chamber: Party 61 (seats\_\_party61)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party61

*Original tag:* seats\_party61

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 61

**4.1.1.205 Party seats lower chamber: Party 62 (seats\_\_party62)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party62

*Original tag:* seats\_party62

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 62

**4.1.1.206 Party seats lower chamber: Party 63 (seats\_\_party63)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party63

*Original tag:* seats\_party63

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 63

**4.1.1.207 Party seats lower chamber: Party 64 (seats\_\_party64)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party64

*Original tag:* seats\_party64

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 64

**4.1.1.208 Party seats lower chamber: Party 65 (seats\_\_party65)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party65

*Original tag:* seats\_party65

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 65

**4.1.1.209 Party seats lower chamber: Party 66 (seats\_\_party66)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party66

*Original tag:* seats\_party66

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 66

**4.1.1.210 Party seats lower chamber: Party 67 (seats\_\_party67)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party67

*Original tag:* seats\_party67

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 67

**4.1.1.211 Party seats lower chamber: Party 68 (seats\_\_party68)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party68

*Original tag:* seats\_party68

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 68

**4.1.1.212 Party seats lower chamber: Party 7 (seats\_\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party7

*Original tag:* seats\_party7

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 7

**4.1.1.213 Party seats lower chamber: Party 8 (seats\_\_party8)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party8

*Original tag:* seats\_party8

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 8

**4.1.1.214 Party seats lower chamber: Party 9 (seats\_\_party9)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party9

*Original tag:* seats\_party9

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 9

**4.1.1.215 Party seats lower chamber: Party 98 (others) (seats\_party98)***Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party98*Original tag:* seats\_party98*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 98 (others)

**4.1.1.216 Party seats lower chamber: Party 99 (others) (seats\_party99)***Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_seats\_party99*Original tag:* seats\_party99*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 99 (others)

**4.1.1.217 Seat share of socialist and green parties: lower chamber (soc\_green\_share)***Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_soc\_green\_share*Original tag:* soc\_green\_share*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)*Description:*

Includes parties that are coded as belonging to the ecologist parties (10), socialist or other left parties (20), or social democratic parties (30) party families in the Manifesto Project data.

**4.1.1.218 Seat share of socialist parties: lower chamber (soc\_share)***Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_soc\_share*Original tag:* soc\_share*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)*Description:*

Includes parties that are coded as belonging to the socialist or other left parties (20) or social democratic parties (30) party families in the Manifesto Project data.

**4.1.1.219 Support parties (support\_parties)***Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_support\_parties*Original tag:* support\_parties*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)*Description:*

See party codebooks. Only includes formal support parties, i.e., those that have a formal written agreement with the government guaranteeing, at minimum, support in issues of confidence and supply

**4.1.1.220 Support party 1 (support\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_support\_party1*Original tag:* support\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)*Description:*

Support party 1

**4.1.1.221 Support party 2 (support\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_support\_party2*Original tag:* support\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Support party 2

**4.1.1.222 Support party 3 (support\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_support\_party3

*Original tag:* support\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Support party 3

**4.1.1.223 Support party 4 (support\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_support\_party4

*Original tag:* support\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Support party 4

**4.1.1.224 Support party 5 (support\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_support\_party5

*Original tag:* support\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Support party 5

**4.1.1.225 Support party 6 (support\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_support\_party6

*Original tag:* support\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Support party 6

**4.1.1.226 Support party 7 (support\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_support\_party7

*Original tag:* support\_party7

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Support party 7

**4.1.1.227 Support party 8 (support\_party8)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_support\_party8

*Original tag:* support\_party8

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Support party 8

**4.1.1.228 Technocrat ministry majority (techno\_maj)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_techno\_maj

*Original tag:* techno\_maj

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)



*Description:*

Technocrat ministry majority

0: No

1: Yes

**4.1.1.229 Technocrat PM (techno\_pm)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_techno\_pm

*Original tag:* techno\_pm

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Technocrat PM

0: No

1: Yes

**4.1.1.230 Broad policy remit (techno\_remit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_techno\_remit

*Original tag:* techno\_remit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Broad policy remit

0: No

1: Yes

A cabinet without a broad policy remit is considered a caretaker cabinet.

**4.1.1.231 Description of dominant policy area (term\_descr)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_descr

*Original tag:* term\_descr

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

No codebook entry

**4.1.1.232 Discretionary termination (term\_disc)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_disc

*Original tag:* term\_disc

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Discretionary termination:

0: No

1: Yes

**4.1.1.233 Cabinet defeat in parliament (term\_disc\_cabdefeat)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_disc\_cabdefeat

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_cabdefeat

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Cabinet defeat in parliament:

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.234 Conflict between coalition parties: Parties involved (term\_disc\_conflict\_parties)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_disc\_conflict\_parties

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_conflict\_parties

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party IDs see party codebooks

#### **4.1.1.235 Conflict between coalition parties (personnel) (term\_disc\_conflict\_pers)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_disc\_conflict\_pers

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_conflict\_pers

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Conflict between coalition parties (personnel):

0: no

1: yes

#### **4.1.1.236 Conflict between coalition parties (policy) (term\_disc\_conflict\_pol)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_disc\_conflict\_pol

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_conflict\_pol

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Conflict between coalition parties (policy):

0: no

1: yes

#### **4.1.1.237 Early parliamentary election (term\_disc\_earlyelec)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_disc\_earlyelec

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_earlyelec

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Early parliamentary election:

0: no

1: yes

#### **4.1.1.238 Voluntary enlargement of coalition (term\_disc\_enlarge)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_disc\_enlarge

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_enlarge

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Voluntary enlargement of coalition:

0: no

1: yes

#### **4.1.1.239 Intra party conflict (term\_disc\_intra)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_disc\_intra

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_intra

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Intra party conflict:

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.240 Intra party conflict: Type of conflict (term\_disc\_intra\_conflict)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_disc\_intra\_conflict

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_intra\_conflict

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Intra party conflict, Type of conflict:

L – Conflict in national party leadership (national executive committee, cabinet, parliamentary party leadership) (NB: This is conflict contained in the leadership.)

NL – Conflict between united national party leadership (national executive committee, cabinet, parliamentary party leadership) and non-leaders (party activists, party congress delegates, backbench MPs, regional leaders, etc.)

LNL – Conflict in national party leadership (national executive committee, cabinet, parliamentary party leadership) including grass-roots mobilization (i.e. conflict is not confined to the top level)

**4.1.1.241 Intra party conflict: Party involved (term\_disc\_intra\_party)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_disc\_intra\_party

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_intra\_party

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party IDs see party codebooks

**4.1.1.242 Other voluntary reason (term\_disc\_voluntary)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_disc\_voluntary

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_voluntary

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Other voluntary reason:

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.243 Economic event (term\_event\_econ)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_event\_econ

*Original tag:* term\_event\_econ

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Economic event:

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.244 International or national security event (term\_event\_intnat)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_event\_intnat

*Original tag:* term\_event\_intnat

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

International or national security event:

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.245 Non-parliamentary elections (term\_event\_nonparlelec)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_event\_nonparlelec

*Original tag:* term\_event\_nonparlelec

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Non-parliamentary elections:  
0: no  
1: yes

**4.1.1.246 Personal event (term\_event\_pers)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_event\_pers

*Original tag:* term\_event\_pers

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Personal event:  
0: no  
1: yes

**4.1.1.247 Popular opinion shock (term\_event\_popshock)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_event\_popshock

*Original tag:* term\_event\_popshock

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Popular opinion shock:  
0: no  
1: yes

**4.1.1.248 Ministry involved (term\_ministry)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_ministry

*Original tag:* term\_ministry

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

No codebook entry

**4.1.1.249 Other constitutional reason (term\_tech\_const)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_tech\_const

*Original tag:* term\_tech\_const

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Other constitutional reason:  
0: no  
1: yes

**4.1.1.250 Death of PM (term\_tech\_death)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_tech\_death

*Original tag:* term\_tech\_death

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Death of PM:  
0: no  
1: yes

**4.1.1.251 Regular parliamentary election (term\_tech\_regelec)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_term\_tech\_regelec

*Original tag:* term\_tech\_regelec

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Regular parliamentary election:

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.252 Party of the median legislator: first policy dimension upper chamber (upper\_dim\_first\_median)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_dim\_first\_median

*Original tag:* upper\_dim\_first\_median

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party IDs, see party codebooks. Excluding legislators subsumed under ‘others’

**4.1.1.253 Party of the median legislator: second policy dimension upper chamber (upper\_dim\_second\_median)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_dim\_second\_median

*Original tag:* upper\_dim\_second\_median

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Party IDs, see party codebooks. Excluding legislators subsumed under ‘others’.

**4.1.1.254 Effective number of parliamentary parties: upper chamber (upper\_enpp)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_enpp

*Original tag:* upper\_enpp

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Effective number of parliamentary parties in upper chamber. All legislators subsumed under ‘others’ treated as one single party (minimum fragmentation).

**4.1.1.255 Cabinet majority (50percent + 1) seat: upper chamber (upper\_majority)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_majority

*Original tag:* upper\_majority

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Cabinet majority (50percent + 1 seat) in upper chamber

0: no

1: yes

**4.1.1.256 Party seats upper chamber: Party 1 (upper\_seats\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party1

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 1

**4.1.1.257 Party seats upper chamber: Party 10 (upper\_seats\_party10)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party10

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party10

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 10

**4.1.1.258 Party seats upper chamber: Party 11 (upper\_seats\_party11)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party11

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party11

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 11

**4.1.1.259 Party seats upper chamber: Party 12 (upper\_seats\_party12)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party12

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party12

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 12

**4.1.1.260 Party seats upper chamber: Party 13 (upper\_seats\_party13)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party13

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party13

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 13

**4.1.1.261 Party seats upper chamber: Party 14 (upper\_seats\_party14)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party14

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party14

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 14

**4.1.1.262 Party seats upper chamber: Party 15 (upper\_seats\_party15)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party15

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party15

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 15

**4.1.1.263 Party seats upper chamber: Party 16 (upper\_seats\_party16)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party16

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party16

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 16

**4.1.1.264 Party seats upper chamber: Party 17 (upper\_seats\_party17)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party17

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party17

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 17

**4.1.1.265 Party seats upper chamber: Party 18 (upper\_seats\_party18)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party18

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party18

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 18

**4.1.1.266 Party seats upper chamber: Party 19 (upper\_seats\_party19)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party19

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party19

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 19

**4.1.1.267 Party seats upper chamber: Party 2 (upper\_seats\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party2

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 2

**4.1.1.268 Party seats upper chamber: Party 20 (upper\_seats\_party20)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party20

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party20

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 20

**4.1.1.269 Party seats upper chamber: Party 21 (upper\_seats\_party21)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party21

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party21

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 21

**4.1.1.270 Party seats upper chamber: Party 22 (upper\_seats\_party22)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party22

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party22

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 22

**4.1.1.271 Party seats upper chamber: Party 23 (upper\_seats\_party23)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party23

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party23

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 23

**4.1.1.272 Party seats upper chamber: Party 24 (upper\_seats\_party24)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party24

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party24

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 24

**4.1.1.273 Party seats upper chamber: Party 25 (upper\_seats\_party25)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party25

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party25

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 25

**4.1.1.274 Party seats upper chamber: Party 26 (upper\_seats\_party26)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party26

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party26

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 26

**4.1.1.275 Party seats upper chamber: Party 27 (upper\_seats\_party27)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party27

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party27

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 27

**4.1.1.276 Party seats upper chamber: Party 28 (upper\_seats\_party28)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party28

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party28

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 28

**4.1.1.277 Party seats upper chamber: Party 29 (upper\_seats\_party29)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party29

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party29

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 29

**4.1.1.278 Party seats upper chamber: Party 3 (upper\_seats\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party3

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)



*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 3

**4.1.1.279 Party seats upper chamber: Party 30 (upper\_seats\_party30)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party30

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party30

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 30

**4.1.1.280 Party seats upper chamber: Party 31 (upper\_seats\_party31)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party31

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party31

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 31

**4.1.1.281 Party seats upper chamber: Party 32 (upper\_seats\_party32)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party32

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party32

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 32

**4.1.1.282 Party seats upper chamber: Party 33 (upper\_seats\_party33)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party33

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party33

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 33

**4.1.1.283 Party seats upper chamber: Party 34 (upper\_seats\_party34)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party34

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party34

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 34

**4.1.1.284 Party seats upper chamber: Party 35 (upper\_seats\_party35)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party35

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party35

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 35

**4.1.1.285 Party seats upper chamber: Party 36 (upper\_seats\_party36)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party36

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party36

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 36

**4.1.1.286 Party seats upper chamber: Party 37 (upper\_seats\_party37)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party37

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party37

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 37

**4.1.1.287 Party seats upper chamber: Party 38 (upper\_seats\_party38)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party38

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party38

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 38

**4.1.1.288 Party seats upper chamber: Party 39 (upper\_seats\_party39)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party39

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party39

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 39

**4.1.1.289 Party seats upper chamber: Party 4 (upper\_seats\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party4

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 4

**4.1.1.290 Party seats upper chamber: Party 40 (upper\_seats\_party40)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party40

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party40

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 40

**4.1.1.291 Party seats upper chamber: Party 41 (upper\_seats\_party41)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party41

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party41

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 41

**4.1.1.292 Party seats upper chamber: Party 42 (upper\_seats\_party42)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party42

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party42

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 42

**4.1.1.293 Party seats upper chamber: Party 43 (upper\_seats\_party43)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party43

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party43

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 43

**4.1.1.294 Party seats upper chamber: Party 44 (upper\_seats\_party44)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party44

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party44

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 44

**4.1.1.295 Party seats upper chamber: Party 45 (upper\_seats\_party45)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party45

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party45

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 45

**4.1.1.296 Party seats upper chamber: Party 46 (upper\_seats\_party46)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party46

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party46

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 46

**4.1.1.297 Party seats upper chamber: Party 47 (upper\_seats\_party47)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party47

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party47

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 47

**4.1.1.298 Party seats upper chamber: Party 48 (upper\_seats\_party48)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party48

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party48

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 48

**4.1.1.299 Party seats upper chamber: Party 49 (upper\_seats\_party49)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party49

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party49

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 49

**4.1.1.300 Party seats upper chamber: Party 5 (upper\_seats\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party5

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 5

**4.1.1.301 Party seats upper chamber: Party 50 (upper\_seats\_party50)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party50

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party50

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 50

**4.1.1.302 Party seats upper chamber: Party 51 (upper\_seats\_party51)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party51

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party51

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 51

**4.1.1.303 Party seats upper chamber: Party 52 (upper\_seats\_party52)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party52

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party52

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 52

**4.1.1.304 Party seats upper chamber: Party 53 (upper\_seats\_party53)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party53

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party53

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 53

**4.1.1.305 Party seats upper chamber: Party 54 (upper\_seats\_party54)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party54

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party54

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 54

**4.1.1.306 Party seats upper chamber: Party 55 (upper\_seats\_party55)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party55

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party55

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 55

**4.1.1.307 Party seats upper chamber: Party 56 (upper\_seats\_party56)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party56

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party56

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 56

**4.1.1.308 Party seats upper chamber: Party 57 (upper\_seats\_party57)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party57

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party57

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 57

**4.1.1.309 Party seats upper chamber: Party 58 (upper\_seats\_party58)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party58

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party58

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 58

**4.1.1.310 Party seats upper chamber: Party 59 (upper\_seats\_party59)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party59

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party59

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 59

**4.1.1.311 Party seats upper chamber: Party 6 (upper\_seats\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party6

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 6

**4.1.1.312 Party seats upper chamber: Party 60 (upper\_seats\_party60)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party60

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party60

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 60

**4.1.1.313 Party seats upper chamber: Party 61 (upper\_seats\_party61)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party61

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party61

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 61

**4.1.1.314 Party seats upper chamber: Party 62 (upper\_seats\_party62)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party62

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party62

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 62

**4.1.1.315 Party seats upper chamber: Party 63 (upper\_seats\_party63)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party63

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party63

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 63

**4.1.1.316 Party seats upper chamber: Party 64 (upper\_seats\_party64)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party64

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party64

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 64

**4.1.1.317 Party seats upper chamber: Party 65 (upper\_seats\_party65)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party65

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party65

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 65

**4.1.1.318 Party seats upper chamber: Party 66 (upper\_seats\_party66)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party66

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party66

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 66

**4.1.1.319 Party seats upper chamber: Party 67 (upper\_seats\_party67)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party67

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party67

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 67

**4.1.1.320 Party seats upper chamber: Party 68 (upper\_seats\_party68)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party68

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party68

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 68

**4.1.1.321 Party seats upper chamber: Party 69 (upper\_seats\_party69)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party69

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party69

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 69

**4.1.1.322 Party seats upper chamber: Party 7 (upper\_seats\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party7

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party7

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 7

**4.1.1.323 Party seats upper chamber: Party 8 (upper\_seats\_party8)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party8

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party8

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 8

**4.1.1.324 Party seats upper chamber: Party 9 (upper\_seats\_party9)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party9

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party9

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 9

**4.1.1.325 Party seats upper chamber: Party 98 (others) (upper\_seats\_party98)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party98

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party98

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 98 (others)

**4.1.1.326 Party seats upper chamber: Party 99 (others) (upper\_seats\_party99)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_party99

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party99

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 99 (others)

**4.1.1.327 Total number of seats: upper chamber (upper\_seats\_total)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_upper\_seats\_total

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_total

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Total number of seats (upper chamber)

**4.1.1.328 Year of cabinet formation (year\_in)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_year\_in

*Original tag:* year\_in

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Year of cabinet formation

**4.1.1.329 Year/month of cabinet formation (year\_month\_in)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_year\_month\_in

*Original tag:* year\_month\_in

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Year/month of cabinet formation

**4.1.1.330 Year/month of cabinet termination (year\_month\_out)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_year\_month\_out

*Original tag:* year\_month\_out

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Year/month of cabinet termination

**4.1.1.331 Year out (year\_out)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_basic\_year\_out

*Original tag:* year\_out

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

*Description:*

Year of cabinet termination

**4.2 REPDEM PAGED Western, Central and Eastern Europe**

**Dataset tag:** repdem\_wecee

**Output Unit:** Repdem Cabinet-Date, i.e., data is collected per cabinet and date.

**Description:** Party Government in Europe Database (PAGED) – Central Eastern and Western Europe Dataset is a research infrastructure project that aims to build a state-of-the-art database for comparative coalition research on political institutions, political parties, parliaments and governments.

This comparative dataset merges the data from Hellström et al. (2021) and Hellström et al. (2024), collected for the volumes Bergman et al. (2021) and Bergman et al. (2024), and including variables produced for Hellström et al. (2023)

All data were meticulously collected by experts on coalition politics in their respective country using standardized coding instructions and interview guidelines. Specifically, the data were gathered from official documents (government, administration, and parliament) and party documents (election manifestos, coalition agreements), by conducting semi-structured interviews with (former) staff and cabinet members as well as a systemic analysis of media reports.

The combined dataset provides detailed information on important aspects of government formation, coalition governance, and government termination in 10 Central Eastern European from their democratic transitions up to June 1st, 2014, as well as 16 West European countries and Croatia up to 31st December 2019.



**Dataset citation:**

Hellström, Johan, Torbjörn Bergman, and Jonas Lindahl (2024). Party Government in Europe Database (PAGED) – Coalition Governance in Central Eastern and Western Europe Dataset. Version 2023.12. Available on <https://repdem.org>

And

Bergman, Torbjörn, Hanna Bäck, and Johan Hellström (eds.). (2021). Coalition Governance in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

And

Bergman, Torbjörn, Gabriella Ilonszki, and Johan Hellström (eds.) (2024). Coalition Politics in Central Eastern Europe: Governing in Times of Crisis. London: Routledge.

**Comments:**

For party abbreviations see party codebooks:

Western Europe: <https://repdem.org/index.php/download/98/central-eastern-europe-and-western-europe-dataset/4266/v1-party-codebook-wecee-dec-2023.pdf>

Notes on coding principles: <https://repdem.org/index.php/download/98/central-eastern-europe-and-western-europe-dataset/4291/paged-notes-on-coding-principles-2.pdf>

**Link to original codebook**

<https://repdem.org/index.php/download/98/central-eastern-europe-and-western-europe-dataset/4606/v1-data-set-codebook-wecee-dec-2023-3.pdf>

**License:** REPDEM presents the comparative data collection efforts undertaken by various research and data infrastructure projects on political institutions, political parties, cabinets and governments in Europe.

Repdem offers a range of datasets available for free (without even a demand for registration).

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page: <https://repdem.org/index.php/current-dataset/>

**4.2.1 Information on the Cabinets**

These variables provide general information on each cabinet such as duration, cabinet composition and majority relations.

**4.2.1.1 Duration of unsuccessful bargaining round (barg\_fail1\_duration)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_duration

*Original tag:* barg\_fail\_rounds

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured in days

**4.2.1.2 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round (barg\_fail1\_parties)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_parties

*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_duration

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party abbreviations, see party codebook

**4.2.1.3 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 1 (barg\_fail1\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party1

*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_parties

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.4 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 10 (barg\_fail1\_party10)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party10

*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.5 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 11 (barg\_fail1\_party11)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party11

*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party10

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.6 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 12 (barg\_fail1\_party12)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party12

*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party11

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.7 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 13 (barg\_fail1\_party13)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party13

*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party12

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.8 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 14 (barg\_fail1\_party14)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party14

*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party13

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.9 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 15  
(barg\_fail1\_party15)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party15*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party14*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.10 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 16  
(barg\_fail1\_party16)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party16*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party15*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.11 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 2  
(barg\_fail1\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party2*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party16*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.12 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 3  
(barg\_fail1\_party3)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party3*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.13 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 4  
(barg\_fail1\_party4)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party4*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party3*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.14 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 5  
(barg\_fail1\_party5)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party5

*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.15 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 6 (barg\_fail1\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party6

*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.16 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 7 (barg\_fail1\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party7

*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.17 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 8 (barg\_fail1\_party8)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party8

*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party7

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.18 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 9 (barg\_fail1\_party9)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail1\_party9

*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party8

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.19 Duration of unsuccessful bargaining round (barg\_fail2\_duration)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail2\_duration

*Original tag:* barg\_fail1\_party9

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured in days

#### **4.2.1.20 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round (barg\_fail2\_parties)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail2\_parties

*Original tag:* barg\_fail2\_duration

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party abbreviations, see party codebook

#### **4.2.1.21 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 1 (barg\_fail2\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail2\_party1

*Original tag:* barg\_fail2\_parties

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.22 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 2 (barg\_fail2\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail2\_party2

*Original tag:* barg\_fail2\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.23 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 3 (barg\_fail2\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail2\_party3

*Original tag:* barg\_fail2\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.24 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 4 (barg\_fail2\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail2\_party4

*Original tag:* barg\_fail2\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.25 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 5 (barg\_fail2\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail2\_party5

*Original tag:* barg\_fail2\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.26 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 6 (barg\_fail2\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail2\_party6

*Original tag:* barg\_fail2\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.27 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 7 (barg\_fail2\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail2\_party7

*Original tag:* barg\_fail2\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.28 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 8 (barg\_fail2\_party8)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail2\_party8

*Original tag:* barg\_fail2\_party7

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.29 Duration of unsuccessful bargaining round (barg\_fail3\_duration)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail3\_duration

*Original tag:* barg\_fail2\_party8

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured in days

**4.2.1.30 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round (barg\_fail3\_parties)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail3\_parties

*Original tag:* barg\_fail3\_duration

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party abbreviations, see party codebook

**4.2.1.31 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 1 (barg\_fail3\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail3\_party1

*Original tag:* barg\_fail3\_parties

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.32 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 2  
(barg\_fail3\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail3\_party2

*Original tag:* barg\_fail3\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.33 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 3  
(barg\_fail3\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail3\_party3

*Original tag:* barg\_fail3\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.34 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 4  
(barg\_fail3\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail3\_party4

*Original tag:* barg\_fail3\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.35 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 5  
(barg\_fail3\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail3\_party5

*Original tag:* barg\_fail3\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.36 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 6  
(barg\_fail3\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail3\_party6

*Original tag:* barg\_fail3\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.37 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 7  
(barg\_fail3\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail3\_party7

*Original tag:* barg\_fail3\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.38 Duration of unsuccessful bargaining round (barg\_fail4\_duration)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail4\_duration*Original tag:* barg\_fail3\_party7*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Measured in days

**4.2.1.39 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round (barg\_fail4\_parties)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail4\_parties*Original tag:* barg\_fail4\_duration*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Party abbreviations, see party codebook

**4.2.1.40 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 1 (barg\_fail4\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail4\_party1*Original tag:* barg\_fail4\_parties*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.41 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 2 (barg\_fail4\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail4\_party2*Original tag:* barg\_fail4\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.42 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 3 (barg\_fail4\_party3)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail4\_party3*Original tag:* barg\_fail4\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.43 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 4 (barg\_fail4\_party4)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail4\_party4*Original tag:* barg\_fail4\_party3



*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.44 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 5 (barg\_fail4\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail4\_party5

*Original tag:* barg\_fail4\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.45 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 6 (barg\_fail4\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail4\_party6

*Original tag:* barg\_fail4\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.46 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 7 (barg\_fail4\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail4\_party7

*Original tag:* barg\_fail4\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.47 Duration of unsuccessful bargaining round (barg\_fail5\_duration)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail5\_duration

*Original tag:* barg\_fail4\_party7

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured in days

**4.2.1.48 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round (barg\_fail5\_parties)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail5\_parties

*Original tag:* barg\_fail5\_duration

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party abbreviations, see party codebook

**4.2.1.49 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 1 (barg\_fail5\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail5\_party1

*Original tag:* barg\_fail5\_parties

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.50 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 2  
(barg\_fail5\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail5\_party2

*Original tag:* barg\_fail5\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.51 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 3  
(barg\_fail5\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail5\_party3

*Original tag:* barg\_fail5\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.52 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 4  
(barg\_fail5\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail5\_party4

*Original tag:* barg\_fail5\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.53 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 5  
(barg\_fail5\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail5\_party5

*Original tag:* barg\_fail5\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.54 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 6  
(barg\_fail5\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail5\_party6

*Original tag:* barg\_fail5\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.55 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 7 (barg\_fail5\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail5\_party7

*Original tag:* barg\_fail5\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.56 Duration of unsuccessful bargaining round (barg\_fail6\_duration)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail6\_duration

*Original tag:* barg\_fail5\_party7

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured in days

**4.2.1.57 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round (barg\_fail6\_parties)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail6\_parties

*Original tag:* barg\_fail6\_duration

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party abbreviations, see party codebook

**4.2.1.58 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 1 (barg\_fail6\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail6\_party1

*Original tag:* barg\_fail6\_parties

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.59 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 2 (barg\_fail6\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail6\_party2

*Original tag:* barg\_fail6\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.60 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 3 (barg\_fail6\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail6\_party3

*Original tag:* barg\_fail6\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.61 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 4  
(barg\_fail6\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail6\_party4

*Original tag:* barg\_fail6\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.62 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 5  
(barg\_fail6\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail6\_party5

*Original tag:* barg\_fail6\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.63 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 6  
(barg\_fail6\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail6\_party6

*Original tag:* barg\_fail6\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.64 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 7  
(barg\_fail6\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail6\_party7

*Original tag:* barg\_fail6\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.65 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 8  
(barg\_fail6\_party8)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail6\_party8

*Original tag:* barg\_fail6\_party7

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.66 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 9  
(barg\_fail6\_party9)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail6\_party9

*Original tag:* barg\_fail6\_party8

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.67 Duration of unsuccessful bargaining round (barg\_fail7\_duration)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail7\_duration*Original tag:* barg\_fail6\_party9*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Measured in days

**4.2.1.68 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round (barg\_fail7\_parties)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail7\_parties*Original tag:* barg\_fail7\_duration*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Party abbreviations, see party codebook

**4.2.1.69 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 1 (barg\_fail7\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail7\_party1*Original tag:* barg\_fail7\_parties*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.70 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 2 (barg\_fail7\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail7\_party2*Original tag:* barg\_fail7\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.71 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 3 (barg\_fail7\_party3)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail7\_party3*Original tag:* barg\_fail7\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.72 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 4 (barg\_fail7\_party4)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail7\_party4*Original tag:* barg\_fail7\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.73 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 5 (barg\_fail7\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail7\_party5

*Original tag:* barg\_fail7\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.74 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 6 (barg\_fail7\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail7\_party6

*Original tag:* barg\_fail7\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.75 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 7 (barg\_fail7\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail7\_party7

*Original tag:* barg\_fail7\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.76 Parties involved in unsuccessful bargaining round: Party 8 (barg\_fail7\_party8)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail7\_party8

*Original tag:* barg\_fail7\_party7

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.77 Number of inconclusive bargaining rounds (barg\_fail\_rounds)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_fail\_rounds

*Original tag:* barg\_fail7\_party8

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of inconclusive bargaining rounds

**4.2.1.78 Duration of successful bargaining round (barg\_success\_duration)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_success\_duration

*Original tag:* barg\_success\_duration

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured in days

#### **4.2.1.79 Parties involved in successful bargaining round (barg\_success\_parties)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_success\_parties

*Original tag:* barg\_success\_parties

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party abbreviations, see party codebook

#### **4.2.1.80 Parties involved in successful bargaining round: Party 1 (barg\_success\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_success\_party1

*Original tag:* barg\_success\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.81 Parties involved in successful bargaining round: Party 2 (barg\_success\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_success\_party2

*Original tag:* barg\_success\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.82 Parties involved in successful bargaining round: Party 3 (barg\_success\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_success\_party3

*Original tag:* barg\_success\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.83 Parties involved in successful bargaining round: Party 4 (barg\_success\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_success\_party4

*Original tag:* barg\_success\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.84 Parties involved in successful bargaining round: Party 5 (barg\_success\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_success\_party5

*Original tag:* barg\_success\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.85 Parties involved in successful bargaining round: Party 6  
(barg\_success\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_success\_party6

*Original tag:* barg\_success\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.86 Parties involved in successful bargaining round: Party 7  
(barg\_success\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_success\_party7

*Original tag:* barg\_success\_party7

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.87 Parties involved in successful bargaining round: Party 8  
(barg\_success\_party8)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_success\_party8

*Original tag:* barg\_success\_party8

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.88 Total bargaining duration (barg\_total\_duration)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_barg\_total\_duration

*Original tag:* barg\_total\_duration

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured in days

Time period between the first day of the first (potentially inconclusive) bargaining round and the last day of the successful bargaining attempt.

**4.2.1.89 Bargaining power (Banzhaf index) fractionalization: lower chamber  
(bp\_fract)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_bp\_fract

*Original tag:* bp\_fract

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Same calculation as enpp, but using Banzhaf index values instead of party seat shares as



weights.

#### 4.2.1.90 Coalition (**cab\_coalition**)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_coalition

*Original tag:* cab\_coalition

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Coalition government

0: no

1: yes

#### 4.2.1.91 Cabinet composition (**cab\_composition1**)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_composition1

*Original tag:* cab\_composition1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party abbreviations (see party codebook). List of cabinet parties, beginning with the party of the PM.

#### 4.2.1.92 Cabinet composition (**cab\_composition2**)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_composition2

*Original tag:* cab\_composition2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party Ids (see party codebook). List of cabinet parties, beginning with the party of the PM.

#### 4.2.1.93 Ideologically connected cabinet (**cab\_connected**)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_connected

*Original tag:* cab\_connected

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Ideologically “connected cabinet” (i.e., the parties are next to one another) on economic left-right placement of political parties.

0: no

1: yes

#### 4.2.1.94 Cabinet duration (**cab\_duration\_days**)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_duration\_days

*Original tag:* cab\_duration\_days

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured in days. Defined as the time period between cabinet’s first and last day in office.

#### 4.2.1.95 Maximum possible cabinet duration (**cab\_duration\_max**)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_duration\_max

*Original tag:* cab\_duration\_max

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured in days. Defined as: remainder of the parliamentary term when cabinet assumes office until

(a) next constitutionally mandated parliamentary elections

(b) next constitutionally mandated presidential elections if it is required or customary for governments to resign at that time

#### **4.2.1.96 Relative cabinet duration (cab\_duration\_relative)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_duration\_relative

*Original tag:* cab\_duration\_relative

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Defined as the share (proportion) of potential duration the cabinet was in office.

#### **4.2.1.97 Effective number of cabinet parties: lower chamber (cab\_enpp)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_enpp

*Original tag:* cab\_enpp

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Effective number of cabinet parties(lower chamber)

#### **4.2.1.98 Formal minority cabinet (cab\_formal\_minority)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_formal\_minority

*Original tag:* cab\_formal\_minority

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Formal minority

0: no

1: yes

#### **4.2.1.99 Cabinet centre of gravity, RILE (cab\_gravity)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_gravity

*Original tag:* cab\_gravity

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

The Manifesto Project's RILE scale has been used to estimate party positions. For the calculation of the measure, consult the notes on coding principles.

#### **4.2.1.100 Cabinet centre of gravity, RILE, logit scaled (cab\_gravity\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_gravity\_logit

*Original tag:* cab\_gravity\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Same as cab\_gravity, but with logit-scaled (Lowe et al. 2011) party positions.

**4.2.1.101 Cabinet centre of gravity, Prosser (2014) left-right scale, logit scaled (cab\_gravity\_logit\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_gravity\_logit\_prosser

*Original tag:* cab\_gravity\_logit\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Same as cab\_gravity\_prosser, but with logit-scaled (Lowe et al. 2011) party positions.

**4.2.1.102 Cabinet centre of gravity, Prosser (2014) left-right scale (cab\_gravity\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_gravity\_prosser

*Original tag:* cab\_gravity\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Prosser's (2014) suggested categories for estimating party positions from the Manifesto Project data has been used.

**4.2.1.103 Cabinet ID (cab\_id)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_id

*Original tag:* cab\_id

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Cabinet code. First two digits: country Second two digits: cabinet number.

**4.2.1.104 Cabinet majority (50percent + 1) seat (cab\_majority)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_majority

*Original tag:* cab\_majority

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Majority government

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.105 Minimal winning coalition (cab\_mwc)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_mwc

*Original tag:* cab\_mwc

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

MWC

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.106 Minimal Winning Connected Cabinet (cab\_mwcc)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_mwcc

*Original tag:* cab\_mwcc

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Minimal Winning Connected Cabinet (MWCC).

0: no

1: yes

A cabinet is a MWCC if (i) it is connected, and (ii) it cannot remain winning AND connected by dropping a party.

**4.2.1.107 MWCC including single-party cabinets (cab\_mwccs)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_mwccs

*Original tag:* cab\_mwccs

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

MWCC including single-party cabinets

0: no

1: yes

Minimal Winning Connected Cabinet including single-party majority governments.

**4.2.1.108 Cabinet (cab\_name)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_name

*Original tag:* cab\_name

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Cabinet name (name of the PM consecutively numbered with Roman figures).

**4.2.1.109 Number of cabinet parties (cab\_num\_parties)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_num\_parties

*Original tag:* cab\_num\_parties

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of cabinet parties

**4.2.1.110 Cabinet party 1 (cab\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_party1

*Original tag:* cab\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks

**4.2.1.111 Cabinet party 2 (cab\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_party2

*Original tag:* cab\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks

**4.2.1.112 Cabinet party 3 (cab\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_party3

*Original tag:* cab\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks

#### **4.2.1.113 Cabinet party 4 (cab\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_party4

*Original tag:* cab\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks

#### **4.2.1.114 Cabinet party 5 (cab\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_party5

*Original tag:* cab\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks

#### **4.2.1.115 Cabinet party 6 (cab\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_party6

*Original tag:* cab\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks

#### **4.2.1.116 Cabinet party 7 (cab\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_party7

*Original tag:* cab\_party7

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks

#### **4.2.1.117 Cabinet party 8 (cab\_party8)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_party8

*Original tag:* cab\_party8

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks

#### **4.2.1.118 Cabinet polarization, RILE (cab\_polar)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_polar

*Original tag:* cab\_polar

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the mean position in cabinet, based on the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale

**4.2.1.119 Cabinet polarization, RILE, logit scaled (cab\_polar\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_polar\_logit

*Original tag:* cab\_polar\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the mean position in cabinet, based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) of the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale

**4.2.1.120 Cabinet polarization, Prosser (2014) left-right scale (cab\_polar\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_polar\_prosser

*Original tag:* cab\_polar\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the mean position in cabinet, based on Prosser's (2014) suggested categories in the Manifesto Project data for the general left-right dimension

**4.2.1.121 Cabinet polarization, Prosser (2014) left-right scale, logit scaled (cab\_polar\_prosser\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_polar\_prosser\_logit

*Original tag:* cab\_polar\_prosser\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the mean position in cabinet, based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) on Prosser's (2014) suggested categories in the Manifesto Project data for the general left-right dimension

**4.2.1.122 Cabinet preference range, RILE (cab\_prefrange)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_prefrange

*Original tag:* cab\_prefrange

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

The distance between the left-most and right-most parties in the cabinet on the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale.

**4.2.1.123 Cabinet preference range, RILE, logit scaled (cab\_prefrange\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_prefrange\_logit

*Original tag:* cab\_prefrange\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

The distance between the left-most and right-most parties in the cabinet based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) of the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale.

**4.2.1.124 Cabinet preference range, Prosser (2014) left-right scale, logit scaled (cab\_prefrange\_logit\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_prefrange\_logit\_prosser

*Original tag:* cab\_prefrange\_logit\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

As cab\_prefrange\_logit, but using the categories suggested by Prosser (2014) for constructing the left-right scale

**4.2.1.125 Cabinet preference range, Prosser (2014) left-right scale (cab\_prefrange\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_prefrange\_prosser

*Original tag:* cab\_prefrange\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

As cab\_prefrange, but using the categories suggested by Prosser (2014) for constructing the left-right scale

**4.2.1.126 Cabinet seat share (cab\_seatshare)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_seatshare

*Original tag:* cab\_seatshare

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Cabinet seat share (0-1)

**4.2.1.127 Cabinet strength: lower chamber (cab\_strength\_lower)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_strength\_lower

*Original tag:* cab\_strength\_lower

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Cabinet strength, i.e., total seat share of all cabinet parties combined.

**4.2.1.128 Cabinet strength including formal support parties: lower chamber (cab\_strength\_lower\_supported)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_strength\_lower\_supported

*Original tag:* cab\_strength\_lower\_supported

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Cabinet strength, i.e., total seat share of all cabinet parties and all formal support parties.

**4.2.1.129 Cabinet strength at date out: lower chamber (cab\_strength\_out)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_strength\_out

*Original tag:* cab\_strength\_out

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Cabinet strength, i.e., total seat share of all cabinet parties at termination of the cabinet.

**4.2.1.130 Cabinet strength: upper chamber (cab\_strength\_upper)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_strength\_upper

*Original tag:* cab\_strength\_upper

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Cabinet strength (upper chamber)

**4.2.1.131 Cabinet strength at date out: upper chamber (cab\_strength\_upper\_out)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_strength\_upper\_out

*Original tag:* cab\_strength\_upper\_out

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Cabinet strength, i.e., total seat share (upper chamber) of all cabinet parties at termination of the cabinet.

**4.2.1.132 Surplus majority cabinet (cab\_surplus)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_surplus

*Original tag:* cab\_surplus

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Surplus government

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.133 Cabinet polarization, RILE, weighted SD (cab\_wpolar)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_wpolar

*Original tag:* cab\_wpolar

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

As cab\_polar, but standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position.

**4.2.1.134 Cabinet polarization, RILE, weighted SD, logit scaled (cab\_wpolar\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_wpolar\_logit

*Original tag:* cab\_wpolar\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

As cab\_wpolar, but standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position.

**4.2.1.135 Cabinet polarization, RILE, weighted SD (cab\_wpolar\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_wpolar\_prosser

*Original tag:* cab\_wpolar\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

As cab\_polar\_prosser, but standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position.



**4.2.1.136 Cabinet polarization, RILE, weighted SD, logit scaled (cab\_wpolar\_prosser\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_cab\_wpolar\_prosser\_logit

*Original tag:* cab\_wpolar\_prosser\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

As cab\_wpolar\_prosser, but standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position.

**4.2.1.137 Coalition agreement (coal\_agree)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_agree

*Original tag:* coal\_agree

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

0: N – No written coalition agreement

1: PRE – Pre-electoral written coalition agreement

2: POST – Post-electoral written coalition agreement

3: IE – Written coalition agreement in the case of coalitions formed during the parliamentary term (not immediately following elections)

4: PRE, POST – Pre- and post-electoral written coalition agreement

5: PRE, POST, IE – Pre-, post- and interelectoral written coalition agreements

**4.2.1.138 Agreement public (coal\_agree\_public)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_agree\_public

*Original tag:* coal\_agree\_public

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Agreement public:

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.139 Conflict management mechanisms (coal\_conf)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_conf

*Original tag:* coal\_conf

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

IC – Inner cabinet: a subset of cabinet ministers which is not issue-specific and which is stable over time

CaC – Cabinet committee(s): typically issue-specific

**4.2.1.140 CMM used for most common conflicts (coal\_conf\_common)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_conf\_common

*Original tag:* coal\_conf\_common

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

IC – Inner cabinet: a subset of cabinet ministers which is not issue-specific and which is stable over time

CaC – Cabinet committee(s): typically issue-specific

**4.2.1.141 CMM used for most common conflicts: Mechanism 1  
(coal\_conf\_common\_mech1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_conf\_common\_mech1

*Original tag:* coal\_conf\_common\_mech1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

- 1: IC
- 2: CaC
- 3: CoC
- 4: Parl
- 5: PCa
- 6: PS
- 7: O

**4.2.1.142 CMM used for most common conflicts: Mechanism 2  
(coal\_conf\_common\_mech2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_conf\_common\_mech2

*Original tag:* coal\_conf\_common\_mech2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

- 1: IC
- 2: CaC
- 3: CoC
- 4: Parl
- 5: PCa
- 6: PS
- 7: O

**4.2.1.143 CMM used for most common conflicts: Mechanism 3  
(coal\_conf\_common\_mech3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_conf\_common\_mech3

*Original tag:* coal\_conf\_common\_mech3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

- 1: IC
- 2: CaC
- 3: CoC
- 4: Parl
- 5: PCa
- 6: PS
- 7: O

**4.2.1.144 CMM: Mechanism 1 (coal\_conf\_mech1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_conf\_mech1

*Original tag:* coal\_conf\_mech1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

- 1: IC
- 2: CaC
- 3: CoC

4: Parl  
5: PCa  
6: PS  
7: O

#### 4.2.1.145 CMM: Mechanism 2 (coal\_conf\_mech2)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_conf\_mech2

*Original tag:* coal\_conf\_mech2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

1: IC  
2: CaC  
3: CoC  
4: Parl  
5: PCa  
6: PS  
7: O

#### 4.2.1.146 CMM: Mechanism 3 (coal\_conf\_mech3)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_conf\_mech3

*Original tag:* coal\_conf\_mech3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

1: IC  
2: CaC  
3: CoC  
4: Parl  
5: PCa  
6: PS  
7: O

#### 4.2.1.147 CMM: Mechanism 4 (coal\_conf\_mech4)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_conf\_mech4

*Original tag:* coal\_conf\_mech4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

1: IC  
2: CaC  
3: CoC  
4: Parl  
5: PCa  
6: PS  
7: O

#### 4.2.1.148 CMM: Mechanism 5 (coal\_conf\_mech5)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_conf\_mech5

*Original tag:* coal\_conf\_mech5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

- 1: IC
- 2: CaC
- 3: CoC
- 4: Parl
- 5: PCa
- 6: PS
- 7: O

#### 4.2.1.149 CMM: Mechanism 6 (coal\_conf\_mech6)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_conf\_mech6

*Original tag:* coal\_conf\_mech6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

- 1: IC
- 2: CaC
- 3: CoC
- 4: Parl
- 5: PCa
- 6: PS
- 7: O

#### 4.2.1.150 CMM used for most serious conflicts (coal\_conf\_serious)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_conf\_serious

*Original tag:* coal\_conf\_serious

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

IC – Inner cabinet: a subset of cabinet ministers which is not issue-specific and which is stable over time

CaC – Cabinet committee(s): typically issue-specific

#### 4.2.1.151 CMM used for most serious conflicts: Mechanism 1 (coal\_conf\_serious\_mech1)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_conf\_serious\_mech1

*Original tag:* coal\_conf\_serious\_mech1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

- 1: IC
- 2: CaC
- 3: CoC
- 4: Parl
- 5: PCa
- 6: PS
- 7: O

#### 4.2.1.152 CMM used for most serious conflicts: Mechanism 2 (coal\_conf\_serious\_mech2)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_conf\_serious\_mech2

*Original tag:* coal\_conf\_serious\_mech2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

- 1: IC
- 2: CaC
- 3: CoC
- 4: Parl
- 5: PCa
- 6: PS
- 7: O

**4.2.1.153 CMM used for most serious conflicts: Mechanism 3  
(coal\_conf\_serious\_mech3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_conf\_serious\_mech3

*Original tag:* coal\_conf\_serious\_mech3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

- 1: IC
- 2: CaC
- 3: CoC
- 4: Parl
- 5: PCa
- 6: PS
- 7: O

**4.2.1.154 Coalition discipline in legislation (coal\_disc\_leg)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_disc\_leg

*Original tag:* coal\_disc\_leg

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

- 1: yes always
- 2: yes, except explicitly exempted
- 3: no, except explicit policies
- 4: no

**4.2.1.155 Coalition discipline in other parliamentary behavior (coal\_disc\_parl)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_disc\_parl

*Original tag:* coal\_disc\_parl

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

- 1: yes always
- 2: yes, except explicitly exempted
- 3: no, except explicit policies
- 4: no

**4.2.1.156 Distribution of competences: all agreements (coal\_distcomp\_all)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_distcomp\_all

*Original tag:* coal\_distcomp\_all

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

in percent

**4.2.1.157 Distribution of competences (coal\_distcomp\_doc1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_distcomp\_doc1

*Original tag:* coal\_distcomp\_doc1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

**4.2.1.158 Distribution of competences: additional agreement number 1 (coal\_distcomp\_doc2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_distcomp\_doc2

*Original tag:* coal\_distcomp\_doc2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

**4.2.1.159 Distribution of competences: additional agreement number 2 (coal\_distcomp\_doc3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_distcomp\_doc3

*Original tag:* coal\_distcomp\_doc3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

**4.2.1.160 Distribution of competences: additional agreement number 3 (coal\_distcomp\_doc4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_distcomp\_doc4

*Original tag:* coal\_distcomp\_doc4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

**4.2.1.161 Distribution of offices: all agreements (coal\_distoff\_all)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_distoff\_all

*Original tag:* coal\_distoff\_all

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

**4.2.1.162 Distribution of offices: (coal\_distoff\_doc1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_distoff\_doc1

*Original tag:* coal\_distoff\_doc1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

**4.2.1.163 Distribution of offices: additional agreement number 1 (coal\_distoff\_doc2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_distoff\_doc2

*Original tag:* coal\_distoff\_doc2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

in percent

**4.2.1.164 Distribution of offices: additional agreement number 2 (coal\_distoff\_doc3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_distoff\_doc3

*Original tag:* coal\_distoff\_doc3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

in percent

**4.2.1.165 Distribution of offices: additional agreement number 3 (coal\_distoff\_doc4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_distoff\_doc4

*Original tag:* coal\_distoff\_doc4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

in percent

**4.2.1.166 Election rule (coal\_elec\_rule)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_elec\_rule

*Original tag:* coal\_elec\_rule

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Election rule:

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.167 Freedom of appointment (coal\_free\_appointment)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_free\_appointment

*Original tag:* coal\_free\_appointment

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

0: no, i.e. ministerial posts are subject to coalition approval/veto

1: yes

**4.2.1.168 General rules: all agreements (coal\_genrules\_all)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_genrules\_all

*Original tag:* coal\_genrules\_all

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

#### **4.2.1.169 General rules (coal\_genrules\_doc1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_genrules\_doc1

*Original tag:* coal\_genrules\_doc1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

#### **4.2.1.170 General rules: additional agreement number 1 (coal\_genrules\_doc2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_genrules\_doc2

*Original tag:* coal\_genrules\_doc2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

#### **4.2.1.171 General rules: additional agreement number 2 (coal\_genrules\_doc3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_genrules\_doc3

*Original tag:* coal\_genrules\_doc3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

#### **4.2.1.172 General rules: additional agreement number 3 (coal\_genrules\_doc4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_genrules\_doc4

*Original tag:* coal\_genrules\_doc4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

#### **4.2.1.173 Agreement on junior ministers (coal\_junmin)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_junmin

*Original tag:* coal\_junmin

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

0: no

1: yes

#### **4.2.1.174 Agreement on non-cabinet positions (coal\_noncab)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_noncab

*Original tag:* coal\_noncab

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)



*Description:*

0: no, i.e. left to the discretion of parliament or individual ministers

1: yes

**4.2.1.175 Policies: all agreements (coal\_pol\_all)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_pol\_all

*Original tag:* coal\_pol\_all

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

in percent

**4.2.1.176 Policies (coal\_pol\_doc1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_pol\_doc1

*Original tag:* coal\_pol\_doc1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

in percent

**4.2.1.177 Policies: additional agreement number 1 (coal\_pol\_doc2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_pol\_doc2

*Original tag:* coal\_pol\_doc2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

in percent

**4.2.1.178 Policies: additional agreement number 2 (coal\_pol\_doc3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_pol\_doc3

*Original tag:* coal\_pol\_doc3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

in percent

**4.2.1.179 Policies: additional agreement number 3 (coal\_pol\_doc4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_pol\_doc4

*Original tag:* coal\_pol\_doc4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

in percent

**4.2.1.180 Agreement on policies (coalition agreement) (coal\_policy)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_policy

*Original tag:* coal\_policy

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

0: no explicit agreement

- 1 on few selected policies
- 2: on a variety of issues, but not comprehensive
- 3: comprehensive policy platform

#### 4.2.1.181 Policy specific procedural rules: all agreements (coal\_polspec\_all)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_polspec\_all

*Original tag:* coal\_polspec\_all

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

#### 4.2.1.182 Policy specific procedural rules (coal\_polspec\_doc1)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_polspec\_doc1

*Original tag:* coal\_polspec\_doc1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

#### 4.2.1.183 Policy specific procedural rules: additional agreement number 1 (coal\_polspec\_doc2)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_polspec\_doc2

*Original tag:* coal\_polspec\_doc2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

#### 4.2.1.184 Policy specific procedural rules: additional agreement number 2 (coal\_polspec\_doc3)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_polspec\_doc3

*Original tag:* coal\_polspec\_doc3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

#### 4.2.1.185 Policy specific procedural rules: additional agreement number 3 (coal\_polspec\_doc4)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_polspec\_doc4

*Original tag:* coal\_polspec\_doc4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*  
in percent

#### 4.2.1.186 Size of agreement: all agreements (coal\_size\_agreement\_all)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_size\_agreement\_all

*Original tag:* coal\_size\_agreement\_all

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

approximate number of words  
Corresponds to the sum of all coalition agreements

#### **4.2.1.187 Size of agreement (coal\_size\_agreement\_doc1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_size\_agreement\_doc1

*Original tag:* coal\_size\_agreement\_doc1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

approximate number of words

#### **4.2.1.188 Size of agreement (coal\_size\_agreement\_doc2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_size\_agreement\_doc2

*Original tag:* coal\_size\_agreement\_doc2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

approximate number of words

#### **4.2.1.189 Size of agreement (coal\_size\_agreement\_doc3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_size\_agreement\_doc3

*Original tag:* coal\_size\_agreement\_doc3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

approximate number of words

#### **4.2.1.190 Size of agreement (coal\_size\_agreement\_doc4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_coal\_size\_agreement\_doc4

*Original tag:* coal\_size\_agreement\_doc4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

approximate number of words

#### **4.2.1.191 Seat share of conservative parties: lower chamber, alternative operationalization (con\_alt\_share)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_con\_alt\_share

*Original tag:* con\_alt\_share

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Includes parties that are coded as belonging to the Christian democratic (50) or conservative (60) party families in the Manifesto Project data.

#### **4.2.1.192 Seat share of conservative parties: lower chamber (con\_share)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_con\_share

*Original tag:* con\_share

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Includes parties that are coded as belonging to the liberal (40) or conservative (60) party families in the Manifesto Project data.

#### **4.2.1.193 Date in (date\_in)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_date\_in

*Original tag:* date\_in

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

First day in cabinet life according to official criteria defined as:

- (a) date that PM/cabinet was appointed by head of state
- (b) date of investiture vote in parliament
- (c) date of general election

#### **4.2.1.194 Date in (String) (date\_in\_str)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_date\_in\_str

*Original tag:* date\_in\_str

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

In date as character string

#### **4.2.1.195 Date out (date\_out)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_date\_out

*Original tag:* date\_out

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Last day in cabinet life defined as:

- (a) day of cabinet resignation
- (b) day of general election

#### **4.2.1.196 Date out (string) (date\_out\_str)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_date\_out\_str

*Original tag:* date\_out\_str

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Out date as character string

#### **4.2.1.197 Deputy PM party 1 (deputy\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_deputy\_party1

*Original tag:* deputy\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.198 Deputy PM party 2 (deputy\_\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_deputy\_party2

*Original tag:* deputy\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.199 Deputy PM party 3 (deputy\_\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_deputy\_party3

*Original tag:* deputy\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.200 Deputy PM party 4 (deputy\_\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_deputy\_party4

*Original tag:* deputy\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.201 Deputy PM party 5 (deputy\_\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_deputy\_party5

*Original tag:* deputy\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.202 Deputy PM party 6 (deputy\_\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_deputy\_party6

*Original tag:* deputy\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.203 Portfolio Deputy PM party 1 (deputy\_\_port1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_deputy\_port1

*Original tag:* deputy\_port1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Portfolio ID

**4.2.1.204 Portfolio Deputy PM party 2 (deputy\_\_port2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_deputy\_port2

*Original tag:* deputy\_port2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Portfolio ID

#### **4.2.1.205 Portfolio Deputy PM party 3 (deputy\_port3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_deputy\_port3

*Original tag:* deputy\_port3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Portfolio ID

#### **4.2.1.206 Portfolio Deputy PM party 4 (deputy\_port4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_deputy\_port4

*Original tag:* deputy\_port4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Portfolio ID

#### **4.2.1.207 Portfolio Deputy PM party 5 (deputy\_port5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_deputy\_port5

*Original tag:* deputy\_port5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Portfolio ID

#### **4.2.1.208 Portfolio Deputy PM party 6 (deputy\_port6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_deputy\_port6

*Original tag:* deputy\_port6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Portfolio ID

#### **4.2.1.209 First policy dimension (label) (dim\_first\_label)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_dim\_first\_label

*Original tag:* dim\_first\_label

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

First policy dimension (label)

#### **4.2.1.210 Party of the median legislator: first policy dimension, lower chamber (dim\_first\_median)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_dim\_first\_median

*Original tag:* dim\_first\_median

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks, Excluding legislators subsumed under ‘others’

**4.2.1.211 Party of the median legislator: first policy dimension, lower chamber (dim\_first\_median\_2nd)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_dim\_first\_median\_2nd

*Original tag:* dim\_first\_median\_2nd

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks, Excluding legislators subsumed under ‘others’, only coded if a second median party exists

**4.2.1.212 Bargaining power (Banzhaf index) of the party of the median legislator: first policy dimension, lower chamber (dim\_first\_median\_bp)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_dim\_first\_median\_bp

*Original tag:* dim\_first\_median\_bp

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks

**4.2.1.213 Second policy dimension (label) (dim\_second\_label)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_dim\_second\_label

*Original tag:* dim\_second\_label

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Second policy dimension (label)

**4.2.1.214 Party of the median legislator: second policy dimension, lower chamber (dim\_second\_median)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_dim\_second\_median

*Original tag:* dim\_second\_median

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks, Excluding legislators subsumed under ‘others’

**4.2.1.215 Party of the median legislator: second policy dimension, lower chamber (dim\_second\_median\_2nd)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_dim\_second\_median\_2nd

*Original tag:* dim\_second\_median\_2nd

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks, Excluding legislators subsumed under ‘others’, only coded if a second median party exists

**4.2.1.216 Third policy dimension (label) (dim\_third\_label)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_dim\_third\_label

*Original tag:* dim\_third\_label

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Third policy dimension (label)

#### **4.2.1.217 Party of the median legislator: third policy dimension, lower chamber (dim\_third\_median)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_dim\_third\_median

*Original tag:* dim\_third\_median

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks, Excluding legislators subsumed under ‘others’

#### **4.2.1.218 Election date (elecdate)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_elecdate

*Original tag:* elecdate

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Date of most recent parliamentary election:

(a) two-round elections: date of second round

(b) elections held over several days: date of last day

#### **4.2.1.219 Effective number of parliamentary parties: lower chamber (enpp)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_enpp

*Original tag:* enpp

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

All legislators subsumed under ‘others’ treated as one single party (minimum fragmentation)

#### **4.2.1.220 Effective number of parliamentary parties: lower chamber (Other minor parties and independents excluded) (enpp\_no\_others)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_enpp\_no\_others

*Original tag:* enpp\_no\_others

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

All legislators subsumed under ‘others’ have been excluded from the calculation of the measure.

#### **4.2.1.221 Issues excluded from agenda (exclagenda)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_exclagenda

*Original tag:* exclagenda

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Issues excluded from agenda:

0: no

1: yes



**4.2.1.222 Decade by date of formation (form\_decade)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_form\_decade

*Original tag:* form\_decade

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

90: 1990s

100: 2000s

110: 2010s

120: 2020s

**4.2.1.223 Number of days required for cabinet formation (form\_duration)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_form\_duration

*Original tag:* form\_duration

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured in days. Time period between ‘Date out’ of previous cabinet and ‘Date in’ of current cabinet.

**4.2.1.224 Number of days required for cabinet formation (form\_duration\_alt)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_form\_duration\_alt

*Original tag:* form\_duration\_alt

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured in days. Number of days since the election OR the ‘Date out’ of previous cabinet if it is terminated between elections. Thus, this alternative measurement ignores/doesn’t count the time between ‘Date out’ of previous cabinet and the election date.

**4.2.1.225 Final vote of investiture: abstentions (form\_invest\_abs)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_form\_invest\_abs

*Original tag:* form\_invest\_abs

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Final vote of investiture. Number of abstentions.

**4.2.1.226 Final vote of investiture: contra (form\_invest\_con)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_form\_invest\_con

*Original tag:* form\_invest\_con

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Final vote of investiture. Number of contra votes.

**4.2.1.227 Final vote of investiture: pro (form\_invest\_pro)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_form\_invest\_pro

*Original tag:* form\_invest\_pro

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Final vote of investiture. Number of pro votes.

**4.2.1.228 Government type (govtype)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_govtype

*Original tag:* govtype

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

1: Min Minority cabinet: Holds less than 50 percent plus one seat in parliament. Single-party minority cabinets are likewise coded as ‘Min’.

2: Maj Single-party majority cabinet: Holds 50percent plus one seat in parliament. Is not a coalition.

3: Mwc Minimal winning coalition: Is turned into a losing coalition by the subtraction of any of the coalition parties, i.e., if it loses a coalition party it holds less than 50 percent plus one seat.

4: Sur Surplus majority coalition: Can lose a coalition party and still be winning, i.e. control 50 percent plus one seat or more in the parliament

5: Non A non-partisan cabinet, e.g. appointed by a president to hold an election

**4.2.1.229 Bicameralism (inst\_bicam)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_inst\_bicam

*Original tag:* inst\_bicam

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Bicameralism:

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.230 Comments on institutional features (inst\_comment)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_inst\_comment

*Original tag:* inst\_comment

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Comments

**4.2.1.231 Constructive vote of no-confidence (inst\_convote)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_inst\_convote

*Original tag:* inst\_convote

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Constructive vote of no-confidence:

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.232 PM powers (inst\_pmpower)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_inst\_pmpower

*Original tag:* inst\_pmpower

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

PM powers. Ranges from 1 to 8, with an increasing number indicating an increasingly more powerful PM.

**4.2.1.233 Positive parliamentarism (inst\_posparl)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_inst\_posparl

*Original tag:* inst\_posparl

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Positive parliamentarism:

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.234 Semi-presidentialism (inst\_semipres)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_inst\_semipres

*Original tag:* inst\_semipres

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Semi-presidentialism:

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.235 Approval required for investiture vote in bicameral systems (invest\_bicameral)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_invest\_bicameral

*Original tag:* invest\_bicameral

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Approval required for investiture vote in bicameral systems:

1: Only in first/lower chamber

2: In both chambers

**4.2.1.236 Comments on investiture vote (invest\_comment)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_invest\_comment

*Original tag:* invest\_comment

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Comments

**4.2.1.237 Existence of investiture vote (invest\_exist)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_invest\_exist

*Original tag:* invest\_exist

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Existence of investiture vote:

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.238 Government in office after investiture object (invest\_inoffice)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_invest\_inoffice

*Original tag:* invest\_inoffice

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Government in office after investiture object. In the case of multiple objects of investiture, indicates after which object the government can effectively act (e.g., has control over armed forces):

- 1: Only PM
- 2: Whole cabinet
- 3: Single ministers
- 4: Government and its programme

**4.2.1.239 Object of investiture vote (invest\_object)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_invest\_object

*Original tag:* invest\_object

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Object of investiture vote. Lists all objects that need to pass an investiture vote, separated by commas:

- 1: Only PM
- 2: Whole cabinet
- 3: Single ministers
- 4: Government and its programme

**4.2.1.240 Object of investiture vote: first object (invest\_object1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_invest\_object1

*Original tag:* invest\_object1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Object of investiture vote: first object:

- 1: Only PM
- 2: Whole cabinet
- 3: Single ministers
- 4: Government and its programme

**4.2.1.241 Object of investiture vote: second object (invest\_object2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_invest\_object2

*Original tag:* invest\_object2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Object of investiture vote: second object:

- 1: Only PM
- 2: Whole cabinet
- 3: Single ministers
- 4: Government and its programme

**4.2.1.242 Allowed number of investiture votes/rounds (invest\_rounds\_max)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_invest\_rounds\_max

*Original tag:* invest\_rounds\_max

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Only relevant if there is a maximum number of votes/rounds.

#### **4.2.1.243 Decision rule for first investiture vote (invest\_rule1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_invest\_rule1

*Original tag:* invest\_rule1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Decision rule for first investiture vote/round:

- 1: Majority support (50percent+1 votes)
- 2: Plurality support
- 3: Plurality support among different options
- 4: No majority against
- 5: No investiture vote

#### **4.2.1.244 Decision rule for first investiture vote (invest\_rule2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_invest\_rule2

*Original tag:* invest\_rule2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Decision rule for second investiture vote/round:

- 1: Majority support (50percent+1 votes)
- 2: Plurality support
- 3: Plurality support among different options
- 4: No majority against
- 5: No investiture vote

#### **4.2.1.245 Decision rule for first investiture vote (invest\_rule3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_invest\_rule3

*Original tag:* invest\_rule3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Decision rule for third investiture vote/round:

- 1: Majority support (50percent+1 votes)
- 2: Plurality support
- 3: Plurality support among different options
- 4: No majority against
- 5: No investiture vote

#### **4.2.1.246 Decision rule for first investiture vote (invest\_rule4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_invest\_rule4

*Original tag:* invest\_rule4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Decision rule for fourth investiture vote/round

- 1: Majority support (50percent+1 votes)

- 2: Plurality support
- 3: Plurality support among different options
- 4: No majority against
- 5: No investiture vote

#### 4.2.1.247 Timing of investiture vote (*invest\_timing*)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_invest\_timing

*Original tag:* invest\_timing

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Timing of investiture vote:

- 1: Before taking office
- 2: After taking office
- 3: Both before and after taking office. When investiture votes must be held with respect to the government taking office.

#### 4.2.1.248 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 10 (*jm\_portfolio10\_party1*)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio10\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio1\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### 4.2.1.249 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 10 (*jm\_portfolio10\_party2*)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio10\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio1\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### 4.2.1.250 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 10 (*jm\_portfolio10\_party3*)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio10\_party3

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio1\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### 4.2.1.251 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 11 (*jm\_portfolio11\_party1*)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio11\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio10\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### 4.2.1.252 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 11 (*jm\_portfolio11\_party2*)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio11\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio10\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.253 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 11 (jm\_portfolio11\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio11\_party3

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio10\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.254 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 12 (jm\_portfolio12\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio12\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio11\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.255 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 12 (jm\_portfolio12\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio12\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio11\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.256 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 12 (jm\_portfolio12\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio12\_party3

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio11\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.257 Party 4 junior minister portfolio 12 (jm\_portfolio12\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio12\_party4

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio12\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.258 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 13 (jm\_portfolio13\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio13\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio12\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.259 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 13 (jm\_portfolio13\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio13\_party2*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio12\_party3*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.260 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 13 (jm\_portfolio13\_party3)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio13\_party3*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio12\_party4*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.261 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 14 (jm\_portfolio14\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio14\_party1*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio13\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.262 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 14 (jm\_portfolio14\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio14\_party2*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio13\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.263 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 14 (jm\_portfolio14\_party3)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio14\_party3*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio13\_party3*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.264 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 15 (jm\_portfolio15\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio15\_party1*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio14\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID



**4.2.1.265 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 15 (jm\_portfolio15\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio15\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio14\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.266 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 15 (jm\_portfolio15\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio15\_party3

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio14\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.267 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 16 (jm\_portfolio16\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio16\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio15\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.268 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 16 (jm\_portfolio16\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio16\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio15\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.269 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 17 (jm\_portfolio17\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio17\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio15\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.270 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 17 (jm\_portfolio17\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio17\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio16\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.271 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 18 (jm\_portfolio18\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio18\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio16\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.272 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 18 (jm\_portfolio18\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio18\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio17\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.273 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 19 (jm\_portfolio19\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio19\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio17\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.274 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 19 (jm\_portfolio19\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio19\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio18\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.275 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 19 (jm\_portfolio19\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio19\_party3

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio18\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.276 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 1 (jm\_portfolio1\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio1\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio19\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.277 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 1 (jm\_portfolio1\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio1\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio19\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.278 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 1 (jm\_portfolio1\_party3)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio1\_party3*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio19\_party3*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.279 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 20 (jm\_portfolio20\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio20\_party1*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio2\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.280 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 20 (jm\_portfolio20\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio20\_party2*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio2\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.281 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 21 (jm\_portfolio21\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio21\_party1*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio2\_party3*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.282 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 21 (jm\_portfolio21\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio21\_party2*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio2\_party4*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.283 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 22 (jm\_portfolio22\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio22\_party1*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio2\_party5*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.284 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 22 (jm\_portfolio22\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio22\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio20\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.285 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 22 (jm\_portfolio22\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio22\_party3

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio20\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.286 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 23 (jm\_portfolio23\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio23\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio21\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.287 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 23 (jm\_portfolio23\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio23\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio21\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.288 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 23 (jm\_portfolio23\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio23\_party3

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio22\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.289 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 25 (jm\_portfolio25\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio25\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio22\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.290 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 25 (jm\_portfolio25\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio25\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio22\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.291 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 26 (jm\_portfolio26\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio26\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio23\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.292 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 26 (jm\_portfolio26\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio26\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio23\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.293 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 26 (jm\_portfolio26\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio26\_party3

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio23\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.294 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 27 (jm\_portfolio27\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio27\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio25\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.295 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 27 (jm\_portfolio27\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio27\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio25\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.296 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 28 (jm\_portfolio28\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio28\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio26\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.297 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 29 (jm\_portfolio29\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio29\_party1*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio26\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.298 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 29 (jm\_portfolio29\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio29\_party2*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio26\_party3*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.299 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 2 (jm\_portfolio2\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio2\_party1*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio27\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.300 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 2 (jm\_portfolio2\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio2\_party2*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio27\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.301 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 2 (jm\_portfolio2\_party3)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio2\_party3*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio28\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.302 Party 4 junior minister portfolio 2 (jm\_portfolio2\_party4)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio2\_party4*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio29\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.303 Party 5 junior minister portfolio 2 (jm\_portfolio2\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio2\_party5

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio29\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.304 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 30 (jm\_portfolio30\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio30\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio3\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.305 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 30 (jm\_portfolio30\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio30\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio3\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.306 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 31 (jm\_portfolio31\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio31\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio3\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.307 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 31 (jm\_portfolio31\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio31\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio3\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.308 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 32 (jm\_portfolio32\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio32\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio30\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.309 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 33 (jm\_portfolio33\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio33\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio30\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.310 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 34 (jm\_portfolio34\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio34\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio31\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.311 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 35 (jm\_portfolio35\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio35\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio31\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.312 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 36 (jm\_portfolio36\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio36\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio32\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.313 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 37 (jm\_portfolio37\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio37\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio33\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.314 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 39 (jm\_portfolio39\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio39\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio34\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.315 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 3 (jm\_portfolio3\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio3\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio35\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)



*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.316 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 3 (jm\_portfolio3\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio3\_party2*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio36\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.317 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 3 (jm\_portfolio3\_party3)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio3\_party3*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio37\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.318 Party 4 junior minister portfolio 3 (jm\_portfolio3\_party4)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio3\_party4*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio39\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.319 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 40 (jm\_portfolio40\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio40\_party1*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio4\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.320 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 43 (jm\_portfolio43\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio43\_party1*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio4\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.321 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 44 (jm\_portfolio44\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio44\_party1*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio4\_party3*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.322 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 45 (jm\_portfolio45\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio45\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio4\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.323 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 45 (jm\_portfolio45\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio45\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio40\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.324 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 46 (jm\_portfolio46\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio46\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio43\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.325 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 4 (jm\_portfolio4\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio4\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio44\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.326 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 4 (jm\_portfolio4\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio4\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio45\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.327 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 4 (jm\_portfolio4\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio4\_party3

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio45\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.328 Party 4 junior minister portfolio 4 (jm\_portfolio4\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio4\_party4

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio46\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.329 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 5 (jm\_portfolio5\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio5\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio5\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.330 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 5 (jm\_portfolio5\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio5\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio5\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.331 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 5 (jm\_portfolio5\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio5\_party3

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio5\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.332 Party 4 junior minister portfolio 5 (jm\_portfolio5\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio5\_party4

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio5\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.333 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 6 (jm\_portfolio6\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio6\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio6\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.334 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 6 (jm\_portfolio6\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio6\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio6\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.335 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 6 (jm\_portfolio6\_party3)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio6\_party3*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio6\_party3*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.336 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 7 (jm\_portfolio7\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio7\_party1*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio7\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.337 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 7 (jm\_portfolio7\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio7\_party2*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio7\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.338 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 7 (jm\_portfolio7\_party3)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio7\_party3*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio7\_party3*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.339 Party 4 junior minister portfolio 7 (jm\_portfolio7\_party4)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio7\_party4*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio7\_party4*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.340 Party 5 junior minister portfolio 7 (jm\_portfolio7\_party5)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio7\_party5*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio7\_party5*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.341 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 8 (jm\_portfolio8\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio8\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio8\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.342 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 8 (jm\_portfolio8\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio8\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio8\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.343 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 8 (jm\_portfolio8\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio8\_party3

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio8\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.344 Party 4 junior minister portfolio 8 (jm\_portfolio8\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio8\_party4

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio8\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.345 Party 5 junior minister portfolio 8 (jm\_portfolio8\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio8\_party5

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio8\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.346 Party 1 junior minister portfolio 9 (jm\_portfolio9\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio9\_party1

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio9\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.347 Party 2 junior minister portfolio 9 (jm\_portfolio9\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio9\_party2

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio9\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.348 Party 3 junior minister portfolio 9 (jm\_portfolio9\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio9\_party3

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio9\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.349 Party 4 junior minister portfolio 9 (jm\_portfolio9\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio9\_party4

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio9\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.350 Party 5 junior minister portfolio 9 (jm\_portfolio9\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio9\_party5

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio9\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.351 Party 6 junior minister portfolio 9 (jm\_portfolio9\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_jm\_portfolio9\_party6

*Original tag:* jm\_portfolio9\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.352 Information on junior ministers (junmin)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_junmin

*Original tag:* junmin

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

- 1: there are no junior ministers according to the definition given below
- 2: all junior ministers are from the same party holding the portfolio
- 3: there are watchdog junior ministers at least for some portfolios and we have information for all of them
- 4: there are watchdog junior ministers at least for some portfolios and we have information for some of them
- 5: there are watchdog junior ministers at least for some portfolios but we have no information on any of them

**4.2.1.353 Largest party in parliament (largest\_party)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_largest\_party*Original tag:* largest\_party*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

See party codebooks. Largest party in term of seats.

**4.2.1.354 Bargaining power (Banzhaf index) of largest party in parliament: lower chamber (largest\_party\_bp)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_largest\_party\_bp*Original tag:* largest\_party\_bp*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Bargaining power (Banzhaf index) of largest party in parliament (lower chamber)

**4.2.1.355 Largest party in parliament in cabinet (largest\_party\_incab)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_largest\_party\_incab*Original tag:* largest\_party\_incab*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Largest party in parliament in cabinet

0: No

1: Yes

**4.2.1.356 Seat share of largest party in parliament: lower chamber (largest\_party\_share)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_largest\_party\_share*Original tag:* largest\_party\_share*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Seat share of largest party in parliament (lower chamber)

**4.2.1.357 Minority situation in parliament (minority\_sit)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_minority\_sit*Original tag:* minority\_sit*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Minority situation in parliament i.e., no single party holds 50percent plus one seat or more of the parliamentary seats.

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.358 Type of new government (newgov\_type)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_newgov\_type*Original tag:* newgov\_type*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Records if a new cabinet is the result of an election, replacement of one or several cabinet parties without a preceding election, of if there has only been a change of PM without a preceding election. This variable does not apply to non-partisan cabinets.

1: Election

2: Replacement

3: PM change, but same party composition as previous cabinet

4: other

5: non-partisan

**4.2.1.359 Number of cabinet members (num\_ministers)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_num\_ministers

*Original tag:* num\_ministers

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of cabinet members

**4.2.1.360 Number of ministries (num\_ministries)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_num\_ministries

*Original tag:* num\_ministries

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of ministries

**4.2.1.361 Number of parties in parliament (num\_parties)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_num\_parties

*Original tag:* num\_parties

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of parties in parliament. All parties, excluding ‘others’.

**4.2.1.362 Parliamentary polarization, Prosser (2014) left-right scale (parl\_polar\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_parl\_polar\_prosser

*Original tag:* parl\_polar\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in cabinet, based on Prosser’s (2014) suggested categories in the Manifesto Project data for the general left-right dimension

**4.2.1.363 Parliamentary polarization, Prosser (2014) left-right scale, logit scaled (parl\_polar\_prosser\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_parl\_polar\_prosser\_logit

*Original tag:* parl\_polar\_prosser\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)



*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in cabinet, based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) on Prosser's (2014) suggested categories in the Manifesto Project data for the general left-right dimension

**4.2.1.364 Parliamentary polarization, RILE (parl\_polar\_rile)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_parl\_polar\_rile

*Original tag:* parl\_polar\_rile

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in cabinet, based on the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale

**4.2.1.365 Parliamentary polarization, RILE, logit scaled (parl\_polar\_rile\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_parl\_polar\_rile\_logit

*Original tag:* parl\_polar\_rile\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in cabinet, based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) of the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale

**4.2.1.366 Parliamentary preference range: lower chamber, RILE (parl\_prefrange)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_parl\_prefrange

*Original tag:* parl\_prefrange

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

The distance between the left-most and right-most parties in parliament on the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale.

**4.2.1.367 Parliamentary preference range: lower chamber, RILE, logit scaled (parl\_prefrange\_logit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_parl\_prefrange\_logit

*Original tag:* parl\_prefrange\_logit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Same as parl\_prefrange, but using logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011).

**4.2.1.368 Parliamentary preference range: lower chamber, Prosser (2014) scale, logit scaled (parl\_prefrange\_logit\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_parl\_prefrange\_logit\_prosser

*Original tag:* parl\_prefrange\_logit\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Same as parl\_prefrange\_prosser, but using logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011).

**4.2.1.369 Parliamentary preference range: lower chamber, Prosser (2014) scale (parl\_prefrange\_prosser)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_parl\_prefrange\_prosser

*Original tag:* parl\_prefrange\_prosser

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

The distance between the left-most and right-most parties in parliament on the general-left right dimension in the Manifesto Project data based on the categories suggested by Prosser (2014)

#### **4.2.1.370 Personal union (personalunion)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_personalunion

*Original tag:* personalunion

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Personal union:

0: no

1: yes

#### **4.2.1.371 Exception to personal union: Party 1 (personalunion\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_personalunion\_party1

*Original tag:* personalunion\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.372 Exception to personal union: Party 2 (personalunion\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_personalunion\_party2

*Original tag:* personalunion\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.373 Exception to personal union: Party 3 (personalunion\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_personalunion\_party3

*Original tag:* personalunion\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.374 Exception to personal union: Party 4 (personalunion\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_personalunion\_party4

*Original tag:* personalunion\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.375 Exception to personal union: Party 5 (personalunion\_party5)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_personalunion\_party5*Original tag:* personalunion\_party5*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.376 Exception to personal union: Party 6 (personalunion\_party6)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_personalunion\_party6*Original tag:* personalunion\_party6*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.377 Exception to personal union: Party 7 (personalunion\_party7)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_personalunion\_party7*Original tag:* personalunion\_party7*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.378 Formal cabinet decision rule (pmpower\_formcab)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_formcab*Original tag:* pmpower\_formcab*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Formal cabinet decision rule:

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.379 Type of actual decision rule 1 (pmpower\_formcab\_rule1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_formcab\_rule1*Original tag:* pmpower\_formcab\_rule1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Type of actual decision rule 1:

1: unanimity

2: majority

3: consensus defined by PM (by way of summarizing cabinet debate)

4: consensus defined by head of state (by way of summarizing cabinet debate)

**4.2.1.380 Type of actual decision rule 2 (pmpower\_formcab\_rule2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_formcab\_rule2*Original tag:* pmpower\_formcab\_rule2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Type of actual decision rule 2:

- 1: unanimity
- 2: majority
- 3: consensus defined by PM (by way of summarizing cabinet debate)
- 4: consensus defined by head of state (by way of summarizing cabinet debate)

**4.2.1.381 Ministers' parliamentary accountability (pmpower\_minaccount)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_minaccount

*Original tag:* pmpower\_minaccount

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Ministers' parliamentary accountability:

- 0: direct
- 1: via PM only
- 2: via vote of no confidence against full cabinet only

**4.2.1.382 PM right to appoint ministers (pmpower\_minappoint)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_minappoint

*Original tag:* pmpower\_minappoint

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

PM right to appoint ministers:

- 0: no
- 1: yes

**4.2.1.383 Type of actual appointment right (pmpower\_minappoint\_rule)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_minappoint\_rule

*Original tag:* pmpower\_minappoint\_rule

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Type of actual appointment right:

- 1: yes, PM alone
- 2: yes, through formal act carried out by head of state
- 3: no, head of state has discretionary powers
- 4: other

**4.2.1.384 PM right to dismiss ministers (pmpower\_mindismiss)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_mindismiss

*Original tag:* pmpower\_mindismiss

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

PM right to dismiss ministers:

- 0: no
- 1: yes

**4.2.1.385 Type of actual dismissal right (pmpower\_mindismiss\_rule)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_mindismiss\_rule

*Original tag:* pmpower\_mindismiss\_rule

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Type of actual dismissal right:

- 1: yes, PM alone
- 2: yes, through formal act carried out by head of state
- 3: no, head of state has discretionary powers
- 4: other

**4.2.1.386 PM full control over agenda for cabinet meeting (pmpower\_pmagenda)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_pmagenda

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmagenda

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

PM full control over agenda for cabinet meeting:

- 0: no
- 1: yes

**4.2.1.387 PM formal right to determine jurisdiction of ministries (pmpower\_pmjurisdiction)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_pmjurisdiction

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmjurisdiction

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

PM formal right to determine jurisdiction of ministries:

- 0: no
- 1: yes

**4.2.1.388 Regular bureaucratic structure in PM's office designed to monitor departmental affairs (pmpower\_pmoffice)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_pmoffice

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmoffice

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Regular bureaucratic structure in PM's office designed to monitor departmental affairs:

- 0: no
- 1: yes

**4.2.1.389 Description of structure 1 (pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule1

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Description of structure 1:

- 1: personal staff (political appointees)
- 2: civil service staff
- 3: PM occupies specific (PM) portfolio
- 4: other

**4.2.1.390 Description of structure 2 (pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule2

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Description of structure 2:

- 1: personal staff (political appointees)
- 2: civil service staff
- 3: PM occupies specific (PM) portfolio
- 4: other

**4.2.1.391 Description of structure 3 (pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule3

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Description of structure 3:

- 1: personal staff (political appointees)
- 2: civil service staff
- 3: PM occupies specific (PM) portfolio
- 4: other

**4.2.1.392 Description of structure 4 (pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule4

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmoffice\_rule4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Description of structure 4:

- 1: personal staff (political appointees)
- 2: civil service staff
- 3: PM occupies specific (PM) portfolio
- 4: other

**4.2.1.393 PM steering or coordination rights vis-à-vis cabinet ministers (pmpower\_pmsteering)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pmpower\_pmsteering

*Original tag:* pmpower\_pmsteering

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

PM steering or coordination rights vis-à-vis cabinet ministers:

- 0: no
- 1: yes

**4.2.1.394 Party 1 holding portfolio 10 (portfolio10\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio10\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio1\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.395 Party 1 holding portfolio 11 (portfolio11\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio11\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio10\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.396 Party 2 holding portfolio 11 (portfolio11\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio11\_party2*Original tag:* portfolio11\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.397 Party 1 holding portfolio 12 (portfolio12\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio12\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio11\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.398 Party 2 holding portfolio 12 (portfolio12\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio12\_party2*Original tag:* portfolio12\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.399 Party 1 holding portfolio 13 (portfolio13\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio13\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio12\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.400 Party 2 holding portfolio 13 (portfolio13\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio13\_party2*Original tag:* portfolio13\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.401 Party 1 holding portfolio 14 (portfolio14\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio14\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio13\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.402 Party 2 holding portfolio 14 (portfolio14\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio14\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio14\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.403 Party 1 holding portfolio 15 (portfolio15\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio15\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio14\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.404 Party 2 holding portfolio 15 (portfolio15\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio15\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio15\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.405 Party 3 holding portfolio 15 (portfolio15\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio15\_party3

*Original tag:* portfolio15\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.406 Party 1 holding portfolio 16 (portfolio16\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio16\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio15\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.407 Party 2 holding portfolio 16 (portfolio16\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio16\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio16\_party1



*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.408 Party 1 holding portfolio 17 (portfolio17\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio17\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio16\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.409 Party 2 holding portfolio 17 (portfolio17\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio17\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio17\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.410 Party 3 holding portfolio 17 (portfolio17\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio17\_party3

*Original tag:* portfolio17\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.411 Party 1 holding portfolio 18 (portfolio18\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio18\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio17\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.412 Party 1 holding portfolio 19 (portfolio19\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio19\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio18\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.413 Party 2 holding portfolio 19 (portfolio19\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio19\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio19\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.414 Party 1 holding portfolio 1 (portfolio1\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio1\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio19\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.415 Party 1 holding portfolio 20 (portfolio20\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio20\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio2\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.416 Party 2 holding portfolio 20 (portfolio20\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio20\_party2*Original tag:* portfolio2\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.417 Party 1 holding portfolio 21 (portfolio21\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio21\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio20\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.418 Party 2 holding portfolio 21 (portfolio21\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio21\_party2*Original tag:* portfolio20\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.419 Party 1 holding portfolio 22 (portfolio22\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio22\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio21\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.420 Party 2 holding portfolio 22 (portfolio22\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio22\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio21\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.421 Party 1 holding portfolio 23 (portfolio23\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio23\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio22\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.422 Party 2 holding portfolio 23 (portfolio23\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio23\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio22\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.423 Party 1 holding portfolio 24 (portfolio24\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio24\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio23\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.424 Party 2 holding portfolio 24 (portfolio24\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio24\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio23\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.425 Party 1 holding portfolio 25 (portfolio25\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio25\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio24\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.426 Party 2 holding portfolio 25 (portfolio25\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio25\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio24\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.427 Party 3 holding portfolio 25 (portfolio25\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio25\_party3

*Original tag:* portfolio25\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.428 Party 1 holding portfolio 26 (portfolio26\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio26\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio25\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.429 Party 2 holding portfolio 26 (portfolio26\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio26\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio25\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.430 Party 3 holding portfolio 26 (portfolio26\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio26\_party3

*Original tag:* portfolio26\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.431 Party 1 holding portfolio 27 (portfolio27\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio27\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio26\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.432 Party 2 holding portfolio 27 (portfolio27\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio27\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio26\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.433 Party 1 holding portfolio 28 (portfolio28\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio28\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio27\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.434 Party 2 holding portfolio 28 (portfolio28\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio28\_party2*Original tag:* portfolio27\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.435 Party 3 holding portfolio 28 (portfolio28\_party3)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio28\_party3*Original tag:* portfolio28\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.436 Party 1 holding portfolio 29 (portfolio29\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio29\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio28\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.437 Party 2 holding portfolio 29 (portfolio29\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio29\_party2*Original tag:* portfolio28\_party3*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.438 Party 3 holding portfolio 29 (portfolio29\_party3)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio29\_party3*Original tag:* portfolio29\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.439 Party 1 holding portfolio 2 (portfolio2\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio2\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio29\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.440 Party 2 holding portfolio 2 (portfolio2\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio2\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio29\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.441 Party 1 holding portfolio 30 (portfolio30\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio30\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio3\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.442 Party 1 holding portfolio 31 (portfolio31\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio31\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio3\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.443 Party 2 holding portfolio 31 (portfolio31\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio31\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio30\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.444 Party 3 holding portfolio 31 (portfolio31\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio31\_party3

*Original tag:* portfolio31\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.445 Party 1 holding portfolio 32 (portfolio32\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio32\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio31\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.446 Party 2 holding portfolio 32 (portfolio32\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio32\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio31\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.447 Party 1 holding portfolio 33 (portfolio33\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio33\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio32\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.448 Party 2 holding portfolio 33 (portfolio33\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio33\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio32\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.449 Party 1 holding portfolio 34 (portfolio34\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio34\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio33\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.450 Party 2 holding portfolio 34 (portfolio34\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio34\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio33\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.451 Party 1 holding portfolio 35 (portfolio35\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio35\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio34\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.452 Party 2 holding portfolio 35 (portfolio35\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio35\_party2*Original tag:* portfolio34\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.453 Party 1 holding portfolio 36 (portfolio36\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio36\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio35\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.454 Party 2 holding portfolio 36 (portfolio36\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio36\_party2*Original tag:* portfolio35\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.455 Party 3 holding portfolio 36 (portfolio36\_party3)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio36\_party3*Original tag:* portfolio36\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.456 Party 1 holding portfolio 37 (portfolio37\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio37\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio36\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.457 Party 1 holding portfolio 38 (portfolio38\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio38\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio36\_party3*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID



**4.2.1.458 Party 2 holding portfolio 38 (portfolio38\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio38\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio37\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.459 Party 1 holding portfolio 39 (portfolio39\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio39\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio38\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.460 Party 1 holding portfolio 3 (portfolio3\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio3\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio38\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.461 Party 2 holding portfolio 3 (portfolio3\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio3\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio39\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.462 Party 1 holding portfolio 40 (portfolio40\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio40\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio4\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.463 Party 1 holding portfolio 41 (portfolio41\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio41\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio4\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.464 Party 1 holding portfolio 42 (portfolio42\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio42\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio40\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.465 Party 2 holding portfolio 42 (portfolio42\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio42\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio41\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.466 Party 1 holding portfolio 43 (portfolio43\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio43\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio42\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.467 Party 1 holding portfolio 44 (portfolio44\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio44\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio42\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.468 Party 1 holding portfolio 45 (portfolio45\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio45\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio43\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.469 Party 1 holding portfolio 46 (portfolio46\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio46\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio44\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.470 Party 1 holding portfolio 47 (portfolio47\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio47\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio45\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.471 Party 1 holding portfolio 48 (portfolio48\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio48\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio46\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.472 Party 1 holding portfolio 49 (portfolio49\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio49\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio47\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.473 Party 1 holding portfolio 4 (portfolio4\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio4\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio48\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.474 Party 2 holding portfolio 4 (portfolio4\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio4\_party2*Original tag:* portfolio49\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.475 Party 1 holding portfolio 50 (portfolio50\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio50\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio5\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.476 Party 1 holding portfolio 51 (portfolio51\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio51\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio5\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.477 Party 1 holding portfolio 52 (portfolio52\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio52\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio50\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.478 Party 1 holding portfolio 53 (portfolio53\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio53\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio51\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.479 Party 1 holding portfolio 54 (portfolio54\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio54\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio52\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.480 Party 1 holding portfolio 55 (portfolio55\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio55\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio53\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.481 Party 1 holding portfolio 56 (portfolio56\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio56\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio54\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.482 Party 1 holding portfolio 57 (portfolio57\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio57\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio55\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.483 Party 1 holding portfolio 58 (portfolio58\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio58\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio56\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.484 Party 1 holding portfolio 59 (portfolio59\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio59\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio57\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.485 Party 1 holding portfolio 5 (portfolio5\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio5\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio58\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.486 Party 2 holding portfolio 5 (portfolio5\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio5\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio59\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.487 Party 1 holding portfolio 60 (portfolio60\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio60\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio6\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.488 Party 1 holding portfolio 6 (portfolio6\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio6\_party1

*Original tag:* portfolio6\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

#### **4.2.1.489 Party 2 holding portfolio 6 (portfolio6\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio6\_party2

*Original tag:* portfolio60\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.490 Party 1 holding portfolio 7 (portfolio7\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio7\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio7\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.491 Party 1 holding portfolio 8 (portfolio8\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio8\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio8\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.492 Party 2 holding portfolio 8 (portfolio8\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio8\_party2*Original tag:* portfolio8\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.493 Party 1 holding portfolio 9 (portfolio9\_party1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio9\_party1*Original tag:* portfolio9\_party1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.494 Party 2 holding portfolio 9 (portfolio9\_party2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_portfolio9\_party2*Original tag:* portfolio9\_party2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

REPDEM Party ID

**4.2.1.495 Post-electoral cabinet (post\_election\_cab)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_post\_election\_cab*Original tag:* post\_election\_cab*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Post-electoral cabinet

0: No  
1: Yes

#### 4.2.1.496 Presidential power to appoint PM (pres\_appoint\_pm)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_appoint\_pm

*Original tag:* pres\_appoint\_pm

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Presidential power to appoint PM:

0: No appointment power  
1: Free choice  
2: Constitution gives open room for interpretation  
3: Constitution gives clear instruction

#### 4.2.1.497 Restrictions on presidential power to appoint PM (pres\_appoint\_pm\_restr)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_appoint\_pm\_restr

*Original tag:* pres\_appoint\_pm\_restr

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Clarification on what constitutional restrictions apply if a president has limited appointment power.

#### 4.2.1.498 Comments on presidential powers (pres\_comment)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_comment

*Original tag:* pres\_comment

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Comments on presidential powers

#### 4.2.1.499 Presidential decree powers (pres\_decree)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_decree

*Original tag:* pres\_decree

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Presidential decree powers:

0: No decree power  
1: Decree power  
2: Decrees need to be countersigned by PM

#### 4.2.1.500 Presidential decree powers: explanation (pres\_decree\_expl)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_decree\_expl

*Original tag:* pres\_decree\_expl

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Provides further detail on any decree powers held by the president, if any.

**4.2.1.501 Presidential power to dismiss PM/cabinet at own initiative (pres\_dismiss)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_dismiss

*Original tag:* pres\_dismiss

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Presidential power to dismiss PM/cabinet at own initiative:

0: No dissolution at own initiative

1: Free choice (at own initiative)

2: In case of parliamentary (in)activity

**4.2.1.502 No codebook entry (pres\_dissolve\_parl)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_dissolve\_parl

*Original tag:* pres\_dissolve\_parl

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

No codebook entry

**4.2.1.503 Presidential right of initiative (legislation) (pres\_init)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_init

*Original tag:* pres\_init

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Presidential right of initiative (legislation):

0: No (President cannot initiate legislation)

1: Yes (President can initiate legislation)

**4.2.1.504 Popularly elected president (pres\_pop)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_pop

*Original tag:* pres\_pop

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Popularly elected president:

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.505 Presidential power of referenda (pres\_refer)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_refer

*Original tag:* pres\_refer

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Presidential power of referenda. All relevant referenda powers are listed, separated by commas:

0: No right to initiate referenda

1: Right to initiate referenda

2: Right to initiate referenda in assent with parliament/government

3: Right to initiate referenda on initiative of the people

4: Right to initiate referenda on special issues



**4.2.1.506 Presidential power of referenda: first right (pres\_refer\_rule1)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_refer\_rule1*Original tag:* pres\_refer\_rule1*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Presidential power of referenda, first right:

0: No right to initiate referenda

1: Right to initiate referenda

2: Right to initiate referenda in assent with parliament/government

3: Right to initiate referenda on initiative of the people

4: Right to initiate referenda on special issues

**4.2.1.507 Presidential power of referenda: first right (pres\_refer\_rule2)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_refer\_rule2*Original tag:* pres\_refer\_rule2*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Presidential power of referenda, second right

0: No right to initiate referenda

1: Right to initiate referenda

2: Right to initiate referenda in assent with parliament/government

3: Right to initiate referenda on initiative of the people

4: Right to initiate referenda on special issues

**4.2.1.508 Presidential power of referenda: first right (pres\_refer\_rule3)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_refer\_rule3*Original tag:* pres\_refer\_rule3*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Presidential power of referenda, third right:

0: No right to initiate referenda

1: Right to initiate referenda

2: Right to initiate referenda in assent with parliament/government

3: Right to initiate referenda on initiative of the people

4: Right to initiate referenda on special issues

**4.2.1.509 Presidential power to select the PM (pres\_select\_pm)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_select\_pm*Original tag:* pres\_select\_pm*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Presidential power to select the PM:

0: No power or only formal powers

1: Selecting power

**4.2.1.510 Presidential veto powers (pres\_veto)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_veto*Original tag:* pres\_veto

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Presidential veto powers:

0: No veto power

1: Veto can be overruled by supermajority

2: Veto can be overruled by majority of the new parliament after new elections

3: Veto can be overruled by absolute majority

4: Veto can be overruled by simple majority

5: Veto of president leads to a referendum

#### **4.2.1.511 Presidential veto powers: explanation (pres\_veto\_expl)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_pres\_veto\_expl

*Original tag:* pres\_veto\_expl

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Provides further detail on any veto powers held by the president, if any.

#### **4.2.1.512 Proximity to election: lower chamber (prox\_election)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_prox\_election

*Original tag:* prox\_election

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Proximity to election: lower chamber

1 (FE): Cabinets formed immediately following an election and ended by the next election.

2 (F): Cabinets formed immediately following an election.

3 (N): Cabinets neither formed immediately following an election nor ended by the next election.

4 (E): Cabinets ended by an election.

#### **4.2.1.513 Proximity to election: upper chamber (prox\_election\_upper)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_prox\_election\_upper

*Original tag:* prox\_election\_upper

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Proximity to election: upper chamber

1 (FE): Cabinets immediately following an election and ended by the next election.

2 (F): Cabinets immediately following an election.

3 (N): Cabinets neither immediately following an election nor ended by the next election.

4 (E): Cabinets ended by an election.

#### **4.2.1.514 Seat share of radical left/right parties: lower chamber (rad\_share)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_rad\_share

*Original tag:* rad\_share

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Includes parties that are coded as belonging to the socialist or other left parties (20) or nationalist and radical right parties (70) party families in the Manifesto Project data.

#### **4.2.1.515 Total number of seats: lower chamber (seats)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats

*Original tag:* seats

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Total number of seats (lower chamber)

#### **4.2.1.516 Party seats lower chamber: Party 1 (seats\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party1

*Original tag:* seats\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 1

#### **4.2.1.517 Party seats lower chamber: Party 10 (seats\_party10)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party10

*Original tag:* seats\_party10

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 10

#### **4.2.1.518 Party seats lower chamber: Party 11 (seats\_party11)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party11

*Original tag:* seats\_party11

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 11

#### **4.2.1.519 Party seats lower chamber: Party 12 (seats\_party12)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party12

*Original tag:* seats\_party12

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 12

#### **4.2.1.520 Party seats lower chamber: Party 13 (seats\_party13)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party13

*Original tag:* seats\_party13

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 13

#### **4.2.1.521 Party seats lower chamber: Party 14 (seats\_party14)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party14

*Original tag:* seats\_party14

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 14

#### **4.2.1.522 Party seats lower chamber: Party 15 (seats\_party15)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party15

*Original tag:* seats\_party15

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 15

#### **4.2.1.523 Party seats lower chamber: Party 16 (seats\_party16)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party16

*Original tag:* seats\_party16

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 16

#### **4.2.1.524 Party seats lower chamber: Party 17 (seats\_party17)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party17

*Original tag:* seats\_party17

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 17

#### **4.2.1.525 Party seats lower chamber: Party 18 (seats\_party18)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party18

*Original tag:* seats\_party18

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 18

#### **4.2.1.526 Party seats lower chamber: Party 19 (seats\_party19)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party19

*Original tag:* seats\_party19

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 19

#### **4.2.1.527 Party seats lower chamber: Party 2 (seats\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party2

*Original tag:* seats\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 2

**4.2.1.528 Party seats lower chamber: Party 20 (seats\_party20)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party20

*Original tag:* seats\_party20

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 20

**4.2.1.529 Party seats lower chamber: Party 21 (seats\_party21)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party21

*Original tag:* seats\_party21

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 21

**4.2.1.530 Party seats lower chamber: Party 22 (seats\_party22)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party22

*Original tag:* seats\_party22

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 22

**4.2.1.531 Party seats lower chamber: Party 23 (seats\_party23)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party23

*Original tag:* seats\_party23

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 23

**4.2.1.532 Party seats lower chamber: Party 24 (seats\_party24)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party24

*Original tag:* seats\_party24

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 24

**4.2.1.533 Party seats lower chamber: Party 25 (seats\_party25)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party25

*Original tag:* seats\_party25

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 25

**4.2.1.534 Party seats lower chamber: Party 26 (seats\_party26)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party26

*Original tag:* seats\_party26

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 26

**4.2.1.535 Party seats lower chamber: Party 27 (seats\_party27)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party27

*Original tag:* seats\_party27

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 27

**4.2.1.536 Party seats lower chamber: Party 28 (seats\_party28)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party28

*Original tag:* seats\_party28

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 28

**4.2.1.537 Party seats lower chamber: Party 29 (seats\_party29)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party29

*Original tag:* seats\_party29

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 29

**4.2.1.538 Party seats lower chamber: Party 3 (seats\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party3

*Original tag:* seats\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 3

**4.2.1.539 Party seats lower chamber: Party 30 (seats\_party30)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party30

*Original tag:* seats\_party30

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 30

**4.2.1.540 Party seats lower chamber: Party 31 (seats\_party31)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party31

*Original tag:* seats\_party31

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 31

#### **4.2.1.541 Party seats lower chamber: Party 32 (seats\_party32)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party32

*Original tag:* seats\_party32

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 32

#### **4.2.1.542 Party seats lower chamber: Party 33 (seats\_party33)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party33

*Original tag:* seats\_party33

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 33

#### **4.2.1.543 Party seats lower chamber: Party 34 (seats\_party34)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party34

*Original tag:* seats\_party34

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 34

#### **4.2.1.544 Party seats lower chamber: Party 35 (seats\_party35)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party35

*Original tag:* seats\_party35

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 35

#### **4.2.1.545 Party seats lower chamber: Party 36 (seats\_party36)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party36

*Original tag:* seats\_party36

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 36

#### **4.2.1.546 Party seats lower chamber: Party 37 (seats\_party37)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party37

*Original tag:* seats\_party37

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 37

**4.2.1.547 Party seats lower chamber: Party 38 (seats\_party38)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party38

*Original tag:* seats\_party38

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 38

**4.2.1.548 Party seats lower chamber: Party 39 (seats\_party39)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party39

*Original tag:* seats\_party39

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 39

**4.2.1.549 Party seats lower chamber: Party 4 (seats\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party4

*Original tag:* seats\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 4

**4.2.1.550 Party seats lower chamber: Party 40 (seats\_party40)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party40

*Original tag:* seats\_party40

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 40

**4.2.1.551 Party seats lower chamber: Party 41 (seats\_party41)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party41

*Original tag:* seats\_party41

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 41

**4.2.1.552 Party seats lower chamber: Party 42 (seats\_party42)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party42

*Original tag:* seats\_party42

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 42



**4.2.1.553 Party seats lower chamber: Party 43 (seats\_party43)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party43

*Original tag:* seats\_party43

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 43

**4.2.1.554 Party seats lower chamber: Party 45 (seats\_party45)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party45

*Original tag:* seats\_party45

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 45

**4.2.1.555 Party seats lower chamber: Party 48 (seats\_party48)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party48

*Original tag:* seats\_party48

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 48

**4.2.1.556 Party seats lower chamber: Party 49 (seats\_party49)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party49

*Original tag:* seats\_party49

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 49

**4.2.1.557 Party seats lower chamber: Party 5 (seats\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party5

*Original tag:* seats\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 5

**4.2.1.558 Party seats lower chamber: Party 50 (seats\_party50)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party50

*Original tag:* seats\_party50

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 50

**4.2.1.559 Party seats lower chamber: Party 51 (seats\_party51)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party51

*Original tag:* seats\_party51

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 51

#### **4.2.1.560 Party seats lower chamber: Party 52 (seats\_party52)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party52

*Original tag:* seats\_party52

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 52

#### **4.2.1.561 Party seats lower chamber: Party 53 (seats\_party53)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party53

*Original tag:* seats\_party53

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 53

#### **4.2.1.562 Party seats lower chamber: Party 54 (seats\_party54)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party54

*Original tag:* seats\_party54

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 54

#### **4.2.1.563 Party seats lower chamber: Party 56 (seats\_party56)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party56

*Original tag:* seats\_party56

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 56

#### **4.2.1.564 Party seats lower chamber: Party 57 (seats\_party57)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party57

*Original tag:* seats\_party57

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 57

#### **4.2.1.565 Party seats lower chamber: Party 58 (seats\_party58)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party58

*Original tag:* seats\_party58

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 58

**4.2.1.566 Party seats lower chamber: Party 59 (seats\_party59)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party59

*Original tag:* seats\_party59

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 59

**4.2.1.567 Party seats lower chamber: Party 6 (seats\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party6

*Original tag:* seats\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 6

**4.2.1.568 Party seats lower chamber: Party 60 (seats\_party60)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party60

*Original tag:* seats\_party60

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 60

**4.2.1.569 Party seats lower chamber: Party 61 (seats\_party61)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party61

*Original tag:* seats\_party61

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 61

**4.2.1.570 Party seats lower chamber: Party 65 (seats\_party65)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party65

*Original tag:* seats\_party65

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 65

**4.2.1.571 Party seats lower chamber: Party 7 (seats\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party7

*Original tag:* seats\_party7

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 7

**4.2.1.572 Party seats lower chamber: Party 8 (seats\_party8)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party8*Original tag:* seats\_party8*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 8

**4.2.1.573 Party seats lower chamber: Party 9 (seats\_party9)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party9*Original tag:* seats\_party9*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 9

**4.2.1.574 Party seats lower chamber: Party 98 (others) (seats\_party98)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party98*Original tag:* seats\_party98*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 98 (others)

**4.2.1.575 Party seats lower chamber: Party 99 (others) (seats\_party99)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_seats\_party99*Original tag:* seats\_party99*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Number of seats (lower chamber): Party 99 (others)

**4.2.1.576 Seat share of socialist and green parties: lower chamber (soc\_green\_share)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_soc\_green\_share*Original tag:* soc\_green\_share*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Includes parties that are coded as belonging to the ecologist parties (10), socialist or other left parties (20), or social democratic parties (30) party families in the Manifesto Project data.

**4.2.1.577 Seat share of socialist parties: lower chamber (soc\_share)***Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_soc\_share*Original tag:* soc\_share*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)*Description:*

Includes parties that are coded as belonging to the socialist or other left parties (20) or social democratic parties (30) party families in the Manifesto Project data.

**4.2.1.578 Support parties (support\_parties)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_support\_parties

*Original tag:* support\_parties

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

See party codebooks. Only includes formal support parties, i.e., those that have a formal written agreement with the government guaranteeing, at minimum, support in issues of confidence and supply

**4.2.1.579 Support party 1 (support\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_support\_party1

*Original tag:* support\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Support party 1

**4.2.1.580 Support party 2 (support\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_support\_party2

*Original tag:* support\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Support party 2

**4.2.1.581 Support party 3 (support\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_support\_party3

*Original tag:* support\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Support party 3

**4.2.1.582 Support party 4 (support\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_support\_party4

*Original tag:* support\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Support party 4

**4.2.1.583 Support party 5 (support\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_support\_party5

*Original tag:* support\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Support party 5

**4.2.1.584 Support party 6 (support\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_support\_party6

*Original tag:* support\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Support party 6

#### **4.2.1.585 Support party 7 (support\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_support\_party7

*Original tag:* support\_party7

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Support party 7

#### **4.2.1.586 Support party 8 (support\_party8)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_support\_party8

*Original tag:* support\_party8

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Support party 8

#### **4.2.1.587 Technocrat ministry majority (techno\_maj)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_techno\_maj

*Original tag:* techno\_maj

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Technocrat ministry majority

0: No

1: Yes

#### **4.2.1.588 Technocrat PM (techno\_pm)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_techno\_pm

*Original tag:* techno\_pm

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Technocrat PM

0: No

1: Yes

#### **4.2.1.589 Broad policy remit (techno\_remit)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_techno\_remit

*Original tag:* techno\_remit

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Broad policy remit

0: No

1: Yes

A cabinet without a broad policy remit is considered a caretaker cabinet.

#### 4.2.1.590 Description of dominant policy area (term\_descr)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_descr

*Original tag:* term\_descr

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

#### 4.2.1.591 Discretionary termination (term\_disc)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_disc

*Original tag:* term\_disc

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Discretionary termination:

0: No

1: Yes

#### 4.2.1.592 Cabinet defeat in parliament (term\_disc\_cabdefeat)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_disc\_cabdefeat

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_cabdefeat

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Cabinet defeat in parliament:

0: no

1: yes

#### 4.2.1.593 Conflict between coalition parties: Parties involved (term\_disc\_conflict\_parties)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_disc\_conflict\_parties

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_conflict\_parties

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks

#### 4.2.1.594 Conflict between coalition parties (personnel) (term\_disc\_conflict\_pers)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_disc\_conflict\_pers

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_conflict\_pers

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Conflict between coalition parties (personnel):

0: no

1: yes

#### 4.2.1.595 Conflict between coalition parties (policy) (term\_disc\_conflict\_pol)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_disc\_conflict\_pol

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_conflict\_pol

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Conflict between coalition parties (policy):

0: no

1: yes

#### **4.2.1.596 Early parliamentary election (term\_disc\_earlyelec)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_disc\_earlyelec

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_earlyelec

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Early parliamentary election:

0: no

1: yes

#### **4.2.1.597 Voluntary enlargement of coalition (term\_disc\_enlarge)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_disc\_enlarge

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_enlarge

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Voluntary enlargement of coalition:

0: no

1: yes

#### **4.2.1.598 Intra party conflict (term\_disc\_intra)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_disc\_intra

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_intra

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Intra party conflict:

0: no

1: yes

#### **4.2.1.599 Intra party conflict: Type of conflict (term\_disc\_intra\_conflict)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_disc\_intra\_conflict

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_intra\_conflict

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Intra party conflict, Type of conflict:

L – Conflict in national party leadership (national executive committee, cabinet, parliamentary party leadership) (NB: This is conflict contained in the leadership.)

NL – Conflict between united national party leadership (national executive committee, cabinet, parliamentary party leadership) and non-leaders (party activists, party congress delegates, backbench MPs, regional leaders, etc.)

LNL – Conflict in national party leadership (national executive committee, cabinet,



parliamentary party leadership) including grass-roots mobilization (i.e. conflict is not confined to the top level)

#### 4.2.1.600 Intra party conflict: Party involved (term\_disc\_intra\_party)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_disc\_intra\_party

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_intra\_party

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks

#### 4.2.1.601 Other voluntary reason (term\_disc\_voluntary)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_disc\_voluntary

*Original tag:* term\_disc\_voluntary

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Other voluntary reason:

0: no

1: yes

#### 4.2.1.602 Economic event (term\_event\_econ)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_event\_econ

*Original tag:* term\_event\_econ

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Economic event:

0: no

1: yes

#### 4.2.1.603 International or national security event (term\_event\_intnat)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_event\_intnat

*Original tag:* term\_event\_intnat

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

International or national security event:

0: no

1: yes

#### 4.2.1.604 Non-parliamentary elections (term\_event\_nonparlelec)

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_event\_nonparlelec

*Original tag:* term\_event\_nonparlelec

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Non-parliamentary elections:

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.605 Personal event (term\_event\_pers)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_event\_pers

*Original tag:* term\_event\_pers

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Personal event:

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.606 Popular opinion shock (term\_event\_popshock)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_event\_popshock

*Original tag:* term\_event\_popshock

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Popular opinion shock:

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.607 Ministry involved (term\_ministry)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_ministry

*Original tag:* term\_ministry

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

States which ministry that were involved in termination.

**4.2.1.608 Other constitutional reason (term\_tech\_const)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_tech\_const

*Original tag:* term\_tech\_const

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Other constitutional reason:

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.609 Death of PM (term\_tech\_death)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_tech\_death

*Original tag:* term\_tech\_death

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Death of PM:

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.610 Regular parliamentary election (term\_tech\_regelec)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_term\_tech\_regelec

*Original tag:* term\_tech\_regelec

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Regular parliamentary election:

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.611 Party of the median legislator: first policy dimension, upper chamber (upper\_dim\_first\_median)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_dim\_first\_median

*Original tag:* upper\_dim\_first\_median

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks. Excluding legislators subsumed under ‘others’.

**4.2.1.612 Party of the median legislator: second policy dimension, upper chamber (upper\_dim\_second\_median)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_dim\_second\_median

*Original tag:* upper\_dim\_second\_median

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Party-IDs, see party codebooks. Excluding legislators subsumed under ‘others’.

**4.2.1.613 Effective number of parliamentary parties: upper chamber (upper\_enpp)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_enpp

*Original tag:* upper\_enpp

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Effective number of parliamentary parties in upper chamber. All legislators subsumed under ‘others’ treated as one single party (minimum fragmentation).

**4.2.1.614 Cabinet majority (50percent + 1) seat: upper chamber (upper\_majority)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_majority

*Original tag:* upper\_majority

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Cabinet majority (50percent + 1 seat) in upper chamber

0: no

1: yes

**4.2.1.615 Party seats upper chamber: Party 1 (upper\_seats\_party1)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party1

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party1

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 1

**4.2.1.616 Party seats upper chamber: Party 10 (upper\_seats\_party10)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party10

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party10

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 10

**4.2.1.617 Party seats upper chamber: Party 11 (upper\_seats\_party11)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party11

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party11

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 11

**4.2.1.618 Party seats upper chamber: Party 12 (upper\_seats\_party12)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party12

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party12

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 12

**4.2.1.619 Party seats upper chamber: Party 13 (upper\_seats\_party13)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party13

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party13

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 13

**4.2.1.620 Party seats upper chamber: Party 14 (upper\_seats\_party14)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party14

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party14

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 14

**4.2.1.621 Party seats upper chamber: Party 15 (upper\_seats\_party15)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party15

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party15

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 15

**4.2.1.622 Party seats upper chamber: Party 16 (upper\_seats\_party16)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party16

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party16

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 16

#### **4.2.1.623 Party seats upper chamber: Party 17 (upper\_seats\_party17)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party17

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party17

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 17

#### **4.2.1.624 Party seats upper chamber: Party 18 (upper\_seats\_party18)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party18

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party18

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 18

#### **4.2.1.625 Party seats upper chamber: Party 19 (upper\_seats\_party19)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party19

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party19

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 19

#### **4.2.1.626 Party seats upper chamber: Party 2 (upper\_seats\_party2)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party2

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party2

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 2

#### **4.2.1.627 Party seats upper chamber: Party 20 (upper\_seats\_party20)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party20

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party20

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 20

#### **4.2.1.628 Party seats upper chamber: Party 21 (upper\_seats\_party21)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party21

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party21

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 21

**4.2.1.629 Party seats upper chamber: Party 22 (upper\_seats\_party22)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party22

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party22

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 22

**4.2.1.630 Party seats upper chamber: Party 23 (upper\_seats\_party23)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party23

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party23

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 23

**4.2.1.631 Party seats upper chamber: Party 24 (upper\_seats\_party24)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party24

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party24

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 24

**4.2.1.632 Party seats upper chamber: Party 25 (upper\_seats\_party25)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party25

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party25

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 25

**4.2.1.633 Party seats upper chamber: Party 26 (upper\_seats\_party26)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party26

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party26

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 26

**4.2.1.634 Party seats upper chamber: Party 27 (upper\_seats\_party27)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party27

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party27

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 27

**4.2.1.635 Party seats upper chamber: Party 29 (upper\_seats\_party29)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party29

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party29

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 29

**4.2.1.636 Party seats upper chamber: Party 3 (upper\_seats\_party3)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party3

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party3

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 3

**4.2.1.637 Party seats upper chamber: Party 30 (upper\_seats\_party30)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party30

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party30

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 30

**4.2.1.638 Party seats upper chamber: Party 31 (upper\_seats\_party31)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party31

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party31

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 31

**4.2.1.639 Party seats upper chamber: Party 32 (upper\_seats\_party32)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party32

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party32

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 32

**4.2.1.640 Party seats upper chamber: Party 33 (upper\_seats\_party33)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party33

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party33

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 33

**4.2.1.641 Party seats upper chamber: Party 34 (upper\_seats\_party34)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party34

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party34

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 34

#### **4.2.1.642 Party seats upper chamber: Party 35 (upper\_seats\_party35)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party35

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party35

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 35

#### **4.2.1.643 Party seats upper chamber: Party 36 (upper\_seats\_party36)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party36

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party36

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 36

#### **4.2.1.644 Party seats upper chamber: Party 37 (upper\_seats\_party37)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party37

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party37

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 37

#### **4.2.1.645 Party seats upper chamber: Party 38 (upper\_seats\_party38)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party38

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party38

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 38

#### **4.2.1.646 Party seats upper chamber: Party 39 (upper\_seats\_party39)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party39

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party39

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 39

#### **4.2.1.647 Party seats upper chamber: Party 4 (upper\_seats\_party4)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party4

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party4

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)



*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 4

**4.2.1.648 Party seats upper chamber: Party 40 (upper\_seats\_party40)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party40

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party40

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 40

**4.2.1.649 Party seats upper chamber: Party 41 (upper\_seats\_party41)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party41

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party41

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 41

**4.2.1.650 Party seats upper chamber: Party 44 (upper\_seats\_party44)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party44

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party44

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 44

**4.2.1.651 Party seats upper chamber: Party 45 (upper\_seats\_party45)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party45

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party45

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 45

**4.2.1.652 Party seats upper chamber: Party 46 (upper\_seats\_party46)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party46

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party46

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 46

**4.2.1.653 Party seats upper chamber: Party 47 (upper\_seats\_party47)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party47

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party47

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 47

**4.2.1.654 Party seats upper chamber: Party 48 (upper\_seats\_party48)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party48

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party48

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 48

**4.2.1.655 Party seats upper chamber: Party 49 (upper\_seats\_party49)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party49

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party49

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 49

**4.2.1.656 Party seats upper chamber: Party 5 (upper\_seats\_party5)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party5

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party5

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 5

**4.2.1.657 Party seats upper chamber: Party 50 (upper\_seats\_party50)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party50

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party50

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 50

**4.2.1.658 Party seats upper chamber: Party 54 (upper\_seats\_party54)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party54

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party54

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 54

**4.2.1.659 Party seats upper chamber: Party 55 (upper\_seats\_party55)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party55

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party55

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 55

**4.2.1.660 Party seats upper chamber: Party 56 (upper\_seats\_party56)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party56

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party56

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 56

#### **4.2.1.661 Party seats upper chamber: Party 57 (upper\_seats\_party57)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party57

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party57

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 57

#### **4.2.1.662 Party seats upper chamber: Party 58 (upper\_seats\_party58)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party58

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party58

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 58

#### **4.2.1.663 Party seats upper chamber: Party 59 (upper\_seats\_party59)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party59

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party59

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 59

#### **4.2.1.664 Party seats upper chamber: Party 6 (upper\_seats\_party6)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party6

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party6

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 6

#### **4.2.1.665 Party seats upper chamber: Party 60 (upper\_seats\_party60)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party60

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party60

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 60

#### **4.2.1.666 Party seats upper chamber: Party 7 (upper\_seats\_party7)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party7

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party7

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 7

**4.2.1.667 Party seats upper chamber: Party 8 (upper\_seats\_party8)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party8

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party8

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 8

**4.2.1.668 Party seats upper chamber: Party 9 (upper\_seats\_party9)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party9

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party9

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 9

**4.2.1.669 Party seats upper chamber: Party 98 (others) (upper\_seats\_party98)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party98

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party98

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 98 (others)

**4.2.1.670 Party seats upper chamber: Party 99 (others) (upper\_seats\_party99)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_party99

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_party99

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Number of seats (upper chamber): Party 99 (others)

**4.2.1.671 Total number of seats: upper chamber (upper\_seats\_total)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_upper\_seats\_total

*Original tag:* upper\_seats\_total

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Total number of seats (upper chamber)

**4.2.1.672 Year of cabinet formation (year\_in)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_year\_in

*Original tag:* year\_in

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Year of cabinet formation

**4.2.1.673 Year/month of cabinet formation (year\_\_month\_\_in)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_year\_\_month\_\_in

*Original tag:* year\_\_month\_\_in

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Year/month of cabinet formation

**4.2.1.674 Year/month of cabinet termination (year\_\_month\_\_out)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_year\_\_month\_\_out

*Original tag:* year\_\_month\_\_out

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Year/month of cabinet termination

**4.2.1.675 Year out (year\_\_out)**

*Long tag:* repdem\_wecee\_year\_\_out

*Original tag:* year\_\_out

*Dataset citation:* Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

*Description:*

Year of cabinet termination

## 5 V-DEM

Based at the University of Gothenburg, the **Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)** Research Project takes a comprehensive approach to understanding democratization. This approach encompasses multiple core principles: electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensual, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. Each Principle is represented by a separate index, and each is regarded as a separate outcome in the proposed study. In this manner V-Dem reconceptualizes democracy from a single outcome to a set of outcomes. In addition, V-Dem breaks down each core principle into its constituent components, each to be measured separately. Components include features such as free and fair elections, civil liberties, judicial independence, executive constraints, gender equality, media freedom, and civil society. Finally, each component is disaggregated into specific indicators. This fundamentally different approach to democratization is made possible by the V-Dem Database, which measures 450+ indicators annually from 1789 to the present for all countries of the world. The V-Dem approach stands out, first, as a large global collaboration among scholars with diverse areas of expertise; second, as the first project attempting to explain different varieties of democracy; and third, thanks to the highly disaggregated V-Dem data, the first project to explore causal mechanisms linking different aspects of democracy together. With five Principal Investigators, 19 Project Managers with special responsibility for issue areas covered in the V-Dem dataset, around 23 Regional Managers, 134 Country Coordinators and more than 4000 Country Experts, the V-Dem project is one of the world's largest social science data collection projects on democracy. More information is available on the project's website: <https://www.v-dem.net/>

### 5.1 V-Dem Country-Year: V-Dem Full+Others v14

**Dataset tag:** `vdem_cy`

**Output Unit:** V-Dem Country-Year, i.e., data is collected per country and year.

**Description:** All 500 V-Dem indicators and 245 indices + 57 other indicators from other data sources. For R users, we recommend to install our `vdemdata` R package which includes the most recent V-Dem dataset and some useful functions to explore the data.

**Dataset citation:** Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Fabio Angiolillo, Michael Bernhard, Cecilia Borella, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Linnea Fox, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Ana Good God, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Katrin Kinzelbach, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Anja Neundorff, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Oskar Rydén, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2024. "V-Dem Codebook v14" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

**Link to original codebook**

[https://v-dem.net/documents/38/v-dem\\_codebook\\_v14.pdf](https://v-dem.net/documents/38/v-dem_codebook_v14.pdf)

**License:** CC-BY-SA 4.0 International

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode>

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page: <https://www.v-dem.net/vdemds.html>

#### 5.1.1 Identifier Variables in the V-Dem Datasets

Variables in this section identify the observations in the dataset.

##### 5.1.1.1 Gap index (`gap_index`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_cy_gap_index`

*Original tag:* `gap_index`

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 27555, Percent: 100

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 15657 Percent: 56.82

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

CLARIFICATION: Indication that party was not present in national legislature.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 11-14.

### 5.1.2 V-Dem Democracy Indices - V-Dem Mid-Level Indices: Components of the Democracy Indices

This section includes the V-Dem mid-level indices, subcomponents of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 5.1.2.1 Freedom of association index (thick) (v2x\_frassoc\_thick)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_frassoc\_thick

*Original tag:* v2x\_frassoc\_thick

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2x\_elecreg

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26882, Percent: 97.56

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 14984 Percent: 55.74

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken, Michael Bernhard, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2x\_elecreg

DATA RELEASE: 1-14. Release 1-3 used a different aggregation formula for the thinner index v2x\_frassoc.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x\_elecreg.

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.2.2 Civil society participation index (v2x\_cspart)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_cspart

*Original tag:* v2x\_cspart

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2csptrcpt v2csgender

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26928, Percent: 97.72

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 15030 Percent: 55.82

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Bernhard

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymakers; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?

CLARIFICATION: The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations CSOs. CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations if they are engaged in civic or political activities, social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.

The core civil society index CCSI is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2csptrcpt v2csgender

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for candidate selection — national/local (v2pscnslnl), CSO consultation (v2cscnsult), CSO participatory environment (v2csptrcpt), and CSO women participation (v2csgender).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

### 5.1.3 V-Dem Indicators - Elections

**Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys) Elections:** Among national elections we distinguish elections to: (i) the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature (including constituent or constitutional assemblies), (ii) the upper chamber of the legislature, and (iii) the presidency. For present purposes an executive who is elected by a legislature is considered a *prime minister*, not a president. In order to be considered a *president*, an executive must, under ordinary circumstances, be chosen directly by the electorate (perhaps mediated by an electoral college).

**Non-election specific coding:** The following questions are not election-specific and should be coded for every year from 1900 (or when applicable) to the present.

**Election specific questions:** The following questions pertain to specific national elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date. If you have coded for V-Dem in the past, your previous scores will be displayed in the survey. You are welcome to revise



previously submitted scores in all surveys. For this section, we kindly ask you make sure that you have coded all election years.

**Election specific questions – Historical clarification:** The following questions pertain to specific national elections. National elections include elections to the presidency (if applicable) and legislature (lower and upper house, whatever applies), whether direct or indirect, as well as constituent assembly elections. It does not include other elections, *e.g.*, subnational elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referendums, or by-elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date."

**Subnational elections and offices:** This section of the survey asks a small number of questions about *subnational* elections and offices. You will be instructed to identify two subnational levels, referred to as "regional government" and "local government". Questions in this section should be answered for every year, rather than for specific elections.

**Lower chamber election:** The following questions pertain to specific lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections. The dates of these elections have been pre-coded.

#### Executive and legislative versions of Election specific variables

- In order to subset election specific variables for executive elections only (previously \*\_ex) – keep only those observations where v2xel\_elecpres is 1.
- In order to subset election specific variables for legislative elections only (previously \*\_leg) – keep only those observations where v2xel\_elecparl is 1.

#### 5.1.3.1 Election type (v2eltype)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2eltype

*Original tag:* v2eltype

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Hyde & Marinov (2012b), Marshall & Jagers (2020), (IPU)

NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IFES; IDEA; Reif (2011, 2012); Polity IV (Marshall, Jagers 2007); *Keesings Records*; *CIA Factbook*; Wikipedia.

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4939, Percent: 17.92

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11564, Percent: 97.19

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: What type of election was held on this date?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply. Whenever possible, specify the exact date of each election. If the election unfolds across more than one day, enter the date for the first day. If the precise date is unavailable, enter the first of the month; if the month is unknown, enter January 1. Multiple-round elections (*e.g.*, two-round elections) are counted separately. (More than one election in a single year can be accommodated.)

RESPONSES:

0: Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_0]

1: Legislative, lower, sole, or both chambers, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_1]

2: Legislative, upper chamber only, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_2] (Not yet coded)

3: Legislative, upper chamber only, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_3] (Not yet coded)

4: Constituent Assembly, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_4]

5: Constituent Assembly, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_5]

6: Presidential, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_6]

7: Presidential, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_7]

8: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_8] (Not yet coded)

9: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_9] (Not yet coded)

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple selection.

SOURCE(S): NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IPU Parline; IFES Election Guide; IDEA; Reif (2011, 2012); Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers 2007); *Keesings Records*; *CIA Factbook*.

NOTES: All direct elections and elections by an electoral college that is elected by the people and has the sole purpose of electing an executive or members of parliament are coded. Note that single-party elections, elections held under limited suffrage and for only parts of a parliament, as well as elections of which the results are subsequently cancelled are included. Elections for constituent assemblies that come to perform functions beyond drafting and adopting a new constitution (*e.g.* legislating, electing president, adopting budget, etc) are also included and coded under category 0 and 1 (Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers; first or second round). Direct elections for prime minister (*e.g.* Israel in 1996-2001) are coded under category 6. Excluded are elections that are not decisive, i.e. when the HOS alone is selecting the candidate(s). The variable includes elections where results were declared invalid after the fact, *e.g.* by a constitutional court, since they also provide information on the quality of democracy.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.3.2 Public campaign finance (v2elpubfin)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elpubfin

*Original tag:* v2elpubfin

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26554, Percent: 96.37

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 14656 Percent: 55.19

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is significant public financing available for parties' and/or candidates' campaigns for national office?

RESPONSES:

0: No. Public financing is not available.

1: Little. There is public financing but it is so small or so restricted that it plays a minor role in most parties' campaigns.

2: Ambiguous. There is some public financing available but it is unclear whether it plays a significant role for parties.

3: Partly. Public financing plays a significant role in the campaigns of many parties.

4: Yes. Public financing funds a significant share of expenditures by all, or nearly all parties.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.3.3 Elections multiparty (v2elmulpar)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elmulpar

*Original tag:* v2elmulpar

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 15499, Percent: 56.25

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11691, Percent: 98.26

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3808 Percent: 24.57

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Was this national election multiparty?

RESPONSES:

0: No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few parties are legal but they are all *de facto* controlled by the dominant party).

1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency.

2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained — legally or informally.

3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (*de jure* or *de facto*) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory.

4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (*e.g.* far-right/left extremist parties, anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.3.4 Election vote buying (v2elvotbuy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elvotbuy

*Original tag:* v2elvotbuy

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 15497, Percent: 56.24

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11691, Percent: 98.26

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3806 Percent: 24.56

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?

CLARIFICATION: Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, *i.e.* "porkbarrel" legislation.

## RESPONSES:

0: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties.

2: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an ‘entry-ticket’ expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded.

3: Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.

4: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series 2024:21*); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

**5.1.3.5 Election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elirreg

*Original tag:* v2elirreg

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 15495, Percent: 56.23

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11691, Percent: 98.26

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3804 Percent: 24.55

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud?

CLARIFICATION: Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions).

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country.

2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups.

3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups’ access to participation.

4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.3.6 Election government intimidation (v2elintim)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elintim

*Original tag:* v2elintim

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 15489, Percent: 56.21

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11682, Percent: 98.18

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3807 Percent: 24.58

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents?

CLARIFICATION: Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should *not* be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately).

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet.

1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period.

2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated — harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents.

3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups.

4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 5.1.3.7 Election other electoral violence (v2elpeace)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elpeace

*Original tag:* v2elpeace

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 15504, Percent: 56.27

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11691, Percent: 98.26

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3813 Percent: 24.59

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types not by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)?

RESPONSES:

0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees.

1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily.

2: Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small.

3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured.

4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 5.1.3.8 Election boycotts (v2elboycot)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elboycot

*Original tag:* v2elboycot

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 15399, Percent: 55.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11691, Percent: 98.26

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3708 Percent: 24.08

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, did any registered opposition candidates or parties boycott?

CLARIFICATION: A boycott is a deliberate and public refusal to participate in an election by a candidate or party who is eligible to participate.

RESPONSES:

0: Total. All opposition parties and candidates boycotted the election.

1: Significant. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but they constituted a major opposition force.

2: Ambiguous. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but it is unclear whether they would have constituted a major electoral force.

3: Minor. A few opposition parties or candidates boycotted and they were relatively

insignificant ones.

4: Nonexistent. No parties or candidates boycotted the elections.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 5.1.3.9 Election free campaign media (v2elfrcamp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elfrcamp

*Original tag:* v2elfrcamp

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 12587, Percent: 45.68

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11684, Percent: 98.2

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 903 Percent: 7.17

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, did parties or candidates receive either free or publicly financed access to national broadcast media?

RESPONSES:

0: Either no parties or only the governing party receives free access.

1: Some parties in addition to the governing party receive free access.

2: All parties receive free access.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

#### 5.1.3.10 Election paid campaign advertisements (v2elpdcamp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elpdcamp

*Original tag:* v2elpdcamp

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 12595, Percent: 45.71

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11684, Percent: 98.2

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 911 Percent: 7.23

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, were parties or candidates able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor the government and its allies.

2: It is permitted without limit.

3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster fair competition.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 5.1.3.11 Election domestic election monitors (v2eldommon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2eldommon

*Original tag:* v2eldommon

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3695, Percent: 13.41

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11027, Percent: 92.68

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: In this national election, were election monitors from all parties and independent domestic election monitors allowed to monitor the vote at polling stations across the country?

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

SCALE: Dichotomous.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

#### 5.1.3.12 Election losers accept results (v2elaccept)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elaccept

*Original tag:* v2elaccept

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 15449, Percent: 56.07

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11691, Percent: 98.26

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3758 Percent: 24.33

*Description:*



VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this national election within three months?

RESPONSES:

0: None. None of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results the election, or all opposition was banned.

1: A few. Some but not all losing parties or candidates accepted the results but those who constituted the main opposition force did not.

2: Some. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results but it is unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively insignificant.

3: Most. Many but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results and those who did not had little electoral support.

4: All. All parties and candidates accepted the results.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 5.1.3.13 Election assume office (v2elasmoff)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elasmoff

*Original tag:* v2elasmoff

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 15496, Percent: 56.24

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11691, Percent: 98.26

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3805 Percent: 24.55

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Following this national election, did winners assume office according to prescribed constitutional rules and norms?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The official winner of the election was prevented from assuming office by *unconstitutional* means.

1: Partially. The official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter was forced at least in part by unconstitutional means to share power, or delay assuming power for more than 6 months.

2: Yes. Constitutional rules and norms were followed and the official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter assumed office accordingly (or continued in office).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: The question text between contemporary and historical differ in inclusion of "within 12 months of the election". In contemporary it is excluded while included in historical.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 5.1.3.14 Name of largest party (v2lpname)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lpname

*Original tag:* v2lpname

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3460, Percent: 12.56

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11128, Percent: 93.53

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the name of the largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Based on seat share. Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; IFES Election Guide; Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019); websites of National Election Commissions.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2023

#### 5.1.3.15 Name of second largest party (v2slpname)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2slpname

*Original tag:* v2slpname

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 2965, Percent: 10.76

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 10660, Percent: 89.59

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the name of the second largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Based on seat share. Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; IFES Election Guide; Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019); websites of National Election Commissions.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2023

### 5.1.3.16 Name of third largest party (v2tlpname)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2tlpname

*Original tag:* v2tlpname

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 2271, Percent: 8.24

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9428, Percent: 79.24

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the name of the third largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Based on seat share. Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; IFES Election Guide; Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019); websites of National Election Commissions.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1791-2023

### 5.1.3.17 Election HOG turnover ordinal (v2elturnhog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elturnhog

*Original tag:* v2elturnhog

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Henisz (2000, 2002b), Lentz (1994, 1999), (IPU), Cahoon (n.d.), [www.worldstatesmen.org](http://www.worldstatesmen.org), Election Guide, IDEA, V-Dem Country Coordinators

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3840, Percent: 13.94

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11373, Percent: 95.59

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Was there turnover in the office of the head of government (HOG) as a result of this national election?

CLARIFICATION: Turnover can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party. If the HOS and HOG are the same person, the coding is the same for the two variables. The second round of election is coded as the first.

RESPONSES:

0: No. The head of government- retained his/her position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the HOG.

1: Half. The head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party that was in power before the election, or a new independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership.

2: Yes. The executive(s) - head of state and head of government- lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party than before the election or an independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. This code also applies if this is the first head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; IFES Election Guide; IDEA; IPU Parline; V-Dem Country Coordinators.

DATA RELEASE: 3-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

### 5.1.3.18 Elections HOS turnover ordinal (v2elturnhos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elturnhos

*Original tag:* v2elturnhos

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Henisz (2000, 2002b), Lentz (1994, 1999), (IPU), Cahoon (n.d.), [www.worldstatesmen.org](http://www.worldstatesmen.org), Election Guide, IDEA V-Dem Country Coordinators

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3846, Percent: 13.96

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11378, Percent: 95.63

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Was there turnover in the office of the head of state (HOS) as a result of this national election?

CLARIFICATION: Turnover can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party.

RESPONSES:

0: No. The head of state retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the HOS.

1: Half. The head of state is a different individual than before the election but from the same party that was in power before the election, or a new independent candidate is elected.

2: Yes. The head of state lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party than before the election or an independent candidate is elected. This code also applies if this is the first head of state elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; IFES Election Guide; IDEA; IPU Parline; V-Dem Country Coordinators.

DATA RELEASE: 3-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

### 5.1.3.19 Election executive turnover ordinal (v2eltvrexo)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2eltvrexo

*Original tag:* v2eltvrexo

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Henisz (2000, 2002b), Lentz (1994, 1999), (IPU), Cahoon (n.d.), [www.worldstatesmen.org](http://www.worldstatesmen.org), Election Guide, IDEA, V-Dem Country Coordinators

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3427, Percent: 12.44

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 10168, Percent: 85.46

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Was there turnover in the executive office as a result of this national election?

CLARIFICATION: Turnover in the executive can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party. This question considers whether turnover occurs both in the office of head of state and head of government, even if one of the positions is not contested in the particular elections.

RESPONSES:

0: No. The executive(s) — head of state and head of government — retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the executive.

1: Half. The head of state or head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party (or independent) that was in power before the election. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership, or a new independent head of government. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when the elections result in co-habitation after a period when one party (or independent) has held both offices, or if one of the executive office holders — the head of state or head of government changes, while the other retains their position.

2: Yes. The executive(s) — head of state and head of government — lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party (or independent) than before the election. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when one party holds both the office of the head of state and head of government after a period of co-habitation, or if the holders of both offices change in terms of person and party (or independent) in the same election. This code also applies if this is the first head of state and/or head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); [worldstatesmen.org](http://worldstatesmen.org); IFES Election Guide; IDEA; IPU Parline; V-Dem Country Coordinators.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

### 5.1.3.20 Lower chamber electoral system (v2elloelsy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elloelsy

*Original tag:* v2elloelsy

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen (2005), Nohlen et al. (2002), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (?), Colomer & Grofman (2016), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), IDEA

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3045, Percent: 11.05

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9641, Percent: 81.03

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

QUESTION: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Mixed majoritarian systems were coded as a two-round system. Regarding multi-member districts we coded list PR with large multi-member districts when the mean district size = 7. Constituent Assembly elections are excluded from the coding, since they often use specifically designed electoral systems. Further information on the following electoral system types can be found in Reynolds/Reilly, *The New International IDEA Handbook* (2005), chapter two and Annex B (Glossary of Terms) — downloadable, free of charge, at [www.idea.int/publications/esd/](http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/).

RESPONSES:

0: First-past-the-post (FPP, aka plurality) in single-member constituencies. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat.

1: Two-round system in single-member constituencies. Like FPP except that a threshold — usually 50percent + 1 — is required to avoid a runoff between the two top vote-getters.

2: Alternative vote in single-member districts. Voters rank-order their preferences for the candidates who compete for a single seat. If any candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, s/he is elected.

If not, then the least successful candidates (based on first-preferences) are eliminated and their votes reallocated to the second-preferences. This process is repeated until a candidate reaches 50percent +1 of the votes.

3: Block vote in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are seats within that district and can rank-order them (within or across parties) as they please.

4: Party block vote in multi-member districts. Voters cast a vote for a single party (but not for individual candidates within the party's list). The party with the most votes (*i.e.*, a plurality) wins all the seats in that district.

5: Parallel (SMD/PR). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are independent.

6: Mixed-member proportional (SMD with PR compensatory seats). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are not independent. Specifically, the multimember seats are used to rectify disproportionalities achieved in the single-member district election — by adding seats, as necessary.

This means that the representation of parties in the legislature is determined entirely by the PR ballot. It also means that the result of an MMP election is similar to the result of a PR election: parties achieve representation according to their nationwide vote share (on the PR ballot).

7: List PR with small multi-member districts (mean district size  $\leq 7$ ). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is less than seven.

8: List PR with large multi-member districts (mean district size gt; 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is greater than seven.

9: Single-transferable vote (STV) in multi-member districts. Electors rank-order candidates nominated for a district. Candidates that surpass a specified quota of first-preference votes are elected. The remaining seats are chosen by reallocating the votes of the least successful candidates to elector's second- (or third-) preferences until the specified quota is reached. This process is repeated until all seats for that district are filled.

10: Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts. Each elector chooses a single candidate. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

11: Limited vote in multi-member districts.

Electors have more than one vote but fewer votes than the number of seats in the district. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

12: Borda Count in single- or multi-member districts. Electors use numbers to mark preferences among candidates and each preference is assigned a value. For example, in a ten-candidate field a first preference is worth one, a second preference is worth .9, and so forth. These are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are elected.

SOURCE(S): IPU Parline; IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Colomer (2016).

DATA RELEASE: 7-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 5.1.3.21 Lower chamber election seats (v2elloseat)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elloseat

*Original tag:* v2elloseat

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3363, Percent: 12.2

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 10783, Percent: 90.63

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats were there in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; IFES Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2023

**5.1.3.22 Lower chamber election seats won by largest party (v2ellostlg)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellostlg

*Original tag:* v2ellostlg

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3162, Percent: 11.48

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 10742, Percent: 90.28

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; IFES Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2023

**5.1.3.23 Lower chamber election seat share won by largest party (v2ellostsl)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellostsl

*Original tag:* v2ellostsl

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3164, Percent: 11.48

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 10744, Percent: 90.3

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: In this election, what percentage (percent) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; IFES Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.



COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2023

#### 5.1.3.24 Lower chamber election seats won by second largest party (v2ellostsm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellostsm

*Original tag:* v2ellostsm

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 2941, Percent: 10.67

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 10494, Percent: 88.2

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; IFES Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2023

#### 5.1.3.25 Lower chamber election seat share won by second largest party (v2ellostss)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellostss

*Original tag:* v2ellostss

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 2940, Percent: 10.67

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 10494, Percent: 88.2

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election, what percentage (percent) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even

pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; IFES Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2023

### 5.1.3.26 Lower chamber election seats won by third largest party (v2ellosttm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellosttm

*Original tag:* v2ellosttm

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Election Guide

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 1773, Percent: 6.43

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7174, Percent: 60.3

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; IFES Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1791-2023

### 5.1.3.27 Lower chamber election seat share won by third largest party (v2ellostts)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellostts

*Original tag:* v2ellostts

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen (2005), Nohlen *et al.* (2002), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (?), (IPU), Election Guide

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 1767, Percent: 6.41

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7176, Percent: 60.31

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, what percentage (percent) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; IFES; IFES Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1791-2023

### 5.1.3.28 Lower chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (v2ellovtlg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellovtlg

*Original tag:* v2ellovtlg

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 2719, Percent: 9.87

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9815, Percent: 82.49

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; IFES Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2023

### 5.1.3.29 Lower chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (v2ellovtsm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellovtsm

*Original tag:* v2ellovtsm

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 2491, Percent: 9.04

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9618, Percent: 80.84

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.* , no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; IFES Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2023

### 5.1.3.30 Lower chamber election vote share of third-largest vote-getter (v2ellovttm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellovttm

*Original tag:* v2ellovttm

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen (2005), Nohlen *et al.* (2002), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (?), (IPU), Election Guide

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 1693, Percent: 6.14

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7675, Percent: 64.51

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the third largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.* , no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; IFES Election Guide.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1795-2023

### 5.1.3.31 Lower chamber election statutory threshold (v2elthresh)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elthresh

*Original tag:* v2elthresh

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky,

Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3164, Percent: 11.48

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 10791, Percent: 90.7

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: For this election, what was the statutory threshold (percent share of votes) that a party needed to obtain in order to gain representation in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: If there is no statutory threshold, enter 0. (Some thresholds are applied at regional levels. Nonetheless, they are usually consistent across regions.) Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1816-2023

### 5.1.3.32 Lower chamber election turnover (v2eltvrig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2eltvrig

*Original tag:* v2eltvrig

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* V-Dem country coordinators, Nohlen (2005), Nohlen et al. (2002), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (?), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide, IDEA

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3316, Percent: 12.03

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11067, Percent: 93.02

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Did control of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The majority party or ruling coalition includes the same or substantially the same parties, even if some minor parties (holding less than 10 percent of the seats in the legislature) left or joined the coalition, or because the elections do not affect the lower chamber.

1: Half. A minority party or coalition who was not in control of the chamber before the elections assumed the leading position in the legislature but is dependent on other parties for support. Or, a post-election ruling coalition includes some old parties and some new parties and the new parties represent more than 10 percent of the seats in the legislature.

2: Yes. The incumbent party or coalition lost its majority or plurality-dominant position in the legislature and a different party or coalition assumes the majority position.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem country coordinators; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; IFES Election Guide; IDEA.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-2023

### 5.1.3.33 Subnational election area less free and fair characteristics (v2elsnlfc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elsnlfc

*Original tag:* v2elsnlfc

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 14909, Percent: 54.11

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9596, Percent: 80.65

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5313 Percent: 35.64

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *less* free and fair?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_0]

1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_1]

2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_2]

3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_3]

4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_4]

5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_5]

6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_6]

7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_7]

8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_8]

9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_9]

10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_10]

11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_11]

12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_12]

13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_13]

14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_14]

15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_15]

16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_16]

17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_17]

18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_18]

19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_19]

20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_20]

21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_21]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

### 5.1.3.34 Subnational election area more free and fair characteristics (v2elsnmrfc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elsnmrfc

*Original tag:* v2elsnmrfc

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 14884, Percent: 54.02

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9611, Percent: 80.78

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5273 Percent: 35.43

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *more* free and fair?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_0]

1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_1]

2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_2]

3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_3]

4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_4]

5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_5]

6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_6]

7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_7]

8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_8]

9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_9]

10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_10]

11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_11]

12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_12]

13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_13]

14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_14]

15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_15]

16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_16]

17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_17]

18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_18]

19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_19]

20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_20]

21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_21]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

### 5.1.3.35 Lower chamber hybrid system reserved seats (v2elloreseat)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elloreseat

*Original tag:* v2elloreseat

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election, how many reserved seats were there, either in the ‘base’ or in the ‘upper’ tier?

CLARIFICATION: This variable refers to hybrid (or split) electoral systems where electoral rules differ geographically. In such systems, we treat the reserved seats as a second tier, compute an `eff_M` for them separately and take the weighted average (where the weight is the proportion of `S` allocated in each tier). Leave this question blank if the election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed. We only consider seats that are filled by popular elections and are reserved for minorities with regards to ethnicity, religion, or social group. We do not consider seats filled by appointment, or quotas (e.g. gender quotas). We do not consider non-elected or non-voting seats.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): IPU Parline; IDEA; IFES Election Guide; Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

DATA RELEASE: 14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (`v2eltype_0`, `v2eltype_1`)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

### 5.1.3.36 Lower chamber upper tier electoral districts (`v2elloupdis`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_cy_v2elloupdis`

*Original tag:* `v2elloupdis`

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election, how many electoral districts were there in the ‘upper’ tier?

CLARIFICATION: In an electoral system with one tier, `v2elloupdis=0`. In proportional systems with more than one tier, the ‘upper’ tier is the tier with fewer seats. In mixed systems, the ‘upper’ tier is the PR (proportional representation) part of the system. In hybrid systems where electoral rules differ geographically, `v2ellouptield=0`. Does not include appointed (nonelected) and reserved seats. Leave this question blank if the election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed. If there are more than two tiers, include these extra upper tiers into this category.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): IPU Parline; IDEA; IFES Election Guide; Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

DATA RELEASE: 14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (`v2eltype_0`, `v2eltype_1`)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023



**5.1.3.37 Lower chamber base tier electoral districts (v2ellobadis)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellobadis

*Original tag:* v2ellobadis

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election, how many electoral districts were there in the ‘base’ (or ‘nominal’) tier?

CLARIFICATION: In electoral systems with one tier, the ‘base’ tier includes all elected seats. In proportional systems with more than one tier, the ‘base’ tier is the tier with most seats. In mixed systems, the ‘base’ tier is the SMD (single-member district) part of the system. In hybrid systems where electoral rules differ geographically, the ‘base’ tier includes all elected seats. Does not include appointed (nonelected) and reserved seats. Leave this question blank if the election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed. Does not include appointed (nonelected) and reserved seats. Leave this question blank if the election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): IPU Parline; IDEA; IFES Election Guide; Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

DATA RELEASE: 14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

**5.1.3.38 Lower chamber base or nominal tier seats (v2ellobaseat)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2ellobaseat

*Original tag:* v2ellobaseat

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats were there in the ‘base’ (or ‘nominal’) tier?

CLARIFICATION: In electoral systems with one tier, the ‘base’ tier includes all elected seats. In proportional systems with more than one tier, the ‘base’ tier is the tier with most seats. In mixed systems, the ‘base’ tier is the SMD (single-member district) part of the system. In hybrid systems where electoral rules differ geographically, the ‘base’ tier includes all elected seats. Does not include appointed (nonelected) and reserved seats. Leave this question blank if the election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

Numeric.

SCALE: Interval.

SOURCE(S): IPU Parline; IDEA; IFES Election Guide; Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002, 2005,

2010).  
DATA RELEASE: 14.  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum  
DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)  
CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 5.1.4 V-Dem Indicators - Political Parties

##### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

###### **Political parties:**

A "political party" refers to an organization that nominates candidates for public office. A party may refer to a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party. Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party/coalition changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituency then it should be considered the same organization. Our notion of a party includes loose factional groupings such as the Tories and Whigs in the 19th-century Britain or the Caps and Hats in 18th-century Sweden. Unless stated otherwise the following questions pertain to parties that compete for seats in the national legislature or for the presidency.

Most of the questions in the following section ask you to generalize across parties in a particular country (and at a particular point in time). We realize that practices vary from party to party; these are, after all, highly diverse organizations. However, for our purposes it is important to consider what the most common practices are.

In answering these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them. And if there is no clarification of the issue, assume that the question is referring to practices rather than formal rules.

##### 5.1.4.1 Barriers to parties (v2psbars)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psbars

*Original tag:* v2psbars

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26885, Percent: 97.57

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 14987 Percent: 55.74

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?

CLARIFICATION: Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits, as well as harassment.

RESPONSES:

0: Parties are not allowed.

1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally).

2: There are significant obstacles (*e.g.* party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities).

3: There are modest barriers (*e.g.* party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities).

4: There are no substantial barriers.

ORDERING: If your answer is 1-4, proceed to the next question [v2psoppaut]. If your answer is 0, skip to the question about Party organization [v2psorgs].

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 5.1.4.2 Party Ban (v2psparban)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psparban

*Original tag:* v2psparban

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26823, Percent: 97.34

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 14925 Percent: 55.64

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are any parties banned?

CLARIFICATION: This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet registration requirements or support thresholds.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned.

1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties.

2: Yes. Many parties are banned.

3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned.

4: No. No parties are officially banned.

ORDERING: If your answer is 4, skip the next question [v2psbantar].

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 5.1.4.3 Opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psoppaut

*Original tag:* v2psoppaut

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 22917, Percent: 83.17

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11878, Percent: 99.83

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11039 Percent: 48.17

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?

CLARIFICATION: An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government, *i.e.*, that has no control over the executive.

RESPONSES:

0: Opposition parties are not allowed.

1: There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co-opted by the ruling regime.

2: At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

3: Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

4: All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 5.1.4.4 Party organizations (v2psorgs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psorgs

*Original tag:* v2psorgs

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26275, Percent: 95.35

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 14377 Percent: 54.72

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?

CLARIFICATION: A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season.

RESPONSES:

0: No parties.

1: Fewer than half of the parties.

2: About half of the parties.

3: More than half of the parties.

4: All parties.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 5.1.4.5 Party Branches (v2psprbrch)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psprbrch

*Original tag:* v2psprbrch

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26346, Percent: 95.61

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 14448 Percent: 54.84

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How many parties have permanent local party branches?

RESPONSES:

0: None.

1: Fewer than half.

2: About half.

3: More than half.

4: All.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 5.1.4.6 Party linkages (v2psprlnks)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psprlnks

*Original tag:* v2psprlnks

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 25215, Percent: 91.51

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 13317 Percent: 52.81

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their constituents?

CLARIFICATION: A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of "good" that the party offers in exchange for political support and participation in party activities.

RESPONSES:

0: Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs.

1: Mixed clientelistic and local collective.

2: Local collective. Constituents are rewarded with local collective goods, *e.g.*, wells, toilets, markets, roads, bridges, and local development.

3: Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic.

4: Policy/programmatic. Constituents respond to a party's positions on national policies, general party programs, and visions for society.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

*V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 5.1.4.7 Distinct party platforms (v2psplats)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psplats

*Original tag:* v2psplats

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 25610, Percent: 92.94

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 13712 Percent: 53.54

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How many political parties with representation in the national legislature or presidency have publicly available party platforms (manifestos) that are publicized and relatively distinct from one another?

CLARIFICATION: In order to be counted in the affirmative, parties must have platforms that are both distinct (either in terms of content or generalized ideology) and publicly disseminated.

This question is *not* intended to measure how much the public actually knows about these platforms or whether they are important in structuring policymaking.

RESPONSES:

0: None, or nearly none.

1: Fewer than half.

2: About half.

3: More than half.

4: All, or nearly all.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 5.1.4.8 Candidate selection–National/local (v2pscnslnl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pscnslnl

*Original tag:* v2pscnslnl

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 24934, Percent: 90.49

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 13036 Percent: 52.28

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How centralized is legislative candidate selection within the parties?

CLARIFICATION: The power to select candidates for national legislative elections is often divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organizations, and national party leaders. One level usually dominates the selection process, while sometimes candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organization.

RESPONSES:

0: National legislative candidates are selected exclusively by national party leaders.

1: National legislative candidate selection is dominated by national party leaders but with some limited influence from local or state level organizations.

2: National legislative candidates are chosen through bargaining across different levels of party organization.

3: National legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level organizations, perhaps with some input from local party organizations or constituency groups.

4: National legislative candidates are chosen by a small cadre of local or municipal level actors.

5: National legislative candidates are chosen by constituency groups or direct primaries.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 5.1.4.9 Legislative party cohesion (v2pscohesv)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pscohesv

*Original tag:* v2pscohesv

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 24482, Percent: 88.85

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11894, Percent: 99.97

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 12588 Percent: 51.42

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their party on important bills?

RESPONSES:

0: Not really. Many members are elected as independents and party discipline is very weak.

1: More often than not. Members are more likely to vote with their parties than against them, but defections are common.

2: Mostly. Members vote with their parties most of the time.

3: Yes, absolutely. Members vote with their parties almost all the time.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

**5.1.4.10 Party competition across regions (v2pscomprg)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pscomprg

*Original tag:* v2pscomprg

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 24464, Percent: 88.78

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 12566 Percent: 51.37

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following best describes the nature of electoral support for major parties (those gaining over 10 percent of the vote)?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

0: Most major parties are competitive in only one or two regions of the country, *i.e.*, their support is heavily concentrated in a few areas.

1: Most major parties are competitive in some regions of the country, but not in others.

2: Most major parties are competitive in most regions of the country.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

**5.1.4.11 National party control (v2psnatpar)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psnatpar

*Original tag:* v2psnatpar

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 19101, Percent: 69.32

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11888, Percent: 99.92

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7213 Percent: 37.76

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How unified is party control of the national government?

CLARIFICATION: With respect to the executive, consider only those offices that have effective power over policymaking. (If there is a monarch or president with very little policymaking power, this office should not be considered.) With respect to bicameral legislatures, consider only the chamber, or chambers, that have effective policymaking power. (If the upper chamber is inactive or clearly subordinate, consider only the lower chamber.) Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.



## RESPONSES:

0: Unified coalition control. A single multi-party coalition controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single coalition gathers together a majority of seats.).

1: Divided party control. (A) Different parties or individuals (unconnected to parties) control the executive and the legislature or (B) Executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each of which belongs to different parties; or between a non-partisan monarch and a prime minister.

2: Unified party control. A single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single party has a majority of seats.).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

**5.1.4.12 Subnational party control (v2pssunpar)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pssunpar

*Original tag:* v2pssunpar

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 24559, Percent: 89.13

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 12661 Percent: 51.55

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does a single party control important policymaking bodies across subnational units (regional and local governments)?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

0: In almost all subnational units (at least 90percent), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

1: In most subnational units (66percent-90percent), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

2: In few subnational units (less than 66percent), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

**5.1.4.13 Party ban target (v2psbantar)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psbantar

*Original tag:* v2psbantar

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 21986, Percent: 79.79

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9986, Percent: 83.93

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 12000 Percent: 54.58

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: If any parties are banned, what label best describes these parties?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Ethnic party. [v2psbantar\_0]

1: Religious party. [v2psbantar\_1]

2: Regional/local party. [v2psbantar\_2]

3: Leftist extremist party. [v2psbantar\_3]

4: Rightist extremist party. [v2psbantar\_4]

5: Other. [v2psbantar\_5]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

NOTES: The answer categories for contemporary and historical differ in the inclusion of the word "extremist". In contemporary it is included while excluded in the historical answer categories.

DATA RELEASE: 3-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.5 V-Dem Indicators - The Executive

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **Executive:**

In this section, we distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG). The *head of state* is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. Sometimes this is a largely ceremonial role, *e.g.* a monarch who reigns but does not rule, or a president whose powers are strictly circumscribed. The *head of government* is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government, typically presiding over a cabinet. In a parliamentary system, this is usually the prime minister. In a presidential system, this is usually the president, who then serves as both, head of state and head of government. In a typical semi-presidential system, the president serves as head of state and the prime minister serves as head of government.

These definitions are grounded in the *functions* that each office performs, as described above. Titles can be confusing. Do not assume, for example, that simply because an individual holds the title of "president" s/he is serving as the chief public representative of the country. Likewise, it may be that the *effective* head of state/head of government is someone other than the *official* head of state/head of government. In this instance, the following questions apply to the person who effectively wields this power. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of state was a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country was the chairman of the communist party. It is the latter who is the "effective" head of state, and hence should be the focus of your answers. The same applies if the head of state/head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else. It is the latter person who is the effective head of state/head of government.

If you are considering a semi sovereign territory, such as a colony, an annexed territory or a member

of the British Commonwealth, please answer the following questions with respect to the head of state and (if separate) the head of government who is located in the territory in question. Thus, in a typical British colony the governor-general—not the King/Queen of England—would be understood as the head of state. Likewise, in a British colony the local prime minister in the colony—not the prime minister in London—would be understood as the head of government.

In order to mitigate potential misunderstandings, the identities of the head of state and head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, "HOS name." This is your key to what we mean by "head of state" or "head of government."

Note also that when the two functions are fused in the same office, we ask you to code only the head of state section of the survey. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the precoded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your V-Dem contact. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question.

In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days.

#### 5.1.5.1 HOS appointment in practice (v2expathhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2expathhs

*Original tag:* v2expathhs

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* (IPU), V-Dem country coordinators, [www.constituteproject.org](http://www.constituteproject.org)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 27110, Percent: 98.39

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11897, Percent: 99.99

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 15213 Percent: 56.12

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: How did the head of state reach office?

CLARIFICATION: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 7 should only be selected if the head of state is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election. We count as direct elections (category 7) also those indirect elections carried out by an electoral college, whose only purpose is to elect the president. In cases where an elected president dies, resigns, or is legally removed from office, and a line of succession is defined by the constitution, we code a vice president ascending to the presidency according to how they assumed the vice presidency. *E.g.*, coded under category 7 when elected on the same ticket as the outgoing president, or 6 if they were appointed by the legislature.

RESPONSES:

0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.

1: Appointed by a foreign power.

2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).

3: Appointed by a royal council.

4: Through hereditary succession.

5: Appointed by the military.

6: Appointed by the legislature.

7: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).

8: Other.

ORDERING: If you select 0 or 8, proceed to the next question [v2exothhs]. If you select 1-5, skip to question "HOS selection by legislature in practice [v2exaphos]";. If you selected 6-7, skip to question [v2excomhs].

SCALE: Nominal (v2expathhs), or a series of dichotomous scales.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem country coordinators; Constitute Project; IPU Parline.

NOTES: Converted from B to A coding. v2expathhs is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of State. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOS was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.5.2 HOS control over (v2exctlhs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exctlhs

*Original tag:* v2exctlhs

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 27176, Percent: 98.62

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 15278 Percent: 56.22

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, from which of the following bodies must the head of state customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply. In case the HOS does not have the power to make important decisions on domestic policy, select 0 (None).

RESPONSES:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_4]

5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_5]

6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_6]

7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_7]

ORDERING: If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhos]. If you select 0-6, skip to question "HOS dissolution in practice"; [v2exdfdshs].

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.5.3 HOS party (v2exparhos)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exparhos

*Original tag:* v2exparhos

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Düpont et al. (2021), Döring & Regel (2019), Cahoon (n.d.), [www.worldstatesmen.org](http://www.worldstatesmen.org)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 17909, Percent: 64.99

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11431, Percent: 96.07

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 6478 Percent: 36.17

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Nils Düpont

QUESTION: What is the name of the political party to which the head of state belongs?

CLARIFICATION: “Technical” refers to non-party leaders, such as members of the royal family, military leaders, foreign leaders, governors, or collective bodies. “Independent” refers to leaders without party affiliation in systems where the leader would normally be affiliated to a party. This does not include leaders in systems where a candidate who is running on a party platform is required to leave the party for the duration of their term. Appointed leaders are considered to be affiliated with the party or body that appointed them.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Leaders Global (Düpont, Döring, and Bederke 2021), Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019); [worldstatesmen.org](http://worldstatesmen.org)

DATA RELEASE: 11-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

#### 5.1.5.4 HOG appointment in practice (v2expathhg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2expathhg

*Original tag:* v2expathhg

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* (IPU), V-Dem country coordinators, [www.constituteproject.org](http://www.constituteproject.org)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 13123, Percent: 47.62

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8045, Percent: 67.62

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5078 Percent: 38.7

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: How did the head of government gain access to office?

CLARIFICATION: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 8 should only be selected if the head of government is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election. If the same person or body is both head of state and head of government, they are only coded as head of state.

RESPONSES:

0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.

1: Appointed by a foreign power.

- 2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).
- 3: Appointed by a royal council.
- 4: Through hereditary succession.
- 5: Appointed by the military.
- 6: Appointed by the head of state.
- 7: Appointed by the legislature.
- 8: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).
- 9: Other.

ORDERING: If you select 0 or 9, proceed to the next question [v2exothhgl]. If you selected 1-6, skip to question "HOG selection by legislature in practice"; [v2exaphogp]. If you selected 7-8, skip to question [v2excomex].

SCALE: Nominal (v2expathhg), or a series of dichotomous scales.

SOURCE(S): V-Dem country coordinators; Constitute Project; IPU Parline.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. v2expathhg is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of Government. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOG was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 5.1.5.5 HOG control over (v2exctlhg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exctlhg

*Original tag:* v2exctlhg

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 12936, Percent: 46.95

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8058, Percent: 67.73

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4878 Percent: 37.71

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: In practice, from which of the following bodies does the head of government customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply. In case the HOG does not have the power to make important decisions on domestic policy, select 0 (None).

RESPONSES:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_4]

5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_5]

6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_6]

7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_7]

8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_8]

ORDERING: If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhog]. If you select 0-7, skip to question HOG dissolution in practice [v2exdjdshg].

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 5.1.5.6 HOG party (v2expothog)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2expothog

*Original tag:* v2expothog

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Düpont et al. (2021), Döring & Regel (2019), Bederke et al. (2021), Cahoon (n.d.), [www.worldstatesmen.org](http://www.worldstatesmen.org)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 8930, Percent: 32.41

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7850, Percent: 65.98

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1080 Percent: 12.09

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Nils Düpont

QUESTION: What is the name of the political party to which the head of government belongs?

CLARIFICATION: “Technical” refers to non-party leaders, such as members of the royal family, military leaders, foreign leaders, governors, or collective bodies. “Independent” refers to leaders without party affiliation in systems where the leader would normally be affiliated to a party. This does not include leaders in systems where a candidate who is running on a party platform is required to leave the party for the duration of their term. Appointed leaders are considered to be affiliated with the party or body that appointed them.

RESPONSES:

Text.

SOURCE(S): Leaders Global (Düpont, Döring, and Bederke 2021), Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke et al. 2021); [worldstatesmen.org](http://worldstatesmen.org)

DATA RELEASE: 11-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

#### 5.1.5.7 HOG removal by other in practice (v2exrmhgnp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2exrmhgnp

*Original tag:* v2exrmhgnp

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 12963, Percent: 47.04

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8058, Percent: 67.73

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4905 Percent: 37.84

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of government if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

CLARIFICATION: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_4]

5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_5]

6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_6]

7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_7]

8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_8]

ORDERING: If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exrmhgop]. If you select 0-7, skip to question HOG control [v2exctlhg].

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple selection

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.5.8 Regime interregnum (v2regint)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regint

*Original tag:* v2regint

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Encyclopedia Britannica, Wikipedia, various region- and country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 27503, Percent: 99.81

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11859, Percent: 99.67

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 15644 Percent: 56.88

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

QUESTION: Is there an identifiable political regime?

CLARIFICATION: This question is used to identify so-called interregnum periods, where no political regime is in control over the entity. Different types of political situations can lead to periods of time under which there is no identifiable political regime, one example being a civil war in which none of the parties have clear control over political bodies and processes in the country. However, the interregnum coding is employed conservatively, meaning that partial control over political bodies and processes in fairly large parts of the country (which is often the case also during civil wars) is sufficient for a 0 score.

Please note that the expert coded (C) questions on support and opposition groups in the regime survey are only coded when v2regint=1.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

SCALE: Dichotomous



SOURCE(S): Encyclopedia Britannica; Wikipedia; various region- and country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 5.1.5.9 Regime support groups (v2regsupgroups)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2regsupgroups

*Original tag:* v2regsupgroups

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26395, Percent: 95.79

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11840, Percent: 99.51

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 14555 Percent: 55.14

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which groups does the current political regime rely on in order to maintain power? (Check all that apply.)

CLARIFICATION: Consider which group(s) is supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power.

RESPONSES:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regsupgroups\_0]

1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regsupgroups\_1]

2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regsupgroups\_2]

3: Business elites. [v2regsupgroups\_3]

4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regsupgroups\_4]

5: The military. [v2regsupgroups\_5]

6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regsupgroups\_6]

7: A religious group(s). [v2regsupgroups\_7]

8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regsupgroups\_8]

9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regsupgroups\_9]

10: Urban middle classes. [v2regsupgroups\_10]

11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regsupgroups\_11]

12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regsupgroups\_12]

13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regsupgroups\_13]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple-selection.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

DEFAULT DATE: Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 5.1.6 V-Dem Indicators - The Legislature

##### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

### The Legislature:

The following questions pertain to the legislature, an assembly of deputies or representatives with powers to consider, pass, amend, or repeal laws. If there is no legislature in the country you are coding for some period of years, do not code any questions for those year. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory such as a colony please answer this question with respect to the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the Parliament in London). A popular election need not involve universal suffrage; indeed, suffrage may be highly restricted. A "direct election" can include seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election.

Frequently, it is important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues. Note that sometimes we ask different coders to code different aspects of a question. So, you might get a question about the *de facto* state of affairs, but another source might provide the answer to the *de jure* state of affairs.

#### 5.1.6.1 Legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgoppart

*Original tag:* v2lgoppart

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 17945, Percent: 65.12

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11499, Percent: 96.65

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 6446 Percent: 35.92

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?

RESPONSES:

0: No, not at all.

1: Occasionally.

2: Yes, for the most part.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 5.1.6.2 Lower chamber gender quota (v2lgqugen)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgqugen

*Original tag:* v2lgqugen

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Hughes et al. (2017), Quota Project (n.d.), International IDEA (2018a), Coding by project manager

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 18433, Percent: 66.9

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11743, Percent: 98.7

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 6690 Percent: 36.29

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: Is there a national-level gender quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: National-level quotas either reserve some seats for women in the legislature (as a whole or per district) or mandate through statutory law that all political parties must nominate a certain percentage of female candidates or candidates considered for nomination. A sanction for noncompliance imposes a penalty on a party that fails to meet the quota provisions. Examples of sanctions for noncompliance include rejection of the party list, loss of public campaign funds, or other financial penalties. Weak sanctions are those that parties may be able to ignore, such as a very weak financial penalty. Strong sanctions provide strong deterrents for noncompliance. An example of a strong sanction would be the rejection of a party's list. Countries with both candidate quotas and reserved seats are recorded at the stronger level. This variable records quotas from the date of implementation. The quota adoption date may be earlier, sometimes by several years. Data on quota adoption is available from the QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017) while the theoretical implications of adoption vs. implementation are discussed in Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018).

RESPONSES:

0: No national level gender quota.

1: Yes, a statutory gender quota for all parties without sanctions for noncompliance.

2: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with weak sanctions for noncompliance.

3: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with strong sanctions for noncompliance.

4: Yes, there are reserved seats in the legislature for women.

ORDERING: If you answer 1-4, proceed to the next question [v2lgqugens]. If you answer 0, skip to question [v2lglegllo].

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017), Quota project (2018); International IDEA (2018a) ; Coding by project manager.

NOTES: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

### 5.1.6.3 Lower chamber gender quota placement mandate (v2lgqugens)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2lgqugens

*Original tag:* v2lgqugens

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Hughes et al. (2017), Quota Project (n.d.), International IDEA (2018a), Coding by project manager

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 1478, Percent: 5.36

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1597, Percent: 13.42

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

QUESTION: Does the national-level quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the

legislature contain a placement mandate?

CLARIFICATION: A placement mandate is a rule concerning rank order on the party list, usually to ensure that women are placed in electable positions on the party list. An example would be a rule stating that no more than three of the top five candidates can be of the same gender. Coded only for years where a gender quota was present.

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

ORDERING: Only answer this question if you answered 1-4 on previous question [v2lgqugen].

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017), Quota project (2018); International IDEA (2018a); Coding by project manager.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2lgqugen is 0

CITATION: Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1947-2023

### 5.1.7 V-Dem Indicators - Civil Society

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **Civil society organization:**

The following set of questions focus on civil society organizations (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but *not* businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

**Civil society organization – Historical clarification:** The following set of questions focus on civil society organizations (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but not businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

If no CSOs exist at all for a particular time period, code the following relevant questions as giving the "lowest score" (indicating, for instance, strong repression or no consultation, a 0).

**Religious organizations:** In this section, we ask two questions regarding religious organizations. These may be religiously inspired civil society organizations (CSOs) or organizations whose purpose is primarily spiritual.

#### 5.1.7.1 Religious organization repression (v2csrlgrep)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2csrlgrep

*Original tag:* v2csrlgrep

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 27058, Percent: 98.2

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 15160 Percent: 56.03

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government attempt to repress religious organizations?

RESPONSES:

0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of religious organizations. It seeks not only to deter the activity of such groups but also to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia and Maoist China.

1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional religious organizations who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property).

2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of religious civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar religious civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts.

3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new religious civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize parallel religious organizations to crowd out independent religious organizations.

4: No. Religious civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2017); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.8 V-Dem Indicators - The Media

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Media:** Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and broadcast (radio and television), and (2) online media. We ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. Thus, "the print and broadcast media" can provide a wide range of perspectives in a country even when individual publications or programs take a consistently narrow perspective.

**Historical clarification:** Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and (2) broadcast (radio) media. The latter is, however, only for reference to the contemporary era, and should of course be ignored before it appeared. But when applicable, we ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. If there is no print or broadcast media at all in a given time period, leave the following questions blank (missing) for this time period. Please also explicitly note in the comments section at the end for which years there was no print or broadcast media at all.

#### 5.1.8.1 Media bias (v2mebias)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mebias

*Original tag:* v2mebias

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26524, Percent: 96.26

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11839, Percent: 99.5

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 14685 Percent: 55.36

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates?

CLARIFICATION: We ask you to take particular care in rating the year-to-year variation on this question if media bias tends to increase or decrease in election years. Coverage can be considered "more or less impartial" when the media as a whole present a mix of positive and negative coverage of each party or candidate.

RESPONSES:

0: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage, or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover.

1: The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage.

2: The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate.

3: The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated *amount* of coverage to the governing party or candidates.

4: The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.9 V-Dem Indicators - Exclusion

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **Exclusion:**

The following survey contains questions pertaining to exclusion. Political, economic and social well-being may depend on whether groups or individuals are excluded from positions of power, the state's protection of rights and freedoms, access to public goods and services, and opportunities to work or do business with the state.

Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

*Exclusion* is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. It is not necessary for all members of a group to be excluded in order for group-based exclusion to occur. Exclusion occurs even when only a single individual is excluded based on her or his identity or membership (perceived or actual) in a particular group.

*Political groups* are defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. A common form of partisan exclusion is when state services or regulations are implemented in a way that seeks to reward the incumbent's political supporters and punish non-supporters.

*Socio-Economic position* defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property. Exclusion of economic groups occurs when, for example, those who are not property owners are restricted from voting, or when fees associated with justice, health or education are set at a rate that is unaffordable for poorer individuals.

*Social group* is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion,

migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood - by those residing within that society - to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant. Contrast Identity group.

*Geographic group* refers to those living in rural or urban areas. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer and there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54).

#### 5.1.9.1 Political group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clpolcl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2clpolcl

*Original tag:* v2clpolcl

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 18751, Percent: 68.05

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11819, Percent: 99.34

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 6932 Percent: 36.97

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do members of all political groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

CLARIFICATION: A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates that can be distinguished from others in terms of enjoyment of civil liberties. Responses should not reflect which party controls the legislature and executive. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

RESPONSES:

0: Some political groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

1: Some political groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

2: Some political groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

3: Some political groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

4: All political groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

#### 5.1.9.2 Access to public services distributed by political group (v2peapspol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peapspol

*Original tag:* v2peapspol

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 18786, Percent: 68.18

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11848, Percent: 99.58

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 6938 Percent: 36.93

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across political groups?

CLARIFICATION: A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. This question asks if political group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular political groups, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a political group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation 75 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation 25 percent (percent) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation only 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation less than 5 percent (percent) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

### 5.1.9.3 Access to state jobs by political group (v2peasjpol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peasjpol

*Original tag:* v2peasjpol

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 18700, Percent: 67.86

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11756, Percent: 98.81

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 6944 Percent: 37.13

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of their association with a political group?

CLARIFICATION: A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation, 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation, 25 percent (percent) or more of the



population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

#### 5.1.9.4 Access to state business opportunities by political group (v2peasbepol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2peasbepol

*Original tag:* v2peasbepol

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 18700, Percent: 67.86

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11756, Percent: 98.81

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 6944 Percent: 37.13

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of an individual's association with a political group?

CLARIFICATION: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates that can be distinguished from others in terms of access to power. Responses should not reflect which party controls the legislature and executive.

RESPONSES:

0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation 75 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation 25 percent (percent) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 10 to 25 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 5 to 10 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation less than 5 percent (percent) of the population, even if qualified, lack equal access to state business opportunities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

### 5.1.10 V-Dem Indicators - Civic and Academic Space

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **Civic and Academic Space:**

In this survey, we ask you to assess several issues concerning the space for and state of civil society and academia. First, we ask about some general issues such as polarization and peaceful assembly. Then, we probe into mobilization for mass events and associations. Finally, we ask you to consider questions related to academia.

#### 5.1.10.1 Engagement in independent political associations (v2capolit)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2capolit

*Original tag:* v2capolit

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 18691, Percent: 67.83

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11664, Percent: 98.03

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7027 Percent: 37.6

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What share of the population is regularly active in independent political interest associations, such as environmental associations, animal rights groups, or LGBT rights groups?

CLARIFICATION: Political associations include all associations whose main purpose is the change of policy or practice at the state or societal level. It does NOT include political parties or trade unions. An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

RESPONSES:

0: Virtually no one.

1: A small share of the population (less than 5percent).

2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 percent).

3: A large share of the population (about 16 percent to 25percent).

4: A very large share of the population (about 26percent or more).

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

#### 5.1.11 Historical V-Dem - Elections

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem Elections*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 5.1.11.1 Ballot printing (v3elbalstat)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elbalstat

*Original tag:* v3elbalstat

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 1030, Percent: 3.74

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 731, Percent: 6.14

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 299 Percent: 29.03

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Who prints ballot papers?

CLARIFICATION: Leave blank if all or nearly all voting is verbal (viva voce).

RESPONSES:

0: Political parties or candidates print all (or nearly all) the ballot papers.

1: Both the state and parties or candidates print the ballot papers.

2: The state prints all (or nearly all) ballot papers.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3elbalpap is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

#### 5.1.11.2 Minority or majority government (v3elncbmaj)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elncbmaj

*Original tag:* v3elncbmaj

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* <http://www.countrystudies.us>, various country specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 2692, Percent: 9.77

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 691, Percent: 5.81

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2001 Percent: 74.33

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In the first cabinet after this national election, did the political parties that were represented in the cabinet hold a majority of the seats in the (lower chamber of) the legislature?

RESPONSES:

0: Parties are not allowed.

1: No, the parties represented in cabinet held less than half of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

2: Yes, the parties represented in cabinet held half, or more than half, of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

3: Parties are allowed but nonexistent or so diffuse as to be more like factions, and the factions represented in government hold less than half of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

4: Parties are allowed but nonexistent or so diffuse as to be more like factions, but the factions represented in government hold half, or more than half, of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): <http://www.countrystudies.us>, various country specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

### 5.1.11.3 Upper chamber election turnover (v3eltvriguc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3eltvriguc

*Original tag:* v3eltvriguc

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen (2005), Nohlen et al. (2002), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Nohlen et al. (1999), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 18, Percent: 0.07

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3, Percent: 0.03

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 15 Percent: 83.33

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Did control of the upper chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The same party/group/coalition remained in control of the majority of seats.

1: Partly. The leading position within a coalition changed. Or, a new coalition includes some old groups/parties and some new groups/parties.

2: Yes. Another party/group/coalition gained control of the majority of seats.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Wikipedia; Websites of National Parliaments; Websites of National Bureau of Statistics; Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1831-1900

### 5.1.11.4 Upper chamber election seats (v3elupseat)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elupseat

*Original tag:* v3elupseat

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen (2005), Nohlen et al. (2002), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Nohlen et al. (1999), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 77, Percent: 0.28

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5, Percent: 0.04

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 72 Percent: 93.51

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats were there in the upper chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Wikipedia; Websites of National Parliaments; Websites of National Bureau of Statistics; Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1900

#### 5.1.11.5 Upper chamber election seats won by largest party (v3elupstsl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elupstsl

*Original tag:* v3elupstsl

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen (2005), Nohlen et al. (2002), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Nohlen et al. (1999), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 73, Percent: 0.26

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5, Percent: 0.04

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 68 Percent: 93.15

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Wikipedia; Websites of National Parliaments; Websites of National Bureau of Statistics; Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1900

**5.1.11.6 Upper chamber election seats won by second largest party (v3elupstsm)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elupstsm

*Original tag:* v3elupstsm

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen (2005), Nohlen et al. (2002), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Nohlen et al. (1999), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 73, Percent: 0.26

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5, Percent: 0.04

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 68 Percent: 93.15

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats in the upper chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Wikipedia; Websites of National Parliaments; Websites of National Bureau of Statistics; Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1900

**5.1.11.7 Upper chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (v3elupvtlg)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elupvtlg

*Original tag:* v3elupvtlg

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen (2005), Nohlen et al. (2002), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Nohlen et al. (1999), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3, Percent: 0.01

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3, Percent: 0.03

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Wikipedia;

Websites of National Parliaments; Websites of National Bureau of Statistics; Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1894-1900

#### 5.1.11.8 Upper chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (v3elupvtsm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elupvtsm

*Original tag:* v3elupvtsm

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen (2005), Nohlen et al. (2002), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Nohlen et al. (1999), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3, Percent: 0.01

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3, Percent: 0.03

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Wikipedia; Websites of National Parliaments; Websites of National Bureau of Statistics; Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1894-1900

#### 5.1.11.9 Total votes (v3ttlvote)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ttlvote

*Original tag:* v3ttlvote

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen (2005), Nohlen et al. (2002), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Nohlen et al. (1999), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 398, Percent: 1.44

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 80, Percent: 0.67

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 318 Percent: 79.9

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What is the total number of votes cast in this election.

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Wikipedia; Websites of National Parliaments; Websites of National Bureau of Statistics; Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

### 5.1.12 Historical V-Dem - Political Parties

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - Political Parties*- section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 5.1.12.1 Party identification (v3partyid)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3partyid

*Original tag:* v3partyid

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 6563, Percent: 23.82

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 827, Percent: 6.95

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5736 Percent: 87.4

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do voters identify with a political party?

CLARIFICATION: When party identification is strong, vote choice is largely determined by a voter's party affiliation (and his/her affiliation with that party) rather than attachments to particular candidates, non-partisan issue-positions, or material incentives (*e.g.*, vote-buying). Likewise, when party identification is strong, voters retain loyalty to a single party rather than switching from one party to another across elections or across offices in the same election (ticket-splitting). In this fashion we can somewhat crudely distinguish between partisans and non-partisans. Note that this question refers only to voters, not to members of the population who do not vote (because they are disenfranchised, choose not to vote, or are discouraged from voting). Leave this question blank if there are no national elections.



## RESPONSES:

0: There are national elections, but there are no political parties.

1: Only one party is allowed to participate in national elections.

2: More than one party participates, and nearly all voters are non-partisans.

3: More than one party participates, and most voters are non-partisans.

4: More than one party participates, and voters are equally divided between partisans and non-partisans.

5: More than one party participates, and most voters are partisans.

6: More than one party participates, and nearly all voters are partisans.

SCALE: Nominal, but categories 2–6 constitute ordinal.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**5.1.12.2 Party age largest (v3psagefirst)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3psagefirst

*Original tag:* v3psagefirst

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* <http://countrystudies.us>

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 2507, Percent: 9.1

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 721, Percent: 6.06

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1786 Percent: 71.24

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: How many years have passed since the party that holds the most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

CLARIFICATION: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): <http://countrystudies.us>

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

**5.1.12.3 Party age executive (v3psagepm)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3psagepm

*Original tag:* v3psagepm

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* <http://countrystudies.us>

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 2254, Percent: 8.18

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 634, Percent: 5.33

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1620 Percent: 71.87

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: How many years have passed since the party controlling the executive was formed?

CLARIFICATION: If there is a coalition government, you should count the party of the prime minister was counted. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): <http://countrystudies.us>

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

#### 5.1.12.4 Party age second largest (v3psagesecond)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3psagesecond

*Original tag:* v3psagesecond

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* <http://countrystudies.us>

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 2437, Percent: 8.84

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 711, Percent: 5.98

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1726 Percent: 70.82

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: How many years have passed since the party that holds the second most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

CLARIFICATION: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): <http://countrystudies.us>

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

#### 5.1.12.5 Party age third largest (v3psagethird)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3psagethird

*Original tag:* v3psagethird

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* <http://countrystudies.us>

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 1226, Percent: 4.45

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 598, Percent: 5.03

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 628 Percent: 51.22

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: How many years have passed since the party that holds the third most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

CLARIFICATION: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): <http://countrystudies.us>

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1791-1920

### 5.1.13 Historical V-Dem - The Legislature

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

The *Historical V-Dem - The Legislature-* section includes new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in the corresponding V-Dem Indicators section.

#### 5.1.13.1 Lower chamber quota for social groups (v3lgqumin)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgqumin

*Original tag:* v3lgqumin

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* <https://www.constituteproject.org>, <http://countrystudies.us>, <https://en.wikipedia.org>

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 5009, Percent: 18.18

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 755, Percent: 6.35

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4254 Percent: 84.93

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: Is there a national-level quota for any social groups in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: These quotas are sometimes informally known as "minority quotas." Do not record gender quotas here (as gender is not part of what we mean by a social group). Also, do not include special rules that benefit parties defined by social group but do not guarantee seats for these groups. For example, do not count a rule exempting parties from threshold requirements. Code "yes" only if the groups covered by the quota have full voting rights in the legislature.

RESPONSES:

0: No national level quota for any social group.

1: Yes, there are reserved seats for at least one social group.

SCALE: Dichotomous

SOURCE(S): <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>;  
<https://en.wikipedia.org>

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1920

#### 5.1.14 Historical V-Dem - Historical V-Dem Modified

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

V-Dem indicators that are different to their contemporary counterparts, for the purpose of gathering additional relevant information for the historical period in Historical V-Dem. These variables are also merged into their v2 equivalents.

First, In contrast to contemporary V-Dem, Historical V-Dem codes upper chamber elections and thus also includes eltype category 2. Those observations are treated as missing in the historical-contemporary merged version of v2eltype. Due to election specific variables being cleaned by v2eltype, these do not include upper chamber elections either. In order to include historical data on upper chamber elections we thus also provide v3eltype and v3 election specific variables that are cleaned by v3eltype.

Second, Historical V-Dem codes additional chambers compared to contemporary V-Dem. When merging v2lgbicam and v3lgbicam the categories get recoded as follows:

- Categories 3 (tricameral) and 4 (quadricameral) become category 2 for the merged v2lgbicam.
- Category 9 (Other types of legislature) becomes category 0 for the merged v2lgbicam.

In order to include historical data on additional chambers, we thus also provide v3lgbicam and v3 chamber specific variables that are cleaned by v3lgbicam.

##### 5.1.14.1 Lower chamber electoral system (v3elloelsy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elloelsy

*Original tag:* v3elloelsy

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Golder (2006), Kollman et al. (2011), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen et al. (2002), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Nohlen et al. (1999), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), IDEA, IFES, various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 534, Percent: 1.94

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8, Percent: 0.07

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 526 Percent: 98.5

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Further information on the following electoral system types can be found in Reynolds/Reilly, *The New International IDEA Handbook (2005)*, chapter two and Annex B (Glossary of Terms) – downloadable, free of charge, at [www.idea.int/publications/esd/](http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/).

RESPONSES:

0: First-past-the-post (FPP, aka plurality) in single-member constituencies. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat.

1: Two-round system in single-member constituencies. Like FPP except that a threshold — usually 50percent + 1 — is required to avoid a runoff between the two top vote-getters.

2: Alternative vote in single-member districts. Voters rank-order their preferences for the candidates who compete for a single seat. If any candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, s/he is elected. If not, then the least successful candidates (based on first-preferences) are eliminated and their votes reallocated to the second-preferences. This process is repeated until a candidate reaches 50percent +1 of the votes.

3: Block vote in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are seats within that district and can rank-order them (within or across parties) as they please.

4: Party block vote in multi-member districts. Voters cast a vote for a single party (but not for individual candidates within the party's list). The party with the most votes (*i.e.*, a plurality) wins all the seats in that district.

5: Parallel (SMD/PR). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are independent.

6: Mixed-member proportional (SMD with PR compensatory seats). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are not independent. Specifically, the multimember seats are used to rectify disproportionalities achieved in the single-member district election — by adding seats, as necessary. This means that the representation of parties in the legislature is determined entirely by the PR ballot. It also means that the result of an MMP election is similar to the result of a PR election: parties achieve representation according to their nationwide vote share (on the PR ballot)

7: List PR with small multi-member districts (mean district size lt; 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is less than seven.

8: List PR with large multi-member districts (mean district size gt; 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is greater than seven.

9: Single-transferable vote (STV) in multi-member districts. Electors rank-order candidates nominated for a district. Candidates that surpass a specified quota of first-preference votes are elected. The remaining seats are chosen by reallocating the votes of the least successful candidates to elector's second- (or third-) preferences until the specified quota is reached. This process is repeated until all seats for that district are filled.

10: Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts. Each elector chooses a single candidate. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

11: Limited vote in multi-member districts.

Electors have more than one vote but fewer votes than the number of seats in the district. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

12: Borda Count in single- or multi-member districts. Electors use numbers to mark preferences among candidates and each preference is assigned a value. For example, in a ten-candidate field a first preference is worth one, a second preference is worth .9, and so forth. These are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are elected.

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): Golder (2006); CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2011); Colomer (2004); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; IFES; Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1902

#### 5.1.14.2 Lower chamber election seats (v3elloseat)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elloseat

*Original tag:* v3elloseat

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 655, Percent: 2.38

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 527, Percent: 4.43

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 128 Percent: 19.54

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats were there in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Wikipedia;

Websites of National Parliaments; Websites of National Bureau of Statistics; Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 5.1.14.3 Lower chamber election seats won by largest party (v3ellostlg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ellostlg

*Original tag:* v3ellostlg

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 497, Percent: 1.8

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 559, Percent: 4.7

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Wikipedia; Websites of National Parliaments; Websites of National Bureau of Statistics; Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 5.1.14.4 Lower chamber election seat share won by largest party (v3ellostsl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ellostsl

*Original tag:* v3ellostsl

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 486, Percent: 1.76

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 514, Percent: 4.32

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, what percentage (percent) of the total seats in the lower (or

unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Wikipedia; Websites of National Parliaments; Websites of National Bureau of Statistics; Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 5.1.14.5 Lower chamber election seats won by second largest party (v3ellostsm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ellostsm

*Original tag:* v3ellostsm

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 502, Percent: 1.82

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 553, Percent: 4.65

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Wikipedia; Websites of National Parliaments; Websites of National Bureau of Statistics; Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 5.1.14.6 Lower chamber election seat share won by second largest party (v3ellostss)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ellostss

*Original tag:* v3ellostss

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 494, Percent: 1.79



*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 524, Percent: 4.4

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election, what percentage (percent) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

CLARIFICATION: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Wikipedia; Websites of National Parliaments; Websites of National Bureau of Statistics; Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 5.1.14.7 Lower chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (v3ellovtlg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ellovtlg

*Original tag:* v3ellovtlg

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 260, Percent: 0.94

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 74, Percent: 0.62

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 186 Percent: 71.54

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Wikipedia; Websites of National Parliaments; Websites of National Bureau of Statistics; Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 5.1.14.8 Lower chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (v3ellovtsm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3ellovtsm

*Original tag:* v3ellovtsm

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 213, Percent: 0.77

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 74, Percent: 0.62

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 139 Percent: 65.26

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 5.1.14.9 Effective number of cabinet parties (v3elncbpr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elncbpr

*Original tag:* v3elncbpr

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* <http://www.countrystudies.us>, various country specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 921, Percent: 3.34

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 699, Percent: 5.87

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 222 Percent: 24.1

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): John Gerring

QUESTION: In the first cabinet after this national election, how many political parties were represented in the cabinet?

RESPONSES:

0: Parties are not allowed.

1: One party.

2: Two parties.

3: Three parties.

4: Four or more parties.

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): <http://www.countrystudies.us>, various country specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v3eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).  
 YEARS: 1790-1920

#### 5.1.14.10 Lower chamber election turnover (v3eltvrig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3eltvrig

*Original tag:* v3eltvrig

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Caramani (2000), Websites of National Parliaments, Library of Congress - Country Studies, Various country-specific sources, Constitutions

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 164, Percent: 0.6

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 37, Percent: 0.31

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 127 Percent: 77.44

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: Did control of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The majority party or ruling coalition includes the same or substantially the same parties, even if some minor parties (holding less than 10 percent of the seats in the legislature) left or joined the coalition, or because the elections do not affect the lower chamber.

1: Half. A minority party or coalition who was not in control of the chamber before the elections assumed the leading position in the legislature but is dependent on other parties for support. Or, a post-election ruling coalition includes some old parties and some new parties and the new parties represent more than 10 percent of the seats in the legislature.

2: Yes. The incumbent party or coalition lost its majority or plurality-dominant position in the legislature and a different party or coalition assumes the majority position.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Websites of National Parliaments; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Various country-specific sources; Constitutions.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1790-1912

#### 5.1.14.11 Presidential election vote share of largest vote-getter (v3elvtlrg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elvtlrg

*Original tag:* v3elvtlrg

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 140, Percent: 0.51

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5, Percent: 0.04

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 135 Percent: 96.43

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this presidential election, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the winning candidate in the first round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Record only direct presidential elections. Cases where the presidents are elected indirectly by the legislature (*i.e.* Germany) are not being coded since there is no popular vote share. However, in countries where electoral college is present (*i.e.* U.S.), the percentage of popular vote should be recorded if available.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Wikipedia; Websites of National Parliaments; Websites of National Bureau of Statistics; Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v3eltype\_6, v3eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1792-1919

#### 5.1.14.12 Presidential election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (v3elvotsml)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3elvotsml

*Original tag:* v3elvotsml

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), Caramani (2000), Wikipedia, Websites of National Parliaments, Websites of National Bureau of Statistics, Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 81, Percent: 0.29

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5, Percent: 0.04

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 76 Percent: 93.83

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Carl Henrik Knutsen

QUESTION: In this presidential election, what percentage (percent) of the vote was received by the second most successful candidate in the first round?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Record only direct presidential elections. Cases where the presidents are elected indirectly by the legislature (*i.e.* Germany) are not being coded since there is no popular vote share. However, in countries where electoral college is present (*i.e.* U.S.), the percentage of popular vote should be recorded if available.

SCALE: Interval

ANSWER-TYPE: Percent

SOURCE(S): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Wikipedia; Websites of National Parliaments; Websites of National Bureau of Statistics; Various country-specific sources.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

DATE SPECIFIC: Presidential election dates (v3eltype\_6, v3eltype\_7)

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1792-1919

**5.1.14.13 Legislature opposition parties (v3lgoppart)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3lgoppart*Original tag:* v3lgoppart*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)*Merge scores:**Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 5630, Percent: 20.43*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 797, Percent: 6.7*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4833 Percent: 85.84*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?

RESPONSES:

0: No, not at all.

1: Occasionally.

2: Yes, for the most part.

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2010

**5.1.15 Historical V-Dem - Overlap Period Discrepancies**

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/orgmanv111.pdf>) or the Historical V-Dem page: <https://www.v-dem.net/hdata.html>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present.

This section includes A and A\* variables where there is a discrepancy in the coding of some observations between the Historical and Contemporary V-Dem coding for the overlap period (typically 1900-1920). The v2-versions of these variables, reported elsewhere in the codebook, report the Contemporary V-Dem scores in cases of discrepancies in the overlap period.

Remaining inconsistencies in the Historical and Contemporary V-Dem coding, that are not due to substantive differences in the indicators, will be sorted out for version 10 of the dataset.

**5.1.15.1 HOS appointment in practice (v3expathhs)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v3expathhs*Original tag:* v3expathhs*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Various country-specific sources

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 7931, Percent: 28.78

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7931 Percent: 100

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: How did the head of state reach office?

CLARIFICATION: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 7 should only be selected if the head of state is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election.

RESPONSES:

0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.

1: Appointed by a foreign power.

2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).

3: Appointed by a royal council.

4: Through hereditary succession.

5: Appointed by the military.

6: Appointed by the legislature.

7: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).

8: Other.

SCALE: Nominal

SOURCE(S): Various country-specific sources

DATA RELEASE: 8-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v3exnamhos).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-1933

### 5.1.16 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Regimes of the World (RoW)

The *Regimes of the World Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V -Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 5.1.16.1 Regimes of the world - the RoW Measure (v2x\_regime)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_regime

*Original tag:* v2x\_regime

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Lührmann et al. (2018), v2x\_elecreg v2xlg\_elecreg v2xex\_elecreg v2elmulpar\_osp\_ex v2elmulpar\_osp\_leg v2elmulpar\_osp v2elfrfair\_osp v2elfrfair\_osp\_leg v2elfrfair\_osp\_ex v2expathhg v2expathhs v2ex\_legeonhos v2ex\_hosw v2x\_polyarchy v2x\_liberal v2clacjstm\_osp v2clacjstw\_osp v2cltrnslw\_osp v2exaphogp

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 19222, Percent: 69.76

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11879, Percent: 99.84

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7343 Percent: 38.2

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenber, Staffan I Lindberg

QUESTION: How can the political regime overall be classified considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles?

RESPONSES:

0: Closed autocracy: No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature.

1: Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature, but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy).

2: Electoral democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy), but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x\_liberal).

3: Liberal democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy) are guaranteed as well as access to justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x\_liberal).

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_elecreg v2xlg\_elecreg v2xex\_elecreg v2elmpar\_osp\_ex  
v2elmpar\_osp\_leg v2elmpar\_osp v2elfrfair\_osp v2elfrfair\_osp\_leg v2elfrfair\_osp\_ex  
v2expathhg v2expathhs v2ex\_legconhos v2ex\_hosw v2x\_polyarchy v2x\_liberal  
v2clacjstm\_osp v2clacjstw\_osp v2cltrnslw\_osp v2exaphogp

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

AGGREGATION: Electoral democracies score above 2 on the indicators for multi-party (v2elmpar\_osp) and free and fair elections (v2elfrfair\_osp), as well as above 0.5 on the Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy). Liberal democracy meets the criteria for Electoral democracy but also satisfy the liberal dimensions by a score above 0.8 on the V-Dem Liberal Component index (v2x\_liberal), as well as a score above 3 on transparent law enforcement (v2cltrnslw\_osp), access to justice for men (v2clacjstm\_osp) and women (v2clacjstw\_osp). Electoral autocracies fail to meet one or more of the above-mentioned criteria of electoral democracies, but subject the chief executive and the legislature to de-jure multiparty elections as indicated by a score above 1 on the V-Dem multiparty elections indicator (v2elmpar\_osp). Closed autocracy if either no multiparty elections for the legislature take place (v2xlg\_elecreg == 0) or the chief executive is not elected in direct or indirect multiparty elections. To identify whether this is the case, we take into account if there is no basic multiparty competition in elections (v2elmpar\_osp lt; 1) and the relative power of the Head of State (HoS) and the Head of Government (HoG) as well as the appointment procedures. The V-Dem variable v2ex\_hosw identifies if the HoS (v2ex\_hosw gt; 0.5) or HoG (v2ex\_hosw lt; or equal to 0.5) is the chief executive. If the HoG is the chief executive, the variable v2expathhg indicates whether the HoG is directly (8) or indirectly (7) elected or appointed by the HoS (6). In the first case, we consider whether executive elections (v2xex\_elecreg == 0) take place, in the second case whether legislative elections take place (v2xlg\_elecreg == 0) and in the third case how HoS is selected as follows. The variable v2expathhs indicates whether the HoS is directly (7) or indirectly (6) elected. Thus, in the first case, we consider whether executive elections (v2xex\_elecreg) take place, in the second case whether legislative elections take place and the legislature approves on HoG (v2xlg\_elecreg == 0 and v2exaphog == 0). This also applies for the cases if the HoS is the chief executive.

CITATION: Lührmann *et al.* (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

### 5.1.17 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Executive Bases of Power

The *Executive Bases of Power Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V -Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 5.1.17.1 Ruling party dimension index (v2x\_ex\_party)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_ex\_party

*Original tag:* v2x\_ex\_party

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Teorell & Lindberg (2019), v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp\_ord v2exrmhsol\_2 v2exrmhsol\_3 v2exrmhsol\_4 v2exhoshog v2ex\_hosw

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 27391, Percent: 99.4

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 15493 Percent: 56.56

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

QUESTION: To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by a ruling party?

CLARIFICATION: Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which a ruling party appoints and dismisses the chief executive.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp\_ord v2exrmhsol\_2 v2exrmhsol\_3 v2exrmhsol\_4 v2exhoshog v2ex\_hosw

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is based on whether the *quot;chief executivequot;* was (a) appointed by the ruling party, and (b) can be dismissed by the ruling party. Both condition (a) and (b) are coded as present (1) or not (0); we then average across the two. In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the *quot;chief executivequot;* by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

CITATION: Teorell, Jan, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2019. "Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789-2016". *Perspectives on Politics* 17(1):66-84; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.18 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Party Institutionalization

The *Party Institutionalization Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V -Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 5.1.18.1 Party institutionalization index (v2xps\_party)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xps\_party

*Original tag:* v2xps\_party



*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Bizzarro Neto et al. (2017), v2psorgs v2psprbrch v2psprlnks v2psplats v2pscohesv v2lgello

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 17630, Percent: 63.98

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11614, Percent: 97.61

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 6016 Percent: 34.12

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

QUESTION: To what extent are political parties institutionalized?

CLARIFICATION: Party institutionalization refers to various attributes of the political parties in a country, *e.g.*, level and depth of organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party supporters within the electorate, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, party-line voting among representatives within the legislature. A high score on these attributes generally indicates a more institutionalized party system.

This index considers the attributes of all parties with an emphasis on larger parties, *i.e.*, those that may be said to dominate and define the party system.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2psorgs v2psprbrch v2psprlnks v2psplats v2pscohesv v2lgello

DATA RELEASE: 1-14. Release 1-6 Party system institutionalization index, release 7 changed to Party institutionalization index.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by adding scaled indicators for party organizations (v2psorgs), party branches (v2psprbrch), party linkages (v2psprlnks), distinct party platforms (v2psplats), and legislative party cohesion (v2pscohesv, set to missing when the lower chamber of legislature (v2lgello) does not exist). The index is then converted to its CDF in order to range from 0 to 1.

CITATION: Bizzarro *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:48); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.19 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Consensual Democracy Dimensions

The *Consensual Democracy Dimensions Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 5.1.19.1 Divided party control index (v2x\_divparctrl)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_divparctrl

*Original tag:* v2x\_divparctrl

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* v2psnatpar v2psnatpar\_ord

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 19101, Percent: 69.32

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11888, Percent: 99.92

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7213 Percent: 37.76

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, Svend-Erik Skaaning

QUESTION: Are the executive and legislature controlled by different political parties?

**CLARIFICATION:** This variable is a reordered version of the continuous measurement model estimates for indicator v2psnatpar: National party control. After reordering, the positive extreme signifies Divided party control. A Different parties or individuals unconnected to parties control the executive and the legislature or B Executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each of which belongs to different parties; or between a non-partisan monarch and a prime minister. The intermediate values signify Unified coalition control. A single multi-party coalition controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single coalition gathers together a majority of seats. And the negative extreme signifies Unified party control. A single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single party has a majority of seats.

**SCALE:** Interval, from low to high.

**SOURCE(S):** v2psnatpar v2psnatpar\_ord

**NOTES:** V-Dem originally intended to generate indices to measure concepts inspired by Arend Lijphart's two dimensions of consensus vs. majoritarian democracy. The project no longer plans to produce such indices. Instead, it offers the two indices, the Divided party control index and the Division of power index, which are conceptually thinner than Lijphart's concepts and not equivalent substitutes for them. However, these alternatives are useful for some purposes.

**DATA RELEASE:** 6-14. For Version 6 as Divided party control of legislature index v2x\_lgdivparctrl, 7 modified to Divided party control index.

**AGGREGATION:** The reordering is accomplished in two steps. First, 5 is subtracted from v2psnatpar when the ordinal version of this variable, v2psnatpar\_ord, is 2. This moves the ordinal score corresponding to unified party control to the lowest values. Then the result is standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

**COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION:** Last

**CITATION:** *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**YEARS:** 1900-2023

### 5.1.20 Digital Society Survey - Coordinated Information Operations

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media

transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times' website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual's use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization's digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss "censorship" or "censoring" content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### 5.1.20.1 Party dissemination of false information domestic (v2smpardom)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smpardom

*Original tag:* v2smpardom

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3930, Percent: 33.03

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 169 Percent: 4.12

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence their own population?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Major political parties and candidates never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

### 5.1.20.2 Party dissemination of false information abroad (v2smparab)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smparab

*Original tag:* v2smparab

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3930, Percent: 33.03

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 169 Percent: 4.12

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence citizens of other countries abroad?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Major political parties and candidates never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

### 5.1.21 Digital Society Survey - Digital Media Freedom

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein,

Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

**Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)**

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyberwarfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual’s use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization’s digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

**5.1.21.1 Political parties cyber security capacity (v2smpolcap)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smpolcap

*Original tag:* v2smpolcap

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3930, Percent: 33.03

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 169 Percent: 4.12

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major political parties have sufficiently technologically skilled staff and resources to mitigate harm from cyber security threats?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The government does not have the capacity to counter even unsophisticated cyber security threats.

1: Not really. The government has the resources to combat only unsophisticated cyber attacks.

2: Somewhat. The government has the resources to combat moderately sophisticated cyber attacks.

3: Mostly. The government has the resources to combat most sophisticated cyber attacks.

4: Yes. The government has the resources to combat sophisticated cyber attacks, even those launched by highly skilled actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

### 5.1.22 Digital Society Survey - Social Cleavages

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although

content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times' website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual's use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization's digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss "censorship" or "censoring" content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### 5.1.22.1 Party/candidate use of social media in campaigns (v2smcamp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smcamp

*Original tag:* v2smcamp

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3930, Percent: 33.03

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 169 Percent: 4.12

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do major political parties and candidates use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents?

RESPONSES:

0: None. Major political parties and candidates do not use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

1: A little. Major political parties and candidates rarely use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

2: Somewhat. Major political parties and candidates sometimes use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

3: Substantial. Major political parties and candidates frequently use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model

(see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

### 5.1.22.2 Political parties hate speech (v2smpolhate)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smpolhate

*Original tag:* v2smpolhate

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3930, Percent: 33.03

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 169 Percent: 4.12

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do major political parties use hate speech as part of their rhetoric?

CLARIFICATION: Hate speech is any speech that is intended to insult, offend, or intimidate members of specific groups, defined by race, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, disability, or similar trait.

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often.

1: Often.

2: Sometimes.

3: Rarely.

4: Never, or almost never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

### 5.1.23 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Ordinal Versions of Indices

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

#### 5.1.23.1 Civil society participation index ordinal (e\_v2x\_cspart\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_cspart\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_cspart\_3C

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Lindberg (2016), v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2csptrcpt v2csgender

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26928, Percent: 97.72

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100



*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 15030 Percent: 55.82

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymaker; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem civil society participation index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2cspcpt v2csgender

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for `quot;v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5Cquot;`.

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.23.2 Freedom of association (thick) index ordinal (e\_v2x\_frassoc\_thick\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2x\_frassoc\_thick\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2x\_frassoc\_thick\_3C

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Lindberg (2016), v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26882, Percent: 97.56

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11898, Percent: 100

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 14984 Percent: 55.74

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem freedom of association (thick) index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for `quot;v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5Cquot;`.

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.23.3 Party institutionalization index ordinal (e\_v2xps\_party\_3c)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_v2xps\_party\_3c

*Original tag:* e\_v2xps\_party\_3C

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Lindberg (2016), v2psorgs v2psprbrch v2psprlnks v2psplats v2pscohesv v2lghello

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 17630, Percent: 63.98

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11614, Percent: 97.61

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 6016 Percent: 34.12

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

QUESTION: To what extent are political parties institutionalized?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem party institutionalization index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2psorgs v2psprbrch v2psprlnks v2psplats v2pscohesv v2lgello

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for `quot;v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5Cquot;`.

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2023

### 5.1.24 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Freedom House

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

#### 5.1.24.1 Freedom House: Political Rights (`e_fh_pr`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_cy_e_fh_pr`

*Original tag:* `e_fh_pr`

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2022a)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 8131, Percent: 29.51

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7145, Percent: 60.05

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 986 Percent: 12.13

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. The specific list of rights considered varies over the years.

RESPONSES:

Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

SOURCE(S): Freedom House (2022).

NOTES: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

CITATION: Freedom House (2022)

YEARS: 1972-2021

### 5.1.25 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections

based on source.

#### 5.1.25.1 Lexical index (e\_lexical\_index)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_lexical\_index

*Original tag:* e\_lexical\_index

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Skaaning et al. (2015)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26721, Percent: 96.97

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11769, Percent: 98.92

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 14952 Percent: 55.96

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the lexical index of democracy in the country?

RESPONSES:

0: No elections

1: No party or one-party elections

2: Multi-party elections for legislature

3: Multi-party elections for legislature and executive

4: Minimally competitive elections

5: Male or female suffrage

6: Universal suffrage

SOURCE(S): Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

CITATION: Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

YEARS: 1789-2021

### 5.1.26 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Political Institutions and Political Events

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

#### 5.1.26.1 Parties in legislature (e\_legparty)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_legparty

*Original tag:* e\_legparty

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Przeworski et al. (2013)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 12597, Percent: 45.72

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9047, Percent: 76.04

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3550 Percent: 28.18

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: Number of parties in the legislature. By "party" we take here any recognizable, named grouping, regardless whether and how they appeared in elections. This variable is coded regardless whether the legislature was elected or appointed.

RESPONSES:

-1: if no legislature.

0: if none (including cases where parties are officially banned).

1: if one (including cases where other parties are officially banned).

2: if more.

SCALE: Nominal.

SOURCE(S): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

NOTES: During the early period candidates typically competed in elections on an individual basis, without any kind of centralized party organizations or shared programs. Within legislatures, however, they often coalesced into groups, currents, factions, "sentiments," etc. Hence, subjective judgments are inevitable in coding this variable. Our rule of thumb was to code as parties any kind of groups that bare a label that survived over two consecutive legislatures. This was true in several countries of "Liberals" and "Conservatives." In other countries, notably France between 1815 and 1848, however, the divisive issues, the parliamentary groups, and their labels changed frequently, and such cases are coded as "none." A legislature consisting of one party and independents is coded as one party. When there is more than one observation per country-year, the one which has higher value is taken.

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

CITATION: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

YEARS: 1789-2008

### 5.1.27 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Polity5

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

#### 5.1.27.1 Political competition (e\_polcomp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_polcomp

*Original tag:* e\_polcomp

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Marshall & Jaggers (2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 17284, Percent: 62.73

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 10466, Percent: 87.96

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 6818 Percent: 39.45

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Is there any (institutionalized) political competition?

CLARIFICATION: This variable combines information presented in two component variables: the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, of political competition (e\_parreg) and the extent of government restriction on political competition (e\_parcomp).

RESPONSES:

1: Repressed Competition: While no significant political activity is permitted outside the ranks of the hegemonic regime, nevertheless, some organized political participation occurs within the regime through highly circumscribed institutional channels.

2: Restricted Competition: Some organized political activity occurs outside the ranks of the hegemonic regime, but the regime systematically limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups from participating in the political arena and/or suppresses the contestation of rival political interests.

3: Authoritarian-guided liberalization of repressed or restricted competition or the deepening of hegemonic control: Used to indicate either the concerted effort on the part of hegemonic regimes to open up their political systems to limited (and typically factional) political competition or the transformation of factional-based "quasi-democracies" or "weak authoritarian regimes" into more repressive hegemonic systems in which political competition is increasingly institutionalized and restricted.

4: Uninstitutionalized Competition: Political participation is decentralized and fluid in

character — revolving around personalities, regional interests, and religious/ethnic/clan groups. There are no enduring national political organizations and systematic regime control of political activity is limited, that is, a situation characterized by a coincidence of weak state and weak society. In the contemporary context, uninstitutionalized competition is most likely to occur in resource poor countries and/or following the collapse of central authority under a (former) repressive, authoritarian state.

5: Gradual transition from uninstitutionalized (unregulated) competition to more regulated forms of political competition (the increasing regulation of competition may be centrally-guided or decentralized through the gradual development of political parties and interest groups).

6: Factional/Restricted Competition: Politics that oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and faction-based restrictions: that is, when one faction secures power it uses that power to promote its exclusive interests and favor group members while restricting the political access and activities of other, excluded groups, until it is displaced in turn.

7: Factional Competition: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level — parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups — but particularistic/parochial agendas tend to be exclusive and uncompromising with limited social integration or accommodation across identity boundaries. Factional competition is distinguished by a relative balance of group capabilities that prevents any one of the groups from capturing state power and imposing restrictions on other groups.

8: Political liberalization or democratic retrenchment: persistent over coercion: relatively coercive/restrictive transitions either from factional/restricted competition to institutionalized competitive participation or from institutionalized competitive participation to factional/restricted competition. In either case, this code reflects the unconsolidated nature of liberal political participation in otherwise procedurally democratic polities.

9: Political liberalization or democratic retrenchment: limited and/or decreasing overt coercion: This code is used to indicate relatively peaceful transitions either to or from institutionalized competitive participation. In either case, this code reflects the unconsolidated nature of liberal political participation in otherwise procedurally open electoral polities.

10: Institutionalized open electoral participation: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence with little use of coercion. No significant or substantial groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

SOURCE(S): Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

NOTES: Standardized authority codes (i.e. -66, -77, -88) are set to missing for the online graphs.

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

CITATION: Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

YEARS: 1789-2020

### 5.1.28 Varieties of Indoctrination

The Varieties of Indoctrination (V-Indoc) dataset is constructed based on an expert survey fielded in collaboration with V-Dem and led by the ERC-funded project “Democracy under Threat: How Education can Save it” (DEMED). The dataset contains indices and indicators that measure indoctrination efforts in education and the media across 160 countries from 1945 to 2021. The indices capture broad dimensions of indoctrination such as indoctrination potential and indoctrination content, while the indicators cover topics related to the curriculum, teachers, schools, and the media. The principal investigators are Anja Neundorf, Eugenia Nazrullaeva, Ksenia Northmore-Ball, Katerina Tertychnaya, and Wooseok Kim. For more information, please visit <https://www.gla.ac.uk/research/az/democracyresearch/>.

#### 5.1.28.1 Political influence, non state-owned media (v2medpolnonstate)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2medpolnonstate

*Original tag:* v2medpolnonstate

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Anja Neundorf

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: For the print and broadcast media outlets NOT owned by the state, how often do political authorities influence how these cover political issues?

CLARIFICATION: Political authorities can be national / sub-national / local public authorities and include ruling political parties and office holders, such as presidents, prime minister or ministers. Political authorities can influence the coverage of non-state owned outlets both directly and indirectly. Indirect forms of control might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities (e.g. subsidized newsprint) and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, and prohibitive tariffs. They might also include tax privileges, bribery, and cash payments. Indirect forms of control may also include the intimidation of owners, advertisers, and editors, through the use of threats and violence.

RESPONSES:

0: Political authorities (almost) never influence the coverage of key political issues.

1: Political authorities sometimes influence the coverage of key political issues.

2: Political authorities often influence the coverage of key political issues.

3: Political authorities almost always influence the coverage of key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: Please answer this question only when both v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are not both 4.

DATA RELEASE: 13-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are both 4.

CITATION: Neundorf et al. (2023a, 2023b, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2023: 136); Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21)

YEARS: 1945-2021

### 5.1.29 Party Systems

## 6 Party Systems

The following indices refer to a variety of latent positions that party systems have on several policy orientations and governance. The Party Systems indices are designed by aggregating individual parties' policy orientations in a given country-election-year using data from the Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party, v2) during the period between 1970-2019 for 178 countries. To find out more about this data and/or the component variables that underly these indices, please visit <https://www.v-dem.net/data/v-party-dataset/>.

The indices in this section have been developed by Fabio Angiolillo and Felix Wiebrecht.

The following applies to all indices in this section:

- These indices are only computed for election-years, as identified by V-Party. They are not calculated for non-election years as the aggregation equation relies on political parties' institutional positions which can change across the legislature.
- The codehigh and codelow versions of the indices are derived by simply using the corresponding versions from each component. This propagates the uncertainty measurement from the component variables to the indices.
- All country-election-year components used for the party systems indices are weighted by the seat shares for each political party within a given party system (v2passeatshare). In the equations for each index, the weights are denoted by *ws* and are indexed by *gp* for government parties, *op* for opposition parties, and *t* for election-year. These components are weighted in order to adjust for the size of each party in influencing the party system.

### 6.0.0.1 Opposition Parties' Democracy Index (v2xpas\_democracy\_opposition)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xpas\_democracy\_opposition

*Original tag:* v2xpas\_democracy\_opposition

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Angiolillo et al. (2023)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Fabio Angiolillo

QUESTION: To what extent do the parties in the opposition show commitment to democratic norms prior to elections?

CLARIFICATION: The Opposition Parties' Democracy Index (OPDI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with more authoritarian opposition parties and higher values with more democratic opposition parties. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we recommend caution in using it for years where the country does not have a general election (lower house).

RESPONSES: Scale, 0-1 high to low

SOURCE(S): Angiolillo, Wiebrecht, and Lindberg (2023)

NOTES: the OPDI is a subgroup of the PSDI variable and it only captures the democratic levels for parties in the opposition. Codelow and codehigh are calculated through the same procedure, yet using anti-pluralist index codelow (v2xpa\_antiplural\_codelow) and codehigh (v2xpa\_antiplural\_codehigh) and EDI codelow (v2x\_polyarchy\_codelow) and codehigh (v2x\_polyarchy\_codehigh), respectively.

DATA RELEASE: Demscore v2

CITATION: Angiolillo, Wiebrecht, and Lindberg (2023)

AGGREGATION: the OPDI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{PSDI}_{\text{PS}} = 1 - \left[ \left( \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{v2pa\_antipluralist}_{\text{gpt}} * w_{\text{sgpt}}) + \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{v2pa\_antipluralist}_{\text{opt}} * w_{\text{sopt}}) \right) \right] \quad (1)$$

, and using only the group `quot;quot;optquot;quot;` (opposition parties).

YEARS: 1970-2019

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 6.0.0.2 Government Coalition Exclusion Index (v2xpas\_exclusion\_government)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xpas\_exclusion\_government

*Original tag:* v2xpas\_exclusion\_government

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Fabio Angiolillo

QUESTION: To what extent do parties in the governing coalition reject cultural superiority and support immigration policies and the equal participation of women in the labor market?

CLARIFICATION: The Government Coalition Exclusion Index (GCEXI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with government coalitions' more inclusive stances and higher values with government coalitions' more exclusive stances. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we recommend caution in using it for years where the country does not have a general election (lower house).

RESPONSES: Scale, -10 to 10 (high to low)

SOURCE(S): Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

NOTES: the GCEXI is a subgroup of the PSEXI variable and it only captures the aggregated positions on exclusion for parties in the government. Codelow and codehigh are calculated through the same procedure, yet using party exclusion index codelow (party\_exclusion\_index\_codelow) and codehigh (party\_exclusion\_index\_codehigh), respectively.

DATA RELEASE: Demscore v2

CITATION: Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

AGGREGATION: the GCEXI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{PSEXI}_{\text{PS}} = \left( \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{party\_exclusion\_index}_{\text{gpt}} * w_{\text{sgpt}}) + \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{party\_exclusion\_index}_{\text{opt}} * w_{\text{sopt}}) \right) \quad (2)$$

, and using only the group `quot;gptquot;` (government parties).

YEARS: 1970-2019

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 6.0.0.3 Opposition Parties' Exclusion Index (v2xpas\_exclusion\_opposition)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xpas\_exclusion\_opposition

*Original tag:* v2xpas\_exclusion\_opposition



*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Fabio Angiolillo

QUESTION: To what extent do opposition parties reject cultural superiority and support immigration policies and the equal participation of women in the labor market?

CLARIFICATION: The Opposition Parties' Exclusion Index (OPEXI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with more inclusive opposition parties and higher values with opposition parties advocating for more exclusion. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we recommend caution in using it for years where the country does not have a general election (lower house).

RESPONSES: Scale, -10 to 10 (high to low)

SOURCE(S): Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

NOTES: the OPEXI is a subgroup of the PSEXI variable and it only captures the aggregated exclusion positions for parties in the opposition. Codelow and codehigh are calculated through the same procedure, yet using the party exclusion index codelow (party\_exclusion\_index\_codelow) and codehigh (party\_exclusion\_index\_codehigh), respectively.

DATA RELEASE: Demscore v2

CITATION: Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

AGGREGATION: the OPREI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{PSEXI}_{\text{PS}} = 1 - \left[ \left( \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{party\_exclusion\_index}_{\text{gpt}} * w_{\text{sgpt}}) + \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{party\_exclusion\_index}_{\text{opt}} * w_{\text{sopt}}) \right) \right] \quad (3)$$

, and using only the group `opt` (opposition parties).

YEARS: 1970-2019

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.0.0.4 Party-System Exclusion Index (v2xpas\_exclusion)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xpas\_exclusion

*Original tag:* v2xpas\_exclusion

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Fabio Angiolillo

QUESTION: To what extent does the party system reject cultural superiority and support immigration policies and the equal participation of women in the labor market?

CLARIFICATION: The Party-System Exclusion Index (PSEXI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with more inclusive party systems and higher values with more exclusive party systems. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we recommend caution in using it for years where the country does not have a general election (lower house).

RESPONSES: Scale, 0-1 low to high

SOURCE(S): Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

NOTES: the PSEXI is calculated by first creating a measure of political parties' exclusion

preferences using the following equation:

$$\text{party\_exclusion\_index}_{\text{PS}} = 2 * (v2paculsup) + 0.5 * (v2paimmig + v2pawomlab) \quad (4)$$

Then, the PSEXI is computed by using another V-Party indicator on political parties' seat shares ( $v2paseatshare$ ), which function is to weight the index. We also divide between parties in the government ( $v2pagovsup = 0, 1$ , or  $2$ ) or in the opposition ( $v2pagovsup = 3$ ). Codelow and codehigh are calculated through the same procedure, yet using religious principle codelow ( $\text{party\_exclusion\_index\_codelow}$ ) and codehigh ( $\text{party\_exclusion\_index\_codehigh}$ ), respectively.

DATA RELEASE: Demscore v2

CITATION: Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

AGGREGATION: The PSEXI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{PSLRI}_{\text{PS}} = 1 - \left[ \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{party\_exclusion\_index}_{\text{gpt}} * w_{\text{sgpt}}) + \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{party\_exclusion\_index}_{\text{opt}} * w_{\text{sopt}}) \right] \quad (5)$$

, the PSEXI is calculated by first creating a measure of political parties' exclusion preferences using the following equation:

$$\text{party\_exclusion\_index}_{\text{PS}} = 2 * (v2paculsup) + 0.5 * (v2paimmig + v2pawomlab) \quad (6)$$

Then, the PSEXI is computed by using another V-Party indicator on political parties' seat shares ( $v2paseatshare$ ), which function is to weight the index. We also divide between parties in the government ( $v2pagovsup = 0, 1$ , or  $2$ ) or in the opposition ( $v2pagovsup = 3$ ).

YEARS: 1970-2019

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.0.0.5 Opposition Parties' Religion Index ( $v2xpas\_religion\_opposition$ )

*Long tag:*  $vdem\_cy\_v2xpas\_religion\_opposition$

*Original tag:*  $v2xpas\_religion\_opposition$

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Fabio Angiolillo

QUESTION: Where are opposition parties located on their overall ideological stance on economic issues?

CLARIFICATION: The Opposition Parties' Left-Right Index (OPLRI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with more left-leaning opposition parties and higher values with more right-leaning opposition parties. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we recommend caution in using it for years where the country does not have a general election (lower house).

RESPONSES: Scale, -4 to 4 (far-left to far-right)

SOURCE(S): Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

NOTES: the OPLRI is a subgroup of the PSLRI variable and it only captures the aggregated economic position levels for parties in the opposition. Codelow and codehigh are calculated through the same procedure, yet using economic left-right scale indicator codelow ( $v2pariglef\_codelow$ ) and codehigh ( $v2pariglef\_codehigh$ ), respectively.

DATA RELEASE: Demscore v2

CITATION: Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

AGGREGATION: the OPREI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{PSLRI}_{\text{PS}} = \left( \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{v2pariglef}_{\text{gpt}} * ws_{\text{gpt}}) + \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{v2pariglef}_{\text{opt}} * ws_{\text{opt}}) \right) \quad (7)$$

, and using only the group `opt`; (opposition parties).

YEARS: 1970-2019

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: `*_codelow`, `*_codehigh`

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

SOURCE(S): Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.0.0.6 Government Coalition Religion Index (`v2xpas_religion_government`)

*Long tag:* `vdem_cy_v2xpas_religion_government`

*Original tag:* `v2xpas_religion_government`

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Fabio Angiolillo

QUESTION: To what extent do political parties in the governing coalition invoke God, religion, or sacred/religious texts to justify their policy positions?

CLARIFICATION: The Government Coalition Religion Index (GCREI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with less religious governmental coalition and higher values with more religious governmental coalition. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we recommend caution in using it for years where the country does not have a general election (lower house).

RESPONSES:

Scale, -4 to 4 (high to low)

SOURCE(S): Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

NOTES: the GCREI is a subgroup of the PSREI variable and it only captures the religious levels for parties in the governmental coalition. `codelow` and `codehigh` are calculated through the same procedure, yet using religious principle `codelow` (`v2parelig_codelow`) and `codehigh` (`v2parelig_codehigh`), respectively.

AGGREGATION: The GCREI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{PSREI}_{\text{PS}} = 1 - \left[ \left( \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{v2parelig}_{\text{gpt}} * ws_{\text{gpt}}) + \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{v2parelig}_{\text{opt}} * ws_{\text{opt}}) \right) \right] \quad (8)$$

, and using only the group `gpt`; (government parties).

YEARS: 1970-2019

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: `*_codelow`, `*_codehigh`

DATA RELEASE: Demscore v2

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

**6.0.0.7 Opposition Parties' Left-Right Index (v2xpas\_economic\_opposition)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xpas\_economic\_opposition

*Original tag:* v2xpas\_economic\_opposition

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Fabio Angiolillo

QUESTION: Where are opposition parties located on their overall ideological stance on economic issues?

CLARIFICATION: The Opposition Parties' Left-Right Index (OPLRI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with more left-leaning opposition parties and higher values with more right-leaning opposition parties. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we recommend caution in using it for years where the country does not have a general election (lower house).

RESPONSES: Scale, -4 to 4 (far-left to far-right)

SOURCE(S): Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

NOTES: the OPLRI is a subgroup of the PSLRI variable and it only captures the aggregated economic position levels for parties in the opposition. Codelow and codehigh are calculated through the same procedure, yet using economic left-right scale indicator codelow (v2pariglef\_codelow) and codehigh (v2pariglef\_codehigh), respectively.

DATA RELEASE: Demscore v2

CITATION: Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

AGGREGATION: the OPREI is calculated using the following equation:

PSLRI<sub>PS</sub> =

$$\left( \sum_{p=1}^N (v2pariglef_{gpt} * ws_{gpt}) + \sum_{p=1}^N (v2pariglef_{opt} * ws_{opt}) \right) \quad (9)$$

, and using only the group "opt" (opposition parties).

YEARS: 1970-2019

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

SOURCE(S): Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

**6.0.0.8 Government Coalition Left-Right Index (v2xpas\_economic\_government)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xpas\_economic\_government

*Original tag:* v2xpas\_economic\_government

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Fabio Angiolillo

QUESTION: Where are parties in the governing coalition located on their overall ideological stance on economic issues?

CLARIFICATION: The Government Coalition Left-Right Index (GCLRI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with more left-leaning government coalitions and higher values with more right-leaning government coalitions. As this index is calculated for

country-election-year, we recommend caution in using it for years where the country does not have a general election (lower house).

RESPONSES: Scale, -4 to 4 (far-left to far-right)

SOURCE(S): Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

NOTES: the GCLRI is a subgroup of the PSLRI variable and it only captures the aggregated economic position levels for parties in the government. Codelow and codehigh are calculated through the same procedure, yet using economic left-right scale indicator codelow (v2pariglef\_codelow) and codehigh (v2pariglef\_codehigh), respectively.

DATA RELEASE: Demscore v2

CITATION: Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

AGGREGATION: the GCLRI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{PSLRI}_{\text{PS}} = \left( \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{v2pariglef}_{\text{gpt}} * w_{s_{\text{gpt}}}) + \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{v2pariglef}_{\text{opt}} * w_{s_{\text{opt}}}) \right) \quad (10)$$

, and using only the group `quot;quot;gptquot;quot;` (government parties).

YEARS: 1970-2019

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.0.0.9 Party-System Left-Right Index (v2xpas\_economic)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xpas\_economic

*Original tag:* v2xpas\_economic

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Fabio Angiolillo

QUESTION: Where are parties in the party system located on their overall ideological stance on economic issues?

CLARIFICATION: The Party-System Left-Right Index (PSLRI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with more left-leaning party systems and higher values with more right-leaning party systems. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we recommend caution in using it for years where the country does not have a general election (lower house).

RESPONSES:

Scale, 0-1 low to high

SOURCE(S): Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

NOTES: the PSLRI is calculated by using two V-Party indicators: the economic left-right scale indicator for each political party in the party system (v2pariglef) and weighting political parties by their seat shares (v2paseatshare). We also divide between parties in the government (v2pagovsup = 0,1, or 2) or in the opposition (v2pagovsup = 3). Codelow and codehigh are calculated through the same procedure, yet using religious principle codelow (v2pariglef\_codelow) and codehigh (v2pariglef\_codehigh), respectively.

DATA RELEASE: Demscore v2

CITATION: Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

AGGREGATION: the PSREI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{PSLRI}_{\text{PS}} = \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{v2pariglef}_{\text{gpt}} * w_{s_{\text{gpt}}}) + \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{v2pariglef}_{\text{opt}} * w_{s_{\text{opt}}}) \quad (11)$$

, PSLRI uses two V-Party variables: the economic left-right scale indicator for each political party in the party system (v2pariglef) and weighting political parties by their seat shares (v2paseatshare). We also divide between parties in the government (v2pagovsup = 0,1, or 2)

or in the opposition ( $v2pagovsup = 3$ ).  
 YEARS: 1970-2019  
 ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh  
 DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.0.0.10 Party-System Religion Index ( $v2xpas\_religion$ )

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xpas\_religion

*Original tag:* v2xpas\_religion

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Fabio Angiolillo

QUESTION: To what extent do political parties in the party system invoke God, religion, or sacred/religious texts to justify their policy positions?

CLARIFICATION: The Party-System Religion Index (PSDI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with less religious party systems and higher values with more religious party systems. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we recommend caution in using it for years where the country does not have a general election (lower house).

RESPONSES: Scale, 0-1 low to high

SOURCE(S): Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

NOTES: the PSREI is calculated by using two V-Party indicators: the religious principle indicator for each political party in the party system ( $v2parelig$ ) and weighting political parties by their seat shares ( $v2paseatshare$ ). We also divide between parties in the government ( $v2pagovsup = 0,1$ , or  $2$ ) or in the opposition ( $v2pagovsup = 3$ ). Codelow and codehigh are calculated through the same procedure, yet using religious principle codelow ( $v2parelig\_codelow$ ) and codehigh ( $v2parelig\_codehigh$ ), respectively.

DATA RELEASE: Demscore v2

CITATION: Angiolillo and Wiebrecht (2023)

AGGREGATION: the PSREI is calculated using the following equation:

$$PSREI_{PS} = 1 - \left[ \sum_{p=1}^N (v2parelig_{gpt} * ws_{gpt}) + \sum_{p=1}^N (v2parelig_{opt} * ws_{opt}) \right] \quad (12)$$

, PSREI uses two V-Party variables: the religious principle indicator for each political party in the party system ( $v2parelig$ ) and weighting political parties by their seat shares ( $v2paseatshare$ ). We also divide between parties in the government ( $v2pagovsup = 0,1$ , or  $2$ ) or in the opposition ( $v2pagovsup = 3$ ).

YEARS: 1970-2019

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.0.0.11 Government Coalition Democracy Index ( $v2xpas\_democracy\_government$ )

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xpas\_democracy\_government

*Original tag:* v2xpas\_democracy\_government

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Angiolillo et al. (2023)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Fabio Angiolillo

QUESTION: To what extent do the parties in the government show commitment to

democratic norms prior to elections?

CLARIFICATION: The Government Coalition Democracy Index (GCDI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with more authoritarian governmental coalition and higher values with more democratic governmental coalition. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we recommend caution in using it for years where the country does not have a general election (lower house).

RESPONSES: Scale, 0-1 high to low

SOURCE(S): Angiolillo, Wiebrecht, and Lindberg (2023)

NOTES: the GCDI is a subgroup of the PSDI variable and it only captures the democratic levels for parties in the governmental coalition. Codelow and codehigh are calculated through the same procedure, yet using anti-pluralist index codelow (v2xpa\_antiplural\_codelow) and codehigh (v2xpa\_antiplural\_codehigh) and EDI codelow (v2x\_polyarchy\_codelow) and codehigh (v2x\_polyarchy\_codehigh), respectively.

DATA RELEASE: Demscore v2

CITATION: Angiolillo, Wiebrecht, and Lindberg (2023)

AGGREGATION: the GCDI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{PSDI}_{\text{PS}} = 1 - \left[ \left( \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{v2pa\_antipluralist}_{\text{gpt}} * w_{\text{sgpt}}) + \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{v2pa\_antipluralist}_{\text{opt}} * w_{\text{sopt}}) \right) \right] \quad (13)$$

, and using only the group `gpt` (government parties).

YEARS: 1970-2019

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.0.0.12 Party-System Democracy Index (v2xpas\_democracy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xpas\_democracy

*Original tag:* v2xpas\_democracy

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Angiolillo et al. (2023)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Fabio Angiolillo

QUESTION: To what extent does the party system show commitment to democratic norms prior to elections?

CLARIFICATION: The Party-System Democracy Index (PSDI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with more authoritarian party systems and higher values with more democratic party systems. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we recommend caution in using it for years where the country does not have a general election (lower house).

RESPONSES: Scale, 0-1 low to high

SOURCE(S): Angiolillo, Wiebrecht, and Lindberg (2023)

NOTES: the PSDI is calculated by using two V-Party variables: the anti-pluralist index for each political party in the party system (v2xpa\_antiplural) and weighting political parties by their seat shares (v2paseatshare). We also divide between parties in the government (v2pagovsup = 0,1, or 2) or in the opposition (v2pagovsup = 3). We replace any missing values for a non-existent opposition with a value equal to 0 if the regime scores lower than 0.5 in the electoral democracy index (v2x\_polyarchy). This approach assigns a 0 to the opposition only if the opposition has a missing value and, therefore, does not apply to hegemonic or competitive authoritarian regimes that allow opposition parties. The threshold

on the democracy score is important since in some cases formation of the executive is delayed, or parties are not able to reach a governmental coalition also resulting in missing values for the opposition. Codelow and codehigh are calculated through the same procedure, yet using anti-pluralist index codelow (v2xpa\_antiplural\_codelow) and codehigh (v2xpa\_antiplural\_codehigh) and EDI codelow (v2x\_polyarchy\_codelow) and codehigh (v2x\_polyarchy\_codehigh), respectively.

DATA RELEASE: Demscore v2

CITATION: Angiolillo, Wiebrecht, and Lindberg (2023)

AGGREGATION: the PSDI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{PSDI}_{\text{PS}} = 1 - \left[ \left( \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{v2pa\_antipluralist}_{\text{gpt}} * w_{\text{sgpt}}) + \sum_{p=1}^N (\text{v2pa\_antipluralist}_{\text{opt}} * w_{\text{sopt}}) \right) \right] \quad (14)$$

, PSDI uses two V-Party variables: the anti-pluralist index for each political party in the party system (v2xpa\_antiplural) and weighting political parties by their seat shares (v2paseatshare). We also divide between parties in the government (v2pagovsup = 0,1, or 2) or in the opposition (v2pagovsup = 3). We replace any missing values for a non-existent opposition with a value equal to 0 if the regime scores lower than 0.5 in the electoral democracy index (v2x\_polyarchy). This approach assigns a 0 to the opposition only if the opposition has a missing value and, therefore, does not apply to hegemonic or competitive authoritarian regimes that allow opposition parties. The threshold on the democracy score is important since in some cases formation of the executive is delayed, or parties are not able to reach a governmental coalition also resulting in missing values for the opposition.

YEARS: 1970-2019

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

## 6.1 V-Dem V-Party v2

**Dataset tag:** vdem\_vparty

**Output Unit:** V-Dem Party-Country-Year, i.e., data is collected per party, country and year.

**Description:** The V-Party dataset includes global data on Political Parties.

**Dataset citation:** Staffan I. Lindberg, Nils Düpont, Masaaki Higashijima, Yaman Berker Kavasoglu, Kyle L. Marquardt, Michael Bernhard, Holger Döring, Allen Hicken, Melis Laebens, Juraj Medzihorsky, Anja Neundorf, Ora John Reuter, Saskia Ruth-Lovell, Keith R. Weghorst, Nina Wiese-homeier, Joseph Wright, Nazifa Alizada, Paul Bederke, Lisa Gastaldi, Sandra Grahn, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Johannes von Römer, Steven Wilson, Daniel Pemstein, and Brigitte Seim. 2022. "Codebook Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party) V2". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vpartydsv2>

and:

Lindberg, Staffan I., Nils Düpont, Masaaki Higashijima, Yaman Berker Kavasoglu, Kyle L. Marquardt, Michael Bernhard, Holger Döring, Allen Hicken, Melis Laebens, Juraj Medzihorsky, Anja Neundorf, Ora John Reuter, Saskia Ruth-Lovell, Keith R. Weghorst, Nina Wiesehomeier, Joseph Wright, Nazifa Alizada, Paul Bederke, Lisa Gastaldi, Sandra Grahn, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Johannes von Römer, Steven Wilson, Daniel Pemstein, and Brigitte Seim. "Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party) Dataset V2." Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vpartydsv2>.



and:

Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle. L. Marquardt, Eitan Tselgov, Yi-ting Wang, Juraj Medzihorsky, Joshua Krusell, Farhad Miri, and Johannes von Römer. 2020. “The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data”. V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 5th edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute

***Link to original codebook***

[https://v-dem.net/documents/6/vparty\\_codebook\\_v2.pdf](https://v-dem.net/documents/6/vparty_codebook_v2.pdf)

***License:*** CC-BY-SA 4.0 International

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode>

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page:  
<https://www.v-dem.net/vpartyds.html>

### 6.1.1 Identifier Variables

This section lists the identifier variables in the V-Dem V-Party Dataset

#### 6.1.1.1 Party name, English (v2paenname)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paenname

*Original tag:* v2paenname

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Döring & Regel (2019), Bederke et al. (2021)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Harmonized English name.

CLARIFICATION: The most common English name for this party in political science datasets as recorded in Party Facts’ core parties (Döring and Regel 2019).

RESPONSES:

Text

SOURCE(S): Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke 2021). For a full list of names used by a wide range of academic sources for the party in question see <https://partyfacts.herokuapp.com/data/partycodes/>.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

#### 6.1.1.2 Party name, Original (v2paorname)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paorname

*Original tag:* v2paorname

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Döring & Regel (2019), Bederke et al. (2021), For a full list of names used by a wide range of academic sources for the party in question see <https://partyfacts.herokuapp.com/data/partycodes/>

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Harmonized original party name

CLARIFICATION: The most common original name for this party in political science datasets as recorded in Party Facts’ core parties (Döring and Regel 2019).

RESPONSES:

Text

SOURCE(S): Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke 2021). For a full list of names used by a wide range of academic sources for the party in question see

<https://partyfacts.herokuapp.com/data/partycodes/>.  
DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

#### 6.1.1.3 Party short name (v2pashname)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pashname

*Original tag:* v2pashname

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Döring & Regel (2019), Bederke et al. (2021), For a full list of names used by a wide range of academic sources for the party in question see <https://partyfacts.herokuapp.com/data/partycodes/>

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Harmonized short name

CLARIFICATION: Harmonized short name.

RESPONSES:

Text

SOURCE(S): Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke 2021). For a full list of names used by a wide range of academic sources for the party in question see <https://partyfacts.herokuapp.com/data/partycodes/>.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

#### 6.1.1.4 Numeric party identifier (v2paid)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paid

*Original tag:* v2paid

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Döring & Regel (2019), Bederke et al. (2021), For a full list of names used by a wide range of academic sources for the party in question see <https://partyfacts.herokuapp.com/data/partycodes/>

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Unique identifier for each party.

CLARIFICATION: Unique, numeric identifier for each party as recorded in Party Facts' core parties dataset (Döring and Regel 2019). In case a party changed names of scholars, sources, etc. used (slightly) different names when referring to this entity.)

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SOURCE(S): Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke 2021). For a full list of names used by a wide range of academic sources for the party in question see <https://partyfacts.herokuapp.com/data/partycodes/>.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

#### 6.1.1.5 Party Facts ID (A) (pf\_party\_id)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_pf\_party\_id

*Original tag:* pf\_party\_id

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Döring & Regel (2019), Bederke et al. (2021)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: Party Facts ID

SCALE: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke 2021).

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

#### **6.1.1.6 Start and end year of gap in party coding (A) (party\_gaps)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_party\_gaps

*Original tag:* party\_gaps

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: The starting and ending year in which the party was out of national legislature.

CLARIFICATION: The default format is YYYY–YYYY. Several time spans can be listed in this manner and are separated by comma. The starting year indicates the first year after the available election year for a party. The ending gap year is specified as the last year before available election for the party in question.

RESPONSES:

Text

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

#### **6.1.1.7 Party Facts URL (A) (pf\_url)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_pf\_url

*Original tag:* pf\_url

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Döring & Regel (2019), Bederke et al. (2021)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

QUESTION: URL to party's webpage at Party Facts website

SCALE: Text

SOURCE(S): Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke 2021).

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

#### **6.1.1.8 Gap index (A) (gap\_index)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_gap\_index

*Original tag:* gap\_index

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

CLARIFICATION: Indication that party was not present in national legislature.

RESPONSES: Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 2.

#### **6.1.1.9 CHES Party Code (E) (ches\_id)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ches\_id

*Original tag:* CHES\_ID

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Bakker et al. (2015), Polk et al. (2017), Bakker et al. (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Unique identifier for each party from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES).

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SOURCE(S): Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)  
DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
CITATION: Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

#### 6.1.1.10 GPS Party Code (E) (gps\_id)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_gps\_id

*Original tag:* GPS\_ID

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg *et al.* (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Norris (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Unique numeric code for each party in the Global Party Survey (GPS) dataset.

RESPONSES: Numeric

SOURCE(S): Norris (2020).

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CITATION: Norris (2020).

#### 6.1.2 Indices

This section lists variables related to indices.

##### 6.1.2.1 Anti-Pluralism Index (D) (v2xpa\_antiplural)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2xpa\_antiplural

*Original tag:* v2xpa\_antiplural

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg *et al.* (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

QUESTION: To what extent does the party show a lacking commitment to democratic norms prior to elections?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

SOURCE(S): v2paopresp v2paplur v2paminor v2paviol

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is computed as a transformed weighted average of the input variables using the following formula:

$$v2xpa\_antiplural_i = 1 - \Phi \left( \frac{0.5 * v2paopresp_i + 2 * v2paplur_i + v2paminor_i + v2paviol_i}{4.5} \right),$$

where  $i$  indexes observations and  $\Phi$  is the standard normal cumulative density function.

For each observation, the posterior distribution of the index is obtained by computing the value of the index for each draw from the posterior distributions of v2paopresp<sub>*i*</sub>, v2paplur<sub>*i*</sub>, v2paminor<sub>*i*</sub> and v2paviol<sub>*i*</sub>, and then summarized.

##### 6.1.2.2 Populism Index (D) (v2xpa\_popul)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2xpa\_popul

*Original tag:* v2xpa\_popul

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg *et al.* (2022b)

*Variable citation:* v2paanteli v2papeople

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

QUESTION: To what extent do representatives of the party use populist rhetoric (narrowly defined)?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

SOURCE(S): v2paanteli v2papeople

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

AGGREGATION: The index is computed as the harmonic mean of rescaled v2paanteli\_osp and v2papeople\_osp posterior distributions, using the following formula:

$$v2xpa\_popul_i = \frac{2}{\frac{1}{x_i} + \frac{1}{y_i}},$$

where  $i$  indexes each observation,

$$x_i = \frac{1}{4}v2paanteli\_osp_i,$$

and

$$y_i = \frac{1}{4}v2papeople\_osp_i.$$

For each observation, the posterior distribution of the index is obtained by computing the value of the index for each draw from the posterior distributions of v2paanteli\_osp<sub>*i*</sub> and v2papeople\_osp<sub>*i*</sub>, and then summarized.

### 6.1.3 Party Basics

This section lists variables related to basic party information.

#### 6.1.3.1 Seat share (v2paseatshare)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paseatshare

*Original tag:* v2paseatshare

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Döring & Düpont (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

QUESTION: Seat share the party gained in the election to the lower chamber.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SOURCE(S): Döring and Düpont (2020).

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.3.2 Seat number (v2panumbseat)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2panumbseat

*Original tag:* v2panumbseat

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Döring & Düpont (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

QUESTION: Number of seats the party gained in the election to the lower chamber.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SOURCE(S): Döring and Düpont (2020).

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 6.1.3.3 Seats total (v2patotalseat)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2patotalseat

*Original tag:* v2patotalseat

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Döring & Düpont (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

QUESTION: Total number of seats in the lower chamber.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SOURCE(S): Döring and Düpont (2020).

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 6.1.3.4 Vote share (v2pavote)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pavote

*Original tag:* v2pavote

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Döring & Düpont (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

QUESTION: Vote share the party gained in the election to the lower chamber.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SOURCE(S): Döring and Düpont (2020).

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 6.1.3.5 Temporary pre-electoral alliance (v2paallian)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paallian

*Original tag:* v2paallian

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Döring & Düpont (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

QUESTION: Was the party part of a temporary pre-electoral alliance in this national election or is the entity actually an alliance?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes, party was part of an alliance.

2: Yes, entity is an alliance of two or more parties.

SOURCE(S): Döring and Düpont (2020).

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

### 6.1.3.6 Name of temporary pre-electoral alliance (v2panaallian)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2panaallian

*Original tag:* v2panaallian

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

QUESTION: If the party was part of a temporary pre-electoral temporary alliance, what was the name of that alliance?

RESPONSES:

Text

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2paallian is 0.

#### 6.1.3.7 Vote share of temporary pre-electoral alliance (v2pavallian)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pavallian

*Original tag:* v2pavallian

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

QUESTION: If the party was part of a temporary pre-electoral temporary alliance, what was the vote share of the alliance?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2paallian is 0.

#### 6.1.3.8 Seats of temporary pre-electoral alliance (v2panoallian)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2panoallian

*Original tag:* v2panoallian

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

QUESTION: If the party was part of a temporary pre-electoral temporary alliance, how many seats did the alliance gain?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

CLEANING: Set to missing where v2paallian is 0.

#### 6.1.3.9 Party continuation (v2paelcont)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paelcont

*Original tag:* v2paelcont

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Did the party participate in the previous election under its current name?

CLARIFICATION: This question concerns the election prior to the one you are coding. If you choose option 2, please provide the previous party name in the comments field.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, party participated in the previous election under the same name.

1: No, party did not participate in the previous election.

2: No, but the party participated in the previous election under a different name.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.3.10 Party continuation (C) (v2paelcont\_nr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paelcont\_nr

*Original tag:* v2paelcont\_nr

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Did the party participate in the previous election under its current name?

RESPONSES: 0: Yes, party participated in the previous election under the same name.

1: No, party did not participate in the previous election.

2: No, but the party participated in the previous election under a different name.

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.3.11 Government support (v2pagovsup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pagovsup

*Original tag:* v2pagovsup

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A,C

QUESTION: Does this party support the government formed immediately after this election?

CLARIFICATION: This question refers to the initial support, by the party, of the first government formed based on this election. It does not include caretaker cabinets that are in office until the first cabinet forms.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes, as senior partner. The Head of Government belongs to this party.

1: Yes, as junior partner. The Head of Government does not belong to this party, but one or more cabinet ministers do.

2: Yes, but the party is not officially represented in government.

3: No, party is in opposition to the government.

4: Not applicable. No government took office based on this election (yet).

NOTES: The data collected using expert survey and aggregated by mode was cross-checked by a research assistant.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mode

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.3.12 Pariah Party (v2papariah)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2papariah

*Original tag:* v2papariah

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In the years before this election, to what extent have other parties distanced themselves from this party?

RESPONSES:

0: Entirely. All other parties are unwilling to accept formal or informal parliamentary



support from this party (e.g. joint legislative initiative; toleration).

1: To a great extent. One or more parties has accepted informal parliamentary support from this party (e.g. joint legislative initiative; toleration) or has signaled that it would be willing to do so. No party is willing to accept formal support from this party.

2: To some extent. One or more parties has accepted formal parliamentary support from this party (e.g. formed a coalition) or has signaled that it would be willing to do so. Most other parties are not willing to accept informal support from this party (e.g. joint legislative initiative; toleration).

3: Not at all. One or more parties has accepted formal parliamentary support from this party (e.g. coalition) or has signaled that it would be willing to do so. Most other parties are willing to accept informal support from this party (e.g. joint legislative initiative; toleration).

NOTES: We show the following question for coding only for election years during which more than two parties won a substantial seat share (more than 5percent) in the election.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.4 Party Identity

This section lists variables related to party identity and ideology.

##### 6.1.4.1 Anti-elitism (v2paanteli)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paanteli

*Original tag:* v2paanteli

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How important is anti-elite rhetoric for this party?

CLARIFICATION: Elites are relatively small groups that have a greater say in society than others, for instance due to their political power, wealth or societal standing. The specific groups considered to be the elite may vary by country and even from party to party within the same country as do the terms used to describe them. In some cases, “elites” can also refer to an international elite.

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all important. The leadership of this party never makes statements against the elite.

1: Not important. The leadership of this party rarely makes statements against the elite.

2: Somewhat important. The leadership of this party sometimes makes statements against the elite.

3: Important. The leadership of this party often makes statements against the elite.

4: Very important. The leadership of this party makes statements against the elite whenever possible.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

##### 6.1.4.2 People-centrism (v2papeople)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2papeople

*Original tag:* v2papeople

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do leaders of this party glorify the ordinary people and identify themselves as part of them?

CLARIFICATION: Many parties and leaders make reference to the “people”, but only some party leaders describe the ordinary people specifically as a homogenous group and emphasize/claim that they are part of this group and represent it. This means that they do not acknowledge the existence of divergent interests and values in society, but rather suggest that the “people” have a unified political will which should guide all political action. Often this group is glorified and romanticized, describing an ideal-typical ordinary person/commoner, who embodies the national ideal.

RESPONSES:

0: Never. The party leadership never glorifies and identifies with the ordinary people.

1: Usually not. The party leadership generally does not glorify and identify with the ordinary people.

2: About half of the time. The party leadership sometimes glorifies and identifies with the ordinary people.

3: Usually. The party leadership generally glorifies and identifies with the ordinary people, which they claim to represent.

4: Always. The party leadership always glorifies and identifies with the ordinary people, which they claim to represent.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.4.3 Political Opponents (v2paopresp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paopresp

*Original tag:* v2paopresp

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Prior to this election, have leaders of this party used severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents?

CLARIFICATION: Severe personal attacks and demonization includes dehumanizing opponents or describing them as an existential threat or as subversive, criminal or foreign agents.

RESPONSES:

0: Always. Party leaders always used severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents

1: Usually. Party leaders usually used severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents

2: About half of the time. Party leaders sometimes used severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents.

3: Usually not. Party leaders usually did not use severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents.

4: Never. Party leaders never used severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

CLEANING: Set to missing when there are more than two answers per coder for this question for a particular date, country, and party.

#### 6.1.4.4 Political Pluralism (v2paplur)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paplur

*Original tag:* v2paplur

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Prior to this election, to what extent was the leadership of this political party clearly committed to free and fair elections with multiple parties, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association?

CLARIFICATION: Party leaders show no commitment to such principles if they openly support an autocratic form of government without elections or freedom of speech, assembly and association (e.g. theocracy; single-party rule; revolutionary regime). Party leaders show a full commitment to key democratic principles if they unambiguously support freedom of speech, media, assembly and association and pledge to accept defeat in free and fair elections.

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all committed. The party leadership was not at all committed to free and fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.

1: Not committed. The party leadership was not committed to free and fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.

2: Weakly committed. The party leadership was weakly committed to free and fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.

3: Committed. The party leadership was committed to free and fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.

4: Fully committed. The party leadership was fully committed to free and fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.4.5 Minority Rights (v2paminor)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paminor

*Original tag:* v2paminor

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: According to the leadership of this party, how often should the will of the majority be implemented even if doing so would violate the rights of minorities?

CLARIFICATION: This concerns the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which apply to everyone “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” The declaration protects - among others - freedom of speech, property, religion, peaceful assembly and association.

RESPONSES:

0: Always. The leadership of this party argues that the will of the majority should always determine policy even if such policy violates minority rights.

1: Usually. The leadership of this party argues that the will of the majority should usually determine policy even if such policy violates minority rights.

2: Half of the time. The leadership of this party argues that the will of the majority should about half of the time determine policy even if such policy violate minority rights.

3: Usually not. The leadership of this party argues that the will of the majority should

usually not determine policy if such policy violates minority rights.

4: Never. The leadership of this party argues that the will of the majority should never determine policy if such policy violates minority rights.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.4.6 Rejection of Political Violence (v2paviol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paviol

*Original tag:* v2paviol

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the leadership of this party explicitly discourage the use of violence against domestic political opponents?

CLARIFICATION: “Domestic political opponents” refers to all political opponents, with the exception of those who are engaged in an armed conflict with the state. They may be other political parties or other political groups and movements.

RESPONSES:

0: Encourages. Leaders of this party often encourage the use of violence against domestic political opponents.

1: Sometimes encourages. Leaders of this party sometimes encourage the use of violence against domestic political opponents and generally refrain from discouraging it.

2: Discourages about half of the time. Leaders of this party occasionally discourage the use of violence against domestic political opponents, and do not encourage it.

3: Generally discourages. Leaders of this party often discourage the use of violence against its domestic political opponents.

4: Consistently discourages. Leaders of this party consistently reject the use of violence against its domestic political opponents.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.4.7 Immigration (v2paimmig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paimmig

*Original tag:* v2paimmig

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What is the party’s position regarding immigration into the country?

CLARIFICATION: Immigration refers to individuals entering the country for an indefinite, long-term or permanent period of time.

RESPONSES:

0: Strongly opposes. This party strongly opposes all or almost all forms of immigration into the country.

1: Opposes. This party opposes most forms of immigration into the country.

2: Ambiguous/No position. This party has no clear policy with regard to immigration into the country.

3: Supports. This party supports most forms of immigration into the country.

4: Strongly supports. This party strongly supports all or almost all forms of immigration into

the country.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.4.8 LGBT Social Equality (v2palgbt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2palgbt

*Original tag:* v2palgbt

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What is this party's position toward social equality for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community?

RESPONSES:

0: Strongly opposes. This party is strongly opposed to LGBT social equality.

1: Opposes. This party is opposed to LGBT social equality.

2: Ambiguous/No position. This party has no clear policy with regard to LGBT social equality.

3: Supports. This party supports LGBT social equality.

4: Strongly supports. This party strongly supports LGBT social equality.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.4.9 Cultural Superiority (v2paculsup)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paculsup

*Original tag:* v2paculsup

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the party leadership promote the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole?

CLARIFICATION: This question refers to key non-economic cleavages in society, which could, for example, be based on caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. This question further refers to cultural issues related to the national history and identity of a country. This question does not pertain to social groups based on gender or sexual orientation.

RESPONSES:

0: Strongly promotes. The party strongly promotes the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole.

1: Promotes. The party promotes the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole.

2: Ambiguous. The party does not take a specific position on the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole.

3: Opposes. The party opposes the promotion of the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole.

4: Strongly opposes. The party strongly opposes the promotion of the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see

*V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.4.10 Religious Principles (v2parelig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2parelig

*Original tag:* v2parelig

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does this party invoke God, religion, or sacred/religious texts to justify its positions?

RESPONSES:

0: Always, or almost always. The party almost always invokes God, religion, or sacred/religious texts to justify its positions.

1: Often, but not always. The party often, but not always, invokes God, religion, or religious texts to justify its positions.

2: About half of the time. The party about half of the time invokes God, religion, or religious texts to justify its positions.

3: Rarely. The party rarely invokes God, religion, or religious texts to justify its positions.

4: Never. The party never invokes God, religion, or religious texts to justify its positions.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.4.11 Gender Equality (v2pagender)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pagender

*Original tag:* v2pagender

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: What is the share of women in national-level leadership positions of this political party?

CLARIFICATION: This question does NOT concern the share of women in the legislature.

RESPONSES:

0: None.

1: Small minority (about 1-15percent).

2: Medium minority (about 16-25percent).

3: Large minority (about 26-39percent).

4: Balanced (about 40percent or more).

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.4.12 Working Women (v2pawomlab)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pawomlab

*Original tag:* v2pawomlab

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does this party support the equal participation of women in the labor market?

CLARIFICATION: Measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market include - but are not limited to - legal provisions on equal treatment and pay, parental leave and financial support for child care.

RESPONSES:

0: Strongly opposes. This party strongly opposes all or almost all types of measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.

1: Opposes. This party opposes most types of measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.

2: Ambiguous/No position. This party has no clear policy with regard to measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.

3: Supports. This party supports most types of measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.

4: Strongly supports. This party strongly supports all or almost all types of measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.4.13 Economic Left-Right Scale (v2pariglef)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pariglef

*Original tag:* v2pariglef

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Please locate the party in terms of its overall ideological stance on economic issues.

CLARIFICATION: Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. This includes higher taxes, more regulation and government spending and a more generous welfare state. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state.

RESPONSES:

0: Far-left.

1: Left.

2: Center-left.

3: Center.

4: Center-right.

5: Right.

6: Far-right.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.4.14 Welfare (v2pawelf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pawelf

*Original tag:* v2pawelf

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does the party promote means-tested or universalistic welfare policies?

RESPONSES:

0: The party does not support either type of policies and opposes any public welfare policy.

1: The party solely promotes means-tested welfare policies.

2: The party mainly promotes means-tested policies, but a significant portion (e.g. 1/4 or 1/3) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population.

3: The party roughly equally supports means-tested and universalistic welfare policies.

4: The party mainly promotes universalistic policies, but a significant portion (e.g. 1/4 or 1/3) of its policies are means-tested.

5: The party solely promotes universalistic welfare policies for all groups of the society.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.4.15 Clientelism (v2paclient)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paclient

*Original tag:* v2paclient

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do the party and its candidates provide targeted and excludable (clientelistic) goods and benefits - such as consumer goods, cash or preferential access to government services - in an effort to keep and gain votes?

CLARIFICATION: In some cases, parties and their candidates deliver targeted and excludable goods and benefits directly to individual voters with the explicit intention to keep or gain votes. In other cases, they rely on brokers or companies as intermediaries. In some countries, candidates promise procurement contracts or favorable regulatory decisions to companies in exchange for ensuring their workers vote for the party/candidate. Such efforts count as an instance of clientelism, if they are clearly targeted at one specific company and excludable. On the other hand, handing out of small gifts can be common in some contexts without the intention to “buy votes” but rather as courtesy or part of what all candidates do (“entry ticket”). Such activities do not count as attempts to “keep or gain votes”.

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. The party and its candidates do not provide targeted goods and benefits in order to keep and gain votes.

1: A minor extent. The party and its candidates provide targeted goods and benefits to a minor extent in order to keep and gain votes.

2: A moderate extent. The party and its candidates provide targeted goods and benefits to a moderate extent in order to keep and gain votes.

3: A large extent. The party and its candidates provide targeted goods and benefits to a sizeable extent in order to keep and gain votes.

4: As its main effort. The party and its candidates provide targeted goods and benefits to the extent that it constitutes the party’s main effort in order to keep and gain votes.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.



#### 6.1.4.16 Salience and Mobilization (v2pasalie\_nr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pasalie\_nr

*Original tag:* v2pasalie\_nr

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following issues are most relevant for the party's effort to gain and keep voters?

CLARIFICATION: Choose only the key issue(s). Though you may choose up to three issues, if only one issue is most relevant, choose only that issue. Most of these issues have been covered in this survey; if you need additional clarification as to what a category represents, you can return to the relevant question.

RESPONSES: 0: Anti-elitism. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_0]

1: People-centrism. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_1]

2: Political pluralism (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_2]

3: Minority rights (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_3]

4: Immigration (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_4]

5: LGBT social equality (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_5]

6: Cultural superiority (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_6]

7: Religious principles (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_7]

8: Gender equality (pro or contra). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_8]

9: Welfare. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_9]

10: Economic issues (including infrastructure and taxes). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_10]

11: Clientelism in order to keep or gain votes (the distribution of targeted and excludable benefits towards supporters). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_11]

12: Environmental protection. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_12]

13: Farmers' issues. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_13]

14: The leader. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_14]

15: Anti-corruption. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_15]

16: Intimidation/violence. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_16]

17: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pasalie\_17]

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates

#### 6.1.5 Party Organisation

This section lists variables related to how parties operate and are organised internally.

##### 6.1.5.1 Local Party Office (v2palocoff)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2palocoff

*Original tag:* v2palocoff

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does this party maintain permanent offices that operate outside of election campaigns at the local or municipal-level?

CLARIFICATION: By "local or municipal" we mean low level administrative divisions that are ranked below regions, provinces, or states. We refer to offices that ensure professional personal and continued interaction of the party with citizens. Permanent offices operate outside of election campaigns.

RESPONSES:

0: The party does not have permanent local offices.

- 1: The party has permanent local offices in few municipalities.
  - 2: The party has permanent local offices in some municipalities.
  - 3: The party has permanent local offices in most municipalities.
  - 4: The party has permanent local offices in all or almost all municipalities.
- DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.5.2 Local Organizational Strength (v2paactcom)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paactcom

*Original tag:* v2paactcom

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what degree are party activists and personnel permanently active in local communities?

CLARIFICATION: Please consider the degree to which party activists and personnel are active both during election and non-election periods. Party personnel refers to paid staff.

RESPONSES:

0: There is negligible permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

1: There is minor permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

2: There is noticeable permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

3: There is significant permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

4: There is widespread permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.5.3 Affiliate Organizations (v2pasoctie)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pasoctie

*Original tag:* v2pasoctie

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent does this party maintain ties to prominent social organizations?

CLARIFICATION: When evaluating the strength of ties between the party and social organizations please consider the degree to which social organizations contribute to party operations by providing material and personnel resources, propagating the party's message to its members and beyond, as well as by directly participating in the party's electoral campaign and/or mobilization efforts. Social organizations include: Religious organizations (e.g. churches, sects, charities), trade unions/syndical organizations or cooperatives, cultural and social associations (e.g. sports clubs, neighborhood associations), political associations (e.g. environmental protection) and professional and business associations. Social organizations do not include paramilitary units or militias.

RESPONSES:

0: The party does not maintain ties to any prominent social organization.

- 1: The party maintains weak ties to prominent social organizations.
  - 2: The party maintains moderate ties to prominent social organizations.
  - 3: The party maintains strong ties to prominent social organizations.
  - 4: The party controls prominent social organizations.
- DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.5.4 Candidate Nomination (v2panom)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2panom

*Original tag:* v2panom

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following options best describes the process by which the party decides on candidates for the national legislative elections?

CLARIFICATION: If nomination procedures vary across constituencies consider the most common practice.

RESPONSES:

0: The party leader unilaterally decides on which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections.

1: The national party leadership (i.e. an executive committee) collectively decides which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections.

2: Delegates of local/regional organizations decide which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections.

3: All party members decide on which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections in primaries/caucuses.

4: All registered voters decide on which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections in primaries/caucuses.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.5.5 Internal Cohesion (v2padisa)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2padisa

*Original tag:* v2padisa

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do the elites in this party display disagreement over party strategies?

CLARIFICATION: Party strategies include election campaign strategy, policy stance, distribution of party financial resources, cooperation with other parties (i.e. coalition formation), and the selection of legislative and presidential candidates as well as the party leader. Party elites are prominent and influential party members such as current and former ministers, members of parliament or the party leadership, regional and municipal leaders, and opinion leaders. They do not necessarily have to be the part of the official party leadership.

RESPONSES:

0: Party elites display almost complete disagreement over party strategies and many party elites have left the party.

- 1: Party elites display a high level of visible disagreement over party strategies and some of them have left the party.
  - 2: Party elites display some visible disagreement over party strategies, but none of them have left the party.
  - 3: Party elites display negligible visible disagreement over party strategies.
  - 4: Party elites display virtually no visible disagreement over party strategies.
- DATA RELEASE: 10-12.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.5.6 Personalization of Party (v2paid)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2paid

*Original tag:* v2paid

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent is this party a vehicle for the personal will and priorities of one individual leader?

RESPONSES:

0: The party is not focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual leader.

1: The party is occasionally focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party leader.

2: The party is somewhat focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party leader.

3: The party is mainly focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party leader.

4: The party is solely focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party leader.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.5.7 Party Resources (v2pafunds\_nr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pafunds\_nr

*Original tag:* v2pafunds\_nr

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Teorell et al. (2022)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: What were the major sources of party funds for this election campaign?

CLARIFICATION: Choose up to three most important ones. If a main source of funding for this campaign

comes from the party's assets such as properties and stocks, please code where these assets originally came from.

RESPONSES:

0: Formal state subsidies for political parties. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_0]

1: Large-scale donations from individuals. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_1]

2: Large-scale donations from companies. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_2]

3: Large-scale donations from civil society organizations (including trade unions). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_3]

4: Membership fees and small-scale supporters' donations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_4] 5:  
Informal use of state resources as incumbent party. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_5]  
6: Funds of the party leader. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_6]  
7: Funds of candidates. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pafunds\_7]  
SOURCE(S): Quality of Government Standard Dataset (2019).  
DATA RELEASE: 1-2.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean  
DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.5.8 Party Support Group (v2pagroup\_nr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_v2pagroup\_nr

*Original tag:* v2pagroup\_nr

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: To which particular group in society does the core membership and supporters of this party belong?

CLARIFICATION: Choose only the key groups. Though you may choose up to three groups, if only one

group is most relevant, please only choose that group.

RESPONSES: 0: No specific, clearly identifiable group. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_0]

1: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_1]

2: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_2]

3: Business elites. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_4]

5: An ethnic or racial group(s). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_5]

6: A religious group(s). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_6]

7: Local elites, including customary chiefs. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_7]

8: Urban working classes, including labor unions. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_8]

9: Urban middle classes. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_9]

10: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_10]

11: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_11]

12: Regional groups or separatists. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_12]

13: Women. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_13]

14: Other specific groups. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2pagroup\_14]

DATA RELEASE: 1-2.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

#### 6.1.6 Populism

This section lists variables measuring populist features of parties.

##### 6.1.6.1 Salience of anti-establishment rhetoric (E) (ep\_antielite\_salience)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_antielite\_salience

*Original tag:* ep\_antielite\_salience

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Bakker et al. (2015), Polk et al. (2017), Bakker et al. (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “Not important at all” to “Extremely important” (0–10)

SOURCE(S): Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

**6.1.6.2 Salience of reducing political corruption (E) (ep\_corrupt\_salience)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_corrupt\_salience

*Original tag:* ep\_corrupt\_salience

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg *et al.* (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the salience of reducing political corruption?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “Not important at all” to “Extremely important” (0–10)

SOURCE(S): Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

**6.1.6.3 Members vs. leadership party policy choices (E) (ep\_members\_vs\_leadership)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_members\_vs\_leadership

*Original tag:* ep\_members\_vs\_leadership

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg *et al.* (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the position on whether members/activists or leadership has control over party policy choices?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “Members/activists have complete control over party policy choices” to “Leadership had complete control over party policy choices” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

**6.1.6.4 Position on direct vs. representative democracy (E) (ep\_people\_vs\_elite)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_people\_vs\_elite

*Original tag:* ep\_people\_vs\_elite

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg *et al.* (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the position on direct vs. representative democracy?

CLARIFICATION: Some political parties take the position that “the people” should have the final say on the most important issues, for example, by voting directly in referendums. At the opposite pole are political parties that believe that elected representatives should make the

most important political decisions.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “Elected office holders should make the most important decisions” to “lt;lt;The peoplegt;gt;, not politicians, should make the most important decisions” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

NOTES: In CHES 2019 survey words “direct” and “representative democracy” are changed to “people” and “elected representatives” accordingly. For this codebook, the entry in CHES 2017 survey was used.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

#### 6.1.6.5 Populism type (E) (ep\_type\_populism)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_type\_populism

*Original tag:* ep\_type\_populism

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg *et al.* (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Norris (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: The Party Populism typology categorizes whether parties favor the use of pluralism or populist rhetoric categorized into four groups (V8\_Ord).

RESPONSES:

1: Strongly Pluralist.

2: Moderately Pluralist.

3: Moderately Populist.

4: Strongly Populist.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Norris (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Norris (2020)

#### 6.1.6.6 Populist values type (E) (ep\_type\_populist\_values)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_type\_populist\_values

*Original tag:* ep\_type\_populist\_values

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg *et al.* (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Norris (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: The Populist Values typology combines the categories of rhetoric (V8\_Bin) and the social values (B6\_Bin) for each party.

RESPONSES:

1: Pluralist–Liberal.

2: Pluralist–Conservative.

3: Populist–Liberal.

4: Populist–Conservative.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): Norris (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Norris (2020)

#### 6.1.6.7 Populist rhetoric (E) (ep\_v8\_popul\_rhetoric)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_v8\_popul\_rhetoric

*Original tag:* ep\_v8\_popul\_rhetoric

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Norris (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Where would you place each party on the following scale?

CLARIFICATION: Parties can also be classified by their current use of *populist* or *pluralist* rhetoric. *Populist* language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people should prevail. By contrast, *pluralist* rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining and compromise, as well as checks and balances on executive power.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “Strongly favors pluralist rhetoric” to “Strongly favors populist rhetoric” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Norris (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Norris (2020)

#### 6.1.6.8 Populist saliency (E) (ep\_v9\_popul\_saliency)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_v9\_popul\_saliency

*Original tag:* ep\_v9\_popul\_saliency

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Norris (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: And how *important* is populist rhetoric currently for each of the following parties? Where would you place each party on the following scale?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “No importance” to “Great importance” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Norris (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Norris (2020)

### 6.1.7 Liberal-Traditional Scaling

This section measures whether parties lean towards liberal values or traditional values.

#### 6.1.7.1 Position on democratic freedoms and rights (E) (ep\_galtan)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_galtan

*Original tag:* ep\_galtan

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Bakker et al. (2015), Polk et al. (2017), Bakker et al. (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the position of the party in a particular year in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights?

CLARIFICATION: “Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm



moral authority on social and cultural issues.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “Libertarian/Postmaterialist” to “Traditional/Authoritarian” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

NOTES: In CHES 2019 survey words “democratic freedoms” and “rights” in the wording of the question are changed to “social” and “cultural values” accordingly. The formulation of the clarification section is also nonsignificantly different in comparison with CHES 1999-2017, which is used in this codebook.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

#### 6.1.7.2 Salience of libertarian or traditional issues (E) (ep\_galtan\_salience)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_galtan\_salience

*Original tag:* ep\_galtan\_salience

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg *et al.* (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the relative salience of libertarian/traditional issues in the party’s public stance in a particular year?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “No importance” to “Great importance” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Bakker *et al.* (2015), Polk *et al.* (2017), Bakker *et al.* (2020)

#### 6.1.7.3 Social Liberalism-Conservatism (E) (ep\_v6\_lib\_cons)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_v6\_lib\_cons

*Original tag:* ep\_v6\_lib\_cons

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg *et al.* (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Norris (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Where would you place each party on the following scale?

CLARIFICATION: Parties can also be classified by their current social values. Those with *liberal* values favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with *conservative* values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “Very liberal” to “Very conservative” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Norris (2020)

NOTES: Only original score is included.

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Norris (2020)

#### 6.1.7.4 Social values saliency (E) (ep\_v7\_lib\_cons\_saliency)

*Long tag:* vdem\_vparty\_ep\_v7\_lib\_cons\_saliency

*Original tag:* ep\_v7\_lib\_cons\_saliency

*Dataset citation:* Lindberg et al. (2022b)

*Variable citation:* Norris (2020)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: And how *important* are liberal/conservative social values for each of the following parties? Where would you place each party on the following scale?

RESPONSES:

Numeric

SCALE: Interval, from “No importance” to “Great importance” (0–10).

SOURCE(S): Norris (2020)

DATA RELEASE: 10-12.

CITATION: Norris (2020)

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